C. JULIUS CÆSAR

PERPETUAL DICTATOR.

From an ancient Buſt.

148.h.12 Hast

THE

COMMENTARIES

OF

CÆSAR,

TRANSLATED into ENGLISH.

To which is prefixed a

DISCOURSE

CONCERNING

The ROMAN ART OF WAR.

By *WILLIAM DUNCAN*,
Professor of Philosophy in the UNIVERSITY of *Aberdeen*.

Illustrated with CUTS.

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M DCC LIII.

To His Royal Highness

GEORGE

PRINCE of *WALES*.

SIR,

THOUGH I am far from thinking that any Performance of mine can be intitled to the Honour of Your Royal Highness's Patronage, yet, as the following Work is a Tranſlation of the Memoirs of the greateſt General of Antiquity, I hope the Merit of the Original, and the Name of *Cæſar*, will in ſome meaſure excuſe the Preſumption of this Addreſs.

In theſe Memoirs Your Royal Highness will ſee diſplayed all that is great and moſt conſummate in the

Art

Art of War. The ableſt Commander of the moſt warlike People upon Earth entertains You with the Hiſtory of his own Campaigns. You are informed of the Motives which determined him in all his Enterpriſes, of the various Difficulties he had to encounter, and of the Steps by which in the end he was enabled to ſurmount all Oppoſition. In a word, Prudence in Counſel, Courage and Intrepidity in the Field, a calm Preſence of Mind in the midſt of Dangers, and an amazing Dexterity in ſudden and unforſeen Emergencies, are here exemplified in the Conduct of a Leader, whom all ſucceeding Ages have agreed to regard as the moſt finiſhed Pattern of military Merit.

It is the Obſervation of one of the wiſeſt of the *Roman* Hiſtorians, "that War is in a peculiar manner "the Province of a Prince; and that though civil "Accompliſhments are by no means to be neglected, "yet to the Perſon of the Sovereign more immediately "belongs the Merit and Praiſe of being a great Ge-"neral." And indeed as it is among the principal Duties of a King, to protect his Subjects from foreign Invaſions, to baffle the Attempts of ambitious and aſpiring Tyrants, and to guard againſt the Incroachments of powerful Neighbours, nothing can be more evident, than that a due Inſtitution in the Art of War ought to be conſidered as an eſſential Part of the Education of a Prince.

Some perhaps may be of opinion, that the Maxims of the preſent Age, which forbid Kings to appear in Perſon at the head of Armies, and injoin them rather to delegate their Power to others, render military Talents

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leſs neceſſary in the Rulers of Nations. But tho' this be in reality a very wiſe Policy, and excellently calculated to prevent thoſe unjuſt Wars, which have no other Foundation but the perſonal Ambition and Glory of Princes, yet does it by no means diſpenſe with the Obligation of applying to the Study of Arms. The due modelling of the Army, the introducing a proper Diſcipline among the Troops, and the Diſpoſal of military Preferments, are intirely in the Breaſt of the Sovereign; who would be but ill qualified for the Exerciſe of ſo great a Truſt, if wholly unacquainted with martial Affairs. It is likewiſe well known, that in dangerous domeſtic Seditions, to which all States are at times liable, nothing tends more to confirm the well-affected in their Duty, and to check the Machinations of the Factious, than when a King every way qualified to command, appears in Perſon at the Head of his Troops. In general Confederacies too, where many Nations unite to oppoſe ſome threatning overgrown Power, it is often impoſſible to reconcile their various Intereſts, and preſerve the Unanimity neceſſary to give Force and Vigour to their Operations, unleſs ſome Prince of diſtinguiſhed Reputation, and eminent Quality in the League, charge himſelf with the Conduct of the War, and employ his whole Authority to prevent thoſe Competitions, Jealouſies and mutual Animoſities, which are every moment ready to break out in an Army compoſed of ſo many ſeparate and divided Bodies.

Hence it is that Valour and the military Virtues have always been conſidered as Objects highly worthy the Purſuit of a Prince; nor do they ever fail to meet with

their due Share of Applauſe, unleſs where they degenerate into that hurtful Ambition, that immoderate Thirſt of Conqueſt, which prompts Men rather to be the Deſtroyers than the Protectors of Nations. As the Commentaries of *Cæſar* furniſh the beſt Leſſons and Precepts of War, ſo the Example and Hiſtory of the ſame *Cæſar* demonſtrate, that the greateſt Talents, when not directed to laudable Ends, are utterly inſufficient, either for preſent Security, or future Fame. Tho' his Abilities as a General and a Stateſman were never perhaps equalled before or ſince; yet as he employed them, not to promote the Welfare, but to diſturb the Peace of Society; not to defend, but to overturn the Liberties of his Country; he could neither eſcape the Hatred of the Age in which he lived, nor the Reproaches of Poſterity. We find him often in Diſtreſs and ſometimes in Deſpair, ready to fly his Country, threatened with being tried and condemned as a public Criminal; and at laſt, after a reſtleſs Life, full of Anxiety and Care, cut off by a violent and untimely Death, juſt as he had eſtabliſhed his Tyranny, tho' with it he could not eſtabliſh his own Happineſs. Had he employed his Authority and Addreſs to preſerve public Liberty; had he, for this glorious End, exerted his Induſtry and admirable Talents; how amiable muſt he have appeared, in what Security might he have lived, and with what Veneration would he have been regarded by all future Ages?

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS is born to govern a People, who have at all times diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their Love of Liberty; a People always obedient to juſt Laws, but impatient under Oppreſſion, and infinitely jealous of

their

their Privileges. *Tacitus* ſpeaking of them ſixteen hundred Years ago ſays, "that they chearfully complied with the "Levies of Men, with the Impoſition of Tribute, and "with all the neceſſary Demands of Government, pro-"vided they received no illegal Treatment or Inſults "from their Governors; for thoſe they bore with Impa-"tience: nor did they acknowledge any other Subjec-"tion to the *Romans*, than what conſiſted in an Obe-"dience to juſt Laws, not the Submiſſion of Slaves." Such was the Character of the *Britiſh* People at that time, ſuch has been their Character in all Ages, and ſuch it remains to this Day. Princes who obſerved the Laws always found them peaceable Subjects, and ready to comply with their juſt Demands: but when Infringements were made upon the public Liberty, they grew uneaſy and diſcontented, and the Sovereign, by graſping at too much, frequently loſt all.

Indeed it appears in our Hiſtory, that the Deſign of aſſuming an Authority independent of the Laws was never entertained by any of the beſt and ableſt of our Princes; who always eſteemed it more glorious to rule over a free People, than to command a Nation of Slaves. Among many remarkable Examples of this, that of the ever memorable *Henry the Fifth* ſeems in a particular manner deſerving of Notice. He was a wiſe and valiant Prince, who ſcorned to incroach upon the Liberties of his Subjects, and abhorred the unjuſtifiable Arts by which they had been impaired. He eſteemed their Courage, Strength, and Love, to be his greateſt Advantage, Riches, and Glory; and readily joined with them to extinguiſh the miſchievous Abuſes that had been introduced by

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ſome of his Predeceſſors. He aimed at making good his Claim to the Crown of *France*, which he knew was only to be effected by the Bravery of a free and well-ſatisfied People. Slaves will always be Cowards, and, when they dare declare themſelves, Enemies to their Maſter: by bringing his Subjects into that Condition, he muſt infallibly have ruined his own Deſigns, and made them unfit to fight either for him or for themſelves. He deſired not only that his People ſhould be free during his Time, but that his Succeſſors ſhould not be able to deprive them of ſo valuable a Bleſſing. He knew that he did not reign for himſelf but for his People, and regarding their Safety as the ſupreme Law of Government, always paſſed with the utmoſt Chearfulneſs ſuch Laws as were preſented to him in behalf of public Liberty. The Event was ſuch as might be expected. Never Prince was better obeyed and ſerved by his Subjects, more ſucceſsful and formidable abroad, more beloved at home, or more ſincerely lamented after his Death. In fine, Hiſtory no where furniſhes a more perfect Pattern of a wiſe, valiant, and virtuous King.

It has been the good Fortune of theſe Nations for ſome time paſt to be bleſt with a ſeries of ſuch Princes. The excellent Principles of Government adopted by King *William* at the Revolution have been ſteddily adhered to by his Succeſſors of your illuſtrious Houſe. Nor has the Security of domeſtic Freedom alone employed their Attention. Like that glorious Monarch they have exerted their utmoſt Influence to preſerve the Independency of the other States of *Europe*, and by a Conduct ſo truly noble merited the greateſt of all Titles, that of being *The Patrons of Public Liberty*, and *The Friends of Mankind*.

Your

DEDICATION.

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS is now at an Age when Examples of this kind make the deepeſt Impreſſion; and the early good Diſpoſitions You diſcover, joined to the excellent Inſtitution under which You have the Happineſs to be formed, give the juſteſt reaſon to believe, that they will not fail of having their due effect. The Public beholds with Pleaſure the Seeds of your many ripening Virtues, and charmed with the Proſpect of the Advantages to be reaped from their Maturity, ſeems to addreſs You in the Words of *Æneas* to his Son *Aſcanius*, a young Prince of great Expectation, in whoſe Perſon were centered the Hopes of a whole People.

------ *Te, Animo repetentem Exempla tuorum,*
Et Pater Æneas, et Avunculus excitet Hector.

That You may improve daily in every laudable and uſeful Quality, and that when by the Appointment of Providence You are called to the Exerciſe of the Government, You may long ſway the *Britiſh* Scepter with uninterrupted Proſperity, and the intire Love of your Subjects, is the ſincere and ardent Prayer of,

SIR,

Your ROYAL HIGHNES'S *moſt humble,*

moſt dutiful, and

moſt obedient Servant,

WILLIAM DUNCAN.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Tranſlation of *Cæſar*'s *Commentaries* was done from the celebrated Edition of the late Dr. *Clarke*, printed for *J. Tonſon* in 1712. All poſſible Care has been taken to render it exact, and to preſerve the Diſtinctneſs and Perſpicuity of Expreſſion for which the Original is ſo juſtly famous. The Reader will perceive, that the very Turn and Manner of *Cæſar* has been copied with the utmoſt Attention; and tho' the Succeſs may not always anſwer Expectation, yet Candor will induce him to make great Allowances, when he conſiders the inimitable Beauty of the *Latin*, and the Difficulty of expreſſing ancient Manners and Tranſactions in modern Language.

It was at firſt intended to accompany the Tranſlation with Notes, explaining what was difficult and obſcure in the *Roman* Art of War. But as a few looſe ſcattered Remarks would have contributed little towards giving the Reader a diſtinct Idea of what was neceſſary to be known on this Head, there is ſubſtituted in their Place a Diſcourſe concerning the military Cuſtoms of the Ancients, in which all that is curious and moſt intereſting relating to theſe Matters is fully and copiouſly explained. Beſides the ancient Authors; *Rollin*, *Folard*, *Orrery*, *Feuquiere*, *Machiavel*, *Monteſquieu*, and ſeveral other Moderns have been conſulted, and all ſuch Paſſages ſelected, as tended to throw Light upon this Branch of the *Roman* Antiquities. As the Author, by his Situation in Life, is neceſſarily a Stranger to the practical Part of War, he pretends not to offer any thing of his own upon the Subject. If he has collected with Care from the Writers before-mentioned, and diſpoſed the Materials they furniſh in ſuch a manner, as ſufficiently to diſplay the Proficiency and Improvements of the Ancients in military Knowledge, he has compaſſed all he intended, and the Reader will have no cauſe to complain.

The Cuts are the ſame with thoſe of Dr. *Clarke*'s Edition, excepting ſome few neceſſary Alterations, to adapt them to an *Engliſh* Tranſlation. It were doing the Work an Injury to ſuppoſe them merely ornamental. For beſides that they ſerve to illuſtrate the Antiquities, Habits, and religious Ceremonies of the ſeveral Nations mentioned in the Commentaries; if it be conſidered, that far the greater number are Plans of Battles, Sieges, and Incampments, or Repreſentations of the Situation and Face of the Countries in which the moſt material Tranſactions paſſed, their great Subſerviency towards a due Underſtanding of the Hiſtory will abundantly appear. The Poſture of two Armies ready to engage, the Nature of the Ground, and the exact Order of Battle, are ſeldom rightly comprehended from a Deſcription, tho' conceived in the moſt clear and explicite Terms. But when the whole is ſubjected to the Eye in a diſtinct and accurate Delineation of every Circumſtance, all Difficulties vaniſh, and we become in a manner Spectators of the Action.

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The ancient Names of Places are retained in the Tranſlation, as well to avoid giving too modern a Turn to the Author by a contrary Practice, as becauſe they are ſufficiently familiar to an *Engliſh* Ear, being conſtantly made uſe of by all Hiſtorians who treat of the Tranſactions of thoſe Times in our Language. But as the following Work may perhaps fall into the Hands of Perſons little acquainted with ancient Geography, and who would therefore be at a loſs in comparing *Cæſar*'s Deſcriptions with the preſent Face of the Country, the Reader will find at the End of the Book a large geographical Index, in which the ancient Names of Places, as near as can be diſcovered with any Certainty, are explained by the modern.

It may be juſt proper to mention, that beſides the Seven Books of the *Gallic* War, and the Three of the Civil, written by *Cæſar* himſelf, the Supplements of *A. Hirtius Panſa* are likewiſe inſerted in the following Tranſlation, conſiſting of one additional Book to the *Gallic* War, and three Books of the *Alexandrian*, *African* and *Spaniſh* Wars.

DISCOURSE

CONCERNING THE

ROMAN ART *of* WAR.

A LETTER OF ADVICE

CONCERNING THE

CHURCH

DISCOURSE

AN ANSWER

CONCERNING

DISCOURSE

A

DISCOURSE

CONCERNING

The ROMAN ART *of* WAR.

CHAP. I.

Of the Undertaking and Declaration of War.

I. THE *Romans*, from ſmall beginnings, and an almoſt contemptible original, roſe by degrees to be Sovereigns of the World. If we enquire into the Cauſes of this, we ſhall find, that nothing ſo much contributed to it, as the excellence of their military Diſcipline. War is a Profeſſion of the greateſt Importance to Society. The ſecurity of our Lives, Liberties, Properties, and indeed of all that is dear and valuable among Men, depends in a manner entirely upon it. Good and wholſom Laws may eſtabliſh Peace and Unity within, and, if executed with vigour, will prevent the Inroads of Vice and Corruption; but are by no means ſufficient to ſcreen a State from powerful Neighbours, or ſecure it againſt the Aſſaults of the Ambitious and Aſpiring. Hence in the moſt peaceful Times, it has ever been eſteemed a maxim of ſound Policy, to cultivate the Science of Arms with the ſame Application, as when we are threatned with War and Invaſions. For however little we may ourſelves be diſpoſed to diſturb the Tranquillity of the Nations around us, yet the Experience of all Ages makes it abundantly evident, that the moſt powerful and prevailing Argument to keep thoſe quiet, from whom we have reaſon to apprehend any danger, is by letting them ſee that we are prepared to receive them, and capable of making them repent of their raſhneſs, ſhould they unjuſtly ſeek a pretence of falling upon us. In all wiſe States therefore, the Profeſſion of a Soldier has ever been held in honour: nor do we read any Part of ancient Hiſtory with greater pleaſure, than that by which we learn, how free Nations have defended themſelves againſt the Attempts of incroaching Tyrants, and when roufed to a thorough exertion of their Strength, overthrown in the end that very Power, which once threatned

to

to cruſh them. It is not indeed to be denied, that the military Virtues of a free People, have not always been confined to Self-defence, and the avenging themſelves of their Enemies. Ambition, and a Conſciouſneſs of Superiority, have ſometimes prompted even theſe to aſpire at univerſal Dominion. This is remarkably exemplified in the Hiſtory of the *Roman* Commonwealth, from whoſe Conſtitution, and Love of Liberty, one would naturally expect a very different Spirit. Who more likely to become the great Patrons and Defenders of the common Rights and Privileges of Mankind, than a People, whoſe prevailing Paſſion was an Abhorrence of Slavery; and who, in a long ſeries of Struggles with the Nations around them, were never weary of fighting in defence of that Liberty, which is the Birthright and Inheritance of every reaſonable Creature? And yet we find, that no ſooner were they ſecure of their own Freedom, than a thirſt of Rule took poſſeſſion of their Minds, and they forcibly impoſed that Yoke upon others, which they had diſdained to ſubmit to themſelves. The Superiority of their military Diſcipline enabled them by degrees to accompliſh this unjuſt Deſign. Trained up in a continued Succeſſion of Wars, and equally attentive to their own Victories and Defeats, they were daily improving themſelves in the Art of Conqueſt, and attained at length to ſo great a maſtery in it, that no Nation was able to withſtand their Attacks. It cannot therefore but be an agreeable, as well as uſeful Inquiry, to trace out the military Cuſtoms of a People, ſo renowned for their Knowledge in the Art of War. And as it is my Deſign, to preſent the Publick with a new Tranſlation of the *Commentaries* of *Cæſar*, who was confeſſedly the greateſt General *Rome* ever produced, I imagine a Diſcouſe of this nature may be not improperly prefixed to that Work.

II. LET us then take a view of the Conduct of the *Romans*, from their firſt engaging in a War, through all the different Branches of its Management, until they at laſt bring it to a happy Period. This will naturally lead us to conſider the Ceremonies attending the Declaration of War; the Manner of levying Troops, and forming a *Roman* Army; the Precautions uſed in Marches and Encampments; their Order of Battle, Conduct in Sieges, and the Machines and other Contrivances made uſe of in the Attack and Defence of Places. Under theſe ſeveral Heads may be comprehended every thing that is material and important upon this Subject. It is not however my Deſign, to enter into Grammatical Niceties, or a minute Detail of particular Criticiſms, but only to give a general Idea of the military Cuſtoms of the *Romans*, intermixed with ſuch Remarks, as may ſerve to lay open the Wiſdom and Policy of their firſt Contrivance, and ſhow their natural Tendency to that Superiority and univerſal Dominion, which they at length procured the Commonwealth.

III. THE Ceremonies relating to the Declaration of War were inſtituted by *Numa Pompilius*, the ſecond King of *Rome*. *Romulus*, the Founder of that Colony, was, during the whole courſe of his Reign, engaged in perpetual Conteſts with his Neighbours. The Neceſſity he was under, at his firſt ſetting out, of procuring Wives for his Subjects by the Rape of the *Sabine* Virgins, exaſperated all the Nations round about, and begot no ſmall Jealouſy of the new Colony, which ſeemed to be founded on maxims of Violence and Injuſtice. We are not therefore to wonder, if this drew on him a Series of Wars, which continued almoſt without intermiſſion to the end of his Life. Thus the *Romans*, who were originally in great meaſure a Band of Fugitives and Outlaws, improving their natural Fierceneſs by having their Arms conſtantly

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in their Hands, gradually grew to be a brave and a warlike People. *Numa*, who ſucceeded *Romulus*, being a Prince of a pacific Temper, ſet himſelf to check this martial Ardor, and form them to Religion, and a Reſpect for the Gods. In order to ſtifle that impetuous deſire of War, which he found ſo prevalent among them, he eſtabliſhed certain Ceremonies, which were always to precede the commencing of Hoſtilities, and committed them to the care of a College of Heralds, called *Feciales*. The Chief or Head of this Society had the Name of *Pater Patratus:* and it was his peculiar Office, to make Peace, or denounce War. *Livy*, indeed, ſeems to conſider him as a temporary Miniſter: for, in his Account of the Treaty concluded with the *Albans*, before the triple Combat of the *Horatii* and *Curiatii*, he makes one of the *Feciales* chooſe a *Pater Patratus*, on purpoſe to perform that Ceremony. But as I have no deſign to enter into a Controverſy of this nature, little important in itſelf, and not eaſy to be decided, I ſhall content myſelf with obſerving, that the Officer here mentioned, whether conſtant or temporary, was one who had a Father and a Son both alive. Hence his Title of *Pater Patratus*, which may be interpreted to imply a more perfect kind of Father, as they ſeem to have imagined him to be, whoſe own Father was ſtill living, after he himſelf had been a Father for ſome time. Such an one, it was believed, would be an equitable and moderate Judge in Affairs of this kind, and not over forward to plunge his Country into a War, in which ſo many Lives that muſt be dear to him, would unavoidably be expoſed to hazard.

IV. AND indeed the Ceremonies themſelves, as inſtituted by *Numa*, ſeem peculiarly calculated to render the *Romans* cautious and circumſpect, in a Matter of ſo great Importance. For before they entered upon a War with any State, the College of Heralds were to commiſſion the *Pater Patratus*, to go and demand ſatisfaction in the name of the *Roman* People. Accordingly this Officer, clothed in the Habit of his Order, ſet forward for the Enemy's Country; and entering the Frontiers, proclaimed aloud the cauſe of his arrival, calling all the Gods to witneſs that he came to demand ſatisfaction, and imprecating the Divine Vengeance on himſelf and Country, if he ſaid any thing contrary to Truth. When he came to the chief City of the Enemy, he again repeated the ſame Declaration, adding freſh Oaths and Imprecations, and withal deſired ſatisfaction. If his Demands were granted, he returned immediately to *Rome*, and all thoughts of War were laid aſide. But if they required time to conſider, he gave them ten Days, and then came again to hear their Reſolution. This he did, in ſome Caſes, three times: but if after thirty Days, nothing was done towards an Accommodation, he called Gods and Men to witneſs the refuſal, and expreſly denounced, that the *Romans* would now think themſelves ſufficiently authoriſed, to take ſuch Meaſures as the Caſe required, in order to do themſelves juſtice. Upon his return to *Rome*, he repaired to the Senate, attended by the whole College of Heralds; and having there made a report of his Embaſſy, declared the legality of the War. The Affair was then debated among the Fathers: and if the majority of Voices were for War, the ſame Officer was ſent back to the Enemy's Frontiers, where in preſence of at leaſt three Perſons, he pronounced the uſual Declaration, throwing a Spear at the ſame time into their Territories, in token of defiance.

V. THESE Inſtitutions continued long in force at *Rome*, even during the times of the Commonwealth; and it muſt be owned, were admirably well

contrived to anſwer *Numa*'s great Deſign, of habituating the *Romans* to Peace, and blunting the edge of their martial Fury. For as a certain ſpace of Time was neceſſarily to intervene, between the Injury received and the commencing of Hoſtilities; this left room for Reaſon and Reflexion, and gave them an Opportunity of weighing maturely all the Conſequences of the Step they were about to take. The Imprecations too to be denounced by the Herald againſt himſelf and Country, if he advanced any thing contrary to Truth, would naturally make them very cautious in their Demands, and extremely attentive to the Equity and Juſtice of them. Add to all this, the great probability of adjuſting Matters amicably, and obtaining a reaſonable Satisfaction, which cannot by any means be expected, where the Parties fly immediately to Arms, and by mutual Acts of Hoſtility exaſperate one another. One would think, that a State under the check of ſo many Reſtraints againſt Oppreſſion, could not eaſily break out into violent or unjuſt Wars. Accordingly we find, not only the ancient Hiſtorians, but even many modern Writers of Name and Reputation, extolling the Moderation and Diſintereſtedneſs of the *Romans*; their Faith in Treaties; ſteddy adherence to their Allies; and care to have Equity on their ſide in all their Undertakings. It is however, methinks, a ſufficiently obvious Reflexion, that a People, who by degrees accompliſhed the Conqueſt of the Univerſe, and forced all Nations to ſubmit to their Dominion, muſt in many Inſtances have been the Aggreſſors. For altho' in the firſt beginnings of their State, they were perhaps often unjuſtly attacked by their Neighbours, out of Envy and Jealouſy; yet it is certain, that their Power at laſt became ſo very formidable, that no Nation was willing to enter the Liſts with them. We find them notwithſtanding ſtill puſhing on their Conqueſts, ſtill engaged in new Wars, and extending the Limits of their Empire. Now both Reaſon and Experience tell us, that in a Controverſy between States of unequal Strength, the weaker will ſubmit to many Inſults and Hardſhips, rather than draw upon themſelves a War, which they foreſee muſt end in the ſubverſion of their Liberties. And indeed if we examine narrowly into the Conduct of the *Romans*, we ſhall find, that their Reputation of Juſtice is owing rather to an exact Obſervance of certain outward Forms, and the Partiality of their Hiſtorians, than any ſteddy Adherence to the Principles of Equity. For as their Power and Dominion increaſed, and they became conſcious of their Superiority, they readily gave way to the Dictates of Ambition, and were never at a loſs in contriving ſome ground of Quarrel with thoſe Nations, whom in their Plan of univerſal Conqueſt, they had reſolved to bring next under ſubjection. But as all their Attempts of this kind were preceded by Complaints of Injuries received, pretended Grievances, and formal declarations of War; this gave a colour of Juſtice to their Undertakings, and effectually deceived the People; who, convinced that they had Equity on their ſide, followed their Generals with an aſſured Confidence, imagining themſelves under the immediate Protection of the Gods. Add to this, that the Hiſtorians, partly miſled by the ſame Notions, partly thro' a national and almoſt unavoidable Partiality, have vied with one another in extolling the Equity and Moderation of the *Romans*, and varniſhing over ſuch parts of their Behaviour, as ſeemed moſt liable to exception. The Merit of theſe Writers, and the Veneration paid them by ſucceeding Ages, have given a kind of Sanction and Authority to their Opinions. It looks like Preſumption to contradict Authors of ſo eſtabliſhed a Reputation: and being accuſtomed to admire them from our Infancy, we are eaſily led to believe, that we cannot do better than blindly give into their Sentiments. It is only upon this Principle I am able to excuſe ſome late

Writers

Writers of great Name, who in treating of the *Roman* Commonwealth, have not ſcrupled to adopt the Prejudices of the ancient Hiſtorians, and repreſent that People as Patterns of Equity and Juſtice in all their Proceedings.

VI. AS nothing is of greater importance in Hiſtory, than to form a right Judgment of Events and their Cauſes, and penetrate into the real Character of States and Nations, I ſhall take ſome pains to ſet this Matter in a true Light, and to that end ſhall lay before the Reader a ſhort view of the Tranſactions between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*. It is well known, that theſe laſt were characterized by the *Romans*, as a faithleſs and perfidious People, regardleſs of Oaths, and whom no Ties or Treaties could bind. They even went ſo far as to make *Punick Faith* ſerve only as another Expreſſion for *Inſincerity*. Who would imagine, after ſuch a repreſentation of Things, that in all the *Punick* Wars the *Romans* were the Aggreſſors; and that, in the two laſt eſpecially, they forced the *Carthaginians* into them by the moſt flagrant Acts of Injuſtice? But let Truth and an impartial Account of Facts determine. The occaſion of the firſt *Punick* War was as follows. A Body of *Campanian* Soldiers, known in Hiſtory by the Name of *Mamertines*, and who had ſerved under *Agathocles* Tyrant of *Syracuſe*, upon the death of that Prince retired to *Meſſina*: where being received as Friends, they treacherouſly maſſacred one part of the Inhabitants, expelled the reſt, and ſeizing upon the Lands, Houſes, and even Wives of thoſe unfortunate Men, remained ſole Maſters of that important City. Some time after this, the People of *Rhegium*, to ſcreen themſelves from the Inſults of the *Carthaginians*, whoſe Fleets appeared frequently off their Coaſt, applied to the *Roman* Senate for a Garriſon. A Legion of four thouſand Men raiſed in *Campania*, and commanded by *Decius Jubellius*, was appointed to that Service. At firſt they behaved themſelves ſuitably to the Intention of thoſe who employed them: but at length, tempted by the Wealth of the Place, emboldened by the example of the *Mamertines*, and ſtrengthened by their aid, they acted the ſame perfidious and cruel Part towards the *Rhegians*, which the other had acted towards the People of *Meſſina*.

VII. AS theſe two Cities were parted only by the narrow Strait which ſeparates *Italy* from *Sicily*, and were not inſenſible of the Odium they had brought upon themſelves by their Treachery, they entered into a ſtrict Confederacy mutually to ſupport each other in their Uſurpations. This Alliance ſubſiſted for ſome time. But at length the *Romans*, having diſengaged themſelves from the many Wars in which they were intangled, turned their Thoughts towards the puniſhment of their perfidious Legion. *Regium* was inveſted, and after an obſtinate Reſiſtance, taken by Aſſault. All that remained alive of the Garriſon, amounting to about three hundred, were carried to *Rome*, beaten with Rods, and then publickly beheaded in the Forum. The deſtruction of this confederate City produced a mighty change in the Affairs of the *Mamertines*. While aided by their Friends at *Rhegium*, they had not only lived fearleſs of Danger, but had often made Inroads into the Territories of the *Carthaginians* and *Syracuſans*, putting many of their Towns and Villages under Contribution. The Caſe was now greatly altered: for being attacked by *Hiero* Prætor of *Syracuſe*, they were overthrown in Battle, and their Army almoſt totally cut off. Humbled and reduced by ſo terrible a Blow, they thought themſelves no longer in a condition to defend *Meſſina*; and differing in Opinion about what Meaſures to purſue, one Party ſurrendered the Citadel to the *Car-*

Carthaginians, whilſt another ſent Ambaſſadors to implore the Protection of the *Romans*.

VIII. THE Affair was debated in the Senate; where being conſidered in all its Lights, it gave no ſmall Perplexity to the Fathers. On the one hand they thought it diſhonourable, and altogether unworthy of the *Roman* Virtue, to undertake the defence of Traitors, whoſe Perfidy was exactly the ſame with that of the *Rhegians*, which they had lately puniſhed with ſo exemplary a Severity. But then again it was of the utmoſt Conſequence to ſtop the Progreſs of the *Carthaginians*; who, not ſatisfied with their Conqueſts in *Africa* and *Spain*, had alſo made themſelves maſters of *Sardinia*, and the adjacent Iſles on the Coaſt of *Italy*; and would certainly get all *Sicily* into their hands, if they ſhould be ſuffered to poſſeſs themſelves of *Meſſina*. From thence, into *Italy*, the Paſſage was very ſhort; and it was in ſome meaſure to invite an Enemy to come over, to leave him that Entrance open. Theſe Reaſons, tho' ſtrong, could not prevail with the Senate to declare in favour of the *Mamertines*; and accordingly Motives of Honour and Juſtice prevailed over thoſe of Intereſt and Policy. But the People were not ſo ſcrupulous. In an Aſſembly held on this Subject, it was reſolved that the *Mamertines* ſhould be aſſiſted; and *Appius Claudius*, one of the Conſuls, was ordered to conduct an Army into *Sicily* for that purpoſe. *Appius*, to learn the true ſtate of Things, went over in perſon to *Meſſina*, and conducted himſelf ſo happily, as by ſome means to perſuade the *Carthaginian* Officer to evacuate the Citadel. This ſo highly offended the People of *Carthage*, that they condemned their Officer to be crucified as a Traitor and a Coward. At the ſame time they inveſted the Place by Sea and Land, and entering into an Alliance with *Hiero* the new King of *Syracuſe*, were joined by his Troops. Mean-while *Appius*, having by an artful Stratagem, eluded the Vigilance of the *Carthaginian* Admiral, croſſed the Strait with all his Forces, and attacking the *Syracuſans* and *Carthaginians* one after another, compelled them to abandon the Siege.

IX. SUCH was the beginning of the firſt *Punick* War, in which I think it evidently appears, that the *Romans* were the Aggreſſors. For they undertook the defence of a traiterous and perfidious ſet of Men, againſt a People with whom they were in Alliance and Amity. I deny not that Reaſons of State, and the Maxims of Policy, plead ſtrongly in their Behalf on this Occaſion. It was certainly not their Intereſt, to ſuffer the *Carthaginians* to become too powerful, or get intire poſſeſſion of an Iſland that lay ſo contiguous to *Italy*. But if we examine their Conduct by the Rules of ſtrict Juſtice, it will be found no very eaſy matter to vindicate it. And in fact we have ſeen, that the Senate abſolutely declared againſt aiding the *Mamertines*, as inconſiſtent with Honour, and the Dignity of the *Roman* Name. Whether they acted ſincerely upon this Occaſion, or only to ſave Appearances, is not my buſineſs to determine. It is enough that the Thing itſelf ſerves to juſtify the *Carthaginians*, and exempt them from the Charge of having been the firſt Aggreſſors in this War. Nor indeed do the *Roman* Writers throw the Blame of it upon them, but generally allow, that Jealouſy, and an apprehenſion of each other's growing Power, embroiled the two States upon the preſent Occaſion.

X. BUT let us now paſs to the ſecond *Punick* War. Here it is that the Charge of Inſincerity ſeems to lie heavieſt againſt the *Carthaginians*. The

Romans

Romans exaſperated by the Loſſes they received, gave a free vent to their Hatred, and ſpared no Endeavours to blacken their Adverſaries, and lay the whole Blame of the War upon them. And indeed they have contrived to give a ſpecious Colour to this Accuſation, by repreſenting the taking of *Saguntum* as the cauſe of the Quarrel. For to conſider only the firſt appearance of this Step; *Hannibal*, contrary, as they pretend, to the expreſs tenor of Treaties, and without any formal Declaration of War, falls upon a City in alliance with the *Romans*. But as *Polybius* has very judiciouſly obſerved, the taking of *Saguntum* is to be looked upon as the beginning, not the cauſe of the War: and if we trace Matters to their ſource, we ſhall find that the *Carthaginians* were provoked to this Step, by a ſeries of the moſt unjuſtifiable Injuries on the ſide of the *Romans*. Soon after the concluſion of the Peace of *Sicily*, the Mercenaries who had ſerved in the Armies of *Carthage* revolting, brought that State to the very brink of Deſtruction. The *Sardinians* taking advantage of theſe Troubles, ſhook off the *Carthaginian* Yoke, and expelled all their Garriſons out of the Iſland. Things continued for ſome time in this ſituation, 'till at length the *Carthaginians*, having quelled the Rebellion in *Africa*, prepared to recover poſſeſſion of *Sardinia*. The *Romans*, who during all the foregoing Troubles of *Carthage* had behaved with great Juſtice and Moderation, now ſeeing that People like to regain their former Strength, pretended a jealouſy of the new Preparations, and declared War againſt them. The *Carthaginians*, unable at that time to enter the Liſts with ſo powerful an Adverſary, were forced to ſubmit to a ſecond Treaty, by which they gave up *Sardinia* to the *Romans*, and obliged themſelves to an additional Payment of twelve hundred Talents.

XI. THIS Injuſtice of the *Romans* may be conſidered as the firſt and principal Cauſe of the ſecond *Punick* War. For *Hamilcar* ſirnamed *Barcha*, highly exaſperated on account of a Treaty, which Neceſſity alone had compelled the *Carthaginians* to ſubmit to, reſolved to break with *Rome* the firſt favourable Opportunity; and accordingly directed all his Views to the ſucceſs of that Enterpriſe. How deeply he reſented the Injury of which we ſpeak, appears by his making *Hannibal* ſwear upon the Altar at the age of nine Years, that he would ever be an irreconcileable Enemy to the *Romans*. During his command in *Spain*, he brought the greateſt part of that Country under the power of the *Carthaginians*: but falling in Battle before he had compleated the Conqueſt of it, *Aſdrubal* his Son-in-law ſucceeded him, and continued the War with ſucceſs. This alarmed the *Romans*, who thinking it a neceſſary piece of Policy to check the growing Power of a rival State, obliged *Aſdrubal* to enter into a new Treaty, in which it was ſtipulated, that he ſhould attempt no Conqueſt beyond the *Iberus*. How this may appear to others, I cannot ſay, but to me it carries the Idea of a freſh Inſult, as the *Romans* hereby claimed a manifeſt ſuperiority over the *Carthaginians*, and aſſumed the power of ſetting Bounds to their Empire: a Point upon which they were always ſo very nice themſelves, that no Excuſe can be offered for their diſregarding it in their Conduct towards others.

XII. *HANNIBAL* ſucceeded *Aſdrubal* in the command of the Army; and having in a very ſhort time compleated the reduction of *Spain*, began to think ſeriouſly of avenging the many Wrongs done his Country by the *Romans*. To that end he contrived a pretence of Quarrel with the *Saguntines*, that by attacking their City, he might give occaſion to a Rupture between the

two States. For though *Saguntum* lay on this ſide the *Iberus*, and therefore was within the Plan of Conqueſt permitted to the *Carthaginians* by the *Romans*; yet theſe laſt, as if repenting of the Conceſſion they had made to their Adverſaries, concluded an alliance with the *Saguntines* ſoon after the ſigning of the Treaty with *Aſdrubal*. Now as by an Article of that Treaty, neither State was to make War upon the Allies of the other, the *Romans* pretended that *Saguntum*, though on this ſide the *Iberus*, could not be attacked without violating the Peace. On the other hand the *Carthaginians* maintained, that the very Alliance with the *Saguntines* was a violation of the Treaty, as being no other than a mean Artifice to wreſt the power of making War upon the *Saguntines* out of their hands, after it had been expreſly conceded to them by that Article, which permitted the Conqueſt of all the Nations of *Spain* on this ſide the *Iberus*. I think it needleſs to enter into a Diſcuſſion of this nice point, becauſe the taking of *Saguntum* ought to be conſidered rather as the beginning of the Quarrel, than the Cauſe of the War. The *Carthaginians* were determined upon Hoſtilities: and it appears by the above deduction, that the *Romans*, by a continued ſeries of Inſults and Provocations, had given them but too juſt ground to come to that Extremity. *Polybius* himſelf, a great admirer of the *Romans*, and who endeavours on all occaſions to repreſent their Conduct in the moſt favourable Light, though he blames the Attempt upon *Saguntum* as an infraction of the Treaty, is yet forced to acknowledge thus much. "It would be a great miſtake, ſays that judicious Hiſtorian, to conſider the "taking of *Saguntum* by *Hannibal* as the real Cauſe of the ſecond *Punick War*. "It was the beginning, but not the cauſe of it. The regret of the *Carthagi-* "*nians* for the loſs of *Sicily*; the Violence and Injuſtice of the *Romans*, in "ſeizing *Sardinia*, and impoſing a new Tribute; and laſtly, the Succeſs of the "*Carthaginian* Armies in *Spain*, which inſpired that State with Courage, and "alarmed their Adverſaries: theſe were the real Cauſes of the Rupture. If we "conſider only the Siege of *Saguntum*, we cannot avoid throwing the whole "blame upon the *Carthaginians*, whoſe attack of that City was a manifeſt Vio- "lation of the Treaty with *Aſdrubal*. For though the *Saguntines* were not in "alliance with *Rome* at the time of the concluſion of that Treaty, it is evident "the *Romans* did not thereby diveſt themſelves of the Liberty of making new "Alliances. In this view of things, therefore, the *Carthaginians* would be alto- "gether inexcuſable. But if we go back to the Times when *Sardinia* was "forcibly ſeized, and a new Tribute impoſed, it muſt be confeſſed, adds the "Hiſtorian, that the Conduct of the *Romans* in theſe two points cannot be "juſtified."

XIII. Thus we ſee that *Polybius* throws the whole blame of the ſecond *Punick War* upon the *Romans*; and I believe every thinking Man will be of the ſame Opinion: which ought to make us cautious of giving too eaſy Credit to the Repreſentations of their Hiſtorians, when they charge their Enemies with Infidelity and Breach of Faith, and beſtow ſuch magnificent Elogiums of Juſtice and Moderation upon their own Commonwealth. For allowing the *Carthaginians* to have been the firſt in breaking the Peace, it may with reaſon be asked, whether the notorious Injuſtice of the *Romans* previouſly committed, did not juſtify them in no longer obſerving a Treaty concluded in all the Forms; and whether it was not a legitimate Reaſon for entering into a War. I cannot however but obſerve, that *Polybius* ſeems to be a little too ſevere in his Cenſure of the *Carthaginians* for attacking *Saguntum*. It will ſurely admit of debate, whether the Article relating to the Allies of both

both States could be extended any farther than to the Alliances actually ſubſiſting at the time of the ſigning of the Treaty. If we extend it to all Alliances whatſoever, either made or to be made; this ſeems mutually to inveſt them with a Power of prohibiting each other from engaging in any War: becauſe either of them contracting an Alliance with that People againſt whom War was intended, rendered them thereby ſacred and inviolable. But allowing the Reflexion of *Polybius* to be juſt, that the two States by that Treaty did not abſolutely diveſt themſelves of the Liberty of making new Alliances; it ſeems yet pretty evident that the *Romans* did ſo, in reſpect of all the Nations lying on this ſide the *Iberus*. For by giving up to the *Carthaginians* the entire Conqueſt of thoſe Countries, they plainly bound themſelves not to come under any Engagements inconſiſtent with that Article. The Alliance therefore with the *Saguntines*, as it tended to diveſt the *Carthaginians* of a Power expreſly conceded to them by the Treaty, ought to be conſidered as a direct Violation of it: and the *Romans* might with equal juſtice have contracted Amity with all the other Nations of *Spain* yet unſubdued, and thereby utterly deprived the *Carthaginians* of the Power of making War in that Country.

XIV. BUT it is now time to take a view of the Cauſes that gave riſe to the third Punic War; in which, I believe, it will be abundantly manifeſt, that the *Romans* proceeded without the leaſt appearance of Juſtice. Among the Conditions of the Peace granted by *Scipio* to the *Carthaginians*, there was one which imported, that they ſhould not make War without the conſent of the *Romans*. *Maſiniſſa*, King of *Numidia*, taking advantage of this Article, made daily Incroachments upon their Territories, and diſpoſſeſſed them of ſeveral Towns and Diſtricts. He was himſelf in great favour with the *Romans*, on account of the many Services he had done them in the ſecond Punic War: and being no Stranger to their Hatred and Jealouſy of the *Carthaginians*, imagined they would not be diſpleaſed at his Attempts to weaken the Power of a Rival-State. The Event ſhewed that he was not miſtaken in his Judgment. The *Carthaginians* not daring to do themſelves juſtice, applied to the *Romans* for Redreſs. But all their Solicitations were to no purpoſe. Commiſſioners indeed ſet out for *Africa*, to examine the Pretenſions of the two Parties, and bring Matters to an iſſue. Theſe finding *Maſiniſſa* already poſſeſſed of the Territories in queſtion, choſe rather to leave the Affair undecided, than either oblige the King to abandon his Conqueſts, or declare expreſly againſt the *Carthaginians*. The ſame Conduct was obſerved in two following Deputations: whence it was generally believed, that the Commiſſioners acted in this manner by Order of the Senate, and had received private Inſtructions to favour *Maſiniſſa*, who by this Delay had an Opportunity of eſtabliſhing himſelf in his Uſurpations.

XV. IT was upon occaſion of the laſt of theſe Deputations, that the elder *Cato*, who was one of the Commiſſioners, obſerving the flouriſhing Condition of *Carthage*, and its great Power and Riches, notwithſtanding the many Loſſes it had ſuſtained, could not help conſidering it as a very dangerous Rival to his Country. Accordingly at his return, he declared in the Senate, that *Rome* could never be ſafe, ſo long as *Carthage* ſhould ſubſiſt. Nay ſo deeply had this Apprehenſion rooted itſelf in his Mind, that in order to keep alive in his Countrymen a ſenſe of their danger, he never ſpoke upon publick Affairs, but he always concluded his opinion with this Sentence, *Carthage muſt be deſtroy'd*. And indeed the *Romans*, naturally averſe to that City, and mindful

mindful of the many Calamities they had ſuffered from it, were eaſily perſuaded to come into this Deſign. Nor was it long before an Opportunity offered itſelf. The *Carthaginians* exaſperated to the laſt degree by the continual Incroachments of *Maſiniſſa*, and ſeeing no hopes of Redreſs from the Senate, had recourſe to Arms. A Battle was fought, in which they were defeated, their Camp taken, and their whole Army cut to pieces. The *Romans* reſolving to take advantage of this Blow, and of the Pretence furniſhed by the Quarrel with *Maſiniſſa*, declared War in form. All the Endeavours of the *Carthaginians* to mollify them were without effect. They even made an abſolute ſurrender of their City and Territories; and in obedience to the Orders of the Senate, ſent three hundred of their principal Nobility as Hoſtages, and delivered up, without Fraud, all their Arms. But theſe Acts of Submiſſion were enjoined, only in the view of weakening, and rendering them incapable of Reſiſtance. For the *Romans* ſtill peremptorily demanding, that they ſhould abandon their City, and give it up to be demoliſhed, compelled them at laſt to arm in their own Defence.

XVI. I thought it neceſſary to be thus particular in my Account of the Wars between theſe two States, becauſe they beſt ſerve to ſhow what Credit is due to the pompous Accounts we meet with in Hiſtorians, of the Sincerity and inviolable Juſtice of the *Romans*. For here, if any where, we may expect to find Samples of that Equity and Moderation. Here we may look for a Conduct altogether clear and void of Reproach. It is certain that the *Romans* always valued themſelves in a particular manner, upon their good Faith, and exact obſervance of Treaties with the *Carthaginians*. This evidently appears by the advantageous Teſtimony *Cæſar* gives of his Countrymen in this reſpect, in that famous Speech of his in *Saluſt*, upon occaſion of the Conſpiracy of *Catiline*. *Bellis Punicis omnibus, cum ſæpe Carthaginienſes, & in Pace, & per Inducias, multa nefanda Facinora feciſſent; nunquam ipſi per Occaſionem talia fecere: magis quod ſe dignum foret, quàm quod in illis Jure fieri poſſet, quærebant.*" " Altho' in all the Punick Wars, the *Carthaginians*, " both in Peace, and during Truces, were guilty of many Abuſes and Vio- " lations of their Engagements; the *Romans*, how inviting ſoever the Oppor- " tunity might be, could yet never be prevailed upon to retaliate the like " uſage. They were more attentive to their own Glory, than to the Revenge " they might have juſtly taken on ſuch perfidious Enemies." We find likewiſe a great many Reflexions to the ſame purpoſe ſprinkled up and down the Writings of *Cicero*: from all which it is eaſy to judge, how irreproachable they thought their Conduct on this head, and what a Pattern of Juſtice and Moderation. But if notwithſtanding all theſe favourable Repreſentations, it ſtill appears ſo very liable to Exception; how much leſs can it be juſtified with regard to other States? And, indeed, was I to enter into a particular Detail, I could eaſily evince, that it was no other than a continued train of Inſults and Provocations, deſignedly calculated to exaſperate ſuch States as were moſt obnoxious, and force them to have recourſe to Arms. It will doubtleſs appear wonderful to the Reader, how amidſt ſuch a ſeries of oppreſſive Conduct, the *Romans* ſtill found means to preſerve, in ſome meaſure, the Reputation of Juſtice and Equity. But this, as we have before intimated, was chiefly owing to their obſervance of certain outward Forms. They never failed to contrive ſome ground of Complaint againſt thoſe Nations they intended to attack; to ſend Deputies to demand ſatisfaction; and to make formal Declaration of War by a Herald, previous to the commencing of Hoſtilities.

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It muſt indeed be owned, that it required no ſmall Art and Policy, ſo to involve and intangle themſelves with all the Nations of the then known World, that they could at pleaſure find ſome ſpecious Pretence of Quarrel, when their Intereſt required them to break with any State. This gave a Colour of Juſtice to all their Undertakings, inſpired their Armies with Aſſurance and Confidence, inviolably attached to them their old Friends, and procured them new Allies at pleaſure. And as it ſeems to have been one of their Maſter-ſtrokes in Politicks, and the principal Engine by which they puſhed on their Conqueſts, it may not be amiſs to give the Reader ſome little Inſight into their artful Conduct in this reſpect, that he may the better comprehend the Motives and Tendency of it.

XVII. ALTHO' I cannot bring myſelf to think, with ſome modern Writers of pretended Depth and Penetration, that *Numa Pompilius* had a political view, in the ſeveral religious Regulations he eſtabliſhed at *Rome*; yet I am ready enough to allow, that many of his Inſtitutions were afterwards, by the prudent Management of the Senate, converted into Maxims of State, and rendered very ſerviceable in the adminiſtration of the Government. Of this Nature particularly were the Ceremonies relating to the Declaration of War. Nothing is of greater conſequence to an ambitious Republick, which aims at univerſal Dominion, and a gradual Subjection of all Nations, than to prevent ſuch a general Confederacy againſt her, as might not only put a ſtop to her Conqueſts, but even threaten her in her turn with Deſtruction. This the Senate effected by their ſingular Addreſs and Conduct, in the ſeveral Wars in which they were engaged. For they always found means to colour them over with ſuch a ſpecious pretence of Juſtice, as gave no Umbrage to the neighbouring States, nor begot any Jealouſy of a Power, which ſeemed to have nothing in view but the redreſſing its own Wrongs, or thoſe of other Nations in alliance with it. That ſtrong bent towards Religion, and the Worſhip of the Gods, which *Numa* introduced among the People, and which the Senate carefully cheriſhed for many Generations, helped greatly to forward this Perſuaſion. Men were not apt to diſtruſt a religious Republick, where Virtue was held in honour, and Vice of every kind diſcountenanced. Let me add, that in the early Ages of the State, this was more than mere Pretence. They were really diſtinguiſhed by their Probity, by a ſteddy adherence to Juſtice, and a faithful obſervance of Treaties. Moſt of their Wars were defenſive, or undertaken for the ſake of their Allies. And though in after-times, in proportion as their Power increaſed, they gave way to the Dictates of Ambition, and became leſs ſcrupulous in their Conduct: yet as they never departed from thoſe outward Obſervances, by which the appearance of Juſtice is maintained; and took care to ſignalize themſelves from time to time, by ſuch particular Inſtances of Moderation, as could not fail to make a deep Impreſſion; their Reputation for Equity and good Faith continued ſtill the ſame.

XVIII. OBSERVE, I beſeech you, the different Sentiments entertained of the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, at the time of the Rupture between the two States. The *Romans*, tho' they had gradually ſubjected all the Nations of *Italy*, and raiſed themſelves to a very formidable Pitch of Greatneſs, were yet ſo far from being conſidered as an ambitious Republick, againſt which it was neceſſary for other States to be upon their Guard, that the fame of their Virtue and Juſtice ſeems at this time to have been at the higheſt; inſomuch that foreign Nations, inſtead of dreading their Power, courted their Alliance and

Amity. It was otherwiſe with the *Carthaginians*. They had been leſs careful to conceal their Ambition, or cover their Breach of Treaties under a pretence of Injuries. Hence their Deſigns became ſuſpected, all their Actions were viewed in the worſt Light, and the general Prejudice againſt them was ſo ſtrong, that every thing laid to their Charge by their Enemies found a ready Belief. By this means it happened, that though in the Interval between the firſt and ſecond Punick Wars, the *Romans* acted without the leaſt regard to Juſtice and the Faith of Treaties, yet very little notice was taken of the Complaints of the *Carthaginians*: and when in conſequence of repeated Inſults and Provocations, they were at laſt obliged to have recourſe to Arms; the whole blame of the War, though ſo manifeſtly flowing from the injurious Behaviour of the *Romans*, was nevertheleſs charged upon the Perfidy of the *Carthaginians*.

XIX. AFTER the entire Conqueſt of *Italy*, and the Reduction of the greateſt Part of *Sicily* in the firſt Punick War, it required a more refined Policy in the *Romans*, to extend the Limits of their Empire, and at the ſame time keep up the Reputation of their Integrity. They were not immediately ſurrounded with thoſe Nations, which it was their Intereſt to attack; and therefore could not eaſily provoke them to ſuch Acts of Hoſtility, as might juſtify a Declaration of War. And ſhould they upon ſlight Pretences tranſport an Army out of their own Territories, to fall upon a diſtant Prince, the deſign of Conqueſt would be viſible, and beget a general alarm. Beſides, their Power was become ſo very formidable, that foreign States did not care to contend with them, and therefore induſtriouſly avoided giving them any juſt ground of Complaint. In this Situation they took upon themſelves the Title of Patrons and Protectors of all Nations, and by contracting Alliances with weaker States, found means to fall upon the ſtronger at pleaſure, without ſeeming themſelves to have any particular Intereſt in the Quarrel. It was upon this Principle that they attached themſelves to the *Saguntines* and *Ætolians*, which afterwards furniſhed them with ſuch a plauſible colour for the *Carthaginian* and *Macedonian* Wars. To know the full Reach and Value of this Policy, we need only reflect, that though the ſecond Punick War was unexceptionably juſt on the Part of the *Carthaginians*; yet the *Romans*, by diverting the attention of the Publick from the Uſurpation of *Sardinia*, and fixing it upon the fate of *Saguntum*, threw the whole odium of that War upon their Adverſaries, whilſt themſelves were conſidered as a humane generous People, actuated merely by a Concern for their Allies.

XX. AND here it is particularly deſerving of our notice, that amongſt the many Wars in which they were engaged, after the concluſion of that with *Hannibal*, we hardly meet with any that can be deemed perſonal. It was always, at leaſt in appearance, to ſupport the Cauſe of ſome of their Allies, or prevent their being cruſhed by a powerful Neighbour. One would be apt to think, that they had it not ſo much in view to aggrandize themſelves, as to prevent the Growth of any dangerous Power, from which weaker States might be expoſed to ſuffer. Upon the concluſion of the firſt *Macedonian* War, they proclaimed Liberty to all the States of *Greece*. This Action, ſo magnificent in appearance, was in reality a refined Stroke of Policy. The *Greeks* were a warlike People, well diſciplined, and capable of bringing great Armies into the Field. Had they ſuſpected the *Romans* of a Deſign upon their Liberties, and united in their own defence, they muſt have been invincible. But this

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ſeeming Grant of Freedom effectually lulled them aſleep, and by the artful Conduct of the *Romans*, gave birth to infinite Diviſions among them; which ending commonly in an Appeal to *Rome*, furniſhed the Senate with frequent Opportunities of taking Part in their Quarrels. Thus they inſenſibly grew to be Rulers and Dictators over them, and by ſlow imperceptible Steps accompliſhed their Subjection.

XXI. THEIR Ambaſſadors to foreign Princes, and ſuch as had not yet felt the weight of their Power, commonly delivered themſelves in ſuch a haughty magiſterial way, as could not fail to draw upon them ſome Indignity or ill Treatment, and thereby furniſh a ſure Pretence of War, when the Intereſt of the Commonwealth rendered ſuch a Step neceſſary. If a People at any time had given them Umbrage, and afterwards repenting of their Raſhneſs, ſurrendered up the principal Offenders; they would often refuſe to puniſh them, chooſing rather to conſider the whole Nation as guilty, and reſerve to themſelves an uſeful Vengeance. When they ſaw two Nations engag'd in War, although they were not in alliance, nor had any Conteſt with either of them, they would nevertheleſs appear upon the Stage of Action, and affected always to ſide with the weakeſt. It was an ancient Cuſtom, ſays *Dionyſius* of *Halycarnaſſus*, for the *Romans* to grant Succour to all who came to implore it. If Princes of the ſame Blood were at variance for the Crown, they ſeldom failed to make themſelves Parties in the Diſpute; and if one of them was a Minor, declared in his favour, proclaiming themſelves his Guardians, in quality of Protectors of the World. When Subjects oppreſſed and tyranniſed over by their Sovereigns, were provoked to renounce their Allegiance, they immediately indulged them the Title of Ally, declaring themſelves the profeſſed Enemies of Tyranny and lawleſs Power.

XXII. THESE were the Arts and Policies, by which the *Romans* ſo intangled themſelves with all Nations, that they could with pleaſure engage in a War with any State, and colour it over with ſuch an appearance of Juſtice, as not only prevented any general Confederacy againſt them, but even warmly engaged their Allies in the ſupport of their Uſurpations. Nor were they leſs politick in the choice of their Wars, and in the manner of conducting and bringing them to a period. For as their Power was very formidable, and they had contrived to draw many Nations over to their Intereſt: whatever State took up Arms againſt them, found it impoſſible to make any long Reſiſtance, and was in the end forced to accept of ſuch Conditions of Peace as they thought fit to propoſe. For this reaſon War was ſeldom declared againſt them, but themſelves always made it, at a Seaſon, with a People, and in ſuch manner as beſt ſuited their Intereſt. If they were oppoſed by ſeveral Enemies at the ſame time, they granted a Truce to the weakeſt, who thought themſelves happy in obtaining it, conſidering it as a great Advantage, that their Ruin was at leaſt ſuſpended. They never engaged in far-diſtant Wars, till they had firſt made an Alliance with ſome Power contiguous to the Enemy they invaded, who might unite his Troops to the Army they ſent: and as this was never conſiderable with regard to Numbers, they always had another in that Province which lay neareſt the Enemy, and a third in *Rome*, ever ready to march at a Minute's warning. In this manner they hazarded but a ſmall part of their Forces at once, and found it eaſy to repair any Loſs they might ſuſtain, whilſt their Enemy was often ruined by a ſingle Battle. It was this Conſideration that inſpired *Hannibal* with the Reſolution of attacking them in *Italy* itſelf,

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the Center of their Dominions. He was ſenſible that a Blow ſtruck there, muſt effectually weaken them: whereas diſtant Defeats, ſo long as the Capital remained unmoleſted, and was at liberty to ſend a freſh Supply of Troops to recruit the Army, were properly ſpeaking little other than ſo many Leſſons of Prudence to their Generals, who ſoon found themſelves in a condition to renew the War, with greater Forces, and more Circumſpection. Accordingly we find, that when the ſame *Hannibal* afterwards offered his Service to *Antiochus*, in his intended War againſt the *Romans*, there was no Principle he inculcated more earneſtly, than the Neceſſity of ſending an Army into *Italy*, and cutting them off from thoſe continual Reſources, by which in any other method of Attack they found themſelves invincible.

XXIII. BUT nothing gives us a greater idea of the Addreſs and Policy of this People, than the manner in which they terminated their Wars, when they had at laſt brought them to the point they deſired. They ſent the Garriſons out of the Strong-holds; had the Horſes and Elephants delivered up to them; and if their Enemies were powerful at Sea, obliged them to burn their Ships, and ſometimes remove higher up in the Country. If the Prince they had overcome was poſſeſſed of numerous Armies, and ſurrounded with warlike Nations, one of the Articles of the Treaty was, that he ſhould not make War with any of the Allies of the *Romans*, but ſubmit his Differences to Arbitration. And as they never refuſed their Alliance to any People who bordered on a powerful Prince, this Condition inſerted in a Treaty of Peace, cut him off from all Opportunities of making War, or employing his Troops, and thereby deprived him of a military Power for the time to come. Nay they even bereaved their very Allies of this Force. The inſtant any Conteſt broke out amongſt them, they ſent Ambaſſadors who obliged them to conclude a Peace. It was in this manner they terminated the Wars between *Attalus* and *Pruſias*; and whoever is in the leaſt acquainted with their Hiſtory, muſt be ſenſible, that they all along adhered ſtrictly to this Policy. The Reſult was, that they alone were poſſeſſed of warlike and veteran Armies, whilſt thoſe of other Nations degenerated into a raw unpractiſed Rabble. When any State compoſed too formidable a Body from its Situation or Union, they never failed to divide it. The Republick of *Achaia* was formed by an Aſſociation of free Cities. The Senate declared, that every City ſhould be governed by its own Laws, independent on the general Authority. *Macedonia* was ſurrounded with inacceſſible Mountains. The Senate divided it into four Parts; declared thoſe free; prohibited them every kind of Alliance among themſelves by Marriage; carried off all the Nobles into *Italy*, and by that means reduced this Power to nothing.

XXIV. THESE Cuſtoms of the *Romans* were not certain particular Incidents, which happened by chance; but ſo many invariable Principles, from which in a long courſe of Years they never deviated. The Maxims they put in practice againſt the greateſt Monarchs, were exactly the ſame with thoſe they had employed in their infant State, againſt the little Cities which ſtood round them. They made *Eumenes* and *Maſiniſſa* contribute to the Subjection of *Philip* and *Antiochus*, as they had before employed the *Latines* and *Hernici*, to ſubdue the *Volſcians* and the *Tuſcans*. They obliged the *Carthaginians* and the Kings of *Aſia* to ſurrender their Fleets to them, in like manner as they had forced the Citizens of *Antium* to give up their little Veſſels. And indeed it is ſurpriſing to conſider, that during the courſe of that long and mighty

Proſperity

Proſperity which attended the *Roman* Arms, and in which it is ſo uſual for Mankind to forget themſelves, the Senate continued to act all along with the ſame depth of Judgment, and the ſame ſteddy Views to the publick Intereſt. They were not dazzled by their good Fortune, nor moved to precipitate their Enterpriſes before the proper Seaſon. Obſerve, I intreat you, the Wiſdom and Policy of their Conduct. After the Defeat of *Antiochus*, they were poſſeſſed of *Africa*, *Aſia*, and *Greece*, without having a ſingle City in thoſe Countries, that could be called immediately their own. They ſeemed to conquer with no other view but to beſtow. But then they obtained ſo complete a Sovereignty, that whenever they engaged in War with any Prince, they oppreſſed him, as it were, with the weight of the whole Univerſe. The time proper for ſeizing upon the conquered Countries was not yet come. Had the *Romans* kept the Cities they took from *Philip*, the *Greeks* would have ſeen at once into their Deſigns. Had they, after the ſecond Punick War, or that with *Antiochus*, poſſeſſed themſelves of Lands in *Africa* and in *Aſia*, they could never have preſerved Conqueſts ſo ſlightly eſtabliſhed. It was the Intereſt of the Senate to wait till all Nations were accuſtomed to obey as free and as confederate, and to let them blend and loſe themſelves inſenſibly in the *Roman* Commonwealth, before they ſhould attempt reducing them to the Condition of Subjects. After overcoming a Nation, they contented themſelves with weakening it, and impoſing ſuch Conditions as conſumed it inſenſibly. If it recovered, they depreſſed it ſtill more, and it became ſubject without a poſſibility of dating the Æra of its Subjection. This was indeed a ſlow way of conquering, but founded in the deepeſt Policy. *Rome*, by a ſteddy Adherence to theſe Maxims, gradually increaſed in Strength; and having at length got the better of all Oppoſition, ſecurely took poſſeſſion of the Sovereignty of the Univerſe.

CHAP. II.

Of the manner of levying Troops, and forming a Roman *Army.*

I. THE Levies, during the times of the Commonwealth, to which Period we chiefly confine ourſelves, were commonly made by the Conſuls. Every Year they iſſued out an Edict, commanding all who had reached the military Age, to appear in the Field of *Mars*, or in the Capitol. Two Legions compoſed a conſular Army: and as there were two Conſuls, it was uſual to raiſe four Legions yearly. The Age for ſerving in the Army was from ſeventeen to forty-five. None but Citizens were admitted: and all of that Rank within the Age prefcribed by Law, were obliged to be preſent on the Day prefixed, under pain of a Fine. To fail in this reſpect was long criminal during the Commonwealth, The People being aſſembled, the Conſuls began by nominating the military Tribunes, twenty-four in Number, ſix to every Legion. Of theſe fourteen were choſen out of the Body of the Knights, and the reſt from among the People. The firſt were required to have ſerved at leaſt five Years, and the others ten. They were divided to the four Legions in this manner. Of the fourteen youngeſt Tribunes, four were aſſigned to the firſt Legion, three to the ſecond, four to the third, and three to the laſt.

Of the ten eldeſt, two to the firſt and third Legions, and three to the ſecond and laſt.

II. THE four and twenty Tribunes thus chôſen and appointed, every Tribe was called out by Lot, and ordered to divide into its proper Centuries. Four Men, as much alike in all circumſtances as could be found, being preſented out of the Century on whom the Lot fell; the Tribunes of the firſt Legion choſe one, then the Tribunes of the ſecond another; the Tribunes of the third Legion a third, and the remaining Perſon fell to the Tribunes of the fourth. After this four more were drawn out. And now the right of chooſing firſt belonged to the Tribunes of the ſecond Legion: in the next four to the Tribunes of the third Legion: then to the Tribunes of the fourth Legion: and ſo continually, thoſe always chooſing laſt in every turn, who choſe firſt the time before. From this manner of chooſing the Soldiers one by one, the ſeveral large Bodies into which they were formed, obtained the Name of Legions, from the Latin Word *legere, to chooſe*; and the Levy itſelf was called *Delectus, Choice.* No Soldier was admitted under the height of five *Roman* Feet and ten Inches, except in an extreme want of Troops, which would not allow of chooſing. It is obſerved, that the Men of the firſt Cohorts of each Legion were not under ſix Feet high, which amounts to about five Feet ten Inches of our meaſure, the *Roman* Foot making eleven Inches and ſix hundred and four decimal Parts of an Inch *Engliſh.*

III. THE Horſe were choſen out of the Body of the *Equites*, into which Order, after the inſtitution of the *Cenſus* by *Servius Tullius*, all were admitted who were worth four hundred *Seſtertia.* They had a Horſe and Ring given them at the publick Charge, and formed a third and middle Order between the Senate and People. They are known in Hiſtory under the Name of *Roman* Knights, and were obliged to appear on horſeback, as often as the State had occaſion for their Service. Thus there was always a ſufficient Number of Cavalry in readineſs, and it belonged to the Cenſors to review them, and furniſh what was neceſſary to complete the Legions. It is indeed hard to conceive, that all the *Roman* Horſe in the Army ſhould be Knights; and therefore many learned Men are of opinion, that after the Siege of *Veii*, there were two ſorts of Cavalry in the *Roman* Armies: one, whom the Publick ſupplied with Horſes, and who were ſaid to ſerve *Equo publico:* the other, who furniſhed themſelves, and ſerved *Equo privato.* The former they allow to have been of the Order of Knights, the latter not. But *Grævius* has abundantly demonſtrated by the courſe of Hiſtory, that from the beginning of the *Roman* State, till the time of *Marius*, no other Horſe entered the Legions but the true and proper Knights, except in the midſt of publick Confuſion, when Order and Diſcipline were neglected. After that Period, the military Affairs being new modelled, the Knights thought not fit to expoſe themſelves abroad in the Legions, as they had formerly done, but generally kept at home to enjoy their Eſtates, and to have a hand in the Tranſactions of the City, leaving their Places in the Army to be ſupplied by foreign Horſe. Or if they ever made Campaigns themſeves, they held ſome Poſt of Honour and Command. Hence under the Emperors, a Man might be a Knight, and have the Honour of a publick Horſe, without ever engaging in the publick Cauſe, or ſo much as touching Arms: which Conſideration made ſome Princes lay aſide the Cuſtom of allowing the Knights a Horſe, and leave them only the gold Ring to diſtinguiſh their Order, as *Pliny* the elder affirms to have been done in his time.

IV.

IV. WHEN the Levies were completed, the Tribunes of every Legion obliged the Soldiers one by one to take the military Oath. The Form in this caſe was, to chooſe out a Soldier, who repeated the Oath aloud. By this Oath he engaged to hazard his Life for the Commonwealth, to obey his General, and not to quit the Army without Leave. In pronouncing it he held up his right Hand, raiſing the Thumb of it upright; after which all the Soldiers of each Legion declared that they ſwore the ſame thing, but without repeating the Form. This was not a mere Ceremony, but a very ſolemn Act of Religion, and ſo eſſential to the military State, that no Man was deemed a Soldier, nor allowed to ſtrike or kill an Enemy, if he had not taken the cuſtomary Oath. We have a remarkable Example of this in the Behaviour of *Cato* the Cenſor. A Legion, in which the Son of that illuſtrious Senator ſerved, being diſmiſſed by the Conſul who commanded in *Macedonia*, young *Cato* choſe to continue with the Army. His Father thereupon wrote immediately to the Conſul, to deſire, if he thought fit to ſuffer his Son to remain in the Service, that he would make him take a new Oath, becauſe being diſcharged from the former, he had no longer any right to join in Battle againſt the Enemy. We find likewiſe, that among the *Greeks* the military Oath was accounted inſeparable from the State of a Soldier. And *Xenophon*, in his Hiſtory of *Cyrus* the Great, informs us, that that Prince exceedingly applauded the Action of an Officer, who having raiſed his Arm to ſtrike an Enemy, upon hearing the Retreat ſounded, ſtopt ſhort, regarding that Signal as an order to proceed no farther.

V. AFTER adminiſtring the military Oath, the next care of the Tribunes was, to form the Troops into Legions. The exact Number of Soldiers in ſuch a Battalion was not always the ſame. *Romulus* fixed it at three thouſand Foot, and three hundred Horſe. It afterwards roſe to four, five, and ſix thouſand. Under the Conſuls it was commonly four thouſand two hundred Foot, and three hundred Horſe. This was the Number in the time of *Polybius*, and here I ſhall fix it. In order thoroughly to comprehend the Nature of the Legion, ſo famous in Hiſtory, we muſt begin with obſerving, that the whole Infantry of which it was compoſed, was divided into four Orders, the *Velites*, *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*. The *Velites* were young, active Soldiers, and formed the light-armed Troops of the *Roman* Commonwealth. They had their Name *à volando*, or *à velocitate*, from their Swiftneſs and Expedition. They were not divided into Companies, nor had any fixed Poſt aſſigned them in a Day of Battle, but hovered in looſe order before the Army, or were diſpoſed among the Cavalry and heavy-armed Troops, as occaſion required. The *Haſtati* were ſo called, becauſe they uſed in ancient times to fight with Spears, which were afterwards laid aſide as incommodious. Theſe were taken out the next in Age to the *Velites*, and formed the firſt Line in a Day of Battle. The *Principes* were generally Men of middle Age, in the prime and vigour of Life, whence probably they took their Name. Their Poſt in an Engagement was the ſecond Line. The *Triarii* were old Soldiers of diſtinguiſhed Valour, who had ſerved long, and acquired great Experience. They had their Name from their Poſt in the Field of Battle, forming the third Line or Reſerve. They are likewiſe ſometimes called *Pilani*, from their Weapon the *Pilum*.

VI. THESE ſeveral Diviſions formed twelve hundred Men apiece in the three firſt Orders, and ſix hundred in the laſt, amounting in all to four thouſand two hundred, the intire Infantry of a Legion. Each Body, the *Velites* excepted, was ſubdivided into ten Parts or *Maniples*, conſiſting of an hundred and

and twenty in the *Haſtati* and *Principes*, and of ſixty in the *Triarii*. Every *Maniple* made two Centuries or Companies. Anciently, and at its firſt Inſtitution by *Romulus*, the Century had an hundred Men, from which it took its Name. But afterwards, it conſiſted only of ſixty in the *Haſtati* and *Principes*, and of thirty in the *Triarii*. Three *Maniples*, one of the *Haſtati*, another of the *Principes*, and a third of the *Triarii*, compoſed a Cohort. Every Legion, therefore, conſiſted of ten Cohorts, beſides the twelve hundred *Velites*, who, as we have already obſerved, were not divided into diſtinct Companies. The Number of Legions kept on Foot was different, according to the different Exigences of the State. During the Commonwealth, four Legions were uſually levied every Year, and divided between the two Conſuls. But in caſe of Neceſſity, the Number was augmented, and we ſometimes meet with eighteen in *Livy*.

VII. WE have obſerved that every *Maniple* was divided into two Centuries or Companies. Over each of theſe preſided an Officer called a Centurion. To determine the Point of Priority between them, they were created at two different Elections. Thoſe of the firſt Election, as the moſt honourable, always took the Precedency of their Fellows, and therefore commanded the right Hand Orders, as the others did the left. He who commanded the firſt Century of the firſt *Maniple* of the *Triarii*, called alſo *Pilani*, was the moſt conſiderable of all the Centurions, and had a Place in the Council of War with the Conſul and principal Officers. He bore the Name of *Primipilus*, or *Primipili Centurio*; and was called likewiſe *Primipilus prior*, to diſtinguiſh him from the Centurion who commanded the ſecond Century of the ſame *Maniple*, who had the Title of *Primipilus poſterior*. This Diſtinction of *prior* and *poſterior* had Place alſo in all the other *Maniples*. The Centurion who commanded the firſt Century of the ſecond *Maniple* of the *Triarii*, was called *ſecundi Pili Centurio*; and ſo on to the tenth, who was called *decimi Pili Centurio*. The ſame order was obſerved among the *Haſtati* and *Principes*. The firſt Centurion of the *Principes* was called *primus Princeps*, or *primi Principis Centurio*. The ſecond, *ſecundus Princeps*, *&c.* and ſo on to the laſt. So likewiſe among the *Haſtati*, *primus Haſtatus*, or *primi Haſtati Centurio*, *ſecundus Haſtatus*, *&c.* through all the different Orders. As it belonged to the military Tribunes to appoint the Centurions, ſo theſe laſt choſe *Vexillarii* or Enſigns, two to every *Maniple*. They had likewiſe Officers under them called *Succenturiones* or *Optiones*, and who were in the nature of our Lieutenants. *Polybius* mentions them under the Name of *Tergiductors*, their Poſt being in the Rear of the Company.

VIII. THE Cavalry required to a Legion was three hundred. They were divided into ten *Turmæ*, or Troops, thirty to a Troop. Every Troop conſiſted of three *Decuriæ*, or Bodies of ten Men. Over each of theſe was a Captain, called *Decurio*. He that was firſt elected commanded the whole Troop, and had the Title of *Præfectus*. The Decurions had every one his *Optio*, or Deputy, under him, who in like manner as in the Foot, were called *Tergiductors*. Theſe Squadrons often occur in Hiſtory under the Name of *Alæ*, becauſe they always formed the Wings of the Legion. At the time the *Romans* warred againſt the leſſer Nations of *Italy*, their Horſe was incomparably ſuperior to that of their Enemies, for which Reaſon they were compoſed of none but the moſt conſiderable among the Citizens, being, as we have obſerved, ſelected wholly out of the Order of the Knights. When they alighted, no Infantry was more formidable,

midable, and they very often turned the Scale of Victory. It muſt be owned, however, that their Cavalry were but few in proportion to their Foot; and though they ſerved well enough for their *Italian* Wars, yet they became fully ſenſible of this Inconvenience when they had to do with *Hannibal.* It was chiefly by the Superiority of his Cavalry, and his manner of uſing it, that he gained ſo many Victories over them. Accordingly they applied themſelves ſeriouſly to the improvement of this Part of their Strength, not only by intermixing Platoons of Foot with their Cavalry, and training them particularly to that Service, but likewiſe by taking foreign Horſe into their pay, *Numidians*, *Gauls*, and *Germans.*

IX. BESIDES the Troops already mentioned, there were always in the *Roman* Armies a Number of Soldiers of a more eminent degree, known by the Title of *Evocati.* They were ſuch as had ſerved out the legal time, and been diſtinguiſhed by particular Marks of Favour, as a Reward of their Valour. It was uſual for the Conſuls, eſpecially in important Wars, to invite a great Number of theſe into the Service, by circular Letters diſpatched for that purpoſe. The Reputation of a General was what chiefly induced them to grant their attendance, and therefore it was conſidered as a particular mark of Honour. In the Field they uſually guarded the chief Standard, being excuſed from all the military Drudgery of ſtanding on the Watch, labouring in the Works, or other ſervile Employments. They had likewiſe the privilege of uſing the *Vitis* or Rod, which was the badge of the Centurion's Office, and indeed were in all reſpects rather ſuperior to the Centurions. It was very common, when any General of an eſtabliſhed Reputation, and who had long diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the ſervice of his Country, was appointed to the management of a difficult War, to ſee great Numbers of theſe flock to his Standard, and offer themſelves anew to Dangers and Fatigues, in hopes of gaining freſh Laurels under the auſpices of a Commander, who had often in their youth led them to Honour and Victory. Thus it happened to *Paulus Æmilius*, when he was charged with the Conduct of the *Macedonian* War. And thus alſo to the younger *Scipio Africanus*, when after a ſeries of Diſgraces before *Numantia*, the *Romans* caſt their Eyes upon him, as alone capable of reſtoring the Reputation of their Arms.

X. BUT to return to the Legions. The Officers next in dignity to the Centurions were the military Tribunes, of whom we have already given ſome account. They owed their Name and Inſtitution to *Romulus*, who having divided the whole Body of the Citizens into three Tribes, appointed an Officer over each, with the Title of Tribune. The Number afterwards increaſed to ſix in every Legion. During the Infancy of the Commonwealth they were nominated by the Conſuls; and afterwards, partly by the Conſuls, partly by the People. Their Buſineſs was to decide all Controverſies in the Army; to give the Word to the Watch; to ſee that the Soldiers obſerved Diſcipline, obeyed Orders, and did their Duty; and to take care of the Works and Camp. None could attain this Dignity, who had not ſerved in the Army five Years; and of the twenty-four that were annually choſen, ten at leaſt muſt have ſerved ten Years. Care was alſo taken to diſtribute them in ſuch manner, that in each Legion the moſt experienced were united with thoſe who were younger, in order to inſtruct and form them for commanding. By this means the Legions were always provided with able Officers, which could not fail of having an excellent Effect upon the Troops, as it naturally tended to inſpire them

with Valour, and beget an Eſteem and Confidence in their Commanders. During the Campaign, which laſted ſix Months, they commanded the Legion by turns, two at a time, for two Months together. The order in which they were to command was decided by Lot.

XI. THE Troops we have hitherto been deſcribing, may properly be termed the natural Forces of the Republick, as conſiſting wholly of her own Citizens. They were indeed the original Armies of *Rome*, and all along conſtituted her main Strength. But this political Commonwealth, when ſhe began to extend her Dominion over *Italy*, inſtead of reducing the vanquiſhed Nations to Slavery, indulged them the Title of Allies, and the free enjoyment of their own Laws, upon Condition of ſupplying her in her Wars with a certain proportion of Men. Theſe were called the allied Troops, and as to Number, were equal to the natural Forces in Foot, and double in Horſe. The manner of levying them was thus. The Conſuls, while they were employed in compleating the Legions at *Rome*, gave notice to the allied States what Number of Forces they would have occaſion for, and appointed a time and place of Rendezvous. The States accordingly convened their Men, and chooſing out the deſired Number, gave them an Oath, and aſſigned them a Commander in Chief, and a Paymaſter-general. When they arrived in the Camp, they were divided into two great Bodies, termed *Alæ*, or *Cornua*, from their poſition in the Army. For the *Romans* always reſerved the Center to themſelves, placing the Confederates, half on the right, and half on the left Wings. And becauſe they were more numerous than the natural Forces, Care was taken farther to ſeparate them, by ſelecting a third part of the Horſe, and a fifth of the Foot, and poſting them near the Conſul's Perſon, under the Name of *Extraordinarii*. It is not certainly known how the ſmaller Bodies of the Confederate Forces were commanded. Moſt probably the *Romans* marſhalled them according to their own Diſcipline, and aſſigned them Officers of the ſame nature with thoſe of the Legions. This ſeems to follow from the manner in which they fought, it appearing evidently by the Courſe of Hiſtory, that both as to their Arms, and order of Battle, they differed in nothing from the Troops of the Republick. We are aſſured, however, that the two *Alæ*, or great Diviſions of the Allies, had each a Præfect appointed them by the *Roman* Conſul, who governed in the ſame manner as the legionary Tribunes. In after times, all the States of *Italy* were admitted to ſhare the Freedom of the City, and their Forces incorporated with thoſe of the Republick. From this Period, therefore, the Name of Allies ceaſed, and in their ſtead the auxiliary Troops were procured. Theſe were ſent by foreign States and Princes, at the Deſire of the *Roman* Senate, or Generals, and were allowed a ſet Pay from the Republick; whereas the Allies received no Conſideration for their Service, but a Diſtribution of Corn.

XII. OVER theſe Armies of the *Roman* People, the two Conſuls preſided, who were the ſtanding Generals of the Republick. They were created yearly, and in the Field poſſeſſed an unlimited Authority; the Senate reſerving to themſelves only the Power of making Peace, and decreeing War, unleſs upon extraordinary Occaſions. The annual Change of Generals was doubtleſs in ſome Caſes an Obſtacle to the Advancement of Affairs: but the danger of infringing the publick Liberty, by continuing the ſame Man longer in the Command of all the Forces of the State, obliged them to overlook this Inconvenience, from the apprehenſion of a much greater. The Neceſſity of Affairs,

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the Diſtance of Places, and other Reaſons, reduced the *Romans* at length to continue their Generals in the Command, for ſeveral Years together, under the Name of Proconſuls or Proprætors. And as theſe Generals had often a great Extent of Country to defend, and were obliged to employ different Bodies of Troops in different Places, they found it neceſſary to have Officers under them, of a more extenſive Authority than the military Tribunes. This gave riſe to the Inſtitution of the *Legati*, who commanded in chief under the General, and managed all Affairs by his Permiſſion. We find them ſometimes at the head of one Legion, ſometimes of three or four, and ſometimes of only part of a Legion. Their Office was accounted very honourable, inſomuch that the greateſt Men of the State, and even ſuch as had been Conſuls and Dictators, did not diſdain to accept of it. The great *Fabius*, as is well known, was his Son's Lieutenant; and *Scipio Africanus* ſerved in the ſame Capacity under the Conſul his Brother. The Number was according to the General's pleaſure, on whom alone the Choice depended: and it appears, that they commanded under him, and received his Orders, as Lieutenant-Generals in our Armies ſerve under the Generaliſſimo. In the abſence of the Conſul or Proconſul, they had the honour of uſing the *Faſces*, and were intruſted with the ſame Charge as the Officer whom they repreſented.

XIII. HAVING thus ſufficiently explained how the Armies of the *Roman* People were formed, and the different Degrees of Rank and military Service that prevailed in them; it is time to conſider a little more particularly wherein their Strength conſiſted, and to what they were indebted for that Superiority, which rendered them victorious over the Troops of all other Nations. The firſt thing that offers itſelf to our Obſervation here is, the Nature and Form of the Legion; whoſe contrivance was ſo admirable, that *Vegetius* thinks nothing leſs than a God could inſpire the Idea of it. The Soldiers of which it was compoſed, were armed with Weapons of a heavier and ſtronger kind than thoſe of other Nations, as we ſhall have occaſion to ſhow more at large in the next Chapter. But becauſe ſome things muſt be done in War, which a heavy Body is not able to execute, it was therefore made to include within itſelf a Band of light Forces, which might iſſue from it in order to provoke the Enemy to Battle, or draw back into it in caſe of Neceſſity. It was likewiſe ſtrengthened with Cavalry, and with Spearmen and Slingers, to purſue thoſe who fled, and compleat the Victory. The Troops were all of different experience and ſtanding in the Service, and ſo mixed together in the Cohorts, that no Party of *Roman* Forces was without a ſufficient Number of Veterans, to give Life and Vigour to its Operations. The Number of Men in a Legion ſeems likewiſe to have been the effect of a wiſe Policy. For theſe amounting to four thouſand five hundred, formed a conſiderable Body of Troops, animated by one and the ſame Spirit, and who from their mutual Relation among themſelves, would take a near Intereſt in each others Preſervation. They were in effect Men of the ſame Regiment, and had all that Zeal and Concern for one another, which is uſual among thoſe leſſer Diviſions of our Troops.

XIV. THE Marquis *de Feuquiere* in his Memoirs obſerves, that the Regiments of which modern Armies conſiſt, are not ſufficiently ſtrong in the Number of Men. He thinks it might do well to form them of ſeveral Battalions: becauſe ſuch a Multitude of different Bodies, without any immediate Tie among themſelves, ſeems directly contrary to that Union and Subordination, which conſtitutes the great beauty of military Diſcipline. It is certain that Troops always

always exert themſelves more, in behalf of thoſe of the ſame Regiment, than where the Party for which they are engaged belongs to a different Diviſion. This the *Romans* were fully ſenſible of, and had an Eye to it particulary in the Conſtitution of their Legion. It was doubtleſs of great Advantage to them in a Day of Battle, that their Lines were made up of a few large Bodies, linked together by the ſtrongeſt military Ties, and nearly intereſted in each others preſervation. Nor did the Number of Men in theſe Bodies render them unwieldy or unmanageable: becauſe being judiciouſly diſpoſed into Cohorts, they could be commanded with the ſame eaſe, and were no leſs nimble in their Operations, than if they had formed ſo many independent Battalions. And here it is worthy of notice, that in drawing up the Army, the Troops were ſo diſpoſed, as tended wonderfully to their mutual Support and Encouragement. For as the *Romans* commonly fought in three Lines, ſo in every one of thoſe Lines, the Soldiers were always ſo poſted, as to be ſuſtained by others of the ſame Legion. This was owing to the manner of forming the Lines, not by intire Legions, but by the different military Orders that compoſed the Legions. The *Haſtati* were placed in the firſt Line, the *Principes* in the ſecond, and the *Triarii* in the third. By this means the *Haſtati* of every Legion were ſupported by the *Principes* of the ſame Legion, and theſe again by the *Triarii*. What Spirit and Confidence this muſt add to the Troops, and how effectually it would tend to preſerve them from Slaughter, when any particular Line was broken, will be evident upon the leaſt Reflexion. It is found by experience, that Soldiers never fight better, nor exert a greater ſhare of Courage, than when they know themſelves to be well ſupported; and if at laſt they are obliged to give way, yet ſtill the Retreat is managed with leſs Terror and Confuſion. The *Romans*, in caſe of a Repulſe, retired through the Intervals of the Lines behind them: and theſe conſiſting of Men of the ſame Legion, advanced immediately to their Relief, and doubtleſs would do every thing in their Power to preſerve their Fellows. This kept up the Spirits of thoſe that fled, prevented their throwing away their Arms, and encouraged them to rally and renew the Charge.

XV. THERE was alſo another Advantage in the Conſtitution of the Legion, ariſing from the ſeveral military Orders of which it was compoſed, with their Diviſion into *Maniples* and Companies. For theſe being very numerous, and differing in point of Rank and Superiority, opened a large Field for Preferment, and thereby excited an incredible Ardor and Emulation among the Troops. A private Soldier, after paſſing through the different military Orders, came to be a Centurion among the *Haſtati*; and riſing from one *Maniple* to another, was at length promoted into the Rank of the *Principes*. Thence by a like Gradation he reached the Order of the *Triarii*, and in time attained the Dignity of *Primipilus*. Nor was he even obliged to ſtop here. For as military Merit was every thing at *Rome*, it ſeldom failed to raiſe thoſe who poſſeſſed it in any eminent Degree, to the firſt Dignities of the State. The manner too in which Promotions were made, ſeems wonderfully calculated for the advancement of true Bravery. Every higher order of Officers created thoſe next below them, and ſo in train continually, through all the different Steps of the Service. As therefore the Perſons on whom the Choice depended, had the beſt Opportunities of knowing the Merit of the ſeveral Competitors, and were likely to be determined by that alone, in a matter that ſo nearly concerned their own Honour and Safety; it is natural to ſuppoſe, that every one would endeavour to recommend himſelf by ſuch Qualifications, as rendered him truly worthy of the

the Place to which he aſpired. This progreſſive Choice of Officers, which eſtabliſhed ſo juſt a Subordination in the Army, and gave a great aſcendant to the principal Commanders, contributed more than any thing to the Perfection of military Diſcipline. It is worth while to obſerve how gradually the *Romans* proceeded herein. The People or State elected the two Conſuls. The Conſuls choſe the military Tribunes: the military Tribunes the Centurions: and the Centurions their *Vexillarii* and *Tergiductors*. This method opened the faireſt Proſpect to Valour, and tended to beget that Spirit among the Troops, which is of all others the happieſt that can be raiſed in an Army, an Emulation to ſurpaſs each other in deſerving Honours.

XVI. WHAT we have hitherto ſaid regards chiefly the Form and Structure of the Legion. Let us now conſider the Quality of the Troops of which it was compoſed. None but Citizens were admitted into this Body: and of all theſe the Tribunes had their Choice, from ſeventeen to forty-five Years of Age. We are to obſerve, however, that it was not every Citizen whom they judged worthy of this Honour. By the Inſtitution of the *Cenſus*, the whole *Roman* People were divided into diſtinct Claſſes, founded on a valuation of their Eſtates. Thoſe of the ſixth and loweſt Claſs, conſiſting of the poorer Citizens, uſeful only by ſtocking the Commonwealth with Children, were not allowed to ſerve in the Army. The *Romans* were for having Soldiers, whoſe real Intereſt in the preſervation of the State, would prompt them to act with Zeal in its Defence. They had every one their portion of Land, and for the moſt part lived in the Country, to improve and cultivate it with their own Hands. Thus accuſtomed to the Toils of Husbandry; to endure Sun, Rain, and Hail; to handle heavy Inſtruments, dig Trenches, and carry Burdens; when they entered the Service they only changed their Arms and Tools, and came with Bodies inured to Labour, and ſeaſoned to all the Fatigues of the Field. Beſides, as War was the proper profeſſion of this People, and what they were all obliged to engage in, as ſoon as they reached the Age for bearing Arms, military Exerciſes made an eſſential part of their Education. They were trained up in them from their Infancy, and had a ſpace of Ground within the City, called the *Campus Martius*, where, as if actually in the Field, they formed themſelves to all the Branches of the Service. After their Fatigues they plunged into the *Tiber*, to accuſtom themſelves to ſwimming, and cleanſe away the Duſt and Sweat. Hence the *Romans* were never obliged, on any ſudden Emergency, to commit the Honour or Safety of the State to a raw undiſciplined Multitude. They had always a ſufficient Number of Men in readineſs, trained and habituated to War, for the forming and recruiting their Armies.

XVII. IN reading the Hiſtory of ancient Commonwealths, we can hardly forbear fancying, that we peruſe the Annals of a ſet of Men, altogether different from ourſelves. The prodigious Fortune to which the *Romans* attained, ſeems incredible to us. We are amazed to ſee that Republick, from an obſcure inconſiderable Village, riſing inſenſibly to Power, extending her Dominion over *Italy*, and at laſt rendring herſelf Miſtreſs of the Univerſe: to behold her Citizens, even thoſe of weight and authority in the Adminiſtration, ſerving as private Men in her Armies: and to find that Soldiers, who in our Days are the Dregs of every Nation, were in that Commonwealth made up of the very ſame People, who at home, in times of Peace, created Magiſtrates, enacted Laws, and obliged the Senate itſelf to ſubmit to their Deciſions. Nor is it leſs a matter of wonder when we conſider the number and greatneſs of her Armies.

It is evident by experience with reſpect to modern times, that a *European* Prince who has a Million of Subjects, cannot, without deſtroying himſelf, keep up and maintain above ten thouſand Men. But when we look into the Affairs of ancient States, eſpecially thoſe of *Sparta*, *Athens*, and *Rome*, the caſe appears to be quite otherwiſe. We there find, that this proportion between the Soldiers and the reſt of the People, which is now as one to an hundred, could not in them be leſs than as one to eight. *Rome* was yet confined within very narrow Bounds, when the *Latins* having refuſed to ſuccour her with the Troops which had been ſtipulated, ten Legions were preſently raiſed in the City only. And if we examine the Hiſtories of *Athens* and *Sparta*, we ſhall there meet with Inſtances no leſs ſurpriſing, of powerful and numerous Armies, when compared with the Extent of their Territories.

XVIII. TO account in ſome meaſure for ſo wonderful a Revolution in the courſe of human Affairs, it behoves us to call to mind, that the Founders of ancient Commonwealths had taken care to make an equal Diſtribution of Lands, and that the ſeveral Portions were allotted to Individuals, upon Condition of ſerving the State in her Wars. This Circumſtance alone raiſed a Nation to Power, gave Strength to its Armies, and made it a well-regulated Society. By this it became equally the Intereſt of every Member of the Commonwealth, and that a very great Intereſt too, to exert himſelf in defence of his Country. *Romulus*, after aſſigning one Part of the *Roman* Territory to the Expences of religious Worſhip, and another to the uſes of the State, divided the remainder into thirty Portions, to anſwer to the thirty *Curiæ*. Under the Commonwealth, in proportion as the publick Domain increaſed, it was the conſtant practice of the Senate for ſeveral Ages, to allot part of the conquered Lands to the uſe of the poorer Citizens, and ſhare it equally among them. This was what at firſt enabled *Rome* to ſoar above its humble Condition; and the People were ſtrongly ſenſible of it even in their corrupted State. We find them conſtantly ſtruggling for an *Agrarian* Law, and contriving means to check the Artifices of thoſe who endeavoured to elude it. The avowed Patrons of Liberty conſidered this Law as the main Bulwark of the State, and were ever ſounding in the Ears of the Senate, the Miſchiefs to which they expoſed themſelves by the violation of it. Tell me, would *Tiberius Gracchus* ſay to the Nobles, which is the moſt valuable Character, that of a Citizen, or of a perpetual Slave? Who is moſt uſeful, a Soldier, or a Man entirely unfit for War? Will you, merely for the ſake of enjoying a few more Acres of Land than your Fellow-citizens, quite lay aſide the hopes of conquering the reſt of the World, or be expoſed to ſee yourſelves diſpoſſeſſed by the Enemy of thoſe very Lands which you refuſe us?

XIX. AND in fact we find, that in proportion as the *Romans* deviated from this great and original Principle of Government, Affairs began to wear the very ſame Face, under which they appear in our Days. The Avarice of ſome, and the laviſh Profuſeneſs of others, occaſioned the Lands to become the Property of a few. Immediately Arts were introduced, to ſupply the reciprocal Wants of the rich and poor; by which means but very few Soldiers or Citizens were to be ſeen. For the Revenues of the Lands, that had before been employed to ſupport the latter, were now wholly beſtowed on Slaves and Artificers, who adminiſtered to the Luxury of the new Proprietors. But it was impoſſible that People of this caſt ſhould be good Soldiers, they being cowardly and abject, already corrupted by the Luxury of Cities, and often by the very

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Art they profeſſed. Beſides, as they might reap the fruits of their Induſtry in every Clime, and could not properly call any Country their own, they had no ſufficient Tie to bind them to its Defence. Nor was this Revolution peculiar to the Republick of *Rome*. *Sparta* before her had experienced the like viciſſitude. *Lycurgus* left no leſs than thirty thouſand Citizens behind him, who in the time of *Agis* and *Cleomenes*, were reduced to ſeven hundred, ſcarce an eighth Part of whom was poſſeſſed of Lands. The reſt were no more than a cowardly Populace. Theſe two Kings undertook to revive the ancient Laws on this occaſion, and from that time *Lacedæmonia* recovered its former Power, and again became formidable to all the States of *Greece*. Had *Tiberius* and *Caius Gracchus* equally ſucceeded in their Deſign of reforming the *Roman* Commonwealth, the loſs of Liberty, and all the Miſeries conſequent upon it, might have been prevented. But their untimely fate diſcouraging others from engaging in the ſame Cauſe, *Rome* ſoon after, inſtead of being defended by, became a Prey to her own Legions. Nor ought we to wonder, if Men who had no Property in the State, and might hope more from its Overthrow than Preſervation, were eaſily induced to conſpire its Ruin.

XX. BUT the equal Diſtribution of Lands, was not that alone, which gave Strength to the Armies of *Rome*. There were other Circumſtances peculiar to the times and Conſtitution of that Republick, which contributed not a little to its Grandeur. The Trade of a Soldier was not then, as in our Days, a Slavery for Life, attended with infinite Fatigue, and ſcarce any Profit. As the Art of exactly fortifying Places was little known, and leſs practiſed; national Quarrels were decided by Battle, and one gained often put an end to the War. Hence the Service was properly ſpeaking little other than ſo many Summer Campaigns. The Armies were renewed yearly, and for ſeveral Ages never kept the Field during the Winter. A Battle was commonly attended with the Conqueſt of an entire Province or Kingdom; and the Pillage got in over-running the Enemies Country, was often not only ſufficient to enrich the Conquerors, but ſometimes even ſerved to aggrandiſe their Poſterity. At the cloſe of the Campaign, the Soldiers were diſmiſſed, every one to his own home, to look after his domeſtick Affairs, and cultivate his Inheritance. Thus there were many Inducements to a military Life: the ſhort Duration of the Service: the Proſpect of Wealth and Affluence, to which it often conducted: the Neceſſity of defending their own Poſſeſſions: and the hope of acquiring new ones from the Enemy. For, as we have already obſerved, it was the conſtant Practice of the Senate for ſeveral Ages, to aſſign part of the conquered Lands to the uſe of the poorer Citizens; either dividing it among thoſe who had no Patrimony of their own, or granting an additional Allowance to ſuch whoſe Inheritance was but ſcanty. In our times the condition of a Soldier is very different. National Quarrels are not now decided by Battles, but moſt commonly by Sieges, which ſpins out the War to an immoderate length, and occaſions an infinite loſs of Men. Towns are ſeldom taken by Storm, or abandoned to be plundered, but given up by Capitulation, and the Inhabitants left in the quiet Poſſeſſion of their Properties. A Country expoſed to Pillage redeems itſelf by Contributions, no Part of which comes into the Hands of the private Men, whoſe Pay at the ſame time is ſo ſmall, that the meaneſt Occupation yields a far greater Income. Thus the Miſeries of Hunger, Heat, and Cold, which are inſeparable from a military Life, the certainty of Blows, and the uncertainty of Plunder, renders the uſual Parts of War full of Sufferings and Dangers, and of little or no Profit to the Soldiers.

XXI.

XXI. INDEED in the latter times of the Commonwealth, War began to partake of thoſe Inconveniencies, with which it is attended in the preſent Age. But then the Encouragements they had to face the Dangers of the Service, and the high Honours to which it paved the way, made all Difficulties vaniſh and diſappear. For as the *Romans* devoted themſelves entirely to the Profeſſion of Arms, and conſidered it as the only Study worthy their Care, they omitted no methods to recommend and place it in Eſteem. Innumerable Rewards and Diſtinctions were invented, ſuited to the different Stations of Men, and the ſeveral kinds of Valour in which they might render themſelves conſpicuous. Magiſtracies and Dignities were almoſt always conferred, according to the Reputation of the Candidate for Bravery in War. And at the ſame time that military Merit never failed to promote the Perſon in whom it was lodged, no one was capable of civil Employment in the Commonwealth, who had not ſerved in the Army at leaſt ten Years. We are not therefore to wonder, that amidſt ſo many Incentives, which rendered the Life of a Soldier not only honourable, but in ſome meaſure neceſſary, Multitudes flocked to the Service, and ſtrove with Emulation to be admitted into the Legions. Intereſt and Ambition are the two ruling Principles of human Life; and as both conſpired to urge the *Romans* to War, it was eaſy for them to find Armies, and to increaſe and multiply them at pleaſure. But in our Days, none of thoſe motives operate upon the Minds of Men. The Condition of a common Soldier is of all others the moſt deſpicable: and even with regard to Officers of the firſt Rank, long Service is ſo far from being a Recommendation to State-Preferment, that they are on that very account, in the Judgment of many, the leſs fit for civil Employments.

XXII. BUT what chiefly contributed to the Strength and Greatneſs of the *Roman* Armies, was the Cuſtom eſtabliſhed by *Romulus*, of incorporating the vanquiſhed Nations, and admitting them to the Privileges of Citizens. Without this it would have been impoſſible for *Rome*, to raiſe herſelf to that height of Grandeur, to which in time ſhe attained. The Spirit of her Citizens, the Bravery of her Troops, and the admirable Diſcipline of her Armies, might have enabled her to ſubject the Nations around her, and extend her Sway over a conſiderable Part of *Italy:* but in proportion as ſhe advanced in Conqueſt, ſhe would have become ſenſible of her own Weakneſs; and the difficulty of maintaining herſelf in her new Territories, when they grew large enough to employ the whole natural Forces of the Commonwealth, would have either made her drop all Thoughts of farther Empire, or forced her to have Recourſe to mercenary Troops, which have always in the end proved the ruin of thoſe States, who were imprudent enough to venture upon ſo dangerous an Expedient. This is remarkably exemplified in the Hiſtory of *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Carthage*. The two firſt of theſe Cities acquired conſiderable Dominion and Authority in *Greece*, and for ſome time maintained themſelves in the Poſſeſſion of that Power, to which their Valour and Abilities in War had raiſed them. But as the Number of Citizens in either State ſeldom exceeded thirty thouſand, and they were unacquainted with the Policy of incorporating the vanquiſhed Nations, it was impoſſible for them to enlarge their Territories in any extenſive Degree. For great Conqueſts require great Armies to maintain them, which Cities ſo conſtituted as *Athens* and *Sparta*, were not able to furniſh. Accordingly we find, that when Ambition prompted them to Undertakings beyond their Strength, they were ſo far from being able to increaſe their Dominions, that their very Conqueſts proved their Ruin, and they ſunk under

under the weight of their own Greatneſs. For the Countries they had brought under Subjection, not conſidering themſelves as Parts of the State, but rather as Tributaries and Slaves, were glad of an Opportunity of ſhaking off the Yoke; and therefore ſeldom failed to revolt, when they ſaw them engaged in any difficult War. By this means they were not only deprived of a conſiderable Part of their Revenues, at a time when they ſtood moſt in need of Money and Supplies; but obliged likewiſe to divide their Forces: which was a great Check upon their Deſigns, and in the end ſo weakened them, that they were no longer able to maintain themſelves in that Grandeur and Reputation they had acquired.

XXIII. THE caſe of *Carthage* was indeed ſomewhat different. That Commonwealth, by its Riches and Commerce, was able to ſet great Armies on foot, and make extenſive Conqueſts. But as the Genius of the Citizens was turned more to Traffick than War, and as they never admitted the conquered Nations to the Privileges of natural Subjects, they were under a Neceſſity of employing mercenary Troops, both for enlarging their Territories, and holding the vanquiſhed Countries in Obedience. Hence the many Shocks and Convulſions to which that State was liable. For as her Armies had no other Tie to the Republick, but that of their Pay, they were eaſily induced to throw off their Allegiance, when any more advantageous Proſpect offered itſelf. Their Revolt more than once brought *Carthage* to the very brink of Deſtruction. Inſtead of contributing to ſecure the Tranquillity of the tributary Countries, they often ſpirited them up to Rebellion; and, which is indeed a neceſſary Conſequence of employing mercenary Troops, upon any ſudden reverſe of Fortune, they were ever ready to abandon the Service. Thus the *Carthaginians*, though abſolute Maſters at Sea, poſſeſſed of immenſe Territories, and able to ſet on foot numerous Armies, were in reality rather a rich than a powerful Republick. They were ſucceſsful indeed for a time againſt a Number of barbarous States and Nations, without Diſcipline or Experience in War: but when they came to enter the Liſts with a brave and a military People, their Undertakings almoſt always miſcarried. Witneſs their many fruitleſs Attempts upon *Syracuſe*; the Extremity to which they were reduced by *Agathocles*; and the eaſe with which they were in a manner totally driven out of *Sicily* by *Pyrrhus*. Indeed in their firſt and ſecond War with the *Romans*, they make a very conſiderable figure in Hiſtory, whether we regard the greatneſs of their Victories, or the ſtrength of their Armies. But the merit of that ſeems rather owing to the Abilities of their Generals, than to the intrinſick Power of the Commonwealth itſelf. Accordingly, in the third *Punick* War, when they had neither a *Hamilcar* nor a *Hannibal* at the head of their Troops, they in a very ſhort time fell a Prey to their Enemies.

XXIV. BUT now the *Romans*, by the admirable Policy of incorporating the vanquiſhed Nations, avoided all the Inconveniences to which the above-mention'd Cities were liable, and built their greatneſs upon a ſure Foundation. The Forces of the State increaſed with their Territories, inſomuch that it is amazing to conſider, in how ſhort a time, from ſmall beginnings, they roſe to an incredible Multitude of Citizens. The conquered Provinces were ſo far from being an Incumbrance upon them, by exhauſting their Strength in Guards and Garriſons, that, on the contrary, they became real Parts of the Commonwealth, and contributed greatly to her Power, by augmenting her Revenues, and adding to the Number of her Subjects. Thus in proportion as *Rome* grew

in greatneſs, and ſtood in need of mighty Armies to ſupport the weight of her Enterpriſes, ſhe found within herſelf an inexhauſtible Stock of Men and Riches, and without having recourſe to mercenary Troops, could furniſh more than ſufficient to anſwer all the Demands of the State. *Polybius*, when he comes to ſpeak of the War with the *Italick Gauls*, takes occaſion to deſcribe the mighty Preparations made by the *Romans*, to oppoſe that formidable Enemy. We there find, that the Forces of the Commonwealth at that time, amounted to about ſeven hundred thouſand Foot, and ſeventy thouſand Horſe. Compare this Account with the Hiſtories of *Athens* and *Sparta*, and it will ſoon appear, what a diſadvantage theſe two States lay under, for want of ſuch an Inſtitution as that of *Romulus*. For as they never admitted the vanquiſhed Nations to the right of Citizens, but always reduced them to the Condition of Tributaries, the multitude of their Conqueſts ſerved only to enlarge their Territories, without adding to the number of their natural Subjects. Hence even in the moſt flouriſhing Period of their greatneſs, they could ſeldom bring into the Field above thirty thouſand Men. *Rome* on the other hand, by a contrary Policy, increaſed daily in the Multitude of her Citizens, and in time was enabled to furniſh out Armies, adequate to the Conqueſt of the Univerſe.

CHAP. III.

Of the Arms and Diſcipline of the Romans.

I. IT is generally allowed among the Writers upon the Art of War, that as in many other things, ſo particularly in their Arms, the *Romans* excelled all other Nations. I ſhall not here confine myſelf to the uſual Diſtinction into offenſive and defenſive, but rather deſcribe them according to the ſeveral military Orders of which the Legions were compoſed. By the *Velites* we are to underſtand all the light-armed Troops of the Commonwealth, of whatever Rank and Denomination. They were equipped with *Bows*, *Slings*, *Javelins*, a *Spaniſh Sword*, a *Buckler*, and a *Helmet*. The *Bow* is of very remote Antiquity, and has been uſed by almoſt all Nations. *Crete* in particular was famous for its excellent Archers. It does not ſeem to have been much regarded by the *Romans* in the earlieſt times of the Republick, and when it was afterwards introduced, was confined chiefly to the auxiliary Troops. We find however, in the Deſcription of Battles, frequent mention made of the *Sagittarii*; and it appears, that they ſometimes contributed not a little to the Victory. The *Sling* was alſo an Inſtrument of War much uſed by many Nations. The *Baleareans* eſpecially, who inhabited the Iſlands now called *Majorca* and *Minorca*, are beyond all others celebrated for their Expertneſs at this Weapon. They were ſo attentive in exerciſing their Youth in the uſe of it, that they did not give them their Food in a Morning till they had hit a Mark. Theſe *Baleareans* were much employed in the Armies of the *Carthaginians* and *Romans*, and greatly contributed to the gaining of Victories. *Livy* mentions ſome Cities of *Achaia*, particularly *Egium*, *Patræ*, and *Dymæ*, whoſe Inhabitants were ſtill more dexterous at the Sling than the *Baleareans*. They threw Stones farther, and with greater Force and Certainty, never failing to hit what Part of the Face they pleaſed. Their Slings diſcharged Stones with ſo much Force, that neither Buckler nor Head-piece could reſiſt their Impetuoſity. Inſtead of

of Stones, they ſometimes charged the Sling with Balls of Lead, which it carried much farther, and with greater Impetuoſity. The *Javelin*, or *Haſta*, was the proper miſſive Weapon of the *Velites*. It was a kind of Dart not unlike an Arrow, the Wood of which was generally three Foot long, and one Inch thick. The Point was four Inches long, and tapered to ſo fine an end, that it bent at the firſt Stroke in ſuch a manner, as to be uſeleſs to the Enemy. Every Man carried ſeven of them to Battle. The *Spaniſh Sword* was for a cloſe Encounter. The *Romans* judged this Weapon the fitteſt for execution, as having both Edge and Point. It was ſhort, of excellent temper, and in ſhape not unlike a *Turkiſh* Scimetar, only ſharper at the Point. *Livy* tells us, that though it was principally intended for ſtabbing, it would yet ſerve likewiſe to cut off Arms, Legs, and Heads at a Blow. The *Buckler*, or *Parma*, was of a round form, about three Foot in Diameter, and made of Wood covered with Leather. The *Helmet*, called *Galea*, or *Galerus*, was a light Cask for the Head, generally made of the Skin of ſome wild Beaſt, to appear the more terrible.

II. THE Arms of the *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii* were in a great meaſure the ſame; for which Reaſon we ſhall not divide them in our Deſcription, but ſpeak of them all together. Thoſe moſt deſerving our Notice are the *Sword*, the *Scutum*, the *Pilum*, the *Galea*, and the *Lorica*. The *Sword* was the ſame as that of the *Velites*, and therefore requires not any particular Deſcription here. It was uſual with the *Romans* to wear it on the right ſide, that they might be the more at liberty to manage their Shields. In ancient Monuments however, we ſometimes meet with it on the left. The *Scutum* was a Buckler of Wood, oblong, and bending inward like a half Cylinder. Its Parts were joined together with little Plates of Iron, and the whole was covered with a Bull's Hide. An Iron-ring went round it without, to keep off Blows; and another within, to hinder it from taking any Damage by lying on the Ground. In the middle was an Iron-Boſs, or *Umbo*, jutting out, very ſerviceable to glance off Stones and Darts, and ſometimes to preſs violently upon the Enemy, and drive all before them. It appears that theſe Bucklers were large enough to cover almoſt the whole Body. *Polybius* makes them four Foot long, and two and an half broad. And in *Livy* we meet with Soldiers who ſtood on the Guard, ſometimes ſleeping with their Head laid on their Shield, having fixed the other Part of it on the Earth. Some make the *Scutum* the ſame with the *Clypeus*: but this is evidently a miſtake; ſince in the Inſtitution of the *Cenſus* by *Servius Tullius*, we find the *Clypeus* given to thoſe of the firſt Claſs, and the *Scutum* to thoſe of the ſecond. In fact, the *Scutum* was long and ſquare, and came at laſt to be the only Shield of the heavy-armed Troops. The *Clypeus* was of a ſmaller ſize, and quite round, belonging more properly to other Nations, though for ſome time uſed by the *Romans*.

III. THE *Pilum* was a miſſive Weapon, which, in a Charge, they darted at the Enemy. It was commonly four ſquare, but ſometimes round; compoſed of a Piece of Wood about three Cubits long, and a Slip of Iron of the ſame length, hooked and jagged at the end. They took abundance of care in joining the two Parts together, and did it ſo artificially, that it would ſooner break in the Iron itſelf, than in the Joint. Every Man had two of theſe *Pila*, which they diſcharged at the Enemy before they came to cloſe Fight. When they had neither time nor room they threw it upon the Ground, and charged the

the Enemy Sword in Hand. *Marius*, in the *Cimbrian* War, contrived theſe *Pila* after a new Faſhion. For whereas before, the Head was faſtened to the Wood with two Iron-pins; he ſuffered one of them to remain as it was, and pulling out the other, put a weak wooden Peg in its Place. By this means, when it ſtuck in the Enemy's Shield it did not ſtand outright as formerly: but the wooden Peg breaking, the Javelin hung down, and ſticking faſt by its crooked Point, drew after it the Shield. Next to the *Pilum* we mentioned the *Galea*. This was a Head-piece, or Morrion, coming down to the Shoulders. It was either of Iron or Braſs, open before, and leaving the Face uncovered. Some of them were ſo contrived, that they might be let down, on occaſion, to cover the Face. Upon the top was the *Criſta*, or Creſt, in adorning of which the Soldiers took great Pride. In the time of *Polybius* they wore Plumes of Feathers, dyed of various Colours, to render them beautiful to their Friends, and terrible to their Enemies. The Officers in particular were extremely curious and ſplendid in their Creſts, which were uſually worked in Gold and Silver, and ſo contrived as to repreſent Animals of various kinds, Lions, Leopards, Tigers, and Griffins. If we might ſpeak of thoſe of foreign Commanders, the Creſt of King *Pyrrhus*, as very ſingular, would deſerve our notice. It was made, according to *Plutarch*'s Deſcription, of two Goats Horns. *Alexander the great*, as he is repreſented on ancient Medals, wore a Creſt of the ſame Nature.

IV. WE come now to the *Lorica*, which was a defenſive Armour for the Body, as the *Galea* was for the Head and Neck. In our Language it is called the *Cuiraſs*, and was generally made of Leather, covered with Plates of Iron in the form of Scales, or Irong-Rings twiſted within one another in the form of Chains. Theſe are what we call Coats of Mail, in Latin, *Lorica Hamis conſerta*, or *Hamata*. Sometimes the Cuiraſs conſiſted of Thongs, with which the Soldier was girt from the Armpits to the Waſte, and whence probably it took the Name of *Lorica*, from *Lorum*, a Thong or Strap of Leather. We find likewiſe that it was oftentimes a ſort of Linen Caſſock, made with many Folds, which reſiſted, or very much broke the Force of Blows. Among the *Greeks* this Piece of Armour had the Name of *Thorax*, and was made either of Iron or Braſs, in two Pieces, which were faſtned upon the Sides by Buckles. *Alexander* left the Cuiraſs only the two Pieces which covered the Breaſt, that the fear of being wounded in the Back, which had no defence, might prevent the Soldiers from flying. Some of theſe Cuiraſſes were of ſo hard a Metal, as to be abſolutely proof againſt Weapons. *Zoilus*, an excellent Artiſt in this way, offered two of them to *Demetrius Poliocertes*. To ſhow the excellency of them, he cauſed a Dart to be diſcharged from a *Catapulta*, at the diſtance of only twenty-ſix Paces; which though it ſtruck the Cuiraſs with the utmoſt Violence, yet made no Impreſſion, and ſcarce left the leaſt Mark behind it. After all it muſt be owned, that the *Thorax* of the *Greeks* was much leſs capable of Motion, Agility, and Force; whereas the Girts of Leather, ſucceſſively covering each other, left the *Roman* Soldier entire Liberty of Action; and fitting him like a Veſt, defended him againſt Darts. The poorer Soldiers, who were rated under a thouſand Drachms, inſtead of the *Lorica*, wore a *Pectorale*, or Breaſt-Plate of thin Braſs, about twelve Inches ſquare: and this, with what has been already deſcribed, and Greaves and Gantlets upon their Legs and Arms, which were common likewiſe to the reſt, rendered them compleatly armed.

V. WHAT

V. WHAT we have hitherto ſaid regards only the Foot. It is now time to ſpeak of the Cavalry, who at firſt were but very indifferently armed, either for Offence or Defence. They uſed only a round Shield, with a Helmet on their Head, and a couple of Javelins in their Hand, great part of their Body being left without deſence. But as ſoon as they found the many inconveniences to which they were hereby expoſed, they began to arm themſelves like the *Grecian* Horſe, or much in the manner of their own Foot, only their Shield was a little ſhorter and ſquarer, and their Lance or Javelin thicker, with ſpikes at each end, that if one miſcarried, the other might be ſerviceable. It is remarkable, and what indeed we are hardly able to comprehend, that amongſt the Ancients, the Horſe had neither Stirrups nor Saddle. Education, Exerciſe, and Habit, had accuſtomed them not to want thoſe aids, and even not to perceive that there was any occaſion for them. There were ſome Horſemen, ſuch as the *Numidians*, who did not know ſo much as the uſe of Bridles to guide their Horſes: and who, notwithſtanding, by their Voice only, or the uſe of the Heel or Spur, made them advance, fall back, ſtop, turn to the right or left; in a word, perform all the Evolutions of the beſt diſciplined Cavalry. Sometimes, having two Horſes, they leaped from one to the other even in the heat of Battle, to eaſe the firſt when fatigued. Theſe *Numidians*, as well as the *Parthians*, were never more terrible than when they ſeemed to fly thro' Fear and Cowardiſe. For then, facing ſuddenly about, they diſcharged their Darts or Arrows upon the Enemy, and often put them to flight with great ſlaughter. The *Romans* were more than once ſurpriſed by theſe unexpected Attacks, and on ſome Occaſions ſuffered conſiderably. But they at laſt found out a method of ſecuring themſelves, by holding their Targets over their Heads, and forming what Hiſtorians call the *Teſtudo*. It was to this Invention that *Marc Antony* owed the preſervation of his Army, when miſcarrying in his Expedition againſt the *Parthians*, he found himſelf obliged to retreat into *Syria* before a great Body of their Horſe.

VI. THESE were the Arms with which the *Romans* conquered the World: and I believe it will be readily owned, that they were admirably well calculated, both for defending themſelves, and offending their Enemies. *Polybius*, in more Places than one, gives them the advantage in this reſpect over all other Nations, and expreſly affirms, that the many Victories they obtained over the *Gauls*, was owing entirely to the ſuperiority of their Arms. It is true, the cutting Swords of that People terrified them greatly at firſt, and was the cauſe of a fatal Overthrow. But they ſoon learnt from Experience, what a contemptible Weapon that was, when employed in cloſe fight, againſt Troops ſubſtantially armed for defence. For the *Gauls*, to give force and vigour to their Blows, were obliged to avoid too near an approach to the Enemy, that they might have room to wield their Swords. Their firſt Ranks therefore only could do execution, becauſe the *Romans* knowing their ſafety to lie in cloſe fight, advanced continually under cover of their Shields, and crouded upon them in ſuch manner, that they left them not ſufficient ſpace for the free uſe of their Weapons. It is beſides obſerved, that the Swords of the *Gauls* were of ſo ill a temper, as after two or three ſtrokes to ſtand bent in their Hands, and thereby become wholly uſeleſs to them, if they had not time to ſtraighten them on the Ground with their Foot. This was not to be expected in the heat of fight, againſt an Enemy that preſſed hard; ſo that the *Romans* cloſing in with them, ſtabbed them in the Face and Breaſt with their pointed Swords, and made terrible ſlaughter. The Chevalier *Folard* is aſtoniſhed, that under

all theſe Diſadvantages, his Countrymen ſhould obtain ſo many Victories over the *Romans*. He can hardly forbear fancying, that had they ſo far improved by their Defeats, as to change the faſhion of their Weapons, and arm themſelves after the manner of their Adverſaries, we ſhould not have heard ſo much of the boaſted Exploits and Conqueſts of that People. Be that as it will, it is certain the *Gauls* wanted neither Bravery nor military Conduct, and if we except the ſingle Article of their Arms, ſhewed themſelves on many Occaſions no way inferior to the *Romans*.

VII. BUT let us now compare their Arms with thoſe of the *Greeks*. Here, it muſt be owned, the Advantage does not appear ſo manifeſt. Many are rather of opinion, that the *Greeks* excelled the *Romans* in this reſpect. The Earl of *Orrery* particularly, in his *Treatiſe of the Art of War*, wonders much that the *Romans*, who borrowed moſt of their Weapons whether offenſive or defenſive from the *Greeks*, did not alſo follow their example in furniſhing ſome of their Infantry with long Pikes, which he obſerves are the beſt offenſive Arms, either to charge or defend, and of excellent uſe againſt Horſe. It is well known that the *Macedonian* Phalanx, to which *Philip* and *Alexander* were indebted for moſt of their Victories, fought always with this Weapon. One would therefore be apt to think, that an Experience ſo much in its favour, could not have failed of recommending it powerfully to the *Romans*. And yet it is certain, that after making trial of it for ſome time, they laid it aſide as incommodious, ordering the *Haſtati*, who at firſt were equipped with it, and thence took their Name, to arm themſelves after the faſhion of the reſt of the legionary Foot This could not ariſe from any ſcrupulous attachment to their own Cuſtoms, or diſlike of foreign Manners; becauſe no People were ever leſs tenacious in this reſpect, or ſhewed a greater readineſs to adopt the Inſtitutions of other Nations, when they ſaw any real Benefit likely to accrue from them. The principal Reaſon ſeems to have been, that they found the uſe of this Weapon incompatible with that of the Shield. For as it neceſſarily required to be managed with both Hands, thoſe who fought with it were obliged to lay aſide the Buckler; which piece of Armour appeared to the *Romans* of greater conſequence than the Pike, becauſe this laſt was in ſome meaſure ſupplied by the Sword and Javelin. If we might judge of things by the Event, the *Romans* reaſoned very juſtly on this Occaſion; ſince without the aſſiſtance of the Pike, they not only gained greater and more numerous Victories than the *Macedonian* Phalanx, but even beat that very Phalanx itſelf, ſo formidable by the uſe of this Weapon. As this is a very curious and intereſting Subject, and capable of furniſhing many uſeful Reflexions in relation to the ancient Art of War, it will not, I believe, be diſagreeable to the Reader, if we enlarge a little upon it.

VIII. THE *Macedonian* Phalanx was a Body of ſixteen thouſand Men, armed with Pikes four and twenty foot long, which Hiſtorians deſcribe under the Name of *Sariſſæ*. This Corps was generally divided into ten Battalions, each conſiſting of ſixteen hundred Men, an hundred in front, and ſixteen deep. To form ſome idea of their ſtrength and order of Battle, we need only reflect upon what paſſed a few Centuries ago in *Europe*, when *Italy* was a continual Theatre of War, by reaſon of the different Pretenſions of *France*, *Spain*, and the *Emperor*. The Battalions of *Switzerland* were then in great Reputation, and generally looked upon as the beſt Infantry in the World, chiefly on account of the many Victories they had gained by the Pike.

Pike. They were forced at firſt to have recourſe to this Weapon, in order to ſecure themſelves againſt the Ambition of the *German* Princes, who were daily making Attempts upon their Liberty. For theſe Princes being rich, and able to bring into the Field a numerous Cavalry, the *Switzers*, whoſe whole Strength on the contrary lay in their Foot, ſaw themſelves under a neceſſity of contriving Arms, that might defend them againſt the Enemy's Horſe. None appeared ſo proper for this purpoſe as the Pike; and ſo ſucceſsful were they, by the Perfection they attained to in the uſe of it, and their admirable Orders and Diſcipline, that with fifteen or twenty thouſand Foot, they would often venture to attack a vaſt Body of Horſe, and generally came off victorious. From that time the Pike became famous, and was introduced into all the Armies of *Europe*. We find that they uſually had one half of their Infantry Shot, and the other half Pikes; and it is particularly deſerving of our notice, that for ſeveral Ages, the chief Dependence of the General in a Day of Battle ſeems to have been upon the Pikes. By degrees the Musket began to prevail over the Pike; yet gained ground ſo very ſlowly, that it is not much above half a Century, ſince we find one third of the Infantry ſtill Pikes.

IX. BUT tho' the Pike was found to be of admirable ſervice in Engagements with Horſe, Experience conſtantly made it appear, that it was by no means ſufficient againſt a reſolute and well-armed Infantry. For as this Weapon required to be managed with both Hands, and therefore neceſſarily excluded the uſe of the Target, thoſe who carried it were left altogether without defence, if in the courſe of an Engagement, the Enemy ſhould chance to get within their Pikes. Hence the Generals who were acquainted with this Weakneſs in the *Swiſs* Battalions, and could bring their Troops to preſs the Charge vigorouſly, ſeldom failed of defeating them with great ſlaughter. We have a remarkable Example of it in the caſe of Count *Carmignola*, General to *Philip Viconti* Duke of *Milan*. That brave Officer being ſent againſt a Body of eighteen thouſand *Switzers*, with only ſix thouſand Horſe, and a few Foot, advanced boldly to the Encounter: but tho' the Attack was reſolute and well conducted, he was repulſed with conſiderable loſs. *Carmignola* quickly perceived the advantage which the Enemy had in their Foot over his Horſe. As he was a Man of determined Courage, and rather rouſed than diſpirited by the Check he had lately received, he ſoon rallied his Men, and led them on again to the Charge. When he came within a certain diſtance, he ordered his Cavalry to diſmount; and engaging the *Switzers* ſmartly in that Poſture, put them all to the rout, and moſt of them to the Sword. Only three thouſand were left, who finding themſelves paſt Remedy, threw down their Arms. It will be proper to take notice on this Occaſion, that the Cavalry led by *Carmignola* were all Men at Arms, and therefore compleatly provided both for Offence and Defence. Now ſuch a Body of Troops was well enough able to deal with the *Switzers*, if they but once got cloſe up with them, and came to uſe their Swords. For then the Enemy being without defenſive Arms, and deriving no aſſiſtance from their Pikes, whoſe very length rendered them unſerviceable, were expoſed to unavoidable ſlaughter. Conſidering therefore the Advantages and Diſadvantages on both ſides, it will appear, that they who have no defenſive Arms are without Remedy, if the Enemy charges but home, and paſſes their Pikes. This cannot miſs to happen in an Engagement with reſolute Troops: becauſe Battles always advancing, and the Parties on each ſide preſſing on perpetually, they muſt of neceſſity come ſo near at laſt, as to reach one another with their Swords; and tho' ſome few perhaps may be killed or

tumbled

tumbled down by the Pikes, yet thoſe that are behind ſtill preſſing on, are ſufficient to carry the Victory.

X. FROM theſe Reaſons it will be eaſy to conceive, why *Carmignola* overcame with ſo great a ſlaughter of the *Switzers*, and ſo little of his own Army. Nor is this Example ſingular in its kind. We meet with many others in Hiſtory, all tending to demonſtrate, that an Infantry armed with Swords and Bucklers, have great advantages over the Pike. When *Gonſalvo* was beſieged in *Barletta* by the *French*, a detachment of *Spaniſh* Foot was ſent out of *Sicily*, and landed in the Kingdom of *Naples*, with Orders to march to his Relief. Monſieur *d'Aubigny* had notice of their approach, and went to meet them with his Men at Arms, and a Body of about four thouſand *Switzers*. Theſe laſt preſs'd upon them with their Pikes, and at firſt put them into ſome diſorder; but the *Spaniards*, by the help of their Bucklers, and the agility of their Bodies, having at length got under the Pikes of the *Switzers*, and ſo near as that they could come at them with their Swords, defeated them with great ſlaughter, and very little loſs on their own ſide. Every one knows what terrible havock was made of the *Switzers* at the Battle of *Ravenna*, and all upon the ſame account, the *Spaniſh* Foot having got to them with their Swords; nay it is certain they muſt have been all cut to pieces, had they not been happily reſcued by the *French* Horſe: and yet the *Spaniards*, drawing themſelves into cloſe order, bravely ſuſtained the Aſſaults of the Cavalry, and retired without loſs. It appears therefore, that tho' the Pike be excellent againſt Horſe, it is yet inſufficient in an Encounter with Foot; whereas an Infantry judiciouſly armed for Offence and Defence, at the ſame time that it can very well deal with Cavalry, is likewiſe an overmatch for a Body of Pikes.

XI. AND hence it was that the *Macedonian* Phalanx, which ſeems to have been juſt ſuch an order of Battle as the Battalions of *Switzerland*, experienced likewiſe the ſame Fate, when it came to encounter the warlike and well-armed Troops of the *Romans*. Hiſtorians aſcribe the defeat of it to ſeveral Cauſes: the advantageous diſpoſition of the *Roman* Troops, who fought in ſeparate Bodies, yet ſo drawn up, that they could unite and join upon occaſion: the artful Conduct of the Generals, in drawing it into rugged and uneven Places, where it could not preſerve itſelf entire, but became disjointed and broken: the Opportunity this gave of charging it in the openings and void ſpaces, whereby it was totally diſunited, and being attacked in front and rear, fell an eaſy Prey to its Enemies. Theſe things doubtleſs contributed in part to the Overthrow of which we ſpeak: but the principal defect of the Phalanx lay in its diſadvantageous Armour and order of Battle. In reality, the Pikes of the two firſt Ranks only were ſerviceable in an Engagement: thoſe of the reſt ſcarce availed any thing. The Men of the third Rank could not ſee what paſſed in the front, nor had any command of their long Pikes, which were intangled and locked up between the Files, without a poſſibility of moving them to the right or left. Hence the *Romans* found no great difficulty in ſurmounting an Obſtacle, formidable indeed in appearance, but at bottom very trifling. They had only to gain upon the Pikes of the two firſt Ranks, that they might join the Enemy, and fight hand to hand. This they were enabled to do by the help of their large Bucklers, with which they bore up the Pikes of the *Macedonians*, and forcing their way under, reached them with their Swords. All reſiſtance was then at an end. The Phalanx, unprovided for defence, and

rather

rather embarraſſed than aided by their Pikes, could no longer ſtand the furious Charge of the *Romans*, who made dreadful havock with their pointed Swords. We find at the Battle of *Pydna*, where *Paulus Æmilius* gained ſo compleat a Victory over *Perſeus*, that no leſs than twenty thouſand *Macedonians* were ſlain, with the loſs of only a hundred Men on the ſide of the *Romans*. This agrees ſo exactly with what we have above related of the *Switzers*, that it is impoſſible not to aſcribe it to the ſame Cauſe, namely, the inſufficiency of the Pike, when oppoſed to an Infantry armed with Swords and Bucklers.

XII. WE come now to ſpeak of the military Diſcipline of the *Romans*, to which, no leſs than to their Arms, they were indebted for their many Victories and Conqueſts. If we compare this People with other Nations, we do not find that they ſurpaſſed the *Gauls* in Number or Boldneſs, the *Germans* in Stature, the *Spaniards* in Strength of Body, the *Africans* in Stratagem, or the *Greeks* in Learning and the Arts of civil Life. Nay it is evident from Hiſtory, that they were inferior in all theſe Reſpects. But as to what regards the uſe and exerciſe of Arms, the choice of Soldiers, and the training them up in all the Duties of War; here indeed lay their chief Excellence, and by this they were enabled to baffle all the Advantages of their Enemies, whether derived from Nature or Education. We have already obſerved, that none were admitted into the Legions 'till they had reached their ſeventeenth Year. But tho' this was the age for entering the Service, it was not that when they began to learn. For as War was the darling Study of the *Romans*, they habituated their Youth to it from their Infancy, and carefully inſtructed them in all its Branches, having ſet apart the Field of *Mars* for this purpoſe, which was a kind of military School within the City. We are not however to imagine, that they looked upon this early Inſtitution as ſufficient, or were leſs aſſiduous in exerciſing their Men, after they were admitted into the Service. They knew that conſtant Practice alone makes Troops expert, and brings them to the habit of applying their Knowledge with readineſs upon all Occaſions. Hence not only among the younger Soldiers, but even among thoſe of oldeſt ſtanding in the Army, the military Exerciſes were continued without intermiſſion. Theſe Exerciſes had a threefold Tendency: to inure the Men to Labour, and render them robuſt and active: to inſtruct them in the uſe of their Arms: and laſtly, to teach them the neceſſary Evolutions, and how to preſerve their Ranks and Orders, in Marches, Battles, and Incampments.

XIII. AS to the firſt, the *Romans* took great pains to form their Youth to be nimble in running, active to leap, ſtrong to throw the Bar and to wreſtle, which are all neceſſary Qualifications in a Soldier. For running and nimbleneſs fits them to get poſſeſſion of a Place before the Enemy, to fall upon them on a ſudden in their Quarters, and to purſue them with more execution in a Rout. Activity enables them with greater eaſe to avoid Blows, leap a Ditch, or climb a Bank. And Strength makes them carry their Arms better, ſtrike better, and endure the Shock better. Swimming was likewiſe conſidered as an eſſential part of a military Education. Armies are not ſure of Bridges wherever they come, nor are Boats always to be had; ſo that if Men cannot ſwim, they will neceſſarily be deprived of ſeveral Conveniences, and loſe many fair Opportunities of Action. One principal Reaſon why the *Romans* made choice of the *Campus Martius* to exerciſe their Youth in was, its nearneſs to the *Tiber*, into which they plunged after their Fatigues, to accuſtom themſelves to Swimming, and cleanſe away the Duſt and Sweat. But of all their

Exerciſes of this kind, none was purſued with greater attention, than the inuring the Troops to the military Pace; that is, to walk twenty miles, and ſometimes four and twenty, in five Hours. This habituated the Soldiers to a certain ſtated and regular Progreſs in their Marches, taught them to keep cloſe together, and prevented their expoſing themſelves ſcattered and diſperſed to the Enemy. They were obliged likewiſe on theſe Occaſions, to carry Burdens of threeſcore Pound weight, which not only accuſtomed them to bear Fatigue, but was found ſerviceable in many other reſpects. For whether it might be neceſſary in an Expedition to take along with them ſeveral Days Proviſions, or to carry a certain quantity of Water thro' a deſart and ſandy Country, or to provide a number of Stakes for the execution of any particular Enterprize; againſt all theſe Exigencies they had prepared themſelves by the Practice of which we ſpeak: and hence great Dangers were many times avoided, and great Victories many times obtained.

XIV. THE ſecond Particular we mentioned in the *Roman* Exerciſes was, the inſtructing the Men in the uſe of their Arms. Here alſo we meet with many Proofs of the Induſtry and Sagacity of that People. They ſet up a great Poſt about ſix Foot high, ſuitable to the ſtature of a Man, and faſtened it ſo ſtrongly, that no Blows might be able to batter or ſhake it. This the Soldiers were wont to aſſail with all Inſtruments of War, as if it had been indeed a real Enemy. Sometimes they would aim their Blows at the Head, ſometimes ſtrike it on the Face, then on the Sides, Legs, before and behind, now retreating, and then advancing again; during all which they were taught to proceed with ſo much Caution, that in directing their Weapon againſt their Adverſary, they ſhould not mean-while lay themſelves open to Wounds. By this Contrivance they learnt how to place their Blows aright, and became dexterous and nimble, both at defending themſelves, and offending their Enemies. They were inſtructed rather to thruſt than to cut with their Swords; becauſe Thruſts are more mortal, harder to be defended, and he that makes them is not ſo eaſily diſcovered, and is readier to double his Thruſt than his Blow. We muſt not here forget, that in theſe Exerciſes they made uſe of Helmets, Shields, and Swords, double the weight of common Weapons. This made them ready and alert in Battle, which they found ſo far from being attended with any unforeſeen Incumbrances, that it was rather an eaſe from the fatigue of ordinary Duty. Nor let any one wonder, that the *Romans* were ſo extremely attentive to theſe little things, ſince according to the manner of fighting then uſed, in which the Troops encountered hand to hand, every ſmall Advantage was of great Importance. They were beſides ſenſible, that Experience in this kind makes Men bold and courageous; for no one fears to do that which he thinks he underſtands. A Soldier who had often made trial of himſelf in theſe imaginary Combats, grew impatient to come to action in good earneſt, that he might the better judge of his own Proficiency, and have an opportunity of putting that in Practice, which he had ſo well learnt in Theory. Hence Battles were not what they dreaded, but what they deſired: and Generals often found it more difficult to reſtrain their Men from fighting, and check the Ardor of their Courage, where Prudence obliged them to decline the Onſet; than to prevail upon them to face the Enemy, when they judged it neceſſary to come to an Engagement.

XV. BUT it is not ſufficient to inure Men to Labour, to make them ſtrong, ſwift, and expert at the uſe of their Weapons: they muſt learn likewiſe

wiſe to keep their Ranks well, to obey Orders, and follow the Directions and Signals of their Commanders. This was the third Branch of the *Roman* Exerciſes, about which they were no leſs ſolicitous, than about the other two. I ſhall not here enter into a minute Detail of the common Evolutions, the opening and cloſing of the Files, doubling their Ranks, turning to the right and left, Marchings, Wheelings, *&c.* becauſe they differed but little from the Practice of the preſent Age. Their manner of forming too in order of Battle, their Conduct in an Attack or Repulſe, with the general diſpoſition of their Marches, will come in more properly under other Heads of this Diſcourſe. Let it ſuffice for the preſent to obſerve, that they exerciſed their Men without intermiſſion in all theſe different Branches of the Service, and by the force of conſtant Habit, brought them to that degree of Expertneſs, that they could practiſe without Hurry and Confuſion in the heat of Fight, what they had been ſo thoroughly trained to in the Field. Above all it was their particular Care, to accuſtom the Troops to rally and recover their Order readily when broken. To this end, beſides diſtinguiſhing the ſeveral Companies by peculiar Enſigns, every Man had his fixed and invariable Poſt in the Battalion, and was taught by long Practice, to know in a manner habitually, the number of his File, his Place in that File, his right and left-hand Man where he belonged to the front Rank, and both theſe and his File-Leader where he belonged to the other Ranks. Nay ſo very curious were the *Romans* in this Point, that to imprint theſe things the deeper upon the Minds of the Soldiers, they cauſed them to be engraven in great Characters upon their Helmets and Bucklers.

XVI. NOR were they leſs careful in training up the Cavalry, whom they taught particularly to ride well, and ſit faſt when they came to a Charge. To this end they had Horſes of Wood upon which they were exerciſed, vaulting upon them, ſometimes with their Arms, and ſometimes without, very neatly and exactly, without any aſſiſtance; ſo that upon a Signal from their Captain they were immediately on horſe-back, and upon another Signal as ſoon upon the Ground. As they fought in Squadrons, like the Cavalry of our time, their Evolutions were much the ſame with thoſe in uſe at preſent, allowing only for the difference of Armour; and among the Horſe, as well as the Foot, were carried on without intermiſſion. Indeed there is nothing more admirable in the whole *Roman* Diſcipline, than the continual Exerciſe to which the Troops were kept, either within or without the Camp; inſomuch that they were never idle, and had ſcarce any reſpite from Duty. The new raiſed Soldiers performed their Exerciſes regularly twice a Day, and the old ones once: for it was not, in the Opinion of this People, length of Service that conſtituted warlike and veteran Troops, but the uninterrupted Habit and Practice of Arms; nor did they conſider an unexerciſed Soldier, after what number of Campaigns you will, as any other than a Novice in the Profeſſion. Accordingly they were conſtant and indefatigable in training their Men to all the different Operations of the Field. They obliged them to make haſty Marches of a conſiderable length, laden with their Arms and ſeveral Paliſades, and that often in ſteep and craggy Countries. They habituated them always to keep their Ranks, even in the midſt of Diſorder and Confuſion, and never to loſe ſight of their Standards. They made them charge each other in mock Battles, of which the Officers, Generals, and even the Conſul himſelf were Witneſſes, and in which they thought it for their Glory to ſhare in perſon. When they had no Enemy in the Field, the Troops were employed in conſiderable Works, as well to keep them in Exerciſe, as for the publick Utility.

Such

Such in particular were the Highways, called for that reaſon *Viæ militares*, which ſtill ſubſiſt, and are the fruits of that wiſe and ſalutary Cuſtom.

XVII. HOW much the *Romans* relied upon this manner of training and employing their Troops, appears evidently from the Conduct of their Senate and Generals, during a courſe of ſeveral Ages. For in all their Difficulties and Straits, this was that to which they had immediate Recourſe, as their ſureſt Refuge, and the only means by which they could hope to extricate themſelves. Did they think themſelves expoſed to any Danger, or were they deſirous to repair ſome Loſs? It was a conſtant Practice among them, to invigorate and give new Life to their military Diſcipline. Are they engaged in a War with the *Latins*, a People no leſs martial than themſelves? *Manlius* reflects upon the beſt Method of ſtrengthening the Command in the Field, and puts to death his own Son, for conquering without his Orders. Are they defeated before *Numantia*? *Scipio Æmilianus* immediately removes the ſeveral Blandiſhments which had enervated them. Have the *Roman* Legions paſſed under the Yoke in *Numidia*? *Metellus* wipes away the Ignominy, the inſtant he has obliged them to reſume their ancient Inſtitutions. *Marius*, that he may be enabled to vanquiſh the *Cimbri* and the *Teutones*, begins by diverting the courſe of Rivers: and *Sylla* employs in ſuch hard Labour his Soldiers, who were terrified at the War which was carrying on againſt *Mithridates*, that they ſue for Battle, to put an end to their Hardſhips. *Publius Naſica* made the *Romans* build a Fleet of Ships at a time when they had no occaſion for ſuch a Force. In a word, Induſtry, Diligence, and a Perſeverance in all kind of military Toils, was the very Characteriſtick of this People: they dreaded Idleneſs more than an Enemy.

XVIII. THESE Men thus inured were generally healthy and vigorous. We do not find by Hiſtorians, that the *Roman* Armies, which waged War in ſo great a variety of Climates, fell often a prey to Diſeaſes; whereas in the preſent Age, we daily ſee Armies, without once engaging, periſh and melt away, if I may uſe the Expreſſion, in a ſingle Campaign. Nor can I forbear taking notice, that the Dexterity and Addreſs the Soldiers attained, by means of their continual Exerciſes, ſerved not only to render them skilful and active in the Duties of the Field, but inſpired them likewiſe with Boldneſs and Intrepidity. In the Battles fought in our Age, every ſingle Soldier has very little Security and Confidence, except in the Multitude: but among the *Romans*, every Individual, more robuſt and of greater Experience in War, as well as more inured to the Fatigues of it than his Enemy, relied upon himſelf only. He was naturally endued with Courage, or in other Words, with that Virtue which a ſenſibility of our own Strength inſpires. To the ſame admirable Diſcipline too were they indebted, for a certain Haughtineſs and Opinion of ſuperiority, which made them rank themſelves above the Troops of all other Nations, and deſpiſe the ſervice of any foreign Prince or State, compared with that of their own Country. Deſertions are very common among us for this Reaſon, becauſe the Soldiers are the dregs of every Nation, and not one of them poſſeſſes, or thinks himſelf poſſeſſed of a certain Advantage, which renders his Condition preferable to that of his Adverſaries. But among the *Romans* they were leſs frequent; it being ſcarce poſſible that Soldiers, raiſed from among a People naturally ſo imperious and aſpiring, and ſo ſure of commanding over others, ſhould demean themſelves to ſuch a degree as to ceaſe to be *Romans*. We may likewiſe obſerve, as a neceſſary Conſequence of their being ſo carefully trained, that 'twas next to impoſſible in a Battle, how unfortu-

nate

nate ſoever, but ſome Troops muſt rally in one Part or other of it, or the Enemy be defeated in ſome quarter of the Field; either of which was often ſufficient to ſecure the Victory. And indeed we find every where in Hiſtory, that whenever the *Romans* happened to be overpowered in the beginning, whether by numbers or the fierceneſs of the Onſet, they ſeldom failed at laſt to wreſt the Victory out of the Enemy's hands.

XIX. THERE are ſtill many other Particulars that might be mentioned to the advantage of the *Roman* Diſcipline: their ſtrict Regulations with regard to all the different Branches of the Service: their admirable Policy in making Motives of Honour and Shame operate ſtrongly upon the Troops: their ſteddy adherence to the received Maxims of War, ſo as never on any Occaſion to abate of the rigor of military Severity, where the Soldiers were found to have neglected their Duty, abandoned their Poſt, thrown away their Arms, or ſurrendered themſelves to the Enemy. Hiſtory abounds with Examples of this kind. As their Armies were for the moſt part but ſmall, the Commander had a better Opportunity of knowing the ſeveral Individuals, and could more eaſily perceive the various Faults and Miſdemeanors committed by the Soldiery, againſt which care was taken to provide immediately. Nor were they ſo tenacious of their own Cuſtoms, as not to pay a due attention to thoſe of other Nations, which they adopted without heſitation, wherever they appeared attended with any real Benefit. In their War with *Pyrrhus*, they improved themſelves in the knowledge of Poſts and Incampments: in that with *Hannibal* they learnt the true uſe of Cavalry, and how to apply Addreſs and Stratagem in the conduct of a Campaign. If any Nation boaſted, either from Nature or its Inſtitution, any peculiar Advantage, the *Romans* immediately made uſe of it. They employed their utmoſt Endeavours to procure Horſes from *Numidia*, Bowmen from *Crete*, Slingers from the *Balearean* Iſles, and Ships from the *Rhodians:* ſo that it may with juſtice be ſaid of them, that no Nation in the World ever prepared for War with ſo much Wiſdom, and carried it on with ſo much Intrepidity.

XX. THUS have we endeavoured to give ſome account of the Arms and Diſcipline of the *Romans*, and to point out their excellency over thoſe of other Nations. How much they were indebted to them for their Grandeur and Succeſſes, appears evidently from this: that ſo long as their Armies adhered ſtrictly to theſe primitive Inſtitutions, they were invincible; but in proportion as they deviated from them, became like other Men. When they began to look upon their Armour as too weighty and cumberſome, and their Diſcipline as attended with too many Reſtraints, and of courſe to relax in theſe two important Articles, they gradually ſunk to a level with the Troops of their Enemies, and at laſt ſo totally degenerated, that we find not in their Behaviour the leaſt traces of their original Bravery. I know it is a Maxim of long ſtanding, that *Money is the Sinews of War.* How far this may ſuit the Conſtitution of the preſent Age, I will not pretend to ſay; but it ſeems by no means to agree with Antiquity. I am ſure the whole current of Hiſtory is againſt it. Had this been the caſe, *Cyrus* could never have prevailed againſt *Cræſus*, nor the *Greeks* againſt the *Perſians*, nor the *Romans* againſt the *Carthaginians.* It is true Money is requiſite for the carrying on of a War, but not principally and in the firſt place. Good Soldiers and good Diſcipline are of infinitely greater avail. Where theſe are, it will be eaſy to find Money; but Money is not always ſufficient to procure them. Had not the *Romans*

done more in their Wars with their Iron than their Gold, the Treaſures of the whole World would not have been ſufficient for them, conſidering their great Enterprizes abroad, and their no leſs Difficulties at home. But having good and well diſciplined Troops, they were never in want of Money; for thoſe who were afraid of their Armies, ſtrove with Emulation to ſupply them. Nay it is remarkable, that their moſt celebrated Victories, and thoſe which required the greateſt exertion of Strength, were gained during the period of their Poverty. It was then that they ſubdued the *Samnites*, forced *Pyrrhus* to quit *Italy*, and cut in pieces the mighty Armies of the *Carthaginians*. After they became poſſeſſed of the Treaſures of the Univerſe, they had for the moſt part only weak and effeminate Nations to deal with, and were ſo far from increaſing in real Power, that by the concurrent Teſtimony of all Hiſtorians, they are to be conſidered from that time as upon the decline. *Livy*, in that famous Queſtion relating to the *Greeks* and *Romans*, where he endeavours to determine what would have been the Event, had *Alexander the Great* turned his Arms againſt *Italy*, obſerves that in War there are three things fundamentally neceſſary; good Soldiers, good Officers, and good Fortune: and then arguing whether *Alexander* or the *Romans* were more conſiderable in theſe three Points, concludes without the leaſt mention of Money. It is well known that the *Spartans*, ſo long as they adhered to their primitive Inſtitutions and Poverty, were the moſt powerful people of all Greece, and never proved unſucceſsful in their Wars, till they became poſſeſſed of great Riches and Revenues. I conclude therefore, that it was by the Bravery of their Troops, the Advantage of their Arms, and the Excellence of their Diſcipline, that the *Romans* rendered themſelves victorious over all Nations: and accordingly we find, that when they ceaſed to have the ſuperiority in theſe, the Revenues of the whole World were not ſufficient to defend them.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Spirit and Bravery of the Roman *Troops.*

1. ALTHO' military Diſcipline, and the continual exerciſe of Arms, naturally conduce to make a People bold, daring, and intrepid; yet there is ſomething ſo peculiar in the Spirit and Character of the *Romans*, that I flatter myſelf it will not be unacceptable to the Reader, to offer a few Reflexions on this Subject, and give him ſome inſight into thoſe Inſtitutions and Maxims of Conduct, which chiefly contributed to exalt their Courage, and animate their Bravery. Two things here naturally preſent themſelves to our conſideration. Firſt, the admirable Principles upon which the Commonwealth was founded. Secondly, the ſucceſſion of great Men that for ſeveral Ages prevailed in it, and who ſupported, invigorated, and from time to time gave new Life to theſe Principles. Among the Principles of the *Roman* Polity, none ſeems to have taken deeper root, than the fear of the Gods, and a veneration for Religion. This perhaps, at firſt ſight, may not be thought ſo immediately to concern a martial People: but if we examine the effect of it upon their Armies, and the many valuable Purpoſes it was made to ſerve in War, we ſhall have reaſon to conclude, that of all their Inſtitutions, not one contributed more to the Grandeur of the State. For hence in particular it was, that the military

military Oath was held ſo ſacred among the Troops, and became an inviolable bond of Fidelity and Subjection. The Soldiers, however diſpleaſed and enraged, did not dare to quit their Generals, ſo long as this Tie was ſuppoſed to remain in force; nay ſo very tender and ſcrupulous were they, that even in their greateſt Impatience to be diſcharged, they would yet never admit of any Interpretation, that carried in it the leaſt ſtrain or appearance of Deceit. We have a remarkable Example of this, in their Behaviour to *Quinctius Cincinnatus*, after the defeat of *Appius Herdonius*. That *Sabine* had ſeized the Capitol with four thouſand Men. The Danger was imminent, and required ſpeedy redreſs: but the Tribunes, who were then puſhing the *Terentian* Law; in order to force the Senate to a compliance, oppoſed the Levies. The People however, partly by Promiſes, partly by remonſtrating the danger of the City, were at length prevailed upon to take an Oath of Fidelity to the Conſuls; and marching againſt *Herdonius*, ſoon recovered poſſeſſion of the Capitol. *Publius Valerius*, to whom the charge of the Attack fell, chancing to be ſlain, *Quinctius Cincinnatus* was immediately choſen in his room; who to keep the Troops employed, and leave them no room to think of their Law *Terentilla*, ordered them out upon an Expedition againſt the *Volſci*, alledging, that the Oath they had taken to the late Conſul obliged them to follow him. The Tribunes, to evade that Engagement, pretended that the Oath bound them only to the perſon of *Valerius*, and ſo was buried with him in his Tomb. But the People, more ſincere and plain-hearted, could not reſolve to ſhelter themſelves under ſo frivolous a Diſtinction, and therefore prepared every Man to take Arms, tho' very unwillingly. *Nondum* (ſays *Livy*) *hæc, quæ nunc tenet ſeculum, negligentia Deûm venerat, nec interpretando ſibi quiſque jusjurandum, & leges aptas faciebat.* "That neglect of the Gods, which ſo much diſhonours the preſent "Age, was not known in thoſe Days, nor had Men learnt the pernicious Art "of interpreting the Laws of Religion according to their own Purpoſes."

II. I could produce many Inſtances of the like nature, all tending to ſhew, how ſerviceable Religion was, to the governing of Armies, the uniting of the People, and the keeping them in due ſubjection to their Officers and Magiſtrates: inſomuch that ſhould it fall into diſpute, whether *Rome* was more indebted to *Romulus* or *Numa*, I am clearly of Opinion that *Numa* would have the preference. For where Religion is once fixed, military Diſcipline may be eaſily introduced; but where Religion is wanting, Diſcipline is not brought in without great difficulty, and never can be carried to perfection. If we enquire into the nature of the Religion profeſſed by the *Romans*, we find that it ran much upon the Anſwers of Oracles, Divinations, Soothſaying, Sacrifices, and innumerable other Ceremonies, that argue more of Superſtition, than any juſt knowledge of the Deity. But abſurd as this Religion may appear, it had nevertheleſs a wonderful Influence upon the Minds of Men, and was often made uſe of with ſucceſs, to inſpire Courage in Battles and Dangers. It is well known that all their military Expeditions were preceded by the Auguries and Auſpices; and according to the Omens that offered on theſe Occaſions, did the People judge of the iſſue. Hence their wiſeſt and beſt Generals, by a ſtrict Regard to theſe Obſervances, and accommodating the Ceremonies of Religion to their own Deſigns, generally found means to give a favourable turn to the Omens; which greatly contributed to exalt the Courage of their Troops, and made them face the Enemy with Confidence. On the contrary, it is obſerved, that where the uſual Forms were neglected, and Generals affected to act in contempt of the Auſpices, they ſeldom ſucceeded in their Deſigns.

Deſigns. This may well enough be accounted for, without allowing any real Influence to theſe Ceremonies, or ſuppoſing that the flight and chirping of Birds could in the leaſt affect future Events. Nothing in truth can be more trifling, than the pretended Preſages of which we ſpeak: but as they were firmly believed by the bulk of the Army; where at any time they appeared unfavourable, it could not fail of caſting a great damp upon the Spirits of the Soldiers. And yet this does not ſeem to me to have been the principal cauſe of thoſe Miſcarriages, that were uſually obſerved to follow a neglect of the Auſpices. The Ignorance and Incapacity of the Generals will much better account for them; nor need we a ſtronger Proof of this Incapacity, than the Contempt with which they affected to treat Religion. War is neceſſarily attended with ſo much Uncertainty, and requires ſuch a multitude of different Attentions, that a prudent General will be far from neglecting any Advantages, which he ſees may be drawn from the eſtabliſhed Prejudices of thoſe under his command; much leſs will he turn theſe very Prejudices to his own hurt, by an ill-judged Contempt: and the General who is ſo indiſcreet as to act in this manner, plainly diſcovers himſelf unfit for the conduct of any great Enterprize. I know it is aſſerted by ſome, that Religion checks the natural Fierceneſs and Obſtinacy of Men, and renders them poor-ſpirited and abject: but whoever talks in this manner, ſhews himſelf little converſant in the Hiſtory of Mankind. Conſider the *Romans* in the beſt times of the Republick, the *Engliſh* under Queen *Elizabeth* and *Oliver Cromwell*, the *French* in the Age of *Henry* the fourth, the United Provinces in that of *Philip* the ſecond, and the *Suedes* under *Guſtavus Vaſa*, and then tell me, whether the moſt flouriſhing and formidable periods of Nations, be not thoſe when a Spirit of Religion has ſtrongly taken poſſeſſion of the Minds of the People.

III. NEXT to a veneration for Religion, love of their Country was the prevailing Characteriſtick of the *Romans*. This Virtue naturally rouſes Men to great Deſigns, and begets Vigour and Perſeverance in the execution of them; and as it had taken a deeper root among the People of whom we ſpeak, than in any other Nation mentioned in Hiſtory, no wonder we here meet with ſo many Inſtances of Magnanimity, public Spirit, Fortitude, and all the Virtues that tend to form a race of Heroes. It is certain that the Conſtitution of the *Roman* Commonwealth was peculiarly fitted to nouriſh this Spirit. The People had many Ties and Obligations to the State, many endearing Connections to inſpire the love of it. They choſe the Senators by whoſe Counſels the Republick was governed, the Magiſtrates by whom Juſtice was adminiſtered, and the Generals who conducted and terminated their Wars; ſo that the public Succeſſes were in a manner their own Work. Hence the Principle of which we ſpeak became ſo ſtrong in them, that they were ready to ſacrifice every other Conſideration to it, whether of Intereſt or Ambition. No Hazards, no Sufferings appeared great, where their Country ſtood in need of their Aſſiſtance. We find even in the Diſputes between the different Orders of the State, where the Paſſions of Men are wont moſt ſtrongly to be engaged, and where particular Animoſities are but too apt to get the better of Reaſon, that the Conſideration of the public Safety was always ſufficient to calm their Reſentments, and bring them to Temper and Moderation. How violent ſoever the Conteſt might be, however much the Parties appeared exaſperated againſt one another, they were yet ſure to unite, when any Danger from without threatned the Commonwealth. This is evident thro' the whole courſe of the *Roman* Hiſtory, and requires not to be illuſtrated by particular Examples. I ſhall therefore

fore only add, that a Principle ſo powerful and univerſally diffuſed, as it could not fail of having many deſirable Effects upon the People, ſo did it in a particular manner tend to render them brave and reſolute: for Courage being of indiſpenſible neceſſity to the defence of our Country, wherever the love of that predominates, there are we ſure to find the other likewiſe.

IV. BUT if the *Romans* are remarkable for the love they bore their Country, they are no leſs ſo when we conſider how paſſionately fond they were of Liberty. This Spirit ſubſiſted from the very foundation of the State. Tho' *Rome* was at firſt governed by Kings, theſe Kings were far from being abſolute: for beſides the Authority enjoyed by the Senate, the People too had a conſiderable ſhare in the Adminiſtration; ſince to their Aſſemblies were committed the creation of Magiſtrates, the enacting of Laws, and the reſolving upon Peace or War. Indeed, under *Tarquin the Proud*, the Government degenerated into a real Tyranny: but this, inſtead of extinguiſhing, ſerved only to rouſe the love of Liberty; and the behaviour of *Brutus*, who put his own Sons to death, for attempting to reſtore the royal Authority, made ſo ſtrong an Impreſſion upon the Minds of the People, that they henceforward conſidered Slavery as the greateſt of Evils, and bent all their Thoughts to the preſerving and enlarging the Freedom they had acquired. I need not here ſay, how much Liberty tends to enoble the Mind, and how neceſſary it is to the Proſperity and Greatneſs of a State. It is well known that *Athens*, ſo long as it continued under the Tyranny of *Piſiſtratus* and his Deſcendents, made ſcarce any figure in *Greece*; whereas ſoon after their Expulſion, it roſe to ſo aſtoniſhing a pitch of Grandeur, as not only to baffle all the Efforts of the *Perſians*, but even to render itſelf formidable to that mighty Empire. And if we look into the Hiſtory of the *Roman* Commonwealth, we find, that in proportion as Liberty increaſed, and the People got from under the dominion of the Nobles, they became inſpired with a more elevated Courage, a more unwearied Fortitude, and puſhed their Conqueſts with greater rapidity. Nay in the very infancy of their Freedom, when *Tarquin* was endeavouring to recover his loſt Auhority, they gave manifeſt indications of that Spirit, for which they are ſo juſtly admired by ſucceeding Ages. It is upon this Occaſion that we read of the aſtoniſhing Valour of *Horatius Cocles*, the intrepid Firmneſs of *Scævola*, and the maſculine Boldneſs of *Clelia*; inſomuch that *Porſenna* King of the *Cluſians*, who had undertaken the reinſtating of *Tarquin*, admiring their Bravery, would not any longer diſturb them in the enjoyment of a Liberty, to which their Merit gave them ſo juſt a title, and which he found them ſo reſolutely bent to defend.

V. AND here I cannot but obſerve, that this paſſionate deſire of Freedom gave riſe to a peculiar Circumſtance in the *Roman* Conſtitution, which tho' ſeemingly inconſiſtent with the Proſperity of the State, was yet in reality one of the principal cauſes of its Grandeur, as it more than any thing contributed to exalt the Character of the People, and produce among them the moſt finiſhed Models in every Species of Merit. What I mean is, thoſe continual Diſſenſions between the Nobles and Commons, of which we meet with ſo frequent mention in the early Ages of the Commonwealth. Two Bodies at *Rome* divided the whole Authority: the Senate and the People. A mutual Jealouſy, founded on the one ſide upon a deſire of governing, on the other upon that of keeping themſelves free and independent, raiſed between them Contentions and Quarrels, which ended not but with the Republick itſelf.

Theſe Conteſts, tho' attended with many Inconveniences, procured notwithſtanding a conſiderable Advantage to the State, in forming a number of Perſons of diſtinguiſhed Merit, and perpetuating a ſucceſſion of them in the Commonwealth. The Patricians, who were obſtinately bent to keep to themſelves alone the Commands, the Honours, the Magiſtracies; as they could not obtain them but by the Suffrages of the Plebeians, were obliged to uſe their utmoſt Endeavours to prove themſelves worthy by ſuperior Qualities, by real and repeated Services, by illuſtrious Actions, of which their Adverſaries themſelves were Witneſſes, and to which they could not refuſe their Eſteem and Applauſe. This neceſſity of depending on the Judgment of the People for admiſſion to Poſts, obliged the young Patricians to acquire all the Merit capable of gaining the Suffrages of Judges, who examined them rigorouſly, and were not inclined to have a remiſs Indulgence for the Candidates, as well out of love to the Honour and Welfare of the State, as out of an hereditary Jealouſy of the Patrician Order. The Plebeians on their ſide, in aſpiring to the higheſt Dignities of the State, were forced to prepare themſelves ſo as to convince their Brethren, that they had all the Qualities neceſſary to fill them with Honour. Proofs were to be given of a diſtinguiſhed Valour, of a wiſe and prudent Conduct, of a Capacity to diſcharge all the Functions of Government, and to paſs with Reputation thro' the ſeveral Offices, which led by degrees to the higheſt. It was needful to have not only the military Virtues, and Ability to conduct an Army; but the Talent of haranguing the Senate and People, of reporting the great Affairs of State, of anſwering foreign Ambaſſadors, and entering with them into the niceſt and moſt important Negotiations. By all theſe Obligations, impoſed by Ambition on the Plebeians, to qualify them for the Poſts to which they aſpired, they were under neceſſity of making proof of an accompliſhed Merit, and at leaſt equal to that of the Patricians.

VI. THESE were ſome of the Advantages ariſing from the ſharp Conteſts between the Senate and People, from whence reſulted a lively Emulation between the two Orders, and a happy Neceſſity of diſplaying Talents, which perhaps by a continual Concord and Peace would have lain dormant and fruitleſs: juſt as, if I may uſe the Compariſon, from a Steel ſtruck with a Flint, Sparks of Fire fly out, which without that Violence would remain for ever concealed. This is not all. It was by means of theſe Conteſts that the public Liberty was improved and ſettled, without which the Commonwealth would never have become great and flouriſhing. By the Revolution which expelled *Tarquin the Proud*, the Commons of *Rome* were delivered from a Tyrant, but not from Tyranny. The Patricians ſtill held them under ſubjection: and tho' while their Fears of *Tarquin*'s return were alive and ſtrong, they behaved with great Lenity and Moderation, yet no ſooner were they informed of that Prince's death, than the weight of Oppreſſion was renewed, and fell as heavy upon the People as ever. The *Valerian* Law, to permit Appeals from the Sentence of the Magiſtrates to the People aſſembled, was not ſufficient to protect the Plebeians from Injuſtice and Cruelty. They found it neceſſary to have Magiſtrates of their own Body, to ſcreen them from the Tyranny of the Great, and therefore extorted from the Senate a conſent to the eſtabliſhment of the Tribunitian power. The inſtitution of the *Comitia Tributa*, and the practice of bringing into Judgment, before thoſe Aſſemblies, the moſt exalted of the Nobles, upon Accuſations of Treaſon againſt the People, was another Bulwark againſt the overflowings of Ambition. The publi-

cation

cation of the Laws of the twelve Tables, gave ſome Check to the abuſe of that Prerogative, which the Patricians tenaciouſly kept, of being the ſole Judges in civil Cauſes: and on many other Occaſions we find, that the Commons, urged by Oppreſſion to Fury, exerted their natural Strength in ſuch manner as proclaimed them ſovereign Maſters of the Adminiſtration, and gradually extended their Privileges.

VII. BUT the Commonwealth of *Rome* was never truly a free State, 'till after the publication of the *Licinian* Laws, thoſe Laws which, in their Conſequences, made Merit alone the ordinary Scale whereby to aſcend to the higheſt Offices; and which, by admitting the Plebeians to a reaſonable ſhare of what was purchaſed with their Blood, delivered them from that ſervile ſubjection to the wealthy Nobles, in which their Indigence had ſo long detained them. From this Period, the *Roman* People, when they made Laws, or elected Magiſtrates for the execution of them, were generally ſpeaking free from all undue Influence; not overawed, as before, by the Rich and the Great, nor conſtrained by any Force, but that of Reaſon and natural Juſtice, in the moſt abſolute ſubjection to which is the moſt perfect Freedom. No Citizen, who had ſhewed ſuperior Talents and Virtue, ſtood excluded, on account of the low degree of his Birth, from the Dignities of the State: and hence proceeded an Emulation among the Individuals to ſurpaſs each other in deſerving Honours. Indeed the haughty Patricians, as, when vanquiſhed by the Plebeians, they had given ground with an angry Reluctance, and retired fighting, ſo they afterwards, from time to time, ſhewed a ſtrong Diſpoſition to renew the War, in order to regain their unrighteous Sovereignty: but their Efforts were faint and ineffectual; and at length acquieſcing in what they could not undo, there enſued domeſtic Peace and Union, and an eſtabliſhed Liberty. Union at home gave new ſtrength to the State; and Liberty ſeems to have inſpired the People with a nobler Spirit, a more exalted Courage, and a greater Ardor to enlarge the Bounds of their Empire. For whereas before, during the ſpace of four hundred Years, they had not puſhed their Conqueſts beyond a few Leagues round the City; we find that from this period, in the courſe of ſeventy Years, they by a ſeries of Victories made themſelves maſters of all *Italy*. And tho' deſtitute of naval Strength and naval Skill, their next Enterpriſe was againſt a rival Republick beyond the Continent; a Republick that with greater Riches, and more ample Territories than theirs, had poſſeſſion of the abſolute Dominion of the Sea. The Boldneſs of the Undertaking, and the amazing Conſtancy with which they ſupported it, in ſpite of the moſt terrible Adverſities, are not to be paralleled in the Hiſtory of any other Nation: but the *Roman* Legions were, at that time, Legions of free Citizens, whoſe predominant Paſſion was Glory, and who placed the higheſt Glory in facing every Danger, and ſurmounting every Difficulty, to preſerve their Liberty, and extend their Empire.

VIII. THE love of Glory is indeed a natural Conſequence of Liberty, and if to this we join that remarkable diſregard of Wealth, which prevailed for ſo many Ages among this People, we ſhall have reaſon to conclude, that theſe likewiſe contributed not a little, towards forming in them that firm and intrepid Bravery, which makes a diſtinguiſhing part of their Character. For the love of Glory puſhes Men on to great Actions, and a diſregard of Wealth prevents their being biaſed by mean ſordid Views, or ſhaken by the low Conſiderations of Self-Intereſt. It is certain that Glory was the main Spring of

of all thoſe noble and illuſtrious Undertakings, which have rendered the *Romans* ſo famous. By this Motive, the Republick, after Liberty prevailed, made an incredible progreſs in a ſhort time. The frequent Examples of Patriotiſm, and of an inviolable attachment to the public Good, of which *Rome* was witneſs in thoſe critical times, and which ſhe rewarded in ſo eminent a manner, kindled not only in the Patricians, but likewiſe among the Plebeians, that noble Fire of Emulation and Glory, which dares all things, and influenced all along the whole Nation. Greedy of Praiſe, they reckoned Money as nothing, and valued it only to diſperſe it. They were content with moderate Fortunes, ſays *Saluſt*, but deſired Glory without meaſure. Accordingly we find, that for four hundred Years after the building of *Rome*, the City was in very great Poverty: and of this the moſt probable Cauſe ſeems to be, that Poverty was no impediment to Preferment. Virtue was the only thing required in the election of Magiſtrates, and the diſtribution of Offices; and wherever it was found, let the Perſon, or Family be ever ſo poor, he was ſure to be advanced. *Quinctius Cincinnatus* was taken from the Plough, and raiſed to the Office of Dictator, tho' his Eſtate did not exceed four Acres of Land. *Fabricius* and *Attilius Regulus* are likewiſe Examples of this kind; and indeed the *Roman* Hiſtory every where abounds with them.

IX. THE Thirſt of Glory uſually produces that of Dominion. It appears noble to be Maſters, to command others, to compoſe Laws, to be feared and obeyed. This Paſſion, natural to Mankind, was more ſtrong and active in the *Romans*, than in any other People. One would think, at ſeeing the air of Authority they very early aſſume, that they already believed themſelves deſtined to become one day Lords of the Univerſe. Nay it appears from many Indications in their Hiſtory, that this Notion ſubſiſted from the Foundation of the State. The Anſwers and Interpretations of the Augurs frequently glanced this way. A Head was found in digging for the Foundations of the Capitol. This was given out to imply the eternity of their Empire, and that the City to which that Temple belonged, was to become the head of the Univerſe. We ſee likewiſe in the Speech of *Coriolanus* to the Deputies of the Senate, upon occaſion of his inveſting *Rome* with an Army of *Volſcians*, that the Conceit of univerſal Dominion not only ſtrongly prevailed in his time, but was carefully cheriſhed among the People. Nor was it without reaſon that the Senate contrived to raiſe and propagate this Perſuaſion, as it tended wonderfully to exalt the Courage of the Citizens, and not only animated them in the purſuit of Conqueſt, but kept them firm and ſteddy under the ſevereſt Strokes of Adverſity. Thus at the ſame time that Poverty and a diſregard of Wealth rendered them modeſt, the love of Glory and Dominion inſpired them with Magnanimity. When put into Command, and placed at the head of Armies, Kings appeared but little before them; nor was any Danger, Difficulty, or Oppoſition able to diſmay them: but when their Commiſſions expired, and they returned to a private Station; none ſo frugal, none ſo humble, none ſo laborious, ſo obedient to the Magiſtrates, or reſpectful to their Superiors as they; inſomuch that one would think it impoſſible the ſame Minds ſhould be capable of ſuch ſtrange Alterations.

X. FROM theſe diſtinguiſhing Characteriſticks of the *Roman* People, it will be eaſy to perceive, how Courage and a ſenſe of Honour came to be ſo prevalent in their Armies. And here I cannot but obſerve, that the military Rewards were wonderfully calculated to promote this Spirit; ſince without being

being conſiderable for their intrinſick Value, they were yet extremely coveted by the Troops, becauſe Glory, ſo precious to that warlike People, was annexed to them. A very ſmall Crown of Gold, and generally a Crown of Laurel or Oak-Leaves, became ineſtimable to the Soldiers, who knew not any Marks more excellent than thoſe of Virtue, nor any Diſtinction more noble, than that which flows from glorious Actions. Theſe Monuments of Renown were to them real Patents of Nobility, and deſcended to their Poſterity as a precious Inheritance. They were beſides ſure Titles to riſe to Places of Honour and Advantage, which were granted only to Merit, and not procured by Intrigue and Cabal. We have already had occaſion to take notice of the large Field there lay for promotion in the *Roman* Armies, and that ſuch as diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their Valour had reaſon to hope for every thing. What an agreeable proſpect for an inferior Officer, to behold at a diſtance the chief Dignities of the State and Army, as ſo many Rewards to which he could aſpire.

XI. AND indeed if any thing be capable of inſpiring Men with Bravery and a martial Ardor; to paſs thro' a ſucceſſion of different Honours, and to be intitled to a number of military Rewards, which were all conſidered as ſo many ſtanding Monuments of Renown, ſeems to bid faireſt for it. I cannot better repreſent the Effect this had upon the Troops, than by the following Relation, from which the Reader may form ſome Idea of what a *Roman* Soldier was. When the War againſt *Perſeus*, the laſt King of *Macedonia*, was reſolved upon at *Rome*; amongſt the other Meaſures taken for the ſucceſs of it, the Senate decreed, that the Conſul charged with that Expedition, ſhould raiſe as many Centurions and veteran Soldiers as he pleaſed, out of thoſe who did not exceed fifty Years of Age. Twenty-three Centurions, who had been *Primipili*, refuſed to take Arms, unleſs the ſame Rank was granted them, which they had in preceding Campaigns. As it was impoſſible to gratify them all, and they perſiſted obſtinately in their refuſal, the Affair was brought before the People. After *Popilius*, who had been Conſul two Years before, had pleaded the Cauſe of the Centurions, and the Conſul his own, one of the Centurions, who had appealed to the People, having obtained permiſſion to ſpeak, expreſſed himſelf to this effect.

XII. " I am called *Spurius Liguſtinus*, of the *Cruſtumine* Tribe, deſcended " from the *Sabines*. My Father left me a ſmall Field and Cottage, where I " was born, brought up, and now live. As ſoon as I was at age to marry, " he gave me his Brother's Daughter to Wife. She brought me no Portion, " but Liberty, Chaſtity, and a Fruitfulneſs ſufficient for the richeſt Houſes. " We have ſix Sons, and two Daughters, both married. Of my Sons four " have taken the Robe of Manhood, the other two are ſtill Infants. I began " to bear Arms in the Conſulſhip of *P. Sulpicius* and *C. Aurelius*, and ſerved " two Years as a private Soldier in the Army ſent into *Macedonia* againſt King " *Philip*. The third Year *T. Quintius Flamininus*, to reward me for my Ser- " vices, made me Captain of a Century in the tenth Maniple of the *Haſtati*. " I ſerved afterwards as a Volunteer in *Spain*, under *Cato*; and that General, " who is ſo excellent a Judge of Merit, made me firſt Centurion of the firſt " Maniple of the *Haſtati*. In the War againſt the *Ætolians* and King *Antio-* " *chus*, I roſe to the ſame rank amongſt the *Principes*. I afterwards made " ſeveral Campaigns, and in a very few Years have been four times *Primipilus*: " I have been four and thirty times rewarded by the Generals, have received

" ſix Civic Crowns, have ſerved two and twenty Campaigns, and am above
" fifty Years old. Tho' I had not completed the number of Years required
" by the Law, and my Age did not diſcharge me, ſubſtituting four of my
" Children in my place, I ſhould deſerve to be exempt from the neceſſity of
" ſerving. But by all I have ſaid, I only intend to ſhew the juſtice of my
" Cauſe. For the reſt, as long as thoſe who levy the Troops ſhall judge me ca-
" pable of bearing Arms, I ſhall not refuſe the Service. The Tribunes may
" rank me as they pleaſe, that is their Buſineſs: mine is to act, that none be
" ranked above me for Valour; as all the Generals under whom I have had
" the honour to ſerve, and all my Comrades can witneſs for me, I have hi-
" therto never failed to do. For you, Centurions, notwithſtanding your Ap-
" peal; as even during your youth you have never done any thing contrary
" to the Authority of the Magiſtrates and Senate, in my Opinion, it would be-
" come your Age, to ſhew yourſelves ſubmiſſive to the Senate and Conſuls,
" and to think every Station honourable, that gives you opportunity to ſerve
" the Republick."

XIII. IT is eaſy to diſcern in this Speech, the Spirit and Magnanimity of a true *Roman*; and particularly a certain Boldneſs and Confidence, derived from a ſenſe of his many Services, and the Rewards and Honours with which they had been attended. And if this be ſo conſpicuous in the inferior Officers, what may we not expect in thoſe of a more eminent degree? If Civic and Mural Crowns, Collars, Chains, Bracelets, and ſuch like, were ſufficient to rouſe theſe Sentiments of Heroiſm among the lower Order of Troops, what would not the proſpect of a Triumph effect in the Mind of the General? This Honour was granted only to Dictators, Conſuls, and Prætors. After the General had diſtributed a part of the Spoils to the Soldiers, and performed ſome other Ceremonies, the Proceſſion began, and entered the City thro' the Triumphal Port, to aſcend to the Capitol. At the head of it were the players upon muſical Inſtruments, who made the Air reſound with their Harmony. They were followed by the Beaſts that were to be ſacrificed, adorned with Fillets, and Flowers, many of them having their Horns gilt. After them came the whole Booty, and all the Spoils, either diſplayed upon Carriages, or born upon the Shoulders of young Men in magnificent Habits. The Names of the Nations conquered were written in great Characters, and the Cities that had been taken repreſented. Sometimes they added to the Pomp extraordinary Animals, brought from the Countries ſubjected, as Bears, Panthers, Lions, and Elephants. But what moſt attracted the Attention and Curioſity of the Spectators, were the illuſtrious Captives, who walked in Chains before the Victor's Chariot: great Officers of State, Generals of Armies, Princes, Kings, with their Wives and Children. The Conſul followed upon a magnificent Chariot, drawn by four Horſes, and robed with the auguſt Habit of Triumph, his Head incircled with a Crown of Laurel, holding alſo a Branch of the ſame Tree in his Hand, and ſometimes accompanied with his young Children ſitting by him. Behind the Chariot marched the whole Army, the Cavalry firſt, then the Infantry. All the Soldiers were crowned with Laurel, and thoſe who had received particular Crowns, and other Marks of Honour, did not fail to ſhew them on ſo great a Solemnity. They emulated each other in celebrating the Praiſes of their General, and ſometimes threw in Expreſſions, ſufficiently offenſive, of Rallery and Satire againſt him, which ſavoured of the military Freedom; but the Joy of the Ceremony entirely blunted their Edge, and abated their Bitterneſs. When the Proceſſion arrived at the Capitol, the Conſul immediately upon

upon his entering the Temple, made this very remarkable Prayer to the God. " Filled with Gratitude and with Joy, I return you thanks, O moſt good " and moſt great *Jupiter*, and you Queen *Juno*, and all the other Gods, the " Guardians and Inhabitants of this Citadel, that to this Day and Hour you " have vouchſafed by my Hands, to preſerve and guide the *Roman* Republick " happily. Continue always, I implore you, to preſerve, guide, protect, and " favour it in all things." This Prayer was followed by ſacrificing the Victims, and a magnificent Feaſt, given in the Capitol, ſometimes by the Publick, and ſometimes by the Perſon himſelf who triumphed. It muſt be allowed, that this was a glorious Day for a General of an Army; and it is not ſurpriſing that all poſſible Endeavours ſhould be uſed to deſerve ſo grateful a Diſtinction, and ſo ſplendid an Honour. *Rome* had not any thing more majeſtick and magnificent than this pompous Ceremony, which ſeemed to raiſe the Perſon in favour of whom it was granted, above the Condition of Mortals.

XIV. THE *Romans*, in War, knew how to make uſe of Puniſhments, as well as Rewards. The ſteddineſs of a Dictator with reſpect to his General of Horſe, who could not be ſaved from death but by the Intreaties and urgent Prayers of all the People: the inexorable Severity of the Conſul *Manlius* to his own Son, whom he unmercifully put to death, tho' victorious, for fighting contrary to his Orders: theſe Examples made a terrible Impreſſion of Fear upon the People, which became for ever the firm Bond of military Diſcipline. Wherefore never was it obſerved in any Nation ſo inviolably as among the *Romans*, nor did any thing contribute ſo much to render them victorious over all their Enemies. How ſhould they have been otherwiſe than victorious with Troops formed as we have ſeen, and above all guided in their Operations by Principles the moſt proper to make Conquerors? One of which was, not to know any other end of War but Victory, and for its ſake to ſurmount by an indefatigable Perſeverance, all the Obſtacles and all the Dangers by which it can be retarded. The greateſt Misfortunes, the moſt deſperate Loſſes, were incapable of daunting their Courage, or making them accept a baſe and diſhonourable Peace. To grant nothing by compulſion, was a fundamental Law of the *Roman* Policy, from which the Senate never departed; and in the moſt melancholy Junctures, weak Counſels, inſtead of prevailing, were not ſo much as heard. As far back as *Coriolanus*, the Senate declared, that no Agreement could be made with the *Volſci*, ſo long as they remained on the *Roman* Territory. They proceeded in the ſame manner with *Pyrrhus*. After the bloody Battle of *Cannæ*, wherein above fifty thouſand *Romans* lay dead on the Field, it was reſolved no Propoſal of Peace ſhould be liſtened to. The Conſul *Varro*, who had been the Occaſion of the Defeat, was received at *Rome* as if he had been victorious, becauſe in ſo great a Misfortune he had not deſpaired of the *Roman* Affairs. Thus, inſtead of diſheartening the People by an unſeaſonable Inſtance of Severity, theſe generous Senators taught them by their Example, to bear up againſt ill Fortune, and aſſume in Adverſity the Haughtineſs with which others are inſpired by Proſperity.

XV. ONE thing indeed has been generally conſidered, as tending greatly to obſtruct the Conqueſts of the *Roman* People: I mean the too limited ſpace of the Conſulſhip, which often afforded not the General time to finiſh a War he had begun, a good part of the Year being ſometimes ſpent in Preparations. This Inconvenience was afterwards remedied, as far as poſſible, by prolonging the

the Command to the General as Proconſul, and ſometimes continuing him in the Conſulſhip itſelf. But this was practiſed ſparingly in the wiſer Ages of the Republick; the danger of infringing the publick Liberty, making the frequent change of General appear neceſſary to the ſafety of the State. If the Generals had been long continued at the head of the Armies, they might have been able to uſurp all the Authority, and become maſters of the Government, as happened under *Cæſar* in the latter end of the Commonwealth. We are likewiſe to call to mind, that theſe annual Commands were well enough ſuited to the earlier times of *Rome*, when Wars ſeldom laſted above one Campaign; and though perhaps they might not be without their Inconveniences afterwards, yet they had this one manifeſt Advantage attending them, that thereby a number of great Generals was formed in the State, and the *Romans* were not often reduced to the neceſſity of placing all their Hopes in the Abilities of a ſingle Perſon. For this quick circulation of Authority, by raiſing many in their turns to the higheſt Offices of the Republick, excited an incredible Emulation among Individuals, to qualify themſelves for the conduct of Armies; and at the ſame time furniſhed them with frequent Opportunities of acquiring Experience in ſupreme Command, which is one of the moſt requiſite Accompliſhments in a great General.

XVI. THUS every thing at *Rome* led to great Conqueſts: the Conſtitution of the Government; the admirable political Principles on which it was founded; the nature of the Troops; the ability of the Generals; and above all, the ſteddineſs of the Senate, in an attachment to the ancient Maxims of the State. This laſt Particular leads me to the ſecond thing I mentioned, as the cauſe of that noble Spirit which we ſo much admire in the *Roman* Armies, namely, the ſucceſſion of great Men that for ſeveral Ages prevailed in the Commonwealth, and who ſupported, invigorated, and from time to time gave new Life to the fundamental Principles of the Conſtitution. Happy is the State that is bleſſed with this Privilege! and it was the good Fortune of the *Romans* to enjoy it in a ſupreme degree. It were endleſs to recount all the Names that Hiſtory furniſhes on this Subject. I ſhall therefore content myſelf with mentioning only two; *Manlius Torquatus*, and *Valerius Corvinus*; the one famed for his Severity, the other for his Clemency. *Manlius* commanded with Rigor, excuſed his Soldiers from no Labour, and never remitted any Puniſhment. *Valerius*, on the other ſide, uſed them with as much Gentleneſs and Familiarity. *Manlius*, to ſupport the Vigour of military Diſcipline, executed his own Son. *Valerius* acted upon Principles ſo different, that he is ſaid never to have offended any Man. Yet in this great diverſity of Conduct, the Effects were the ſame, both as to the Enemy, the Commonwealth, and themſelves. For none of their Soldiers ever declined fighting, none of them rebelled, none ſo much as diſputed their Orders, tho' the Diſcipline of *Manlius* was ſo ſevere, that afterwards all exceſſive and arbitrary Commands were from him called *Manliana Imperia*. If *Manlius* be conſidered as he is repreſented by Hiſtorians, we find him to have been very valiant, pious to his Father and Country, and ſubmiſſive to his Superiors. This appears by his defence of his Father, at the hazard of his own Life, againſt a Tribune who accuſed him; by his readineſs to offer himſelf to ſingle Combat with a *Gaul*, where he thought the Honour of his Country concerned; and by his firſt applying to the Conſul for Leave, before he would accept the Challenge. Now when a Man of this Conſtitution arrives at Command, he deſires that all Men may be as punctual as himſelf; and being naturally brave, he commands brave things, and when they

they are once commanded, requires that they be executed exactly; this being a certain Rule, that where great Things are commanded, ſtrict Obedience muſt be exacted; in which Caſe Mildneſs and Gentleneſs will not always prevail. But where a Man has not this Greatneſs and Magnificence of Mind, he is by no means to command extraordinary Things, and may therefore ſafely exerciſe the Virtue of Clemency, with which ordinary Puniſhments are compatible enough, becauſe they are not imputed to the Prince, but to the Laws and Cuſtoms of the Place. *Manlius* then was a ſevere Man, and kept up the *Roman* Diſcipline exactly; prompted firſt by his own nature, and then by a ſtrong deſire to have that obeyed, which his own Inclination had conſtrained him to command. *Valerius Corvinus*, on the other hand, might exerciſe his Gentleneſs without Inconvenience, becauſe he commanded nothing extraordinary, or contrary to the Cuſtoms of the *Romans* at that time. For, as thoſe Cuſtoms were good, and not very troubleſome to obſerve, he was ſeldom neceſſitated to puniſh Offenders, becauſe there were but few of that ſort; and where they were, their Puniſhment was imputed to the Laws, and not to his Cruelty. Hence *Valerius* had an Opportunity by his Gentleneſs, to gain both Affection and Authority in the Army; which was the Cauſe, that the Soldiers being equally obedient to the one as the other, tho' their Tempers and Diſcipline were ſo very different, they could yet do the ſame things, and their Actions have the ſame effects. I ſhall only add, that could a State be ſo happy, as to have always Perſons ſucceeding one another within a reaſonable time, who however different in Inclination and Temper, would yet by their Examples renew the Laws, reſtrain Vice, and remove every thing that tended to its Ruin or Corruption, that State muſt be immortal.

XVII. IN thus aſcribing the Bravery and Succeſſes of the *Romans*, to the the excellent Principles of their Conſtitution, and the great Men by whom theſe Principles were ſupported, I do no more than follow the Opinion of their own Writers upon this Subject. *Saluſt* tells us, " that after much Reading " and Reflexion, upon the Cauſes of the Growth and Grandeur of the *Romans*, " he found reaſon to conclude, that the diſtinguiſhed Virtue of a few Citizens " had effected all that mighty run of Proſperity." *Cicero* too, in his Reflexions upon that Verſe of the Poet *Ennius*,

Moribus antiquis res ſtat Romana, *virique*,

makes the ſame Obſervation. " It is, *ſays he*, the union of theſe two Advan- " tages, which has produced all the Grandeur of *Rome:* on the one hand, " the good Manners, the wiſe political Principles eſtabliſhed from the begin- " ning: on the other, a ſucceſſion of great Men formed upon theſe Princi- " ples, and employed by the State in the adminiſtration of Affairs. Before " our times, that happy Union was always the ſame, and theſe two Advan- " tages ever exiſted together; otherwiſe a Republick ſo powerful and extenſive " as ours, could not have ſubſiſted ſo long with Honour, nor ſo conſtantly kept " up its Reputation amongſt all Nations." I omit the Complaints *Cicero* ſubjoins, of the degeneracy of the Age in which he lived, and of the total decay of ancient Manners. Every one knows, that theſe ſoon after occaſioned the ruin of the Republick. Mean-while it may not be improper to obſerve, that theſe two Advantages were not only the chief Cauſes of the *Roman* Greatneſs, but likewiſe produced that ſlow and gradual increaſe of Power, ſo neceſſary to lay a ſolid Foundation of Strength, and ſupport the weight of their many and extenſive Conqueſts.

XVIII. FOR there never was an Empire, either more flouriſhing, or more extenſive than the *Roman*. From the *Euphrates* and *Tanais* to *Hercules*'s Pillars, and the *Atlantick* Ocean, all the Lands, and all the Seas, were under their Obedience. It is aſtoniſhing to conſider, that the Nations which at preſent make Kingdoms ſo conſiderable, all *Gaul*, all *Spain*, almoſt the whole Iſland of *Great-Britain*, *Illyria* to the *Danube*, *Germany* to the *Elbe*, *Africa* to the frightful and impaſſable Deſarts, *Greece*, *Thrace*, *Syria*, *Egypt*, all the Kingdoms of *Aſia Minor*, and thoſe between the *Euxine* and *Caſpian* Seas, with many others, became *Roman* Provinces, almoſt all before the end of the Republick. I have often wondered to obſerve in Hiſtorians a certain Affectation of aſcribing the Succeſſes of the *Romans* to Fortune, as if that, rather than Valour and Wiſdom, had been the Occaſion of their Proſperity. To me it evidently appears, thro' the whole courſe of their Hiſtory, that the unuſual pitch of Grandeur to which they arrived, was the neceſſary reſult of the Talents and Accompliſhments of which they were poſſeſſed, whether they are conſidered with regard to moral Virtues, or to political Government, or to martial Merit and the Art of War. For, as *Livy* obſerves in the Preface to his Hiſtory, there never was a Republick more religious, or more abounding in good Examples, or where Avarice and Luxury gained ground ſo late, or where Simplicity and Poverty were ſo much and ſo long held in honour. All the Debates and Tranſactions of the Senate, ſhew to a Demonſtration, how much wiſdom of Counſel, love of the Publick, ſteddineſs to the Maxims of the State, Lenity and Moderation with regard to the conquered Nations, prevailed in that auguſt Aſſembly. Courage, Boldneſs, Intrepidity in the midſt of the greateſt Dangers, an invincible Patience in the hardeſt Labours, an inexorable Firmneſs to maintain the military Diſcipline in its utmoſt Rigor, a ſettled Reſolution to conquer or die, a greatneſs of Soul, and a Conſtancy proof againſt all Misfortunes, have at all times conſtituted the Character of the *Romans*, and rendered them in the end victorious over all other Nations. *Cyrus* and *Alexander*, it is true, founded great Empires: but the Qualities proper for the execution of ſuch a Deſign, being confined to the perſons of theſe two illuſtrious Conquerors, and not inherited by their Deſcendants; the Grandeur to which they gave a beginning, did not ſupport itſelf long with any Reputation. It was very different with the *Romans*. Their Empire was not founded, nor raiſed to the ſtate of Grandeur it attained, by the rare Endowments, or rapid Conqueſts of a ſingle Perſon. The *Roman* People themſelves, the Body of the State, formed that Empire by ſlow degrees, and at ſeveral times. The great Men that helped, each in their time, to eſtabliſh, enlarge, and preſerve it, had all different Characters, tho' in the main they followed all the ſame Principles: and hence the Empire itſelf, was both more extenſive, and of longer duration, than any that had ever gone before it.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of MARCHES.

I. WHAT we have hitherto ſeen, relating to the raiſing of Troops, their Diviſions and Subdiviſions, Armour, Diſcipline, and Exerciſes, is in a manner only the Mechaniſm of War. There are other ſtill more important Cares, which conſtitute what is called the higher detail of the Service, and depend more immediately upon the General's Ability and Experience. To him it belongs to ſettle the general diſpoſition of Marches; to encamp the Troops advantageouſly; to draw them up in order of Battle, provide againſt the Exigencies of the Field, purſue with Caution, or retreat with Judgment; and laſtly, in conducting an Attack or Defence, to put in practice all the Arts, Stratagems, and Addreſs, that long Experience in the Service, and a conſummate Knowledge in all the parts of War, are jointly able to ſuggeſt. I ſhall offer ſome Reflexions upon the Practice of the *Roman* Generals in all theſe great Points of military Conduct, and begin with that which follows immediately after the rendezvous of the Troops, I mean the marching of an Army. This Subject naturally divides itſelf into three Branches: the general Order of Marches in advancing againſt an Enemy; the Knowledge and Choice of Poſts; and laſtly, the Diſpoſition and Conduct of a Retreat. We ſhall ſpeak of each in order.

II. THE marching againſt an Enemy ſuppoſes many preliminary Cares in the General, and many previous Steps taken, in order to his own Safety, and the ſucceſs of his Deſigns. I ſhall ſuppoſe the Plan of the War ſettled, as likewiſe the manner of acting, and Meaſures concerted accordingly. Yet ſtill it is incumbent upon a wiſe Commander, before he puts his Troops in motion, to provide every thing neceſſary for their Accommodation and Subſiſtence; to acquire an exact knowledge of the Country thro' which he marches; to inform himſelf of the Number and Quality of the Enemy's Forces; to penetrate, if poſſible, into his Deſigns; to ſtudy the Character of the Generals employed againſt him; and by a wiſe Foreſight to be prepared for all the Events and Contingencies that may happen in the courſe of a Campaign. Now tho' theſe things come not ſo properly under fixed Rules, but depend in a great meaſure upon the Ability and Prudence of the Commander in chief; yet we find every where in Hiſtory, that the *Romans* had many Regulations about them, and always treated them with particular Attention. To begin with the care of Proviſions, which is of principal account in an Army; it appears to have been the conſtant Practice, to furniſh the Soldiers with a certain proportion of Corn, which they were obliged to carry along with them in their Marches. This on extraordinary Occaſions amounted to four Buſhels, or a Month's Allowance, and ſeldom was leſs than what might ſerve for fifteen or twenty Days. They choſe rather to give them Corn than Bread, becauſe it was lighter, and might therefore be carried with greater eaſe. Indeed this put them to the trouble of grinding and baking it themſelves; but then they were uſed to it, and could upon Occaſion make it into I know not what variety of Diſhes. Beſides the common Bread, they made a kind of ſoft boiled

Food

Food of it, very agreeable to the Troops: they mingled it with Milk, Roots, and Herbs, and made Pancakes of it, upon a ſmall Plate laid over the Fire, or upon the hot Aſhes, as was anciently the manner of regaling Gueſts, and is ſtill practiſed throughout the Eaſt, where theſe kind of thin Cakes are much preferred to our beſt Bread. Their Drink was anſwerable to this Diet, being no more than a mixture of Vinegar and Water. It was called *Poſca*, could at all times be eaſily procured, and was particularly ſerviceable to quench the Thirſt immediately.

III. I have heard it obſerved, that nothing gives greater Difficulty to military Men, in the reading of ancient Hiſtory, than the Article of Proviſions. *Cato*'s Maxim, that the War feeds the War, holds good in plentiful Countries, and with regard to ſmall Armies: yet ſtill it is more generally true, that the War does not furniſh Proviſions upon command, or at a fixed time. They muſt be provided both for the preſent and the future. We do not however find, that either the *Greeks* or *Romans* had the precaution to provide Magazines of Forage, to lay up Proviſions, to have a Commiſſary-General of Stores, or to be followed by a great number of Carriages. But then we are to conſider, that in the Wars of the *Greeks* againſt each other, their Troops were little numerous, and accuſtomed to a ſober Life: that they did not remove far from their own Country, and almoſt always returned regularly every Winter: ſo that it is plain, it was not difficult for them to have Proviſions in abundance, eſpecially the *Athenians*, who were maſters at Sea. The ſame may be ſaid of the *Romans*. The care of ſubſiſting the Troops was infinitely leſs weighty with them, than it is at preſent with moſt of the Nations of *Europe*. Their Armies were much leſs numerous, and they had a much ſmaller number of Cavalry. A Conſular Army conſiſted of near ſeventeen thouſand Foot, to which they had not above eighteen hundred Horſe. In our Days, to ſeventeen thouſand Foot, we have often more than ſix thouſand Horſe. What a vaſt difference muſt this make in the conſumption of Forage and Proviſions! Let me add, that the ſober manner of Life in the Army, confined to mere Neceſſaries, ſpared them an infinite multitude of Servants, Horſes, and Baggage, which now exhauſt our Magazines, ſtarve our Armies, retard the execution of Enterpriſes, and often render them impracticable. Nor was this the manner of living only of the Soldiers, but likewiſe of the Officers and Generals. Not only Conſuls and Dictators in the early Ages of the Commonwealth, but even Emperors themſelves; *Trajan*, *Adrian*, *Peſcennius*, *Severus*, *Probus*, *Julian*, and many others, not only lived without Luxury, but contented themſelves with boiled Flour or Beans, a piece of Cheeſe or Bacon, and made it their Glory to level themſelves, in this reſpect, with the meaneſt of the Soldiers. It is eaſy to conceive how much this muſt contribute to diminiſh the Train of an Army, to ſupport the Taſte of Frugality and Simplicity amongſt the Troops, and baniſh all Luxury and idle Shew from the Camp.

IV. BUT tho' the care of Proviſions was leſs burdenſom to the Ancients, we find that both it, and all the other Accommodations proper for the march of an Army, were not leſs attended to by their Generals. *Xenophon*, who was himſelf a Soldier, and whoſe Writings abound with Maxims of War, is frequent in his Reflexions upon this Article. One of the principal Inſtructions he makes *Cambyſes* King of *Perſia* give his Son *Cyrus*, who afterwards became ſo glorious, was, not to imbark in any Expedition, 'till he had firſt informed himſelf,

himſelf, whether Subſiſtence were provided for the Troops. In his Account of the Behaviour of the ſame *Cyrus*, after his arrival in the Camp of his Uncle *Cyaxares*, he enters into an immenſe Detail, with reſpect to all the Neceſſaries of an Army. That Prince was to march fifteen Days thro' Countries that had been deſtroyed, and in which there were neither Proviſions nor Forage. He ordered enough of both for twenty Days to be carried, and that the Soldiers, inſtead of loading themſelves with Baggage, ſhould exchange that Burden for an equal one of Proviſions, without troubling themſelves about Beds and Coverlets for ſleeping, the want of which their Fatigues would ſupply. They were accuſtomed to drink Wine; and as a ſudden and total diſuſe of it might be attended with ill Conſequences, he ordered them to carry a certain quantity with them, and to uſe themſelves by degrees to do without it, and be contented with Water. He adviſed them alſo to carry ſalt Proviſions along with them, Hand-mills for grinding Corn, and Medicines for the ſick: to put into every Carriage a Sickle and a Mattock, and upon every Beaſt of burden an Ax and a Scythe: and to take care to provide themſelves with a thouſand other Neceſſaries. He carried alſo along with him Smiths, Shoemakers, and other Workmen, with all manner of Tools uſed in their Trades. For the reſt, he declared publickly, that whoever would charge himſelf with the care of ſending Proviſions to the Camp, ſhould be honoured and rewarded by himſelf and his Friends, and even ſupplied with Money for that Service, provided they would give Security, and engage to follow the Army.

V. THE Reader will here be pleaſed to obſerve, that as I am now entered upon the higher Detail of War, I ſhall not ſo intirely confine myſelf to the *Romans*, as not from time to time to mention the Practices of other Nations, where they any way tend to illuſtrate the Point in hand. For as the *Roman* Writers upon this Subject are but few, and have not entered very circumſtantially into Matters, we are often at a loſs with regard to ſome of the moſt important parts of their Diſcipline. This however we may be certain of, that as they excelled particularly in the Art of War, and readily adopted the Improvements of other Nations; the more we know of the Progreſs and Attainments of the Ancients in this reſpect, the better we ſhall be able to judge of the uncommon Proficiency of the *Romans*. We have already ſeen ſome of their wiſe Precautions with regard to the Subſiſtence and Accommodation of the Troops, for which they provided no leſs by fixed and general Regulations, than *Cyrus* does in the particular Inſtance recorded by *Xenophon*. I ſhall only add, that Hiſtory abounds with Examples of this prudent Care and Foreſight in their Generals. *Paulus Æmilius* would not ſet out for *Macedonia*, 'till he had fully ſettled every thing relating to Proviſions. *Cæſar*, in all his Wars, was extremely attentive to the ſafety of his Convoys, and the keeping up a free communication with thoſe Countries, whence he received his Supplies. We find that he regularly diſtributed Corn to the Army, and always took care, before the time for a new Diſtribution arrived, to have it brought to the Camp by means of his Allies: or, if he chanced to be diſappointed here, ſo contrived his March, as to paſs by ſome great Town, where he could readily be furniſhed with whatever he ſtood in need of.

VI. BUT beſides the care of Proviſions, it is further incumbent upon a wiſe General, to acquaint himſelf throughly with the nature of the Country thro' which he is to march. I take it for granted that the *Romans* omitted none of the uſual and obvious Methods for this Purpoſe: that they furniſhed

themſelves with Guides; interrogated the Natives; and, where ſuch were to be had, procured exact Maps of the Country, delineating the Towns, their number and diſtance, the Roads, the Mountains, the Rivers, the Fords, and the nature and qualities of them all. But what particularly deſerves our Notice in the *Roman* Policy; they ſcarce ever entered into a War with any diſtant State, 'till they had firſt contracted an Alliance with ſome contiguous Power, who might unite his Forces to theirs in the intended Invaſion. This Practice was attended with numberleſs Advantages. They had hereby timely Notice of the Enemy's Deſigns: they were made acquainted with the number and quality of his Forces: and when they approached with their Army, were not only plentifully ſupplied with all kind of military Stores, but joined by a conſiderable Body of Troops perfectly acquainted with the Country, and able to inform them where they might make their Impreſſion with greateſt probability of Succeſs. Thus when they invaded *Philip* King of *Macedon*, they took care to ſecure the Friendſhip of the *Ætolians*, whoſe Troops were of unſpeakable Service to them in that War. In their Expedition againſt *Antiochus* they made uſe of the ſame Policy, having previouſly contracted Amity with ſeveral of the petty Princes and States of *Aſia Minor*. Every one knows what uſe *Cæſar* made of the pretended Alliance with the *Æduans*, and that it was one of the principal Engines by which he compleated the reduction of *Gaul*. Indeed nothing can fall out more fortunately for an Army, about to invade a Country to which they are ſtrangers, than to act in conjunction with Troops contiguous to the Territories they attack: becauſe as by this means they make War with all the Advantages of Natives, they are not only the better enabled to guard againſt Ambuſcades and Surpriſes, but can in their turn make uſe of all thoſe Stratagems and favourable Opportunities of Action, which the particular nature of the Country furniſhes. Whoever therefore conſiders the artful Conduct of the *Romans* in this reſpect, will find himſelf neceſſitated to own, that Deſigns concerted with ſo much Wiſdom and Foreſight merited all the Succeſs with which they were for the moſt part attended.

VII. THESE preliminary Cares ſettled, it is now time to put the Troops in motion. The *Romans* were very exact in the Order of their Marches. In the Morning, at the firſt ſounding of the Trumpet, every one took down his Tent, and began to make up his Baggage: at the ſecond ſounding, every one loaded his Baggage: and at the third, the Legions moved out of their Quarters, and put themſelves in the form and order they were that Day to march in. But none were to take down their Tents, 'till the Conſul and military Tribunes had firſt taken down theirs; whether for the greater Reſpect, or becauſe their Tents and Baggage being larger than the reſt, it was neceſſary they ſhould be the firſt at work, that their Baggage might be in a readineſs to march at the third ſound of the Trumpet, as well as that of the private Soldier. For Commanders, who give Rules to all the reſt, ought to be very exact in obſerving them themſelves; ſince, if they break their own Orders, they encourage others to do the like; Example always operating more ſtrongly than Precept. Hence that conſtant care in the *Roman* Generals, to be themſelves Patterns to the Troops, with regard to all the Duties of the Service; nor do we meet with any thing in their whole Diſcipline, more truly deſerving of imitation, or better calculated to promote Submiſſion and Obedience in the Army. For when Soldiers find the General keeps ſtrictly to the Rules he gives, they are the more careful to obſerve them likewiſe, concluding, that as he therein grants no Indulgence to himſelf, he certainly will not do it to others:

others: nay they implicitly believe ſuch Orders good and neceſſary, becauſe he that gave them is ſo punctual an obſerver of them.

VIII. AS to the particular Form and Diſpoſition of the *Roman* March, we meet with very little on that Subject in ancient Authors. In the general it appears, that whether they marched in a Friend's or Enemy's Country, whether they believed the Enemy near or far off, they proceeded with the ſame Care and Circumſpection: and this certainly was a very wiſe Policy. For a General may be miſtaken in his Intelligence or Intelligencers; nay, may think thoſe Friends, who want but an advantageous Opportunity of declaring themſelves Foes: ſo that all imaginable Caution ought to be obſerved, in all Times, and in all Places. To which let me add, that were there nothing elſe as a Motive to it, but the keeping up exactly the military Diſcipline, yet for that Reaſon ſingly, it ought conſtantly to be done. The Method followed moſt commonly by the *Romans* in their Marches ſeems to have been this. They had always ſome Troops of Horſe ſcouting abroad in order to the diſcovery of the Roads. After them followed the right Wing, with all its Carriages immediately in the rear. Then came a Legion with its Carriages; after that another; and ſo a third, a fourth, *&c.* in order. Laſt of all came the left Wing and its Baggage, with a Party of Horſe in their rear. If, during the March, the Army happened to be aſſaulted in the front, or in the rear, they cauſed all their Carriages to withdraw to the right Wing or the left, as they found it convenient, and moſt agreeable to the nature of the Place: and then, when they were cleared and diſincumbered of their Baggage, all of them unanimouſly made head againſt the Enemy. If they were aſſaulted in the flank, they drew their Carriages on that ſide where they were like to be moſt ſafe, and then addreſſed themſelves to the Fight.

IX. THIS, I ſay, was the moſt common order of their Marches: for as to any fixed and ſtanding Rule, none could poſſibly be eſtabliſhed; becauſe the Form muſt vary, according to the Country you are in, and the Enemy you have to do with. *Julius Cæſar*, when he marched againſt the *Nervians*, ſo long as he thought the Enemy at a diſtance, proceeded exactly according to the Diſpoſition here deſcribed. But upon a nearer approach he changed it entirely. For then all the Cavalry were ſent before. After them followed ſix Legions without Baggage: and laſt of all the Carriages, guarded by two new raiſed Legions. This was an excellent Method, as he was ſure the Enemy could only attempt him in the van; but might be of ill Conſequence, where the rear of the Army was liable to be attacked. One thing the *Romans* particularly attended to, and that was, that the Troops did not ſtraggle, or march unequally, ſome too faſt, others too ſlow, which very much weakens an Army, and expoſes it to great Diſorder. Hence their Care, in training up their Men, to inure them to the *military Pace*; that is, to the walking over a certain ſtated ſpace of Ground within a fixed and limited time. This, as we have already obſerved, amounted to twenty miles in five Hours, which made the uſual Day's March of a *Roman* Army. To accuſtom the Soldiers to it, three times a Month, the Foot as well as Horſe were obliged to take this March. Upon extraordinary Occaſions they were wont to march four and twenty Miles in the ſame ſpace of time. By an exact Calculation of what *Cæſar* relates of a ſudden March, which he made at the time he beſieged *Gergovia*, we find that in four and twenty Hours he marched fifty Miles. This he did with the utmoſt

utmoſt expedition. In reducing it to leſs than half, it makes the uſual rate of an extraordinary Day's March.

X. IT is remarkable with regard to modern Wars, that they not only impoveriſh the Princes that are overcome, but even the Conquerors themſelves: for as one loſes his Country, ſo the other loſes his Money. In ancient times the caſe was otherwiſe; it appearing that the Conqueror always enriched himſelf by the War. The reaſon of this difference ſeems to be, that in our times no publick account is taken of the Plunder; or indeed rather, that the barbarous Cuſtom of pillaging the conquered Countries, is not now ſo much practiſed as formerly. Amongſt the *Romans*, all the Spoil was delivered in and appropriated to the Publick, which afterwards diſtributed it as it ſaw cauſe. To this purpoſe they had their Quæſtors, in whoſe hands all the Pillage and Taxes were depoſited, of which the General diſpoſed as he thought good, for the payment of his Soldiers, the curing of the wounded or ſick, and diſcharging the other Neceſſities of the Army. 'Tis true the Conſul had power to give the plunder of a Town to his Soldiers, and he frequently did it; but that Liberty never bred any Diſorder. For when a Town was taken, or an Army defeated, all the Spoil was brought into a publick Place, and diſtributed Man by Man, according to every ones Merit. This Cuſtom made the Soldiers more intent upon Victory than Plunder. The Practice of the *Roman* Legions was, to break and diſorder an Enemy, but not to purſue; for they never went out of their Ranks upon any Occaſion whatever. Only the Horſe, the light-armed Troops, and what other Soldiers were not of the Legions, followed the Chace. But had the Plunder of the Field belonged to whoever could catch it, it would have been neither reaſonable nor poſſible to have kept the Legions to their Ranks, or to have expoſed them to ſo many Dangers. Hence it was, that upon a Victory, the Publick was always inriched. For when a Conſul entered in triumph, he brought with him great Riches into the Treaſury of *Rome*, conſiſting of Taxes, Contributions, Ranſoms, and Plunder. The *Romans* had likewiſe another Cuſtom well contrived for the preſervation of Diſcipline; and that was, to depoſit a third part of every Soldier's pay, with the Enſigns of their reſpective Companies, who never reſtored it 'till the War was at an end. This ſerved two very excellent Purpoſes: Firſt, every Soldier had a Stock of his own, which without this Precaution would have been ſquandered away, as they were moſt of them young and profuſe. Secondly, knowing their Stocks to be in their Enſign's hands, they were the more careful to defend and keep by him, whether in the Camp, in the Field of Battle, or upon a March. This Cuſtom contributed much to their Valour, and is neceſſary to be obſerved by any General, who would reduce his Soldiers to the Diſcipline of the *Romans*.

XI. AMONG the various orders of the *Roman* Marches, one particularly deſerves our Notice, which is frequently mentioned by Hiſtorians, and which they term forming the Army *itineri & prælio*. It was, when the Line of March was ſo contrived, as to correſpond exactly with the Line of Battle; or, to expreſs myſelf a little more clearly, when the Columns of Horſe and Foot were diſpoſed in ſuch a manner, that upon the ſudden appearance of an Enemy they could fall immediately into an Order proper for fighting. There is not perhaps any thing in the Science of Arms more ſubtle and uſeful than this, and the *Romans* ſeem to have made it their particular ſtudy. I do not

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at preſent recollect in any of their Hiſtorians, a minute and circumſtantial Account of a March of this kind, where the diſpoſition of the Columns is exactly marked, and the manner in which they formed in order of Battle, upon the approach of the Enemy. What moſt readily occurs to my Memory is, the fine March of *Hamilcar* againſt *Spendius*, which has been ſo judiciouſly explained by the Chevalier *Folard*, in his admirable Comment upon *Polybius*. As the whole *Art of War* furniſhes nothing more compleat in its kind, whether we regard the boldneſs of the Attempt, or the well-concerted Motions by which it was accompliſhed, I am ſatisfied I ſhall do the Reader a particular Pleaſure, in laying a full and diſtinct Account of it before him.

XII. UPON the concluſion of the firſt *Punick* War, the *Carthaginian* Mercenaries revolting, choſe *Matho* and *Spendius* for their Leaders. *Hanno* was ſent againſt them with an Army; but receiving a conſiderable Check, the Rebels blocked up *Carthage* on every ſide, and poſſeſſed themſelves of all the Paſſes leading to the Peninſula on which it ſtood. In this Exigence the *Carthaginians* had recourſe to *Hamilcar* the Father of *Hannibal*, who had given eminent proof of his Abilities when he commanded their Armies in *Sicily*. Accordingly he took the Field with ten thouſand Men, and ſeventy Elephants; but was for ſome time at a loſs how to meet with the Enemy upon equal Ground. For beſides the other Places of Advantage which the Mercenaries had ſeized, *Hanno* had ſuffered them to get poſſeſſion of the only Bridge by which the River *Bagradas* was paſſable to thoſe who were to travel from *Carthage* into the Continent. This River had not many Fords, and the few it had were ſo well watched, that it was not eaſy for even a ſingle Man to get over without being ſeen. As for the Bridge itſelf, the Enemy guarded it with the utmoſt Care, and had built a Town cloſe by it, for the more commodious lodging of the Troops that were appointed to that Service. *Hamilcar* having in vain tried all means poſſible to force a Paſſage, at length bethought himſelf of an Expedient to gain one by ſtealth. He had obſerved, that upon the blowing of certain Winds, the Mouth of the *Bagradas* uſed to be choked up with Sand and Gravel, which formed a kind of Bar acroſs it, and rendered it fordable. Remaining therefore in his Camp between the Sea and the Mountains, he waited the Opportunity of theſe Winds; which no ſooner arrived, than marching ſuddenly in the night, he paſſed the Stream unperceived, and the next morning appeared in the Plain, to the great Aſtoniſhment both of the *Carthaginians* and the Enemy.

XIII. *HAMILCAR* by this Step put all to the hazard. Had he failed in his Attempt againſt *Spendius*, his whole Army muſt inevitably have been deſtroyed, for a Retreat was now become impoſſible. But neither was the Danger leſs great to his Country by continuing inactive: and therefore he wiſely conſidered, that in ſuch an Extremity, it was better to try ſome way where Fortune and his own ability in War offered a proſpect of Succeſs, than by a timorous diffident Conduct expoſe himſelf to the ſame Ruin, without a ſingle Effort to evade it. He was now upon the other ſide the *Bagradas*. The Plains were favourable to him, becauſe he had a conſiderable Body of Horſe. The River itſelf too was of no ſmall Advantage, as it ſerved to ſecure his Baggage, and cover one of his Flanks. *Spendius* was advancing to meet him at the head of ten thouſand Men. Beſides theſe, he underſtood that a Detachment of fifteen thouſand was marching with all diligence from *Utica*; and as it was their buſineſs to come upon his flank and rear, rather than to

join *Spendius*, he made no doubt of their proceeding accordingly. Upon theſe Conſiderations he regulated his order of Battle, and the diſpoſition of his March. To make head againſt *Spendius*, he placed his Elephants in the firſt Line, and immediately behind them his Cavalry, intermixed with Platoons of light-armed Foot. The heavy-armed Infantry formed the third Line, in order to oppoſe the Detachment he expected upon his rear from *Utica*. By this Diſpoſition he was enabled to make head on all ſides. For as he made no doubt but his firſt Line of Elephants, of which *Spendius* was totally unprovided, would be ſufficient to break the Body he commanded; and that the Cavalry, aided by the light-armed Foot, falling in immediately, would ſerve to compleat the rout: ſo his third Line conſiſting of the flower of his *African* Infantry, he thought himſelf ſtrong enough likewiſe to deal with the Rebels from *Utica*.

XIV. EACH of theſe Lines marched in four Columns, the Columns of Cavalry following immediately behind the Elephants, and thoſe of the Infantry immediately behind the Cavalry. The diſtance between the Columns was equal to the ſpace they were to occupy in the Line of Battle. By this Diſpoſition, upon the firſt appearance of the Enemy, the Army could form in an Inſtant. For the Columns being commanded to halt, and wheel at once into their place in the Line, were in order of Battle preſently. *Hamilcar* continuing his March, perceived, as the Enemy approached, that the Detachment from *Utica*, inſtead of coming in upon his rear, had actually joined *Spendius*, and formed a ſecond Line of Foot behind that he commanded. As he had foreſeen that this might happen, his order of March was contrived to furniſh a ſpeedy Remedy. It now became neceſſary to change his whole Diſpoſition, and oppoſe a ſtrong front of Infantry to the Enemy, with the Elephants at the head of all, according to the uſual Cuſtom. To that end the Columns were ordered to halt, and the Elephants forming in front, the Cavalry mean-while fell back between the intervals of the Foot, ranging themſelves in two Diviſions behind the two extremities of the Line of Infantry, which was formed in an inſtant by the wheeling of the Columns. The Rebels deceived by this artful Motion, and miſtaking the Retreat of the Cavalry for a real Flight, advanced briskly to the Attack, broke thro' the Elephants, and charged the *Carthaginian* Foot. Mean-while the Cavalry, which, as we have already obſerved, had ranged itſelf in two Columns behind the two Wings of the Infantry, wheeling to the right and left from the rear, appeared all on a ſudden in the ſame Line with the Foot, covering the Flanks of the *Carthaginian* Army, and conſiderably overwinging the Enemy. The Rebels aſtoniſhed at this extraordinary Motion, quickly fell into Diſorder, and at laſt betook themſelves to flight. *Hamilcar* purſued them with his Horſe and Elephants, and following them quite to the Town and Bridge, eaſily got poſſeſſion of that important Paſs.

XV. FROM this Recital it appears, to what a degree of Perfection the Ancients had arrived in the Science of Marches, which is a capital Article in the grand Operations of War. And tho' the Inſtance here given be of an *African* Commander, and therefore does not ſo immediately regard the *Roman* People, yet if we conſider, that theſe laſt are allowed to have excelled all Nations in the knowledge of Arms, and that they often regulated their Marches upon this Plan, it ſeems reaſonable to believe, that had their Hiſtorians entered into particular Details of this kind, we ſhould have met with many

many Examples of military Conduct in their Generals, no leſs ſurpriſing than that now before us. Indeed as it frequently happens in War, that the Enemy, tho' not actually in ſight, is yet hourly expected, this way of ordering an Army ſeems very neceſſary; and the General who excels in it, and is at the ſame time ſufficiently on his guard againſt Surpriſes, will ſeldom or ever be worſted. I have often admired, in reading *Cæſar*'s Commentaries, the conſummate Prudence and Circumſpection of that great Man, eſpecially in relation to Surpriſes. Tho' he was the ableſt General of his time, and commanded the fineſt Army that perhaps ever appeared in the World, yet he always proceeded with the utmoſt Caution, and was extremely careful of believing any thing too eaſily, that was not reaſonably to be ſuppoſed. If a great number of the Enemy was beaten and purſued by a few of his Men, if a few of them attacked a greater Party of his, if they ran unexpectedly, and without any viſible Cauſe, on theſe Occaſions he was always very much upon his guard, and never fancied his Enemy ſo weak, as not to underſtand his own Buſineſs. It ſeems in the general a good Rule, the weaker and more careleſs an Enemy appears to be, the more to apprehend and dread him. In Caſes of this kind, an experienced Commander will comport himſelf in two different manners. He will fear the Enemy in his own Thoughts, and order his Affairs accordingly; but in his Words and outward Behaviour, he will affect to deſpiſe him. This laſt way gives courage to the Soldiers, and makes them confident of Victory. The other keeps the General upon his guard, and renders him leſs liable to be circumvented: for to march thro' an Enemy's Country is more dangerous, and requires greater Addreſs and Foreſight, than to fight a pitched Battle.

XVI. WE proceed now to the ſecond Particular mentioned on the head of *Marches*, namely, the knowledge and choice of Poſts. As this will again fall under our notice in the next Chapter concerning Incampments, we need ſay the leſs of it here. It has however a ſtrict and neceſſary Connection with the marching of an Army. For whether we are to retreat or advance, or which way ſoever our Rout lies, it often happens, that the ſafety of the Army depends upon ſeizing ſome advantageous Poſts, that command the Country thro' which we march. The *Romans* applied themſelves with particular Attention to this part of War, and we meet with ſeveral very early traces of it in their Hiſtory. *Livy* relates an Example of this kind in the perſon of *Publius Decius*, who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Conſul *Cornelius* commanded againſt the *Samnites*, and finding the Conſul and Army falling by accident into a Vale, where they might have been encompaſſed and cut off by the Enemy: "Do you ſee, (ſaid he to *Cornelius*,) that Eminence which "commands the Enemy's Camp? there lies our Hope. It is a Poſt that may "ſerve to extricate us out of the preſent Danger, if we are careful only to "ſeize it quickly, and avail ourſelves of the blindneſs of the *Samnites*, who "have neglected it." The Hiſtorian had before informed us, that *Decius* obſerved a Hill over the Enemy's Camp, not eaſy to be aſcended by thoſe who were compleatly armed, but to thoſe lightly armed, acceſſible enough. The Conſul ordered him to take poſſeſſion of it with three thouſand Men. He obeyed the Order, ſecured the *Roman* Army, and deſigning to march away in the night, and ſave both himſelf and his Party, addreſſed himſelf in theſe Words to ſome of his Companions. "Follow me, Fellow-Soldiers, that whilſt "we have yet Light, we may explore where the Enemy keeps his Guards, "and which way we may make our Retreat." Accordingly he went out in perſon

perſon upon this Deſign, and habited like a Soldier, that the Enemy might not know his rank in the Army, took an exact view of the Ground, and the ſituation of their Camp. Whoever attentively conſiders this Relation, will find how uſeful and neceſſary it is for a Commander, to be acquainted with the nature of Coaſts and Countries, and that not only in a general, but in an exquiſite and more particular way. For had not *Decius* underſtood thoſe things very well, he could not ſo ſuddenly have diſcerned the advantage of that Hill, and of what importance it would be to the preſervation of the *Roman* Army. Neither could he have judged at that diſtance, whether it was acceſſible or not: and when he had poſſeſſed himſelf of it, and was to draw off afterwards; as the Enemy environed him on every ſide, he could never have found out the beſt way for his retreat, nor have gueſſed ſo well where the Enemy kept his Guards. *Fabius Maximus* is another Example of a conſummate Knowledge this way. He commanded the *Roman* Army ſix Months againſt *Hannibal*, and by a ſeries of well-concerted Motions, and a judicious choice of Poſts, conducted himſelf ſo happily, that during all that time he never ſuffered any conſiderable Diſaſter, nor could be compelled to fight againſt his Will, tho' the artful *Carthaginian* left no Stratagem untried, to draw him to an Engagement, or intangle him in an Ambuſcade. But of all the *Roman* Generals, none ſeems to have been a greater maſter in this part of War than *Julius Cæſar*. We meet with many Inſtances of it in his Commentaries, particularly in that famous Campaign in *Spain*, where by a happy choice of Poſts, and an exquiſite Addreſs in improving the Advantages the nature of the Country afforded, he compelled a veteran Army to ſurrender themſelves Priſoners of War without ſtriking a Blow.

XVII. THE third and laſt Particular we mentioned in relation to *Marches*, was the Diſpoſition and Conduct of a Retreat. This is, without diſpute, the niceſt Point in the whole Buſineſs of War. For beſides all the Attentions requiſite in ordinary Marches, you are under the Diſadvantage of being continually preſſed by an Enemy, commonly ſuperior in Force, and fluſhed with Succeſs. The fineſt Retreat we meet with in ancient Hiſtory, is that of the ten thouſand *Greeks* under the conduct of *Xenophon*, who has left us a particular Account of that famous Expedition. We there ſee that the hollow Square, which was invented purpoſely for a Retreat, is very incommodious when the Enemy is directly in your rear. *Xenophon* ſays ſo in expreſs terms, and that the *Greeks* were obliged to diſcontinue that Order, and march in two Columns, with a Body of Reſerve of ſix hundred Men, who were not confined to the ſpace between the Columns, ſo as to compleat the figure of the Square, but formed ſometimes the Van, ſometimes the Rear, filed off by the two Flanks where the Columns were obliged to approach, or poſted themſelves in the interval when they extended to the right and left; in a word, without being tied down to any fixed Poſt, ran wherever their aſſiſtance was wanted. What ſurpriſes moſt in this Retreat is, that upon a computation of the way made by the Troops, which *Xenophon* regularly ſets down, we find their Day's Marches one with another, to fall but little ſhort of twenty-four Miles. Our Armies ſeldom advance half the way, even when they have no Enemy upon their hands, nor any of thoſe other Diſadvantages the *Greeks* laboured under. We find likewiſe in the *Roman* Hiſtory, ſeveral Examples of well conducted Retreats, in which their Generals have happily extricated themſelves out of Dangers that ſeemed to threaten their Armies with unavoidable Deſtruction. *Quintus Lutatius* having the *Cimbri* upon his Heels, and being arrived at a River;

River; that the Enemy might give him time to paſs, pretended a reſolution to fight them, pitched his Camp, intrenched himſelf, ſet up his Standard, and ſent out parties of Horſe to provide Forage. The *Cimbri* believing he meant to incamp there, came and incamped by him, and divided themſelves into ſeveral Parties, to go in queſt of Proviſions. *Lutatius* having notice of this, ſeized the Opportunity ſo favourable to his Deſign, and throwing Bridges over the River, paſſed it before the Enemy could have time to diſturb him. *Lucius Minucius* a *Roman* Conſul was in *Liguria* with an Army, and ſhut up by the Enemy between two Mountains, inſomuch that he could not diſengage himſelf. Being ſenſible of the danger he was in, he ſent certain *Numidians* which he had in his Army, upon ſmall ill-conditioned Horſes, towards the places where the Enemy had their guard. At firſt ſight they put themſelves into a poſture to defend the Paſſes: but when they obſerved the *Numidians* in ill order, and ill mounted in reſpect of themſelves, they began to deſpiſe them, and to be more remiſs in their guard; which was no ſooner perceived by the *Numidians*, than clapping Spurs to their Horſes, and charging them ſuddenly, they paſſed on in ſpite of all oppoſition, and by the Miſchief and Devaſtation they made every where in the Country, conſtrained the Enemy to give free paſſage to the whole Army. I ſhall mention only one Inſtance more, and that is the Retreat of *Marc Antony*, when he was purſued into *Syria* by a great Body of *Parthian* Horſe. He obſerved that every Morning by break of day they were upon his back as ſoon as he moved, and continued skirmiſhing and moleſting him quite thorough his March. In order to deceive them, and obtain ſome reſpite, he reſolved not to remove before Noon; which the *Parthians* obſerving, concluded he would not ſtir that Day, and returned to their Poſts, inſomuch that he had opportunity of marching all the reſt of the Day without interruption. But this was only a temporary Expedient, calculated for preſent Relief; and therefore to ſcreen himſelf from the Arrows of the *Parthians*, with which the Army was greatly incommoded, he made uſe of the following Device, practiſed often by the *Romans* on other occaſions. He ordered the Soldiers, when the Enemy came near them, to caſt themſelves into the figure of the *Teſtudo*, ſo that their Targets ſhould cloſe altogether above their Heads, and defend them from the miſſive Weapons diſcharged at them. In this caſe the firſt Rank ſtood upright on their Feet, and the reſt ſtooped lower and lower by degrees, till the laſt Rank kneeled down upon their Knees; ſo that every Rank covering with their Targets the Heads of all in the Rank before them, they repreſented a Tortoiſe-ſhell, or a ſort of Penthouſe. By this Contrivance he made good his Retreat, and arrived in *Syria* without conſiderable loſs.

XVIII. BEFORE I conclude this Chapter, it will naturally be expected I ſhould explain what was the Practice and Diſcipline of the *Romans*, when they had finiſhed the Day's march, and were arrived near the place of incampment. In this caſe the military Tribunes and Centurions appointed for that Service, advanced before all the reſt, diligently to view and conſider the ſituation of the Place. When they had choſen the Ground, they began by marking the General's Quarter with a white Flag or Streamer, and diſtinctly ſet out its Boundaries. Then the Quarters of the ſeveral Tribunes were appointed, and afterwards thoſe of the Legions, all with diſtinct Flags of ſeveral Colours. Every Legion, as well of the Allies as of the *Romans*, had their portion of Ground aſſigned and marked out, for drawing the Line round the Camp, which was ſet about immediately, part of the Troops continuing

mean-while under Arms, to defend thoſe that were at work upon the Intrenchment, in caſe of any ſudden Surpriſe. All this was finiſhed in a very ſhort ſpace, the *Romans* being remarkably expert in it by conſtant Practice; for they never altered the figure of their Camp, nor omitted to fortify it in all the forms, tho' but for one Night's continuance. But this naturally leads me to the ſubject of the next Chapter.

CHAP. VI.

Of INCAMPMENTS.

I. ONE of the moſt neceſſary and beneficial Parts of the military Art is, to know how to incamp well, and to practiſe it conſtantly. No wonder therefore that the *Romans*, among whom military Diſcipline was carried to ſuch a degree of Perfection, and who exacted the moſt rigorous Submiſſion to all the Laws and Rules of it, were particularly attentive to this Article. And indeed the Armies of that People, tho' ſtill in the Territory of *Rome*, and tho' they had only one Night to paſs in a place, incamped nevertheleſs in all the forms, with no other difference, than that the Camp was leſs fortified there perhaps than in the Enemy's Country. It was always of a ſquare form, contrary to the cuſtom of the *Greeks*, who made theirs round. The Ditch and Rampart, which conſiſted of four equal ſides, was equally diſtributed to be raiſed by the two *Roman* Legions, and the two Legions of the Allies, who perfected it without intermiſſion. If the Enemy were near, part of the Troops continued under arms, whilſt the reſt were employed in throwing up the Intrenchments. They began by digging Trenches of greater or leſs depth, according to the occaſion. They were at leaſt eight Foot broad by ſix deep: but we often find them twelve Foot in breadth, and ſometimes more, to fifteen or twenty. Of the Earth dug out of the Trenches, and thrown up on the ſide of the Camp, they formed the Rampart; and to make it the firmer, mingled it with Turf cut in a certain ſize and form. Sometimes they drove double rows of Stakes into the Earth, leaving ſo much of the length above Ground, as the height of the Work was to be of; and then interweaving them with Twigs, in the manner of Basket-work, filled the ſpace between with the Earth riſing out of the Ditch. This was an expeditious and ſafe way of forming the Line, and appears to have been always practiſed, when they incamped in places where theſe Materials were to be found. Upon the brow of the Rampart the Paliſades were planted. *Polybius*, ſpeaking of the Order given by *Q. Flamininus* to his Troops, to cut Stakes againſt there ſhould be occaſion for them, offers ſeveral very curious Remarks upon this Subject: and as that judicious Hiſtorian, who was himſelf an expert Warrior, ſeems to lay great ſtreſs upon the Conduct of the *Romans* in this Point, I ſhall beg leave to lay ſome of his Obſervations before the Reader.

II. THIS Cuſtom, ſays *Polybius*, which is eaſy to put in practice amongſt the *Romans*, paſſes for impoſſible with the *Greeks*. They can hardly ſupport their own weight upon their Marches, whilſt the *Romans*, notwithſtanding the

the Buckler which hangs at their Shoulders, and the Javelins which they carry in their Hands, load themſelves alſo with Stakes or Paliſades, which are very different from thoſe of the *Greeks*. With the latter thoſe are beſt, which have many ſtrong Branches about the trunk. The *Romans*, on the contrary, leave but three or four at moſt upon it, and that only on one ſide. In this manner a Man can carry two or three bound together, and much more uſe may be made of them. Thoſe of the *Greeks* are more eaſily pulled up. If the Stake be fixed by itſelf; as its Branches are ſtrong, and in great number, two or three Soldiers will eaſily pull it away, and thereby make an opening for the Enemy, without reckoning that the neighbouring Stakes will be looſened, becauſe their Branches are too ſhort to be interwoven with each other. But this is not the caſe with the *Romans*. The Branches of their Paliſades are ſo ſtrongly inſerted into each other, that it is hard to diſtinguiſh the Stake they belong to: and it is as little practicable to thruſt the Hand thro' theſe Branches to pull up the Paliſades; becauſe being well faſtened and twiſted together, they leave no opening, and are carefully ſharpened at their ends. Even tho' they could be taken hold of, it would not be eaſy to pull them out of the Ground, and that for two Reaſons. The firſt is, becauſe they are driven in ſo deep, that they cannot be moved: and the ſecond, becauſe their Branches are interwoven with each other in ſuch a manner, that one cannot be ſtirred without ſeveral more. Two or three Men might unite their ſtrength in vain to draw one of them out, which however if they effected, by drawing it a great while to and fro 'till it was looſe, the opening it would leave would be almoſt imperceptible. Theſe Stakes therefore have three Advantages. They are every where to be had; they are eaſy to carry; and are a ſecure Barrier to a Camp, becauſe very difficult to break thorough. In my Opinion, adds the Hiſtorian, there is nothing practiſed by the *Romans* in War, more worthy of being imitated.

III. THE form and diſtribution of the ſeveral parts of the *Roman* Camp, admits of great Difficulties, and has occaſioned many Diſputes amongſt the learned. The following Deſcription is taken chiefly from *Polybius*, who of all the Ancients is the moſt full and explicit upon this Article. He ſpeaks of a conſular Army, which in his time conſiſted of two *Roman* Legions, and two Legions of the Allies. A *Roman* Legion contained four thouſand two hundred Foot, and three hundred Horſe. A Legion of the Allies was equal in the number of Infantry, and generally double in Cavalry. All together therefore, *Romans* and Allies, they made eighteen thouſand ſix hundred Men. After the place for the Camp was marked out, which was always choſen for its convenience in reſpect to Water and Forage, a part of it was allotted for the General's Tent, called otherwiſe the *Prætorium*, becauſe the ancient *Latins* ſtiled all their Commanders *Prætores*. The Ground pitched upon for this purpoſe was generally higher than the reſt of the Camp, that he might with the greater eaſe ſee all that paſſed, and diſpatch the neceſſary Orders. A Flag was planted upon it, and round that a ſquare ſpace marked out in ſuch manner, that the four ſides were an hundred Feet diſtant from the Flag, and the Ground occupied by the Conſul about four Acres. Near this Tent were erected the Altar on which Sacrifices were offered, and the Tribunal for diſpenſing Juſtice. The two *Roman* Legions had each ſix Tribunes, which made twelve in all. Their Tents were placed in a right Line parallel to the front of the *Prætorium*, at the diſtance of fifty Foot. In this ſpace of fifty Foot were the Horſes, Beaſts of burden, and the whole Equipage of the Tribunes.

Their

Their Tents were pitched in ſuch a manner, that they had the *Prætorium* in the rear, and in the front all the reſt of the Camp. The Tents of the Tribunes, at equal diſtances from each other, took up the whole breadth of the Ground upon which the two *Roman* Legions were incamped.

IV. BETWEEN the Tents of the Legions and Tribunes, a ſpace of an hundred Foot in breadth was left, which formed a large Street called *Principia*, that ran acroſs the whole Camp, and divided it into two parts, the upper and the lower. Beyond this Street were placed the Tents of the Legions. The ſpace which they occupied was divided in the midſt into two equal parts by a Street of fifty Foot broad, which extended the whole length of the Camp. On each ſide of this Street, in ſo many ſeveral Lines, were the Quarters of the *Horſe*, the *Triarii*, the *Principes*, and the *Haſtati*. The *Velites* had no diſtinct Quarters, but were variouſly mingled with the reſt of the Foot, four hundred and eighty of them being joined to the *Haſtati*, a like number to the *Principes*, and two hundred and forty to the *Triarii*. To form a diſtinct idea of the *Roman* Camp, we muſt call to mind, that the Cavalry of each Legion was divided into ten Troops, thirty Men to a Troop; and that the *Triarii*, *Principes*, and *Haſtati*, were likewiſe ſeverally divided into ten Maniples of an hundred and twenty Men each, except thoſe of the *Triarii*, which conſiſted only of half that number. In conformity to this diſtribution, the Lines on which theſe ſeveral Bodies incamped, were each divided into ten Squares, extended length-wiſe from the Tents of the Tribunes. Theſe Squares were an hundred Foot every way, except in the Lines of *Triarii*, where, becauſe of the ſmaller number of Troops, they were only fifty Foot broad by an hundred long, and may therefore more properly be termed half Squares. Acroſs the middle of theſe Lodgments, between the fifth and ſixth Squares, ran a Street of fifty Foot broad, cutting the Lines at right Angles, and extending from one ſide of the Camp to the other. It was called *Quintana*, becauſe it opened beyond the fifth Maniple.

V. THE order and diſpoſition of the ſeveral Lines was as follows. On each ſide the middle Street, that ran according to the length of the Camp, the Cavalry of the two Legions were quartered facing each other, and ſeparated by the whole breadth of the Street. As there were ten Squares on each ſide, and every Square lodged thirty Horſe, the twenty together contained juſt ſix hundred, which made the intire Cavalry of two Legions. Adjoining to the Cavalry the *Triarii* were quartered, a Maniple behind a Troop of Horſe, both in the ſame form. They joined as to the Ground, but faced differently, the *Triarii* turning their Backs upon the Horſe. And here, as we have already obſerved, becauſe the *Triarii* were leſs in number than the other Troops, the Ground aſſigned to each Maniple was only half as broad as long. Fronting the *Triarii* on each ſide, was a Street of fifty Foot broad, running parallel to that between the Quarters of the Horſe. On the oppoſite ſide of this Street was the Line of Lodgments belonging to the *Principes*. Behind the *Principes* the *Haſtati* were quartered, joining as to the Ground, but fronting the other way.

VI. THUS far we have deſcribed the Quarters of the two *Roman* Legions. It remains that we diſpoſe of the Allies. Their Infantry equalled that of the *Romans*, and their Cavalry was twice the number. In removing for the *Extraordinarii* a fifth part of the Foot, or ſixteen hundred and eighty Men, and

and a third of the Horſe, or four hundred Men, there remained in the whole ſeven thouſand five hundred and twenty Men, Horſe and Foot, to quarter. Theſe were diſpoſed upon the two Wings of the Legions, being ſeparated from the *Haſtati* on each ſide, by a Street of fifty Foot. The Cavalry were directly oppoſite to the *Haſtati*, upon a breadth of an hundred and thirty-three Foot, and ſomething more. Behind them, and on the ſame Line, the Infantry were incamped, upon a breadth of two hundred Foot. The *Præfecti* were lodged at the ſides of the Tribunes, over-againſt their reſpective Wings. At the head of every Troop and Maniple, were the Tents of the Captains of Horſe and Centurions. On the right ſide of the *Prætorium* ſtood the *Quæſtorium*, aſſigned to the *Quæſtor*, or Treaſurer of the Army, and hard by the *Forum*. This laſt ſerved not only for the ſale of Commodities, but alſo for the meeting of Councils, and giving audience to Ambaſſadors. On the other ſide of the *Prætorium* were lodged the *Legati*, or Lieutenant-Generals. On the right and left, ſtill in the ſame Line with the *Prætorium*, and directly behind the Præfects of the Allies, were the Quarters of the extraordinary Cavalry *Evocatorum*, and of the other volunteer *Roman* Horſe, *Selectorum*. All this Cavalry faced on one ſide towards the *Forum* and place of the *Quæſtor*, and on the other towards the Lodgments of the *Legati*. They not only incamped near the Conſul's perſon, but commonly attended him upon Marches, that they might be at hand to execute his Orders. The exraordinary and volunteer *Roman* Foot adjoined to the Horſe laſt ſpoken of, forming the extremities of the Line towards the two ſides of the Camp. Above this Line was a Street of an hundred Foot broad, extending the whole breadth of the Camp, and beyond that the Quarters of the extraordinary Horſe of the Allies, facing the *Prætorium*, Treaſury, and the Tents of the *Legati*. The extraordinary Foot of the Allies were directly behind their Horſe, fronting the Intrenchment and upper extremity of the Camp. The void ſpaces that remained on both ſides were allotted to Strangers and Allies, who came later than the reſt.

VII. BETWEEN the Rampart and the Tents, there was an open Place or Street of two hundred Foot in breadth, which was continued all along the four equal ſides of the Camp. This Interval was of very great uſe, either for the entrance or departure of the Legions. For each Body of Troops advanced into that Space by the Street before it, ſo that marching thither different ways, they were in no danger of crowding and breaking each other's Ranks. Beſides which, the Cattle, and whatever was taken from the Enemy, was placed there, where a Guard was kept during the night. Another conſiderable Advantage of it was, that in Attacks by night, neither Fire nor Dart could do any great execution in the Camp; the Soldiers being at ſo great a diſtance, and under cover of their Tents. But the principal Intention of it ſeems to have been, for the drawing up of the Troops who were to defend the Line, and to leave ſufficient room for the Cavalry to ſcour it. My Lord *Orrery* however is of opinion, that it was rather too narrow to anſwer both theſe Services. If it was only deſigned for the Foot, they loſt the benefit of their Horſe, which Experience teaches us to be of ſingular uſe on ſuch Occaſions. For whatever Foot ſtorm a Line, muſt enter it in great Confuſion and Diſorder, and can very hardly indeed reſiſt ſmall Squadrons of Horſe, who are ready to receive them, and charge them all along the inſide of the Line. For theſe Reaſons he conſiders the narrowneſs of this Space as a defect in the *Roman* method of incamping, and thinks that a breadth of three hundred Foot at leaſt ought to

have been allowed for the defence and ſcouring of the Line. It is probable the *Romans* would have done ſo, had they not found the other ſufficient; and we have this to ſay in their favour, that tho' their Camps were frequently attacked, we meet with but few Inſtances in Hiſtory of their being forced.

VIII. THE Gates were only four in number, one to each ſide. *Livy* ſays ſo in expreſs Terms. *Ad quatuor Portas exercitum inſtruxit, ut, ſigno dato, ex omnibus Portubus eruptionem facerent.* "He drew up his Men facing the "four Gates, that, upon a ſignal given, the Army might ſally from all the "ſeveral Gates at once." Theſe are afterwards called by the ſame Author, *the Extraordinary, the right Principal, the left Principal,* and *the Quæſtorian.* They have alſo other Names, about which it is not a little difficult to reconcile Authors. It is believed that the *Extraordinary* Gate was ſo called, becauſe near the Place where the *extraordinary* Troops incamped; and that it was the ſame as the *Prætorian,* which took its Name from its nearneſs to the *Prætorium.* The Gate oppoſite to this, at the other extremity of the Camp, was called *Porta Decumana,* becauſe near the *ten* Maniples of each Legion; and without doubt is the ſame with the *Quæſtorian,* mentioned by *Livy* in the Place above cited. As to the *right* and *left Principals,* they had their Name from being on the *right* and *left* of the Camp, fronting the Street called *Principia.* I ſhall conclude this Deſcription of the *Roman* Camp with obſerving, that when a Conſular Army conſiſted of more than four Legions, they were lodged ſtill in the ſame order, only the figure of the Camp was a long Square, in proportion to the additional Forces which were to be contained in it. When both the Conſular Armies were united, they took up the Ground of two ſuch perfect Squares.

IX. A wonderful Order was obſerved Night and Day throughout the Camp, in reſpect to the Watch-word, Centinels, and Guards; and it was in this its Security and Quiet conſiſted. To render the Guard more regular and leſs fatiguing, the Night was divided into four Parts or Watches, and the Day into four Stations. There ſeems to have been aſſigned one Company of Foot, and one Troop of Horſe, to each of the four Gates every Day. The *Roman* Diſcipline was extremely ſtrict in this particular, puniſhing with an exemplary Severity ſuch as deſerted their Poſt, or abandoned their Corps of Guard. *Polybius* takes notice of the excellent Effects of this Diſcipline, upon occaſion of the Siege of *Agrigentum* in *Sicily,* during the firſt *Punick* War. The *Roman* Guards had diſperſed themſelves a little too far in queſt of Forage. The *Carthaginians* laying hold of the Opportunity, made a vigorous Sally from the Town, and had well nigh forced the Camp; when the Soldiers, ſenſible of the extreme Penalty they had incurred by neglecting their Duty, reſolved to repair the Fault by ſome remarkable Behaviour; and accordingly rallying together, they not only ſuſtained the Shock of the Enemy, to whom they were far inferior in number, but in the end made ſo great a ſlaughter among them, as compelled them to retreat into the Town, tho' they were upon the very point of carrying the *Roman* Lines. The Night-Guards were four out of every *Manipulus,* who continued on Duty three Hours, and were then relieved by thoſe next in turn. To keep the Soldiers alert, they had the *Circuitio Vigilum,* or Patrols, performed commonly four times in the Night, by ſome of the Horſe. Upon extraordinary Occaſions, the Tribunes and Lieutenant-Generals, and ſometimes the General himſelf made theſe Circuits

TABVLA ET FORMA CASTRORUM

CASTRA



A Prætorium
B Quæstorium
C Legati duo
D Tribuni
E Prafecti socium
F Evocati equites
G Ablecti equites
H Evocati pedites
I Ablecti pedites

K Extraordinarij equites
L Extraordinarij pedites
M Principia
N Equitas Romani
O Triarij legg.
P Principes legg.
Q Hastati legg.
R Equites socij
S Peditas socij

T Quintana
V Spatium ad vallum
Xa Porta Praet
Xb Porta Decum
Xc Porta Princip. dextra
Xd Porta Princip sinistra

FORMA CASTRORVM CONSVLARIS



N°. II.

TRA TRIUM LEGIONUM CUM SUPPLEMENTIS

Porta Principalis

2320

240 Coh_5 | 240 Coh_3 | 240 Coh_2 | 240 Coh_4 | 240 Coh_6 | 240 Coh_7 | 240 Coh_8

30 60 36 60 60

Coh_9 | Coh_10

Nationes | Ala Milliaria | Ala Milliaria | Scamnum

60 150 150 60 60

10 10 10 10 10

tribunorum | legatorum

Via Principalis

Quintana

Via

Via

PRÆTORIUM

Quæstorium

Comites Imperatoris

Statores & Coh ped

Equites Prætoriani et singulares

Cohortes prætoriæ

Coh. Equitat

Ala quingenariæ

Coh. I. et Vexill.

peditat

Natio_

Coh_9 | Coh_10

Coh_5 | Coh_3 | Coh_2 | Coh_4 | Coh_6 | Coh_7 | Coh_8

Sagularis

Prætentura

Intervallum

latera Prætorii

Retentura

ORVM EXERCITVS
LARIS

Discourse of the Art of War page 70.

cuits in perſon, and took a ſtrict view of the Watch in every part of the Camp.

X. WHAT we have hitherto ſaid regards only the Plan, Diſpoſition, and well ordering of the *Roman* Camp. But there are many other Particulars to be taken into conſideration, in incamping an Army to advantage: the choice of the Ground; the convenience of Proviſion and Forage; the ſecurity of Convoys; and the Precautions needful to prevent Surpriſe, or the being taken at a Diſadvantage. We cannot however here enter into a particular Detail of the *Roman* Practice, with relation to theſe ſeveral Articles; becauſe not being ſubject to any fixed and invariable Rules, they depend in a manner intirely upon the Prudence and Diſcretion of the General, who muſt therein be guided by the nature of the Country, the poſture of the Enemy, and his own Strength. Two things in particular they were more than ordinarily attentive to; Health, and Safety. The firſt they endeavoured to ſecure, by avoiding all Moraſſes and fenny Places, or where the Wind was cold and unwholſom; which Unwholſomneſs they did not ſo much compute from the ſituation of the Place, as from the Appearance and Complexion of the Inhabitants. Exerciſe contributes greatly to Health, and therefore the *Romans* took care to keep their Troops always employed, either in caſting up new Works round the Camp, or in hunting after Proviſion and Forage, or in performing thoſe ſeveral Exerciſes, that tend to render the Body robuſt and active. It is obſerved in our Days, that the immoderate Labour Soldiers are obliged to undergo, deſtroys our Armies: and yet it was by incredible Labour that the *Romans* preſerved themſelves. The reaſon of the difference I take to be this: their Fatigues were continual and without reſpite; whereas our Men are perpetually ſhifting from the extremes of Labour to the extremes of Idleneſs, than which nothing can be more deſtructive. Who could believe, that there was nothing, even to Cleanlineſs, of which particular care was not taken in the *Roman* Camp. As the great Street ſituated in the front of the *Prætorium* was much frequented by the Officers and Soldiers, who paſſed through it to receive and carry Orders, and upon their other Occaſions; a number of Men were appointed to ſweep and clean it every Day in Winter, and to water it in Summer to prevent the Duſt.

XI. BUT beſides Health, Safety was likewiſe another important Conſideration with the *Romans*. To this end, in chooſing a Place of Incampment, they always had a particular eye to the convenience of Water, Proviſions, and Forage. We ſee evidently in *Cæſar*'s Commentaries, that there was nothing about which he was more ſolicitous, than the contriving his Marches in ſuch manner, as to have his Camp ſeated near ſome navigable River, and a Country behind him, whence he could be eaſily, and at a reaſonable rate, ſupplied with every thing neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence of his Army. Other Inconveniences may find a Remedy in time, but Hunger, the longer it laſts, the more infallibly it deſtroys. And hence it was, that where the above-mentioned Advantages could not be obtained, the *Romans* made it their firſt Care, after fortifying their Camp, to lay in ſuch a quantity of all neceſſary Stores, as might be ſufficient for the time of their continuance in it. Nor were they leſs attentive to the ſtrength of their Camp, and the Precautions neceſſary for its defence. This is a part of the *Art of War* in which they inconteſtibly excelled all Nations. Conſtant Practice made them expert in it; for they never quartered their Troops in Towns and open Villages, but always in ſtanding Camps,

which

which were carefully intrenched and fortified, in proportion to the Danger to which they fancied themſelves expoſed. And here we may obſerve, that whereas the *Greeks* choſe always to incamp where there was ſome River, or Wood, or Bank, or other natural Rampart to defend them; the *Romans*, on the contrary, ſtood not ſo much on the ſtrength of Situation, as on their own ways of fortifying. Hence the *Grecian* Camps were often without Intrenchments, and varied in their form, according to the nature of the Place; but among the *Romans* one conſtant Method was inviolably obſerved, nor would they ever lodge in a Camp, that was not ſurrounded with a Ditch and a Rampart.

XII. THIS Practice of intrenched and fortified Camps was attended with many ſolid and deſireable Advantages. The Army was hereby kept ſafe, and freed from the Danger of having any of its Quarters beat up, by Surpriſe or a ſudden Attack. It was eaſed of the trouble of keeping many and great Guards, ſince a few ſerves the turn for all, when all are at hand in caſe of an Attempt. It could never be compelled to fight againſt its will, than which no greater Misfortune can befal an Army. In fine, as the ſucceſs of Arms is uncertain, it had always a ſecure Retreat in caſe of the worſt. Theſe things conſidered, it will not appear wonderful, that the *Romans* were ſo ſtrict in this Article, and conſidered the Cuſtom of fortifying Camps regularly, as one of the moſt eſſential parts of military Diſcipline. In the War with the *Gauls*, the Commanders of the *Roman* Army were reproached with having omitted this wiſe Precaution, and the loſs of the Battle of *Allia* was in part attributed to it. Hence it was, that to avoid the like Misfortune for the time to come, it became in a manner an eſtabliſhed Law amongſt them, never to hazard a Battle 'till they had finiſhed their Camp. *Paulus Æmilius*, in the ſecond *Macedonian* War, ſuſpended and arreſted the Ardor of his whole Army to attack *Perſeus*, for no other Reaſon, but becauſe they had not formed their Camp. The fortified Camp, in caſe of a Diſaſter, put a ſtop to the Enemy's Victory, received the Troops that retired in ſafety, enabled them to renew the Battle with more Succeſs, and prevented their being intirely routed; whereas without the refuge of a Camp, an Army, tho' compoſed of good Troops, was expoſed to a final Defeat, and to being inevitably cut in pieces. I may add to all theſe Advantages, that an intrenched Camp, by reaſon of the open Air, the healthineſs of its Situation, which always muſt be minded, and the cleanlineſs, which may and ought to be kept in it, is exceedingly leſs ſubject to Infection and Sickneſs, than Villages and ſtrong Towns; inſomuch that ſome great Captains have concluded, an Army will be likelier preſerved, and kept ſound and untainted three Months in a well ſeated and regulated Camp, than three Weeks in the ordinary Villages and Country Towns.

XIII. I have the longer and more particularly inſiſted on this Practice of intrenched Camps, becauſe it appears evident from Hiſtory, that the *Romans* owed as many of their Victories to their Ability in this part of War, as to their other excellent military Diſcipline and Valour. It would be almoſt endleſs to enumerate, what Kingdoms and Provinces they kept in obedience by their ſtanding Camps; and how often they warded off Dangers, and brought their Wars to a fortunate iſſue by the ſame Proceeding. For having firſt wearied out their Enemies by ſafe and beneficial Delays, they would on ſome great Advantage give them Battle and defeat them; which artful Method of making War they neither could have effected nor rationally attempted, but by

by their thoroughly knowing how to incamp advantageouſly, by conſtantly practiſing it, and by a timely providing of Food and Forage. *Vegetius* obſerves, that one of the principal Cauſes of the ruin of the *Roman* Empire was, that they had loſt the Art of fortifying their Camp; by which Negligence they were eaſily overwhelmed by the Barbarian Horſe. And indeed when under the Emperors, they had aſcertained the Limits of their Dominion, reſolving to extend their Conqueſts no farther, but to reſt ſatisfied with maintaining the poſſeſſion of what they had acquired; it is well known, that they effectually accompliſhed this deſign by means of the ſtanding Camps, which they kept upon the *Euphrates*, the *Danube*, and the *Rhine*. And ſo long as this Method was followed, the bordering Nations found it impoſſible to break through the *Roman* Barriers, or hurt the Tranquillity of their Empire. But when in proceſs of time, the military Diſcipline began to decline, and the *Art of incamping*, in particular, was loſt, or grew into diſuſe; the *Romans*, by abandoning the Banks of theſe ſeveral Rivers, opened a free paſſage to the Barbarians, who meeting now with no reſiſtance, poured in upon them like a Torrent, and eaſily overwhelmed a feeble race of Men, whom Luxury, and an undiſturbed Peace of many Ages, had rendered utterly unfit for War.

XIV. AND here, as it falls ſo naturally in my way, and has a ſtrict Connexion with my Subject, I cannot forbear obſerving, that in the laſt Age, the *French*, who had many excellent Commanders, if not the moſt of any one Nation, and to whom the *Art of War* owes much of its preſent Improvement, began to revive, and with great Benefit to themſelves, this almoſt obſolete part of it. For when the Prince of *Orange*, the *Imperialiſts* under the Count *de Souches*, and the *Flemiſh* Forces were united; the Prince of *Conde*, one of the greateſt Captains that any Age has produced, being ſent to oppoſe them, would not give them Battle, but incamped himſelf advantageouſly on the *French* Frontiers, ſo that they were juſtly afraid to enter them, and leave him at their Backs. By this Management he kept them long at bay, and when he found his Opportunity, gave them at *Seneff* ſo conſiderable a Blow, that the *French*, from having been on the defenſive, became afterwards the Aſſaulters, and cloſed that Campaign with taking ſome of the Enemy's Towns. The Marſhal *de Turenne* alſo, who was ſent General to the War in *Germany*, and who in the military Art had hardly a ſuperior, having there to do with the Count *de Montecuculi*, one of the greateſt Captains of his time; would ſtill by intrenched Camps, when the *Germans* were the ſtrongeſt, preſerve himſelf and Army, ſpin out the War, and cover thoſe Territories and Places he had won, while he himſelf had been the moſt powerful.

XV. AND here it is particularly worthy of notice, that when upon the Marſhal *de Turenne*'s death, the *French* King ſent the Prince of *Conde* to command in his ſtead, he alſo by intrenched Incampments weathered that Storm, which in itſelf was ſo threatning, not only by the ſudden loſs of ſo great a Captain, but alſo by the *Germans* being led by the Count *de Montecuculi*, and the Duke of *Lorain*, two Perſons as conſiderable as the very Forces they headed. I ſay it particularly deſerves our obſervation, that two ſuch juſtly celebrated Commanders, as the Prince of *Conde*, and Monſieur *Turenne*, ſhould obſerve the very ſame Methods, in managing the ſame War; whereas uſually when one General ſucceeds another, in heading the ſame Army, and ordering the ſame War, the laſt comer judges it a kind of dimunution to his

own Skill, to tread in the very Paths of his Predeceſſor. But as the Prince of *Conde* obſerved a quite different Conduct on this occaſion, we may thence naturally gather the three following Particulars. *Firſt*, that he judged himſelf ſo juſtly ſecure in his own Reputation, that it could receive no diminution, by his following the Steps of the dead General, more eſpecially as he had done the like before, and ſucceſsfully, in *Flanders*. *Secondly*, that a wiſe and great Captain will rather, by imitating his Predeceſſor, confirm that Courſe to be the beſt which he knows to be ſo in itſelf, than try new Methods of War, whereby out of a mere Hope to do the like thing by a different way, he may hazard his Reputation, his Army, and the Country he is to cover and protect. *Thirdly*, what two ſuch Generals have practiſed, all Circumſtances conſidered, amounts to little leſs than a Demonſtration, that by Camps intrenched and well poſted, a Country may be beſt ſecured, an invading Enemy beſt reſiſted, and in time, all Advantages being judiciouſly taken, defeated or made to retire.

XVI. THESE Examples ancient and modern, ſufficiently evince the Benefit of this Practice, and with what Judgment the *Romans* made it an eſſential part of their military Diſcipline. I ſhall only add, as an indiſputable Argument in its favour, that the great *Cæſar* himſelf has given his ſanction to it, by conſtantly following it in his Wars with the *Gauls*. He had to do with a brave and a warlike Nation, paſſionately fond of Liberty, and therefore extremely averſe to the *Roman* Yoke. To keep them in awe, he eſtabliſhed ſtanding Camps in different parts of the Country, where the Soldiers were quartered in large Bodies, and ſurrounded with ſtrong Intrenchments. This he thought the likelieſt Method to prevent Inſurrections, or ſuppreſs them ſpeedily when they ſhould happen, as the Troops would be always in a readineſs to march, and in condition to act. It was likewiſe the beſt ſecurity againſt Treachery and Surpriſe. Accordingly we find, that all the Efforts of the *Gauls* to recover their Liberty were without effect, the *Roman* Camps ſtanding as ſo many Bulwarks, againſt which tho' they made frequent Attacks, they were yet never able to prevail.

CHAP. VII.

Of BATTLES.

I. HAVING raiſed our Troops, armed and diſciplined them, put them upon the March, and lodged them in a Camp; it is now time to draw them out into the Field, that we may ſee how they acquitted themſelves on a Day of Battle. It is in this view military Merit appears in all its extent. To know whether a General were worthy of that Name, the *Romans* examined the Conduct he obſerved on this critical Occaſion. They did not expect Succeſs from the number of Troops, which is often a Diſadvantage, but from his Prudence and Valour, the Cauſe and Aſſurance of Victory. They conſidered him as the Soul of his Army, that directs all its Motions, whoſe Dictates every thing obeys, and upon whoſe good or bad Conduct the iſſue of the Battle depends. The firſt Conſideration, and that which demands the greateſt

greateſt force of Judgment is, to examine whether it be proper or no to come to an Engagement, and to balance exactly the Advantages with the Diſadvantages. The blind Temerity of *Varro*, notwithſtanding his Collegue's Remonſtrances, and the Advice of *Fabius*, drew upon the Republick the unfortunate Battle of *Cannæ*; whereas a delay of a few Weeks, would probably have ruined *Hannibal* for ever. *Perſeus*, on the contrary, let ſlip the Occaſion of fighting the *Romans*, in not taking advantage of the Ardor of his Army, and attacking them inſtantly after the defeat of their Horſe, which had thrown their Troops into Diſorder and Conſternation. *Cæſar* had been loſt after the Battle of *Dyrrhachium*, if *Pompey* had known how to improve his Advantage. Great Enterpriſes have their deciſive Moments. The important Point lies, in wiſely reſolving what to chooſe, and in ſeizing the preſent Occaſion, which never returns when once neglected.

II. BUT not to inſiſt any longer upon this, which reſts intirely in the Breaſt of the General; we ſhall ſuppoſe the Reſolution to fight taken, and proceed to examine, what Precautions the *Romans* made uſe of, in order to ſecure the Victory. Theſe may in the general be reduced to two. *Firſt*, the inſpiring their Troops with Courage and Confidence. *Secondly*, the ranging them judiciouſly in order of Battle. To inſpire their Troops with Confidence, they began by conſulting the Gods, and endeavouring to incline them in their favour. They conſulted them either by the flight or ſinging of Birds, by the inſpection of the Entrails of Victims, by the manner in which the ſacred Chickens pecked their Corn, and by things of the like nature. They laboured to render them propitious by Sacrifices, Vows, and Prayers. Many of the Generals, eſpecially in the earlier times, diſcharged theſe Duties with great Solemnity and Sentiments of Religion; and would never hazard an Engagement, until by ſome favourable Omens they had brought the Troops to believe that the Gods were on their ſide. *Paulus Æmilius*, before he gave *Perſeus* Battle, ſacrificed twenty Oxen ſucceſſively to *Hercules*, without finding any favourable Sign in all thoſe Victims. It was not 'till the one and twentieth, that he believed he ſaw ſomething which promiſed him the Victory. This attention to Religion was highly neceſſary among a People ſtrongly addicted to Superſtition, and over whom the Omens of which we ſpeak, however trifling in themſelves, had yet a very powerful Influence. Hence the Generals who neglected this Precaution, had often but too juſt cauſe to repent of their Folly; as it tended greatly to diſpirit the Troops, and begot an ill Opinion of their Conduct; inſomuch that we ſeldom find them ſucceſsful in their Undertakings. The wiſeſt and beſt Commanders choſe always to comply with the Prejudices of the Vulgar, and even where they deſpiſed theſe Ceremonies in their Hearts, affected yet a great Veneration for them in publick.

III. AFTER having paid theſe Duties to the Gods, they applied themſelves to Men, and the General exhorted his Soldiers. It ſeems to have been an eſtabliſhed Cuſtom with all Nations among the Ancients, to harangue their Troops before a Battle; nor can we deny that the Cuſtom was very reaſonable in itſelf, and might contribute greatly to the Victory. When an Army is upon the point of engaging an Enemy, what can be more proper, than to oppoſe the fear of a ſeemingly approaching Death with the moſt powerful Reaſons, and ſuch as, if not capable of totally extinguiſhing it, may yet in ſome meaſure allay and overcome it. Such Reaſons are the love of our Country, the Obligation to defend it at the price of our Blood, the remembrance of

paſt

paſt Victories, the neceſſity of ſupporting the Glory of our Nation, the Injuſtice of a violent and cruel Enemy, the Dangers to which the Fathers, Mothers, Wives, and Children of the Soldiers are expoſed: theſe Motives, I ſay, and many of the like nature, repreſented from the Mouth of a General, beloved and reſpected by his Troops, may make a very ſtrong Impreſſion upon their Minds. Not, as *Cyrus* in *Xenophon* obſerves, that ſuch Diſcourſes can in an Inſtant change the Diſpoſition of the Soldiers, and from timorous and abject as they might be, make them immediately bold and intrepid: but they awaken, they rouſe the Courage Nature had before given them, and add a new Force and Vivacity to it. To judge rightly of this Cuſtom of haranguing the Troops, as conſtantly practiſed among the *Romans*, we muſt go back to the Ages wherein they lived, and conſider their Manners with particular Attention. Their Armies were compoſed of the ſame Citizens, to whom, in the City, and in time of Peace, it was cuſtomary to communicate all the Affairs of the State. The General did no more in the Camp, or in the Field of Battle, than he would have been obliged to do in the Roſtrum or Tribunal of Harangues. He did his Troops Honour, and attracted their Confidence and Affection in imparting to them his Deſigns, Motives, and Meaſures. Add to this, that the ſight of the Generals, Officers, and Soldiers aſſembled, communicated a reciprocal Courage and Ardor to them all. Every one piqued himſelf at that time upon the goodneſs of his Aſpect and Appearance, and obliged his Neighbour to do the ſame. The fear of ſome was abated or intirely baniſhed by the Valour of others. The Diſpoſition of particular Perſons became that of the whole Body, and gave Affairs their Aſpect.

IV. LET me obſerve here, that there were many Occaſions beſides Battles, when it was neceſſary to excite the Good-will and Zeal of the Soldier: if, for inſtance, a difficult and haſty March was to be made, to extricate the Army out of a dangerous ſituation, or obtain one more commodious: if Courage, Patience, and Conſtancy were required, for ſupporting Famine, and other Diſtreſſes, painful to Nature: if ſome difficult, dangerous, but very important Enterpriſe was to be undertaken: if it was neceſſary to conſole, encourage, and reanimate the Troops after a Defeat: if an hazardous Retreat was to be made in view of the Enemy, in a Country he was maſter of: in fine, if only a generous Effort was wanting to terminate a War, or ſome important Undertaking. Upon theſe and the like Occaſions, the Generals never failed to ſpeak in publick to the Army, in order to ſound their Diſpoſitions by their Acclamations more or leſs ſtrong; to inform them of their Reaſons for ſuch and ſuch Conduct, and conciliate them to it; to diſpel the falſe Reports, which exaggerated Difficulties, and diſcouraged them; to let them ſee the Remedies preparing for the Diſtreſſes they were under, and the Succeſs to be expected from them; to explain the Precautions it was neceſſary to take, and the Motives for taking them. It was the General's Intereſt to flatter the Soldier, in making him the Confident of his Deſigns, Fears, and Expedients, in order to engage him to ſhare in them, and act in concert, and from the ſame Motives with himſelf. The General in the midſt of Soldiers, who, as well as himſelf, were all not only Members of the State, but had a ſhare in the Authority of the Government, was conſidered as a Father in the midſt of his Family.

V. IT may not be eaſy to conceive how he could make himſelf heard by the Troops: but if we call to mind, that the Armies of the *Roman* People were not very numerous, that Difficulty will in a great meaſure vaniſh. Beſides, I

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pretend not to ſay that the Generals were heard diſtinctly, or in any other manner than the Orators in the publick Aſſemblies. All People did not hear: yet the whole People were informed, the whole People deliberated and decided, and none of them complained of not having heard. It ſufficed that the moſt ancient, the moſt conſiderable, the principals of Companies and Quarters were preſent at the Harangue, of which they afterwards gave an account to the reſt. On the Column of *Trajan*, the Emperor is ſeen haranguing the Troops from a Tribunal of Turf, raiſed higher than the Soldiers Heads, with the principal Officers around him upon the Platform, and the Multitude forming a Circle at a diſtance. The great Men at *Rome* accuſtomed themſelves from their youth to ſpeak upon occaſion with a ſtrong and clear Voice; and as theſe Harangues were made in the Camp to the Soldiers quiet and unarmed, it is not eaſy to conceive in how little room a great number of them could ſtand upright, when they preſſed cloſe to each other. I inſiſt the longer upon this, becauſe many blame the Hiſtorians of Antiquity, for the ſuppoſititious Harangues, as they call them, which they have inſerted in their Works. It muſt indeed be owned, that the Diſcourſes made by Generals on the Occaſions of which we ſpeak, were not always exactly the ſame as Hiſtorians have repeated them. For moſt Authors, writing in the time when the Art of Eloquence was highly in eſteem, have endeavoured, in adorning and inlarging the Harangues they record, to leave Proofs to Poſterity, that they were not leſs excellent Orators than Hiſtorians. But the Fact itſelf, that Generals frequently ſpoke in publick to their Troops, is evident beyond diſpute. *Cæſar*, whoſe Commentaries are a plain and naked relation of what he himſelf performed at the head of his Army, furniſhes many Examples of this kind. When he marched againſt *Arioviſtus*, a ſudden Conſternation ſeizing the Soldiers, which was like to be attended with very diſagreeable Effects, he aſſembled them, reprehended them in a long and ſevere Speech, and thereby put a ſtop to the growing Evil. In like manner, upon occaſion of a conſiderable Check received before *Gergovia*, owing to the too forward Valour of the Troops, and their neglect of his Injunctions, he judged it neceſſary to call them together, expoſtulate with them upon their ill-timed Bravery, and fortify them againſt any Damp their late Diſaſter might have thrown upon their Spirits. I could eaſily produce other Inſtances of the ſame kind, but theſe are abundantly ſufficient to evince the Point in queſtion.

VI. WHEN the Armies were numerous, and upon the point of giving Battle, the Ancients had a very ſimple and natural way of haranguing the Men. The General on horſeback rode thro' the Ranks, and ſpoke ſomething to the ſeveral Bodies of Troops in order to animate them. Where he had to do with different Nations, as very often happened, he addreſſed thoſe of his own Language in perſon, and made known his Views and Deſigns to the reſt by Interpreters. *Hannibal* acted in this manner at the Battle of *Zama* in *Africa*. He thought it incumbent on him to exhort his Troops: and as every thing was different among them, Language, Cuſtoms, Laws, Arms, Habits, and Intereſts, ſo he made uſe of different Motives to animate them. To the auxiliary Troops, he propoſed an immediate Reward, and an augmentation of their Pay out of the Booty that ſhould be taken. He inflamed the peculiar and natural Hatred of the *Gauls* againſt the *Romans*. As for the *Ligurians*, who inhabited a mountainous and barren Country, he ſet before them the fertile Valleys of *Italy*, as the fruit of their Victory. He repreſented

to the *Moors* and *Numidians*, the cruel and violent Government of *Maſiniſſa*, to which they would be ſubjected, if overcome. In this manner he animated theſe different Nations, by the different views of Hope and Fear. As to the *Carthaginians*, he omitted nothing that might excite their Valour, and addreſſed himſelf to them in the warmeſt and moſt pathetic Terms. He put them in mind of their Country, their Houſhold Gods, the Tombs of their Anceſtors, the Terror and Conſternation of their Fathers and Mothers, their Wives and Children; in fine, that the Fate of *Carthage* depended upon that Battle, the Event of which would either ruin and reduce her into perpetual Slavery, or render her Miſtreſs of the Univerſe, every thing being extreme which ſhe had either to hope or fear. This is a very fine Diſcourſe; but how did he make theſe different Nations underſtand it? *Livy* informs us: He ſpoke to the *Carthaginians* himſelf, and ordered the Commanders of each Nation to repeat to their reſpective Troops what he had ſaid. In this manner the General ſometimes aſſembled the Officers of his Army, and after having explained what he deſired the Troops might be told, he ſent them back to their ſeveral Brigades or Companies, in order to report what they had heard, and animate them for the Battle. *Arrian* obſerves this particular of *Alexander the Great*, before the famous Battle of *Arbela*.

VII. AFTER inſpiring the Troops with Reſolution and Confidence, and diſpoſing them to act courageouſly againſt the Enemy, the next care of the General was, to range them judiciouſly in order of Battle. The manner of drawing up the Infantry in three Lines, continued long in uſe among the *Romans*, and with uniformity enough. The *Haſtati* were placed in the front, in thick and firm Ranks; the *Principes* behind them, but not altogether ſo cloſe; and after them the *Triarii* in ſo wide and looſe an order, that upon occaſion, they could receive both the *Principes* and *Haſtati* into their Body in any Diſtreſs. The *Velites*, and in latter times the Bowmen and Slingers, were not drawn up in this regular manner, but diſpoſed of either before the front of the *Haſtati*, or ſcattered up and down among the void ſpaces of the ſame *Haſtati*, or ſometimes placed in two Bodies in the Wings: but wherever they were fixed, theſe light Soldiers began the Combat, skirmiſhing in flying Parties with the firſt Troops of the Enemy. If they prevailed, which very ſeldom happened, they proſecuted the Victory; but upon a repulſe, they fell back by the flanks of the Army, and rallied again in the rear. When they were retired, the *Haſtati* advanced againſt the Enemy; and in caſe they found themſelves overpowered, retiring ſoftly towards the *Principes*, fell into the intervals of their Ranks, and, together with them, renewed the Fight. But if the *Principes* and *Haſtati* thus joined were too weak to ſuſtain the fury of the Battle, they all fell back into the wider intervals of the *Triarii*, and then all together being united into a firm maſs, they made another Effort, much more impetuous than any before. If this Aſſault proved ineffectual, the Day was intirely loſt as to the Foot, there being no farther reſerves. This way of marſhalling the Foot, was exactly like the order of Trees, which Gardiners call the *Quincunx*; as appears from the beautiful compariſon between them in *Virgil*'s ſecond *Georgick*. And as the reaſon of that poſition of the Trees, is not only for Beauty and Figure, but that every particular Tree may have room to ſpread its Roots and Boughs, without intangling and hindering the reſt; ſo in this ranking of the Men, the Army was not only ſet out to the beſt advantage, and made the greateſt

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

A. *The Right Wing.* B. *The Left Wing.* C. *The Hastati, or first Line.* D. *The Principes, or second Line.* E. *The Triarii, or third Line.* F. *The Horse in both Wings.* G. *The light armed Troops* H. *The Extraordinary Horse.* I. *The Extraordinary Foot.* K. *The Volunteer Horse.* L. *The Volunteer Foot.* M. *The Macedonian Phalanx.* N. *The Right Wing of the Phalanx.* O. *The Left Wing of the Phalanx.* P. *The Cavalry on both Flanks of the Phalanx.* Q. *The light armed Troops behind the Cavalry.* R. *The second Line or Body of Reserve.*

ſhow, but every particular Soldier had free room to uſe his Weapons, and to withdraw himſelf between the void ſpaces behind him, without occaſioning any Confuſion or Diſturbance.

VIII. THE Stratagem of rallying thus three times, has been reckoned almoſt the whole Art and Secret of the *Roman* Diſcipline; and 'twas almoſt impoſſible it ſhould prove unſucceſsful, if duly obſerved. For Fortune, in every Engagement, muſt have failed them three ſeveral times, before they could be routed; and the Enemy muſt have had the Strength and Reſolution to overcome them in three ſeveral Encounters, for the deciſion of one Battle: whereas moſt other Nations, and even the Grecians themſelves, drawing up their whole Army as it were in one front, truſted themſelves and fortunes to the ſucceſs of a ſingle Charge. The *Roman* Cavalry was poſted at the two Corners of the Army, like the Wings on a Body; and fought ſometimes on foot, ſometimes on horſeback, as occaſion required, in the ſame manner as our Dragoons. The confederate or auxiliary Forces compoſed the two Points of the Battle, and covered the whole Body of the *Romans*. As to the Stations of the Commanders, the General commonly took up his Poſt near the middle of the Army, between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*, as the fitteſt place to give Orders equally to all the Troops. The *Legati* and Tribunes were uſually poſted by him; unleſs the former were ordered to command the Wings, or the others ſome particular Part of the Army. The Centurions ſtood every Man at the head of his Century, to lead them up; tho' ſometimes, out of Courage and Honour, they expoſed themſelves in the van of the Army, or were placed there for particular Reaſons by the General: as *Saluſt* reports of *Catiline*, that he poſted all his choice Centurions, with the *Evocati*, and the flower of the common Soldiers, in the front of the Battle. But the *Primipili*, or chief Centurions, had the Honour to ſtand with the Tribunes near the General's perſon. The common Soldiers were placed in ſeveral Ranks, at the diſcretion of the Centurions, according to their Age, Strength, and Experience, every Man having three Foot ſquare allowed him to manage his Arms in; and it was moſt religiouſly obſerved in their Diſcipline, never to abandon their Ranks, or break their Order upon any account.

IX. BUT beſides the common Methods of drawing up a *Roman* Army, which are ſufficiently explained by every Hiſtorian of any note; there were ſeveral other very ſingular Methods of forming their Battle into odd Shapes, according to the nature of the Body they were to oppoſe. Of this kind was the *Cuneus*, when the Army was ranged in the figure of a Wedge, the moſt proper to pierce and break the Order of the Enemy. This was otherwiſe called *Caput Porcinum*, which it in ſome meaſure reſembled. And here I beg leave to obſerve, that this laſt Name ſeems to confirm the Conjecture of the Chevalier *Folard*, who maintains that the *Cuneus* was no other than the *Column*, or a Battalion drawn up with a ſmall front and great depth. The triangular Order he looks upon as childiſh and abſurd, and ſuch as never was nor could be practiſed with Succeſs, becauſe of the extreme weakneſs of the Angles. The Authors, however, who give that form to the *Cuneus*, have invented another Order of Battle in oppoſition to it, which they term the *Forfex*. This was when the Army was drawn up in the figure of a Pair of Sheers, as it were on purpoſe to receive the *Cuneus*, in caſe the Enemy ſhould make uſe of that Diſpoſition. For while he endeavoured to open, and as it were

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to cleave their Squadrons with his Wedge, by keeping their Troops extended like the Sheers, and receiving him in the middle, they not only hindered the Damage deſigned to their own Men, but commonly cut the adverſe Body in pieces. The *Globus* was when the Soldiers caſt themſelves into a circular Order, upon an apprehenſion of being ſurrounded. *Cæſar*, in the fifth Book of his Commentaries, ſpeaks of this Diſpoſition as very proper in caſes of Danger and Extremity. The *Turris* repreſented an oblong Square, after the faſhion of a Tower, with very few Men in a File, and the Ranks extended to a great length. This ſeems of very ancient Original, as being mentioned in *Homer*. The laſt Order I ſhall take notice of is the *Serra*, or Saw; when the firſt Companies in the front of the Army, beginning the Engagement, ſometimes proceeded, and ſometimes drew back; ſo that by the help of a large Fancy, one might find ſome reſemblance between them and the Teeth of that Inſtrument.

X. IT was uſual enough among the *Romans*, to raiſe great Cries, and to ſtrike their Swords againſt their Bucklers, as they advanced to charge an Enemy. This Noiſe, joined to that of the Trumpets, was very proper to ſuppreſs in them, by a kind of Stupefaction, all fear of Danger, and to inſpire them with a Courage and Boldneſs, that had no view but Victory, and defied Death. But tho' ſuch Shoutings were allowed, nay even encouraged as uſeful, going towards the Enemy, yet a deep Silence was obſerved by the Soldiery, when they were about to engage, that the Orders of the Officers, and the Words of Command, might be clearly heard, and punctually obeyed. 'Tis obſerved that the *Greeks* went always ſilently to Battle, alledging for it, that they had more to do than to ſay to their Enemies. But the Shoutings of which we ſpeak, is in reality a kind of Doing, as it ſtirs up the Men, and often damps the Enemy. The Troops marched ſometimes ſoftly and coolly to the Charge, and ſometimes, when they approached the Enemy, they ſprung forward with impetuoſity as faſt as they could move. Great Men have been divided in Opinion upon theſe different Methods of attacking. It ſeems however to be generally agreed, that where two Armies engage in a plain Field, a Commander ought never to allow, much leſs order his Men to receive the Charge, but ſtill to meet the Enemy in giving it. *Pompey*, in the deciſive Battle of *Pharſalia*, by the advice of *Triarius*, commanded his Soldiers to receive *Cæſar*'s Aſſault, and to undergo the Shock of his Army, without removing from the place whereon they ſtood, as by this means *Cæſar*'s Men would be diſordered in their advance, and *Pompey*'s, by not moving, keep their Order. But *Cæſar* himſelf obſerves upon it, that according to his Judgment, the Advice was againſt all Reaſon; becauſe there is a certain keenneſs and alacrity of Spirit naturally planted in every Man, who is inflamed with a deſire to fight, and therefore no Commander ſhould repreſs or reſtrain it, but rather increaſe and ſet it forward. The Event juſtified *Cæſar*'s Opinion, and ſhowed that it was well-grounded.

XI. HITHERTO we have contented ourſelves with general Obſervations: but as it is impoſſible from theſe alone, to give any tolerable Idea of the Addreſs and Ability of a Commander in a Day of Battle, becauſe his Conduct muſt vary according to Circumſtances; I ſhall now beg leave to lay before the Reader, an Account of ſome celebrated Actions of Antiquity, taken from the Deſcriptions of ſuch Hiſtorians, as being themſelves military Men, have

have traced them with the utmoſt Exactneſs, and diſtinctly explained the Reaſons of the ſeveral Steps taken. The firſt Inſtance of this kind that we meet with in Hiſtory, is the famous Battle of *Thymbra*, between *Crœſus* and *Cyrus*, which transferred the Empire of *Aſia* from the *Aſſyrians* of *Babylon* to the *Medes* and *Perſians*. Tho' this Action does not ſo immediately and ſtrictly regard the Subject we are upon, as having no Relation to the *Roman* Hiſtory, I ſhall yet give a particular Deſcription of it here, not only becauſe it is the firſt pitched Battle, of which we have any full and circumſtantial Account, but becauſe *Cyrus* being looked upon as one of the greateſt Captains of Antiquity, thoſe of the Profeſſion may be glad to trace him in all his Steps, thro' this important Engagement; and the rather, as what we ſhall preſent them with on this Subject is taken from *Xenophon*, one of the greateſt Commanders, as well as fineſt Writers, of the Age in which he lived.

XII. IN *Cyrus*'s Army the Companies of Foot conſiſted of a hundred Men each, excluſive of the Captain. Each Company was ſubdivided into four Parts, which conſiſted ſeverally of four and twenty Men, not including the Perſon who commanded the Platoon. Each of theſe Subdiviſions was again divided into two Files, conſiſting in conſequence of twelve Men. Every ten Companies had a particular ſuperior Officer to command them, who ſufficiently anſwers to what we call a Colonel. Over ten of theſe again was another ſuperior Commander, whom we ſhall term a Brigadier. When *Cyrus* came at the Head of the thirty thouſand *Perſians*, who had been ſent to the Aid of his Uncle *Cyaxares*, he made a conſiderable Change in the arms of his Troops. 'Till then, two thirds of them made uſe only of Javelins and Bows, and therefore could not fight but at a diſtance from the Enemy. Inſtead of theſe, *Cyrus* armed the greateſt part of them with Cuiraſſes, Bucklers, and Swords or Battle-axes, and left only a few of his Soldiers in light Armour. The *Perſians* did not know at that Time what it was to fight on horſe-back. *Cyrus*, who was convinced that nothing was of ſo great Importance towards the gaining of a Battle as Cavalry, was ſenſible of the great Inconvenience he laboured under in that reſpect, and therefore took wiſe and early Precautions to remedy that Evil. He ſucceeded in his Deſign, and by little and little formed a Body of *Perſian* Cavalry, which amounted to ten thouſand Men, and were the beſt Troops in his Army.

XIII. *XENOPHON* has not acquainted us with the preciſe Number of Troops on both ſides, but as this may be in ſome ſort collected, by putting together certain ſcattered Paſſages of our Author, we ſhall endeavour to fix it in the beſt manner we can. *Cyrus*'s Army amounted in the whole to an hundred and ninety ſix thouſand Men, Horſe and Foot. Of theſe there were ſeventy thouſand natural born *Perſians*, *viz.* ten thouſand Cuiraſſiers of Horſe, twenty thouſand Cuiraſſiers of Foot, twenty thouſand Pikemen, and twenty thouſand light-armed Soldiers. The reſt of the Army, to the number of one hundred and twenty ſix thouſand men, conſiſted of an hundred thouſand *Median*, *Armenian*, and *Arabian* Foot, and twenty ſix thouſand Horſe of the ſame Nations. Beſides theſe Troops, *Cyrus* had three hundred Chariots of War, armed with Scythes, each Chariot drawn by four Horſes a-breaſt, covered with Trappings that were ſhot-proof; as were alſo the Horſes of the *Perſian* Cuiraſſiers. He had likewiſe ordered a great Number of Chariots to be made of a larger ſize, upon each of which was placed a Tower of about eighteen or twenty

Foot high, in which were lodged twenty Archers. Each Chariot was drawn upon Wheels by ſixteen Oxen yoked in a breaſt. There was moreover a conſiderable Number of Camels, upon each of which were two *Arabian* Archers, back to back; ſo that one looked towards the Head, and the other towards the Tail of the Camel.

XIV. *CROESUS*'s Army was above twice as numerous as that of *Cyrus*, amounting in all to four hundred and twenty thouſand Men, of which ſixty thouſand were Cavalry. The Troops conſiſted chiefly of *Babylonians*, *Lydians*, *Phrygians*, *Cappadocians*, of the Nations about the *Helleſpont*, and of *Egyptians*, to the number of three hundred and ſixty thouſand Men. The *Egyptians* alone made a Body of an hundred and twenty thouſand. They had Bucklers that covered them from head to foot, very long Pikes, and ſhort Swords, but very broad. The reſt of the Army was made up of *Cyprians*, *Cilicians*, *Lycaonians*, *Paphlagonians*, *Thracians*, and *Ionians*. The Army in Order of Battle was ranged in one Line, the Infantry in the Centre, and the Cavalry on the two Wings. All the Troops, both Foot and Horſe, were thirty Men deep: But the *Egyptians*, who, as we have taken notice, were an hundred and twenty thouſand in number, and who were the principal Strength of *Cræſus*'s Infantry, in the Centre of which they were poſted; were divided into twelve large Bodies or ſquare Battalions, of ten thouſand Men each, which had an hundred Men in front, and as many in depth, with an Interval or Space between every Battalion, that they might act and fight independent of, and without interfering with one another. *Cræſus* would gladly have perſuaded them to range themſelves in leſs depth, that he might make the wider Front. For the Armies being in an immenſe Plain, which gave room for extending their Wings to right and left, he was in hopes by this means of ſurrounding and hemming in the Enemy. But he could not prevail with the *Egyptians* to change the Order of Battle to which they had been accuſtomed. His Army, as it was thus drawn out into one Line, took up near forty Stadia, or five Miles in length.

XV. *ARASPES*, who under pretence of Diſcontent had retired to *Cræſus*'s Army, and had received particular Orders from *Cyrus*, to obſerve well the Manner of that General's ranging his Troops, returned to the *Perſian* Camp the Day before the Battle. *Cyrus* in drawing up his Army, governed himſelf by the Diſpoſition of the Enemy, of which that young *Median* Nobleman had given him an exact account. The *Perſian* Troops had been generally uſed to engage four and twenty Men deep, but *Cyrus* thought fit to change that Diſpoſition. It was neceſſary for him to form as wide a Front as poſſible, without too much weakening his Phalanx, to prevent his Army's being incloſed and hemmed in. His Infantry was excellent, and moſt advantageouſly armed with Cuiraſſes, Partizans, Battle-axes, and Swords; and provided they could join the Enemy in cloſe Fight, there was but little reaſon to believe the *Lydian* Phalanx, that were only armed with light Bucklers and Javelins, could ſupport the Charge. *Cyrus* therefore thinned the Files of his Infantry one half, and ranged them only twelve Men deep. The Cavalry was drawn out on the two Wings, the Right commanded by *Chryſantes*, and the Left by *Hyſtaſpes*. The whole Front of the Army took up but thirty two Stadia, or four Miles in Extent, and conſequently was at each end near four Stadia, or half a Mile ſhort of the Enemy's Front. Behind the firſt Line at a little diſtance, *Cyrus* placed

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the Spear-men, and behind them the Archers. Both the one and the other were covered by the Soldiers in their Front, over whoſe Heads they could fling their Javelins, and ſhoot their Arrows at the Enemy.

XVI. BEHIND all theſe he formed another Line, to ſerve for the Rear, which conſiſted of the Flower of his Army. Their Buſineſs was to have their Eyes upon thoſe that were placed before them, to encourage thoſe that did their Duty, to ſuſtain and threaten thoſe that gave way, and even to kill thoſe as Traitors that perſiſted obſtinately in flying; by that means to keep the Cowards in awe, and make them have as great a terror of the Troops in the Rear as they could poſſibly have of the Enemy. Behind the Army were placed thoſe moving Towers which I have already deſcribed. Theſe formed a Line equal and parallel to that of the Army, and did not only ſerve to annoy the Enemy by the perpetual Diſcharges of the Archers that were in them, but might likewiſe be looked upon as a kind of moveable Forts or Redoubts, under which the *Perſian* Troops might rally, in caſe they were broken and puſhed by the Enemy. Juſt behind theſe Towers were two other Lines, which alſo were parallel and equal to the Front of the Army: The one was formed of the Baggage, and the other of the Chariots which carried the Women, and ſuch other Perſons as were unfit for Service. To cloſe all theſe Lines, and to ſecure them from the Inſults of the Enemy, *Cyrus* placed in the Rear of all two thouſand Infantry, two thouſand Horſe, and the Troop of Camels, which was pretty numerous. *Cyrus*'s Deſign in forming two Lines of the Baggage was, not only to make his Army appear the more numerous, but likewiſe to oblige the Enemy, in caſe they were reſolved to ſurround him, as he knew they intended, to make the longer Circuit, and conſequently to weaken their Line, by ſtretching it out ſo far. We have ſtill the *Perſian* Chariots of War armed with Scythes to ſpeak of. Theſe were divided into three Bodies of an hundred each. One of theſe Bodies, commanded by *Abradates*, King of *Suſiana*, was placed in the Front of the Battle, and the other two upon the Flanks of the Army.

XVII. WHEN the two Armies were in ſight of each other, and the Enemy had obſerved how much the Front of theirs exceeded that of *Cyrus*, they made the Centre of their Army halt, whilſt the two Wings advanced projecting to the right and left, with deſign to incloſe *Cyrus*'s Army, and begin their Attack on every ſide at the ſame time. This Movement did not at all alarm *Cyrus*, becauſe he expected it; but obſerving that many of his Officers, and even *Abradates* himſelf, diſcovered ſome uneaſy Apprehenſions; theſe Troops diſturb you, ſays he; believe me they will be the firſt routed, and to you *Abradates* I give that as a Signal, for the falling upon the Enemy with your Chariots. When the two detached Bodies of the *Lydians* were ſufficiently extended, *Cræſus* gave the Signal to his main Battle to march up directly to the front of the *Perſian* Army, whilſt the two Wings, that were wheeling round upon their Flanks, advanced on each Side; ſo that *Cyrus*'s Army was incloſed on three Sides; and, as *Xenophon* expreſſes it, looked like a ſmall Square drawn within a great one. In an inſtant, on the firſt Signal *Cyrus* gave, his Troops faced about on every ſide, keeping a profound ſilence in expectation of the Event. The Prince himſelf at the head of ſome Horſe, briskly followed by a Body of Foot, fell upon the Forces that were marching to attack his right Flank, and put them into great diſorder. The Chariots then driving furi-

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ouſly upon the *Lydians* compleated the Defeat. In the ſame moment the Troops of the left Flank, knowing by the Noiſe that *Cyrus* had begun the Battle on the Right, advanced to the Enemy; and immediately the Squadron of Camels was made to advance likewiſe, as *Cyrus* had ordered. The Enemy's Cavalry did not expect this, and their Horſes at a diſtance, as ſoon as they were ſenſible of the Approach of thoſe Animals, whoſe Smell they cannot endure, began to ſnort and prance, to run foul upon and overturn one another, throwing their Riders, and treading them under their feet. Whilſt they were in this confuſion, a ſmall Body of Horſe, commanded by *Artageſes*, puſhed them very warmly to prevent their rallying; and the Chariots armed with Scythes falling furiouſly upon them, they were intirely routed, with a dreadful ſlaughter.

XVIII. This being the Signal which *Cyrus* had given *Abradates* for attacking the front of the Enemy's Army, he drove like Lightning upon them with all his Chariots. Their firſt Ranks were not able to ſtand ſo violent a Charge, but gave way and were diſperſed. Having broken and overthrown them, *Abradates* came up to the *Egyptian* Battalions, which being covered with their Bucklers, and marching in ſuch cloſe order, that the Chariots had not room to pierce amongſt them, gave him much more trouble, and would not have been broken, had it not been for the violence of the Horſes that trod upon them. 'Twas a moſt dreadful Spectacle to ſee the Heaps of Men and Horſes, overturned Chariots, broken Arms, and all the direful Effects of the ſharp Scythes, which cut every thing in pieces that came in their way. But *Abradates*'s Chariot having the misfortune to be overturned, he and his Men were killed, after they had ſignalized their Valour in a very extraordinary manner. The *Egyptians* then marching forward in cloſe Order, and covered with their Bucklers, obliged the *Perſian* Infantry to give way, and drove them beyond their fourth Line, as far as to their Machines. There the *Egyptians* met with a freſh ſtorm of Arrows and Javelins, that were poured upon their Heads from the rolling Towers; and the Battalions of the *Perſian* Rear-guard advancing ſword in hand, hindered their Archers and Spear-men from retreating any farther, and obliged them to return to the Charge.

XIX. *CYRUS* in the mean time having put both the Horſe and Foot to Flight on the left of the *Egyptians*, did not amuſe himſelf in purſuing the Runaways, but puſhing on directly to the Centre, had the mortification to find his *Perſian* Troops had been forced to give way; and rightly judging that the only means to prevent the *Egyptians* from gaining farther ground, would be to attack them behind, he did ſo, and fell upon their Rear. The Cavalry came up at the ſame time, and the Enemy was puſhed with great Fury. The *Egyptians* being attacked on all ſides, faced about every way, and defended themſelves with wonderful bravery. *Cyrus* himſelf was in great danger; his Horſe, which a Soldier had ſtabbed under the Belly, ſinking under him, he fell in the midſt of his Enemies. Here was an Opportunity, ſays *Xenophon*, of ſeeing how important it is for a Commander to have the Affection of his Soldiers. Officers and Men, equally alarmed at the danger in which they ſaw their Leader, ran headlong into the thick foreſt of Pikes to reſcue and ſave him. He quickly remounted another Horſe, and the Battle became more bloody than ever. At length *Cyrus*, admiring the Valour of the *Egyptians*, and being concerned to ſee ſuch brave Men periſh, offered them honourable Conditions,

Conditions, if they would ſurrender, letting them know at the ſame time that all their Allies had abandoned them. The *Egyptians* accepted the Conditions, after which the *Perſians* meeting with no farther oppoſition, a total Rout of the Enemy enſued.

XX. 'Tis allowed that *Cyrus*'s Victory was chiefly owing to his *Perſian* Cavalry, which was a new Eſtabliſhment, and entirely the Fruit of that Prince's Care and Activity in forming his People, and perfecting them in a part of the military Art, of which till his Time they had been utterly ignorant. The Chariots armed with Scythes did good Service, and the uſe of them was ever after retained among the *Perſians*. The Camels too were not unſerviceable in this Battle, tho' *Xenophon* makes no great account of them, and obſerves, that in his time they made no other uſe of them, than for carrying the Baggage. I ſhall not undertake here to enlarge upon *Cyrus*'s Merit. 'Tis ſufficient to obſerve, that in this affair we ſee all the qualities of a great General ſhine out in him. Before the Battle, an admirable ſagacity and foreſight in diſcovering and diſconcerting the Enemy's meaſures; an infinite exactneſs in the detail of affairs, in taking care that his Army ſhould be provided with every thing neceſſary, and all his Orders punctually obeyed at the time prefixed; a wonderful application to gain the hearts of his Soldiers, and to inſpire them with confidence and ardor: in the heat of Action, what a Spirit and Activity? what a preſence of mind in giving Orders as Occaſion requires? what courage and intrepidity, and at the ſame time what humanity towards the Enemy, whoſe Valour he reſpects, and whoſe Blood he is unwilling to ſhed? I have met with but one Objection to the Manner in which he drew up his Troops in Order of Battle, namely, his placing no Troops to cover his Flanks, to ſuſtain his armed Chariots, and to oppoſe the two Bodies of Troops which *Cræſus* had detached to fall upon the Flanks of his Army. But it is very poſſible that ſuch a Circumſtance might eſcape *Xenophon* in deſcribing the Battle; tho' it muſt be owned, that the Fall of *Abradates*, which was immediately followed by the Attack of the *Perſian* Infantry, hardly leaves room for ſuch a Conjecture.

XXI. I ſhall now preſent the Reader with the Deſcriptions of two Battles in which the *Romans* were concerned, thoſe of *Cannæ* and *Zama*, diſtinguiſhed by the importance of their Conſequences, and the abilities of the Generals who commanded in them. *Hannibal* having defeated the *Romans* in three ſucceſſive Engagements, and deſirous of bringing them to another general Action, that by one deciſive Blow he might put an end to the War, removed his Camp to the neighbourhood of *Cannæ*, an open champian Country, and fit for Cavalry to act in, in which he was greatly ſuperior to the Enemy. The *Romans*, headed by the Conſuls *Paulus Æmilius* and *Varro*, followed him thither, where after ſome Diſputes *Paulus* was at laſt obliged to give way to the Obſtinacy of his Collegue, who was reſolutely bent upon fighting. The two Armies were very unequal as to number. There was in that of the *Romans*, including the Allies, fourſcore thouſand Foot, and ſomething more than ſix thouſand Horſe; and in that of the *Carthaginians*, forty thouſand Foot, all well diſciplined and inured to War, and ten thouſand Horſe. *Varro*, at day-break, having made the Troops of the great Camp paſs the *Aufidus*, drew them up immediately in Battle, after having joined them with thoſe of the little Camp. The whole Infantry were upon one Line, cloſer and of

greater depth than uſual. The Cavalry was upon the two Wings: that of the *Romans* on the right, defended by the *Auſidus*; and that of the Allies on the left Wing. The light-armed Troops were advanced in the front of the Battle to ſome diſtance. *Paulus Æmilius* commanded the right Wing of the *Romans*, *Varro* the left, and *Servilius Geminus*, the Conſul of the preceding year, was in the Centre.

XXII. *HANNIBAL* immediately drew up his Army in one Line. He poſted his *Spaniſh* and *Gallick* Cavalry on the left, ſuſtained by the *Auſidus*, to oppoſe the *Roman* Horſe; and upon the ſame Line, half his heavy-armed *African* Infantry: then the *Spaniſh* and *Gallick* Infantry, which properly formed the Centre; on their right the other half of the *African* Infantry; and laſtly the *Numidian* Horſe, who compoſed the right Wing. The light-armed Troops were in the Front, facing thoſe of the *Romans*. *Aſdrubal* had the left, *Hanno* the right; *Hannibal*, having his Brother with him, reſerved the command of the Centre to himſelf. The *African* Troops might have been taken for a Body of *Romans*, ſo much did they reſemble them by their Arms, which they had gained in the Battles of *Trebia* and *Thraſymenus*, and which they now employed againſt thoſe who had ſuffered them to be taken from them. The *Spaniards* and *Gauls* had Shields of the ſame form; but their Swords were very different. Thoſe of the former were equally proper for cutting and thruſting, whereas thoſe of the *Gauls* cut only with the edge, and at a certain diſtance. The Soldiers of thoſe two Nations, eſpecially the *Gauls*, had a dreadful aſpect, in conſequence of their extraordinary ſtature. The latter were naked from their Belts upwards. The *Spaniards* wore linen Habits, the extreme whiteneſs of which, exalted by a border of a purple colour, made a ſurpriſingly ſplendid appearance. *Hannibal*, who knew how to take his advantages as a great Captain, forgot nothing that could conduce to the Victory. A Wind peculiar to that Region, called in the Country *Vulturnus*, blew always at a certain period. He took care to draw up in ſuch a manner, that his Army, facing the North, had it in their Backs, and the Enemy fronting the South, had it in their Faces; ſo that he was not in the leaſt incommoded with it, whereas the *Romans*, whoſe Eyes it filled with Duſt, ſcarce ſaw before them. From hence we may judge how far *Hannibal* carried his attention, which nothing ſeems to eſcape.

XXIII. THE two Armies marched againſt each other, and began the Charge. After that of the light-armed Soldiers on both ſides, which was only a kind of Prelude, the Action began by the two Wings of the Cavalry on the ſide of the *Auſidus*. *Hannibal*'s left Wing, which was an old Corps, to whoſe Valour he was principally indebted for his ſucceſſes, attacked that of the *Romans* with ſo much force and violence, that they had never experienced the like. This Charge was not made in the uſual manner of attacks of Cavalry, by ſometimes falling back, and ſometimes returning to the aſſault; but in fighting man to man, and very near, becauſe they had not room enough to extend themſelves, being pent up on one ſide by the River, and on the other by the Infantry. The ſhock was furious, and equally ſuſtained on both ſides; and whilſt it was ſtill doubtful to which ſide the Victory would incline, the *Roman* Horſe, according to a Cuſtom uſual enough in their Corps, and which was ſometimes ſucceſsful, but was now very ill applied, diſmounted and fought on foot. When *Hannibal* was informed of this, he

he cried out: I am as well pleaſed with them in that Poſture, as I ſhould be to have them all delivered up to me bound hand and foot. Accordingly, after having defended themſelves with the utmoſt valour, moſt of them fell upon the ſpot. *Aſdrubal* purſued thoſe that fled, and made a great ſlaughter of them.

XXIV. WHILST the Horſe were thus engaged, the Infantry of both Armies advanced alſo againſt each other. The Battle began at firſt in the Centre. As ſoon as *Hannibal* perceived that his leſt Wing began to have the advantage, he made the *Gauls* and *Spaniards* move that were in the main Body, and whom he commanded in perſon. In proportion as he advanced, he rounded his front in form of a Half-moon, with its convex ſide towards the Enemy. At firſt, the oppoſite Centre of the *Romans* charged them. After ſome reſiſtance the *Spaniards* and *Gauls* began to give way, and to loſe ground. The reſt of the *Roman* Infantry alſo moved on in order to take them in flank. They fell back according to the Orders they had received, continuing to fight, and regained the ground where they had at firſt been drawn up in Battle. The *Romans*, ſeeing that the *Spaniards* and *Gauls* continued to retreat, continued alſo to purſue them. *Hannibal*, well pleaſed to ſee every thing ſucceed according to his deſign, and perceiving the moment was come for acting with all his Forces, gave orders, that his *Africans* ſhould wheel to the right and left upon the *Romans*. Thoſe two Bodies, which were freſh, well armed, and in good order, having wheeled about ſuddenly towards the ſpace or hollow, into which the *Romans* had thrown themſelves in diſorder and confuſion, charged them on both ſides with vigour, without giving them time to look about them, or leaving them ground to form themſelves.

XXV. IN the mean time the *Numidian* Cavalry on the right Wing, was engaged alſo with the Enemy oppoſite to them, namely the Cavalry of the Allies of the *Romans*. Tho' they did not diſtinguiſh themſelves in this Battle, and the advantage was equal on both ſides, they were however very uſeful: for they found the Enemies which they had in their front ſufficient employment, to prevent them from having time to aſſiſt their own People. But when the left Wing where *Aſdrubal* commanded had routed, as we have ſaid, the whole Horſe of the right Wing of the *Romans*, and had joined the *Numidians*, the Cavalry of the Allies did not wait to be attacked by them, but fled with the utmoſt precipitation. It is ſaid, that *Aſdrubal* then did a thing, which no leſs ſhews his prudence, than it contributed to the ſucceſs of the Battle. As the *Numidians* were very numerous, and never did their duty better than when an Enemy fled, he ordered them to purſue the *Romans* to prevent their rallying, and led on the *Spaniſh* and *Gallick* Horſe to the Charge, to ſupport the *African* Infantry. Accordingly he fell upon the *Roman* Foot in the rear, which being attacked at the ſame time in the flanks, and ſurrounded on all ſides, was intirely cut to pieces, after having acted prodigies of valour.

XXVI. The Battle of *Zama*, between *Hannibal* and *Scipio*, is one of the moſt memorable recorded in Hiſtory; the diſpoſition on both ſides being the maſterpiece of two of the greateſt Generals that ever the World produced. *Scipio* drew up his Troops in the following manner. He poſted the *Haſtati* in the front Line, leaving intervals between the Cohorts. In the ſecond Line he placed

placed the *Principes*, with their Cohorts not behind the ſpaces of the firſt Line, as was the cuſtom of the *Romans*, but behind the Cohorts of that front Line, in order to leave openings for the Elephants of the Enemy which were very numerous. The *Triarii* formed the third Line in the ſame order, and ſerved as a Body of reſerve. He placed *Lælius* on the left Wing with the *Italian* Cavalry, and *Maſiniſſa* on the right with his *Numidians*. In the ſpaces of the firſt Line he placed the light-armed Soldiers, and ordered them to begin the Battle in ſuch a manner, that if they could not ſuſtain the charge of the Elephants, they ſhould retire; ſuch of them as were moſt ſpeedy, behind the whole Army, thro' the ſpaces that divided it in right Lines; and thoſe who ſhould find themſelves too much preſſed, thro' the ſpaces between the Lines on the right and left, in order to leave thoſe Animals a paſſage, in which they would be expoſed to the Darts diſcharged upon them on all ſides. As to *Hannibal*, in order to give the Enemy more terror, he placed in the front his fourſcore Elephants, a number which he never had before in any Battle. In the firſt Line he poſted the auxiliary Troops of the *Ligurians* and *Gauls*, with the *Baleareans* and *Moors*, who amounted in all to twelve thouſand Men. The ſecond Line, in which the principal force of the Army conſiſted, was compoſed of *Africans* and *Carthaginians*. He poſted the Troops he had brought with him from *Italy* in the third Line, and placed them above a ſtadium from the ſecond Line. The *Numidian* Cavalry were upon the left Wing, and the *Carthaginian* upon the right.

XXVII. EVERY thing being ready for the Battle, and the *Numidian* Cavalry on both ſides having long skirmiſhed, *Hannibal* gave orders for the Elephants to move againſt the Enemy. The *Romans* immediately made the Trumpets ſound, and at the ſame time raiſed ſuch great cries, that the Elephants which advanced againſt the right of the *Romans*, turned back, and put the *Moors* and *Numidians* that formed *Hannibal*'s left into Diſorder. *Maſiniſſa* ſeeing their Confuſion, eaſily put them intirely to the rout. The reſt of the Elephants advanced between the two Armies into the Plain, and fell upon the light-armed *Romans*, a great number of whom they cruſhed to death, notwithſtanding the continual ſhower of Darts diſcharged upon them from all ſides. At length being terrified, ſome of them ran thro' the ſpaces *Scipio* had prudently left, and others in their flight returned upon their own right Wing, purſued by the *Roman* Horſe, who with their Spears drove them quite out of the Field of Battle. *Lælius* took this inſtant for charging the *Carthaginian* Cavalry, who turned about and fled full ſpeed. He purſued them warmly, whilſt *Maſiniſſa* did the ſame on his ſide.

XXVIII. THE Army of the *Carthaginians* was uncovered on the right and left by its Cavalry. The Infantry then on both ſides advanced ſlowly and in good order, except that which *Hannibal* had brought from *Italy*, which formed the third Line, and continued in its firſt Poſt. When they were near each other, the *Romans* raiſing great Cries according to their Cuſtom, and ſtriking their Swords upon their Shields, charged the Enemy with vigour. On the ſide of the *Carthaginians*, the Body of foreign Troops that formed the front Line, alſo raiſed great Cries, but confuſed, and diſſonant from each other, becauſe they were of different Nations. As they could uſe neither Swords nor Javelins, but fought hand to hand, the Strangers at firſt had ſome advantage over the *Romans* by their agility and boldneſs, and wounded a great number.

However,

However, the latter having the ſuperiority by their good Order, and the nature of their Arms, gained ground, ſupported by the ſecond Line who followed, and inceſſantly encouraged them to fight with Valour; whereas the Strangers being neither followed nor aſſiſted by the *Carthaginians*, whoſe inaction on the contrary intimidated them, loſt courage, gave way, and believing themſelves openly abandoned by their own Troops, fell, in retiring, upon their ſecond Line, and attacked it in order to open themſelves a paſſage. The latter found themſelves obliged to defend their Lives courageouſly: ſo that the *Carthaginians* attacked by the Strangers, contrary to their Expectation, ſaw they had two Enemies to fight, their own Troops, and the *Romans*. Quite out of their Senſes, and in a manner tranſported with fury, they made a great ſlaughter of both, and put the *Haſtati* into diſorder. Thoſe who commanded the *Principes* having made their Troops advance, rallied them without difficulty. The greateſt part of the Strangers and *Carthaginians* fell in this Place, partly cut in pieces by one another, and partly by the *Romans*. *Hannibal* would not ſuffer thoſe that fled to mingle with thoſe who remained, leſt full of Terror as they were, and covered with Wounds, they might induce Diſorder among thoſe who had received no Blow hitherto: he even ordered the front Rank to preſent their Pikes, which obliged them to retire along the Wings into the Plain.

XXIX. THE Space between the two Armies being then covered with Blood, and with the dead, *Scipio* was in Perplexity enough; for he did not know how to make his Troops move in good Order, over that confuſed heap of Arms and dead Bodies, ſtill bleeding and lying upon each other. He ordered the wounded Men to be carried behind the Army; the Retreat to be ſounded for the *Haſtati*, who were purſuing the Enemy; poſted them oppoſite to the Centre of the *Carthaginians* in expectation of a new Charge; and made the *Principes* and *Triarii* advance on both Wings, When they were upon the ſame front with the *Haſtati*, a new Battle began between the two Armies. The Infantry alternately gave way, and returned to the Charge with great Courage and Vigour. As Number, Reſolution, and Arms were equal on both ſides, and they fought with ſuch obſtinacy that they fell in their Poſts rather than give way, the fate of the Battle was long doubtful, and it could not be conjectured which ſide would remain maſters of the Field. Things being in this ſtate, *Lælius* and *Maſiniſſa*, after having purſued the Enemy's Cavalry a conſiderable time, returned very opportunely for attacking the Infantry in the rear. This laſt Charge decided the Victory. A great number of the *Carthaginians* were killed upon the Field of Battle, where they were ſurrounded on all ſides. Many of them having diſperſed in the Plains round about, were cut off by the *Roman* Cavalry that occupied all the Country. The *Carthaginians* left above twenty thouſand dead upon the ſpot, as well of their own Citizens as Allies. Almoſt as many were taken, with an hundred and thirty Enſigns and Standards, and eleven Elephants. *Hannibal* eſcaped with a ſmall number of Horſe to *Adrumetum*, after having tried, both before and during the Battle, all poſſible means for obtaining the Victory. The *Romans* loſt only fifteen hundred Men.

XXX. HAVING thus given an Account of ſome of the moſt memorable Battles of Antiquity, explained the Conduct of the Generals, and laid open the Reaſons of that Conduct; I ſhall conclude this Chapter with a few general Remarks, tending ſtill farther to illuſtrate this great Branch of War,

and which in ſome meaſure offer themſelves in conſequence of what has been already ſaid. The firſt is, that tho' moſt Nations had a certain fixed and particular form of giving Battle, yet they never adhered to it ſo cloſely, as not to vary when Circumſtances required it. The drawing up an Army to the very beſt advantage, is doubtleſs a great furtherance to the gaining of the Victory. But the doing ſo depends much, not only on the Wiſdom and Skill of the General, the Nature of the Ground, and the Quality of his own Forces, but alſo on thoſe of his Enemies, and on the Diſpoſition of him who commands them. Hence the greateſt Captains of older times, whoſe military Knowledge and Practice the Moderns ſo juſtly value, always acted herein according to their own Judgment, without confining themſelves to any ſtanding Rules. We have ſeen that *Cyrus* being to fight againſt *Cræſus* in a large Plain, where he found the Enemy taking meaſures to ſurround him, drew up his Men but twelve deep in File, whereas formerly the File was twenty-four deep. By this means he augmented the front of his Army double, prevented his being too much over-winged by *Cræſus*, and won the Victory. It is obſervable too of *Scipio* at the Battle of *Zama*, that he placed the Battalions of his ſeveral Lines directly behind one another, and not facing the Intervals of the Lines before them, as was the common Cuſtom. His Deſign in this was, to give free iſſue to the Elephants, whoſe Shock might otherwiſe have diſordered his Men, and render'd them incapable of making any reſiſtance. *Cæſar*, at the Battle of *Pharſalia* againſt *Pompey*, quite altered the manner of the *Roman* Imbattelling. For having found that *Pompey* exceedingly outnumbered him in Horſe, he covered one of his Flanks with a little River, and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank; among the Squadrons whereof he placed Bodies of his beſt Infantry, and there began the Battle. By this means, having all his Horſe in one Wing, and thoſe accompanied with ſelect legionary Foot, he ſoon routed that half of *Pompey*'s Horſe which oppoſed all his, and then falling into the flanks and rear of his Enemy, gained the Victory.

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of ſuch Omiſſion. The Reaſon is, that the Troops on the Wings are not wedged in, as the Troops in the main Battle are; but are at liberty to take all Advantages, which Accident, the good Conduct of the Commander in chief, or the ill Conduct of the Enemy, throw in their way: nor can a General ſo much as rationally hope to fall into the flank and rear of his Enemy, but by attacking one of his Wings; becauſe he cannot overwing him, but only by falling upon one of his outward Flanks. Hence an able Commander chooſes always to begin the Battle on that ſide, where he judges himſelf the ſtrongeſt, and his Enemy the weakeſt; advancing with thoſe Troops as expeditiouſly as he can, whilſt the reſt of the Army moves as ſlowly as they may. For if his firſt Impreſſion be ſucceſsful, he may fall into the flank and part of the rear of the Enemy, while the reſidue of the whole Army is marching to attack them in front: but then the motion of the Army muſt be quicker, as ſoon as ever they ſee that the advanced Wing is ſucceſsful. Such was the Conduct of *Epaminondas*, at the famous Battles of *Leuctra* and *Mantinea*. Such too was the Method followed by *Julius Cæſar*, when he fought againſt *Arioviſtus* and the *Germans*. *Hannibal*, ſo juſtly celebrated for his Skill in drawing up an Army, at the famous Battle of *Cannæ*, placed, as we have ſeen, all his beſt Men in his two Wings, and his worſt Men in the Centre; whereby, when the *Romans* came to the Charge, who had placed their choiceſt Men in their main Battle, they ſoon pierced into the Body of *Hannibal*'s Army, which was the very thing he deſigned they ſhould do: for then with his two Wings, in which were the flower of all his Troops, he immediately wheeled upon the *Romans*, and totally defeated them.

XXXIV. AFTER the Battle was fought, and the Victory apparently won, the great Danger was, as it ſtill is, to purſue with too much Ardor, without regard to what paſſed in the reſt of the Army. Hence that Cuſtom ſo inviolably obſerved among the *Romans*, of never ſuffering the Legions to follow the Chace, or break their Ranks upon any Occaſion whatever. Only the Horſe, the light-armed Men, and what Soldiers were not of the Legions, were ſent upon this Service; and the Purſuit was conducted with ſo much Caution, that a certain number of Squadrons always followed in good Order, ready to to fall upon and break the Enemy anew, ſhould they rally and face about. How many Victories ſeemingly won, have in an inſtant been loſt, for want of care in theſe two Particulars of ſuch high Concernment, which therefore ought never to be omitted. It is certain that nothing more encourages flying Enemies to rally, and fight again, than the ſeeing a diſorderly Purſuit of them. For in ſuch a Purſuit, all the Advantages of the prevailing Party immediately vaniſh, if the Chaced do but turn about; ſuch an Evidence of reſtored Valour, too often daunting thoſe who are to oppoſe it: nor can any thing more deter the flying Party from ſuch a Step, than to ſee ſeveral Bodies in good Order following cloſe behind them, and ready to make them repent of their Confidence, ſhould they venture upon any farther Oppoſition. And tho' brave Officers will not ceaſe preſſing, promiſing, and even threatening their Men that fly, to face about; yet the private Soldier, who ſees thoſe Bodies ready to fall on, concludes it is ſafer to run than to reſiſt, and therefore is too often deaf to all Oratory or Menaces of that nature: For where once Terror has ſeized the Minds of the Troops, they hear no Counſels but thoſe which their own Fears ſuggeſt.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Attack and Defence of Places.

I. WHAT we have to offer upon this Subject falls naturally under three general Heads. *Firſt*, The manner of fortifying Towns in uſe among the Ancients. *Secondly*, The Machines of War employed by them in Sieges. *Thirdly*, The Nature and Conduct of an *Attack* and *Defence*. As to the firſt, how far ſoever we look back into Antiquity, we find amongſt the *Greeks* and *Romans*, Cities fortified in a regular manner, with their Foſſés, Curtains, and Towers. *Vitruvius*, in treating of the Conſtruction of Places of War in his time, ſays, that the Towers ought to project beyond the Walls, in order that when the Enemy approaches, the Defenders upon the right and left may take them in flank: that they ought to be round, and faced with many Stones, becauſe ſuch as are ſquare, are ſoon beat down by the Machines of War and battering Rams, which eaſily break their Angles: and that near the Towers the Wall ſhould be cut within-ſide the breadth of the Towers, and the ways broke in this manner only be joined and continued by Beams laid upon the two Extremities, without being made faſt with Iron, that in caſe the Enemy ſhould make himſelf maſter of any part of the Wall, the Beſieged might remove this wooden Bridge, and thereby prevent his paſſage to the other parts of the Wall, and into the Towers. The beſt Towns of the Ancients were ſituated upon Eminences. They incloſed them ſometimes within two or three Walls and Ditches. *Beroſus*, cited by *Joſephus*, informs us, that *Nebuchadnezzar* fortified *Babylon* with a triple Incloſure of Brick Walls, of a ſurpriſing ſtrength and height. *Polybius*, ſpeaking of *Syringa*, the Capital of *Hyrcania*, which *Antiochus* beſieged, ſays, that City was ſurrounded with three Ditches, each forty-five Foot broad, and twenty-two deep. Upon each ſide of theſe was a double Intrenchment, and behind all a ſtrong Wall. The City of *Jeruſalem*, ſays *Joſephus*, was ſurrounded by a triple Wall, except on the ſide of the Valleys, where there was but one, becauſe they were inacceſſible. To theſe they had added many other Works, one of which, continues the Hiſtorian, had it been compleated, would have rendered the City impregnable. The Stones of which it was built, were thirty Foot long by fifteen broad, which made it ſo ſtrong, that it was in a manner impoſſible to ſap, or ſhake it with Machines. The whole was flanked with Towers from Space to Space of extraordinary ſolidity, and built with wonderful Art.

II. THE Ancients did not generally ſupport their Walls on the inſide with Earth, in the manner of the *Talus* or Slope, which made the Attacks more dangerous. For tho' the Enemy had gained ſome footing upon them, he could not aſſure himſelf of taking the City. It was neceſſary to get down, and to make uſe of the Ladder by which he had mounted; and that deſcent expoſed the Soldier to very great danger. *Vitruvius* however obſerves, that there is nothing renders a Rampart ſo ſtrong, as when the Walls both of the Curtain and Towers are ſupported by Earth. For then neither Rams, Mines, nor any other Machines can ſhake them. The Places of War of the Ancients were not always fortified with Stone Walls. They were ſometimes incloſed

within good Ramparts of Earth, of great firmneſs and ſolidity. The manner of coating them with Turf was not unknown to them, nor the Art of ſupporting the Earth with ſtrong Faſcines, made faſt by Stakes, and of arming the top of the Rampart with a Ruff or Fraiſe of Paliſades, and the foot of the Parapet, or *Pas de Souris*, with another. They often planted Paliſades alſo in the Ditch, to defend themſelves againſt ſudden Attacks. They made Walls alſo with Beams croſſed over one another, with ſpaces between them in manner of a Chequer, the void parts of which they filled up with Earth and Stones. Such almoſt were the Walls of the City of *Bourges*, which *Cæſar*, in the ſeventh Book of his Wars with the *Gauls*, deſcribes as follows. The Walls of *Bourges*, and almoſt thoſe of the Country, were made of pieces of Wood forty Foot in length, laid along the Earth at the diſtance of two Foot from each other, and croſſed over by others of equal length and at equal diſtance, with their ends to the front of the Wall. The ſpaces on the inſide were filled up with Earth and Faſcines, and on the outſide with ſolid Stones. He adds, that the Work by this diſpoſition was agreeable to the Eye, and very ſtrong; becauſe the Wood was of great force againſt the Ram, and the Stones againſt Fire: beſides which, the thickneſs of the Wall, which was generally forty Foot, or the length of the Beams, made it next to impoſſible either to make a breach in it, or throw it down in any manner.

III. WHAT I ſhall ſay in the ſequel, when I come to explain the manner of attacking and defending Places, will ſhew more diſtinctly what kind of Fortifications thoſe of the Ancients were. It is pretended that the Moderns excel them very much in this point. But as the method of *Attack* and *Defence* is intirely different, no juſt Compariſon can be made. The uſe of Muskets, Bombs, Cannons, and other Fire-arms ſince the invention of Gunpowder, has occaſioned many alterations in the way of conducting Sieges, the duration of which has been very much abridged of late. But theſe Changes are not ſo conſiderable as many imagine, and have added nothing either to the Merit or Capacity of Generals. The Moderns have imagined nothing that the Ancients could uſe, and have not uſed. We have borrowed from them the breadth and depth of Foſſés, the thickneſs of Walls, the Towers to flank the Curtains, the Paliſades, the Intrenchments within the Ramparts and Towers, the advantage of many Flanks, in multiplying of which conſiſts the chief Improvement of modern Fortification, and which Fire-arms make the more eaſy to execute. Theſe are the Remarks of Men of Ability and Judgment, who to a profound knowledge of the manner in which the Ancients made War, unite a perfect Experience of the modern Practice of it.

IV. BUT let us now proceed to the Machines made uſe of by the Ancients in their Sieges. The principal of theſe were, the *Tortoiſe*, the *Catapulta*, the *Baliſta*, the *Ram*, and *moving Towers*. The *Tortoiſe* was a Machine compoſed of very ſtrong and ſolid timber-work. The height of it, to the uppermoſt Beam, which ſuſtained the Roof, was twelve Foot. The Baſe was ſquare, and each of its fronts twenty-five Foot. It was covered with a kind of quilted Mattreſs made of raw Hides, and prepared with different Drugs, to prevent its being ſet on fire by Combuſtibles. This heavy Machine was ſupported upon four Wheels, and had the name of *Tortoiſe* from its ſerving as a very ſtrong covering and defence, againſt the enormous weight thrown down on it; thoſe under it being ſafe in the ſame manner as a Tortoiſe under her Shell. It was uſed both to fill up the Ditch, and for ſapping.

For

For the filling up of the Ditch, it was neceſſary to join ſeveral of them together in a Line, and very near one another. *Diodorus Siculus*, ſpeaking of the Siege of *Halicarnaſſus* by *Alexander the Great*, ſays, that he firſt cauſed three Tortoiſes to approach, in order to fill up the Ditch, and that afterwards he planted his Rams upon the ſpace filled up, to batter the Wall. This Machine is often mentioned by Authors. There were, without doubt, Tortoiſes of different forms and ſizes. Some indeed are of Opinion, that becauſe of its enormous weight, it could not be moved from place to place on Wheels, but was puſhed forwards on Rollers. Under theſe Rollers the way was laid with ſtrong Planks, to facilitate its motion, and prevent its ſinking into the Ground, from whence it would have been very difficult to have removed it. The Ancients have obſerved, that the Roof had a thicker covering of Hides, Hurdles, Seaweed, *&c.* than the Sides, as it was expoſed to much greater Shocks from the weight thrown upon it by the Beſieged. It had a Door in front, which was drawn up by a Chain as far as was neceſſary, and covered the Soldiers at work in filling up the Ditch.

V. THE *Muſculus*, tho' very little underſtood by modern Authors, who have repreſented it variouſly, was undoubtedly a kind of Tortoiſe, very low, and with a ſharp Roof. Such was that of *Cæſar* at the Siege of *Marſeilles*. It was ſixty Foot in length, and was moved forward to the Walls upon Rollers, where it was fixed over the part of the Ditch filled up. The Tower of Brick which he built there, communicated with this Muſculus and the Trenches. *Cæſar* ſays the Planks of the Roof were covered with Bricks and Mortar, over which Hides were laid, to prevent the Mortar from diſſolving by the Water which the Beſieged might pour down upon it: and to ſecure it from Stones and Fire, it was again covered over with thick quilted Mattreſſes properly prepared. All this was done under Mantles, after which it was thruſt forward on a ſudden from the Tower to the Walls. Beſides this, there was another kind of *Muſculus*, that was uſed for levelling the Ground, and laying the Planks on which the Tortoiſes and moving Towers were to advance to the Ditch. They were like this, of greater length than breadth, and equal in breadth to the way they were to level. There were ſeveral other Machines intended to cover the Soldiers, called *Crates*, *Plutei*, *Vineæ*, which I ſhall not undertake to deſcribe here, to avoid Prolixity. They may be compriſed in general under the Name of Mantles, or Sheds.

VI. THE *Catapulta* and *Baliſta* were intended for diſcharging Darts, Arrows, and Stones. They were of different ſizes, and conſequently produced more or leſs effect. Some were uſed in Battles, and might be called Field-pieces: others were employed in Sieges, which was the uſe moſt commonly made of them. The *Baliſtæ* muſt have been the heavieſt and moſt difficult to carry, becauſe there was always a greater number of *Catapultæ* in the Armies. *Livy*, in his Deſcription of the Siege of *Carthage*, ſays, that there were an hundred and twenty great, and more than two hundred ſmall *Catapultæ* taken, with thirty-three great *Baliſtæ*, and fifty-two ſmall ones. *Joſephus* mentions the ſame difference amongſt the *Romans*, who had three hundred *Catapultæ*, and forty *Baliſtæ*, at the Siege of *Jeruſalem*. Theſe Machines had a force which it is not eaſy to comprehend, but which all good Authors atteſt. *Vegetius* ſays, that the *Baliſtæ* diſcharged Darts with ſo much rapidity and violence, that nothing could reſiſt their force. *Atheneus* tells us, that *Ageſiſtratus* made one of little more than two Foot in length, which ſhot

Darts

Darts almoſt five hundred Paces. Theſe Machines were not unlike our Croſs-bows. There were others of much greater force, which threw Stones of three hundred weight, upwards of an hundred and twenty-five Paces. We find ſurpriſing effects of them in *Joſephus*. The Darts of the *Catapultæ*, he tells us, deſtroyed abundance of People. The Stones from the *Baliſtæ* beat down the Battlements, and broke the Angles of the Towers; nor was there any Phalanx ſo deep, but one of theſe Stones would ſweep a whole File of it from one end to the other. *Folard*, in his Commentary upon *Polybius*, ſays their force was very near equal to that of Artillery.

VII. THE *Ram* was compoſed of a large long Beam, armed at one end with Iron in the form of a Ram's Head, and of the ſame bigneſs with the Beam. This piece of Wood was ſuſpended by Chains in *æquilibrio*, in order to be ſet in motion with the greater eaſe. An hundred Men, more or leſs, worked it by main Strength, to ſtrike it againſt a Wall or Rampart, in order to beat them down after having ſhaken them by repeated Blows. Care was taken to clothe this Beam with wet Leather, to prevent its being ſet on fire. It was ſlung under a kind of moving Tortoiſe or Gallery, which covered more than half of it, in order to ſhelter thoſe who worked the Ram from the Stones and Darts of the Beſieged. The effects of this Machine were prodigious. As it was one of thoſe that did moſt hurt, many Methods were contrived to render it uſeleſs. Fire was darted upon the Roof that covered, and the Timber that ſupported it, in order to burn them with the Ram. To deaden its Blows, Sacks of Wool were let down againſt the Place at which it was levelled. A Machine was alſo made uſe of againſt it, called the *Wolf*, by way of oppoſition to the Ram, with which they endeavoured to grapple it, in order to draw it to themſelves, or break it. *Joſephus* relates a ſurpriſing action of a *Jew*, who, at the Siege of *Jotophat*, threw a Stone of an uncommon ſize upon the Head of the Ram with ſuch violence, that he looſened it from the Beam, and made it fall down. He leaped afterwards from the top of the Wall to the bottom, took the Head from the midſt of the Enemy, and carried it back with him. He received five Arrows in his Body; and notwithſtanding thoſe Wounds, boldly kept his Poſt, 'till through loſs of Blood and Strength, he fell from the Wall, and the Ram's Head with him, with which he would never part.

VIII. THE *moving Towers* were made of an aſſemblage of Beams and ſtrong Planks, not unlike a Houſe. To ſecure them againſt the Fires thrown by the Beſieged, they were covered with raw Hides, or with pieces of Cloth made of Hair. Their height was in proportion to their Baſe. They were ſometimes thirty Foot ſquare, and ſometimes forty or fifty. They were higher than the Walls or even Towers of the City. They were ſupported upon ſeveral Wheels according to mechanick Principles, by the means of which the Machine was eaſily made to move, how great ſoever it might be. The Town was in great danger if this Tower could approach the Walls: for it had Stairs from one Story to another, and included different methods of attack. At bottom it had a Ram to batter the Wall, and on the middle Story a Draw-bridge, made of two Beams with Rails of Basket-work, which let down eaſily upon the Wall of the City, when within reach of it. The Beſiegers paſſed upon this Bridge to make themſelves maſters of the Wall. Upon the higher Stories were Soldiers armed with Partizans, and miſſive Weapons, who kept a perpetual diſcharge upon the Works. When Affairs were in this poſture, a Place

ſeldom

ſeldom held out long: for what could thoſe hope who had nothing to confide in but the height of their Ramparts, when they ſaw others ſuddenly appear which commanded them? The People of *Namur* demanded to capitulate, when *Cæſar*'s Tower, of which they had made a Jeſt whilſt at a diſtance, was ſeen to move towards them very faſt. They believed this a Prodigy, ſays *Cæſar*, and were aſtoniſhed that Men of our ſize ſhould think of carrying ſo vaſt and heavy a Machine to their Walls. Their Deputies obſerved, that the *Romans* were doubtleſs aſſiſted by the Gods in their Wars, ſince they could make Machines of ſo enormous a ſize advance ſo ſwiftly. It is indeed no wonder they were ſurpriſed, as they had neither ſeen nor heard of any ſuch thing before, and as this Tower ſeemed to advance by Inchantment and of itſelf, the mechanic Powers that moved it being imperceptible to thoſe of the Place. Theſe Towers were ſometimes ſurrounded with Corridors or Galleries at each Story, to prevent their being ſet on fire: and indeed nothing better could have been invented for this purpoſe, as the Galleries were filled with Troops armed with miſſive Weapons, who made their diſcharges from behind the Parapets, if we may ſo term them, and were always ready to pull out the Darts of Fire, and extinguiſh all other Combuſtibles thrown againſt the Tower; ſo that it was impoſſible for the Fire to make the leaſt progreſs, the Remedy being always at hand. Theſe Corridors were built upon Beams that projected five or ſix Foot beyond the Tower, ſeveral of which kind are ſtill to be ſeen upon *Trajan*'s Column.

IX. HAVING thus deſcribed the principal Machines made uſe of by the Ancients in Sieges, I now proceed to the *Attack and Defence of Places*, which I ſhall treat in as brief a manner as poſſible, confining myſelf to the moſt eſſential Parts. When Cities were extremely ſtrong and populous, they were ſurrounded with an Intrenchment on the ſide next the Town, and another on that towards the Country. Theſe were called Lines of Circumvallation and Contravallation. The Beſiegers pitched their Camp between theſe two Lines. Thoſe of Contravallation were againſt the beſieged City, the others againſt Attempts from without. When it was foreſeen that the Siege would be of long duration, it was often changed into a Blockade, and then the two Lines in queſtion were ſolid Walls of ſtrong Maſonry, flanked with Towers at proper diſtances. There is a remarkable Example of this at the Siege of *Platæa* by the *Lacedæmonians* and *Thebans*, of which *Thucydides* has left us a very particular Account. The two ſurrounding Lines were compoſed of two Walls ſixteen Foot diſtant, and the Soldiers lay in that Space, which was divided into Quarters; ſo that it might have been taken for only one Wall with high Towers from diſtance to diſtance. Theſe Towers occupied the whole Interval, in order to enable the Beſiegers to defend themſelves at the ſame time againſt thoſe within and thoſe without. The Quarters of the Soldiers could not be gone round without croſſing the Towers, and the top of the Wall was skirted with a Parapet of Oſier. There was a Ditch on each ſide, the Earth of which had been uſed to make Bricks for the Wall. In this manner *Thucydides* deſcribes theſe two ſurrounding Walls, which were of no great circumference, the City being very ſmall. This Siege, or rather Blockade, was very famous among the Ancients, and the more on account of the ſurpriſing eſcape of the Garriſon, notwithſtanding all theſe Fortifications. For this purpoſe they applied Ladders to the inward Wall. After they had got upon the Platform, and ſeized the two adjoining Towers, they drew up the Ladders, and let them down on the other ſide of the outward Wall, by which they deſcended

to the bottom, drawing up in Line of Battle as faſt as they came down. In this manner by the favour of a dark Night, they got ſafe to *Athens*.

X. THE Camp of the *Roman* Army before *Numantia*, took up a much greater extent of Ground. That City was four and twenty Stadia in circumference, that is to ſay, a League. *Scipio*, when he inveſted it, cauſed a Line of Circumvallation to be drawn, which incloſed more than twice the Ground the City ſtood upon. When this Work was finiſhed, another Line was thrown up againſt the Beſieged, at a reaſonable diſtance from the firſt, compoſed of a Rampart of eight Foot thick by ten high, which was ſtrengthened with ſtrong Paliſades. The whole was flanked with Towers of an hundred Foot from each other. It is not eaſy to comprehend in what manner the *Romans* compleated theſe immenſe Works; a Line of Circumvallation of more than two Leagues in compaſs! but nothing is more certain than the Fact. He alſo erected four Forts upon the Banks of the River *Duæra*, contiguous to the Lines; and contrived a Stoccado or Chain of floating Beams, pierced through croſs-wiſe with long Stakes pointed with Iron, to prevent Barks from entering, and Divers from getting any Intelligence of what was doing in the Camp.

XI. *CÆSAR*'s Circumvallation before *Aleſia*, was formed of Faſcines inſtead of Turf, with its Parapet and Fraiſe made of large Stakes, whoſe Branches were cut in points, and burnt at the ends, like Stags Horns. They ſeemed like Wings at the foot of the Parapet, or like the Oars of a Galley inclining downwards. Of the ſame nature are the Fraiſes of the Moderns, that are far from being ſo well imagined, and are ſmooth-pointed Paliſades, bending downwards to prevent ſcaling. The Moderns fix them in the ſame manner at the bottom of the Parapet, where they form a kind of Cincture very agreeable to the Eye. The Battlements mentioned by *Cæſar* were like the modern Embrazures for Cannon. Here the Archers were placed. Upon the Parapet of the Towers, field Baliſtas were planted to flank the Works. Theſe Towers were not always of Wood, but ſometimes of Earth covered with Turf, or ſtrengthened with Faſcines. They were much higher than the reſt of the Intrenchment, and ſometimes had Towers of Wood raiſed upon them for battering the Places that commanded the Camp. Some Authors have believed, that theſe Intrenchments and Works of the Ancients in the Field, were perpendicular: but that Opinion is very abſurd. Theſe had a Platform with its Talus or Slope, and ſometimes Banquettes, in the form of Steps for aſcending; beſides which, at the Towers, there were Ways made to go up. All this was indiſpenſably neceſſary in *Cæſar*'s Lines, as they were very high, to prevent the Earth from falling away.

XII. THUS much for the two Lines of Circumvallation. We proceed now to the Ground incloſed between the two Foſſés, which is far the moſt curious part of this celebrated Blockade, and will be beſt explained in *Cæſar*'s own Words. "As the Soldiers were employed at the ſame time to fetch Wood and Provi-
"ſions from a conſiderable diſtance, and to work at the Fortifications, and
"the Enemy often ſallied at ſeveral Gates to interrupt them; *Cæſar* found it
"neceſſary to make ſome addition to his Lines, that they might not require
"ſo many Men to guard them. He therefore took Trees of no great height,
"or large Branches, which he cauſed to be made ſharp at the ends, and run-
"ning a Trench of five Foot deep before the Lines, he ordered them to be
"put

" put into it, and made faſt at bottom, ſo that they could not be pulled up. " This Trench was again filled up in ſuch a manner that nothing but the tops " of the Branches appeared, of which the points muſt have run into thoſe " who ſhould have endeavoured to paſs them. As there were five Rows of " them interwoven in a manner with each other, they were unavoidable. In " the front of theſe he cauſed Pits of three Foot deep to be dug, in the " form of the *Quincunx*. In thoſe Pits he fixed ſtrong Stakes, burnt and " ſharpened at the top, which roſe only four Inches above the level of the " Ground, into which they were planted three Foot deeper than the Pits, for " the ſake of firmneſs. The Pits were covered over with Buſhes to deceive the " Enemy. There were eight Rows of them, at the diſtance of three Foot " from each other. In the front of all he ſowed the whole ſpace between the " Pits and the advanced Ditch, with Crows-Feet of an extraordinary ſize, " which the Soldiers called *Spurs*." The other Line, to prevent Succours from without, was intirely the ſame with this.

XIII. THO' Trenches, oblique Lines, Mines, and other the like Inventions, ſeem neither often nor clearly expreſſed in Authors, we can hardly ſuppoſe with reaſon, that they were not in uſe amongſt the *Greeks* and *Romans*. Is it probable, that with the Ancients, whoſe Generals, among their other excellent Qualities, had in an eminent degree that of taking great care to ſpare the Blood and Lives of their Soldiers, Approaches were made in beſieging without any precautions againſt the Machines of the beſieged, whoſe Ramparts were ſo well provided, and Defence ſo bloody? Tho' there were no mention of this in any of the Hiſtorians, who might poſſibly in the Deſcription of Sieges omit this Circumſtance, as well known to all the World; we ſhould not conclude that ſuch able Generals either did not know, or neglected things, on the one ſide ſo important, and on the other ſo eaſy; and which muſt naturally have entered the thoughts of every Man, ever ſo little verſed in attacking Places. But ſeveral Hiſtorians ſpeak of them; of which one ſhall ſuffice for all the reſt: this is *Polybius*, where he relates the Siege of the City *Echinna* by *Philip*. He concludes the Deſcription of it with theſe Words: " To cover " from the Arrows of the Beſieged, as well thoſe that went from the " Camp to the Works, as thoſe who returned from the Works to the Camp, " Trenches were drawn from the Camp to the Tortoiſes, and thoſe Trenches " covered at top." Long before *Philip*, *Demetrius Poliocertes* had uſed the ſame method at the Siege of *Rhodes*. *Diodorus Siculus* tells us, that famous Warrior cauſed Tortoiſes, and Galleries cut in the Earth, or covered Mines, to be made, for communication with the Batteries of Rams; and ordered a Trench with Blinds over head, to cover and ſecure the Troops, in going and coming from the Towers and Tortoiſes. The Seamen and Marines were appointed for this Service: the Work was four Stadia in length, that is to ſay, five hundred Paces.

XIV. BUT tho' their Approaches were not intirely like thoſe of the Moderns, nor ſo deep in the Earth, the Fire from our Works being of a quite different nature from that of the *Catapultæ* and *Baliſtæ*, tho' ſurpriſingly violent; yet it is certain from the above Accounts, and others that might be produced in great number, that they went under cover from their Camp to their Batteries, and uſed more or leſs Precaution, according to the Strength and Valour of the Beſieged, and the number of their Machines, by which they regulated the form of their Approaches or Trenches. Theſe were of two ſorts. The

firſt were compoſed of a Blind of Hurdles or ſtrong Faſcines, placed on the ſide of each other, without any ſpace between them; ſo that they formed a kind of Wall of five or ſix Foot high, with Loop-holes cut from ſpace to ſpace, between the Faſcines, or through the Hurdles. To ſupport this Blind, it is ſuppoſed they planted forked pieces of Wood in the Ground, upon which long Poles were laid croſs-wiſe, with the Faſcines or Hurdles made faſt to them. The other kind of Approaches was very different from the former, and conſiſted of ſeveral Trenches or Galleries of Communication covered at top, drawn in a right line from the Camp to the Works, or to the Parallels, not much unlike ours. Theſe Galleries of Communication were cut ten or twelve Foot broad in the Earth. The Workmen threw up the Earth on both ſides, which they ſupported with Faſcines, and covered the ſpace with Hurdles and Earth laid upon Poles and Rafters. The whole length of theſe Galleries in the Earth, they cut Loop-holes through the ſides and iſſues to go out at. On the ſides of thoſe covered Trenches or Communications were Eſplanades, or places of Arms, which extended the whole front of the Attack. Theſe Places were ſpacious, and capable of containing a great Body of Troops in order of Battle: for here they were poſted to ſupport their Towers, Tortoiſes, Batteries of Rams, Baliſtas, and Catapultas, againſt the Sallies of the Beſieged.

XV. THE firſt parallel Trench, next the Body of the Place, was drawn along the ſide of the Foſſé, and ſerved as a Communication to the battering Towers and Tortoiſes of the Beſiegers. This ſort of Communications to the moving Towers were ſometimes covered at top by a Blind of Hurdles and Faſcines; becauſe as they ran along the ſide of the Counterſcarp, they were expoſed to the downright diſcharges of the Towers and Ramparts of the Beſieged. Loop-holes were cut in the ſides of them, through which the Beſiegers battered without intermiſſion the Works. Theſe covered Lines ſerved beſides for filling up the Foſſés, and had Paſſages of Communication with the battering Tortoiſes cut in them, which Tortoiſes were puſhed forward upon the part of the Foſſé filled. When the Walls of a Place were not high, theſe Trenches were not covered with Blinds, either at top or in front, but only with a Parapet of the Earth dug out of them, like thoſe of the Moderns. At ſome diſtance from this Parallel another was cut behind it, which left a ſpace between them of the nature of our Eſplanades or Places of Arms. Here the Batteries of Baliſtas and Catapultas were erected, which differed from ours only in being higher. There was ſometimes a third upon the ſame parallel Line. Theſe Places of Arms contained all the Troops that guarded the Works. The Lines communicated by the Galleries or Trenches covered at top.

XVI. IT is certain therefore the uſe of Trenches was well known to the Ancients, without which they could have formed no Siege. Theſe Trenches are often mentioned in Authors by the *Latin* Word *Aggeres*, which does not always ſignify Cavaliers or Platforms. The Cavaliers were Mounts of Earth, on which Machines were planted, and were thrown up in the following manner. The Work was begun at a ſmall diſtance from that ſide of the Foſſé next the Country. It was carried on under the cover of Mantles or moving Sheds of conſiderable height, behind which the Soldiers worked in ſecurity from the Machines of the Beſieged. This ſort of Mantles or Galleries were not always compoſed of Hurdles and Faſcines, but of raw Hides, Mattreſſes, or of a Curtain made of ſtrong Cables, the whole ſuſpended between very high Maſts fixed in the Ground, which broke the force of whatever was diſcharged againſt it. The

Work

Work was continued to the height of theſe ſuſpended Curtains, which were raiſed in proportion with it. At the ſame time the void ſpaces of the Platform were filled up with Stones, Earth, and other Materials; whilſt ſome were employed in levelling and beating down the Earth, to make it firm, and capable of ſuſtaining the weight of the Towers and Machines to be planted upon it. From theſe Towers and Batteries of Baliſtas and Catapultas, an hail of Stones, Arrows, and large Darts were diſcharged upon the Ramparts and Works of the Beſieged.

XVII. THE Terraſs which *Alexander the Great* cauſed to be raiſed againſt the Rock of *Coriænæ* was very ſurpriſing. That Rock, which was ſuppoſed impregnable, was two thouſand five hundred Paces high, and ſeven or eight hundred round. It was exceſſively ſteep on all ſides, having only one Path hewn out of the Rock, by which no more than one Man could aſcend without difficulty. It was beſides ſurrounded with a deep Abyſs, which ſerved it inſtead of a Foſſé, and which it was neceſſary to fill up, in order to approach it. All theſe Difficulties were not capable of diſcouraging *Alexander*, to whoſe Valour and Fortune nothing appeared impoſſible. He began therefore by ordering the high Fir-Trees, that ſurrounded the Place in great numbers, to be cut down, in order to uſe them as Stairs to deſcend into the Foſſé. His Troops worked night and day in filling it up. Tho' the whole Army were employed in their turns at this Work, they could do no more than thirty Foot a Day, and ſomething leſs a Night, ſo difficult was the Work. When it was more advanced, and began to come nearer the due height, they drove Piles into both ſides of the Foſſé at proper diſtances from each other, with Beams laid croſs, in order to ſupport the weight to be laid on it. They then formed a kind of Floor or Bridge of Wicker and Faſcines, which they covered with Earth to equal the height of the ſide of the Foſſé, ſo that the Army could advance on a Way even with the Rock. 'Till then the Barbarians had derided the Undertaking, believing it utterly impracticable: but when they ſaw themſelves expoſed to the Darts of the Enemy, who worked upon their Terraſs behind Mantles; they began to loſe courage, demanded to capitulate, and ſoon after ſurrendered the Rock to *Alexander*.

XVIII. THE filling up of the Foſſés was not always ſo difficult as in this Inſtance, but never failed to require great Precautions and Labour. The Soldiers worked under cover in the Tortoiſes, and other the like Machines. The Foſſés were filled up with Stones, the trunks of Trees, and Faſcines, the whole mingled with Earth. It was neceſſary that theſe Works ſhould be of great ſolidity, to bear the prodigious weight of the Machines planted upon them, which would have made them fall in, if this kind of Cauſeway had been compoſed only of Faſcines. If the Foſſés were full of Water, they began by drawing it off, either intirely or in part, by different Drains, which they cut for that purpoſe.

XIX. WHILST theſe Works were carrying on, the Beſieged were not idle. They ran many Mines under the Foſſé to the part of it filled up, in order to carry off the Earth, which they handed from Man to Man into the City. This hindered the Work from advancing, the Beſieged carrying off as faſt as the Beſiegers laid on. They uſed alſo another more effectual Stratagem, which was to cut large Cavities underneath the Works of the Enemy.

After having removed ſome of the Earth without its being diſcovered, they ſupported the reſt with Props or large Beams, which they ſmeared over with Greaſe and other Combuſtibles. They then filled up the void ſpace between the Props with dry Wood, and ſuch things as would ſooneſt burn, and ſet them on fire. Hence when the Props gave way, the whole fell into a kind of Gulf, with the Tortoiſes, battering Rams, and the Men employed in working them.

XX. THE Beſiegers uſed the ſame Artifice to make the Walls of Places fall down. When *Darius* beſieged *Chalcedon*, the Walls were ſo ſtrong, and the Place ſo well provided of all Neceſſaries, that the Inhabitants were in no pain about the Siege. The King did not make any Approaches to the Walls, nor lay waſte the Country; he lay ſtill, as if he expected a conſiderable Reinforcement. But whilſt the People of *Chalcedon* had no other thought than that of guarding their Walls, he opened at the diſtance of three quarters of a League from the City, a Mine, which the *Perſians* carried on as far as the Market-place. They judged themſelves directly under it, from the Roots of the Olive-Trees which they knew grew there. They then opened their Mine, and entering by that Paſſage, took the Place, whilſt the Beſieged were ſtill employed in keeping guard upon the Walls. In the ſame manner *A. Servilius* the Dictator took the City *Fidenæ*, having cauſed ſeveral falſe Attacks to be made on different ſides, whilſt a Mine carried on as far as the Citadel, opened him a paſſage there for his Troops. Another Dictator, the celebrated *Camillus*, could not terminate the long Siege of *Veii* but by this Stratagem. He undertook to run a Mine as far as the Citadel of that Place; and that the Work might not be diſcontinued, nor the Troops diſcouraged by the length of it, he divided them into ſix Brigades, who relieved each other every ſix Hours. The Work being carried on night and day, it extended at length to the Citadel, and the City was taken. At the Siege of *Athens* by *Sylla*, it is aſtoniſhing to conſider the Mines and Countermines uſed on both ſides. The Miners were not long before they met and fought furiouſly under Ground. The *Romans* having cut their way as far as the Wall, ſapped a great part of it, and ſupported it in a manner in the Air on Props of Wood, to which they ſet fire without loſs of time. The Wall fell ſuddenly into the Foſſé with an incredible Noiſe and Ruins, and all that were upon it periſhed.

XXI. THE Mines from the Camp to the inſide of a Place were long uſed before the invention of Sapping, and conſiſted at firſt in only running the Mine from the Camp to the Wall, and from thence a conſiderable way into the Place, underneath ſome large Temple, or other great Building little frequented in the Night. When they came thither they cut a large Space, which they propped up with ſtrong Timbers. They then opened a Paſſage of the whole breadth of this Space, for entering the Place in greater numbers, whilſt the Soldiers advanced into it through the Mine with the utmoſt diligence. The other kind of Mines, for ſapping the Foundations of a Wall, were opened very near the Camp to avoid being diſcovered, and were carried under the Foſſé to the foot of the Wall, when they were inlarged to the right and left of the Foundations. This latter part was made very large, to receive the great number of Workmen, and long in proportion to the extent of the Wall to be thrown down. This being done, they begun to ſap at bottom, and as the Stones were pulled out, and the Work advanced, they propped the Superſtructure with Timbers four Foot high, which were fixed under the bottom

bottom Stones of the Foundation. As ſoon as the Work was finiſhed, they laid Faggots and other Combuſtibles between the Props; and after they had ſet them on fire, they quitted that part of the Mine, and repaſſed the Foſſé to avoid being ſtifled with the Smoke; beſides which, there was reaſon to fear, that the Wall in falling would break into the Mine, and bury all under it in its Ruins.

XXII. THE Ancients uſed ſeveral Methods to defend themſelves againſt the Enemy after the Breach was made. Sometimes, but not ſo frequently, they made uſe of Trees cut down, which they extended along the whole front of the Breach very near each other, in order that the Branches might mingle together: they tied the trunks very firmly to one another, ſo that it was impoſſible to ſeparate theſe Trees, which formed an impenetrable Fence, behind which a multitude of Soldiers were poſted, armed with Pikes and long Partizans. Sometimes the Breaches were made ſo ſuddenly, either by Saps above, or under Ground, or by the violent Blows of the Rams, that the Beſieged often found their Works laid open when they leaſt thought of it. They had recourſe on ſuch Occaſions to a very ſimple Refuge, in order to gain time to look about them, and to intrench behind the Breach. They threw down upon the ruins of the Wall a prodigious quantity of dry Wood, and other combuſtible Matter, to which they ſet fire. This occaſioned ſo violent a Flame, that it was impoſſible for the Beſiegers to paſs through it, or approach the Breach. The Garriſon of *Haliartus* in *Bœotia* thought of this Remedy againſt the *Romans*.

XXIII. BUT the moſt uſual Method was to erect new Walls behind the Breaches, which are now called *Retirades*, or Retrenchments. Theſe Works generally were not parallel with the ruined Walls, but deſcribed a kind of Semicircle towards the Place, of which the two ends joined the two ſides of the Wall that remained whole. They did not omit to cut a very large and deep Ditch before this Work, in order that the Beſiegers might be under the neceſſity of attacking it with no leſs difficulty, and all the Machines employed againſt the ſtrongeſt Walls. *Sylla* having beat down great part of the Walls of the Piræum with his battering Rams, cauſed the Breach to be immediately attacked, where ſo furious a Battle enſued, that he was obliged to ſound a Retreat. The Beſieged improving the Opportunity this gave them, immediately ran a ſecond Wall behind the Breach. *Sylla* perceiving it made his Machines advance to batter it, rightly judging, that being newly built, it could not long reſiſt their violence. The effect anſwered with no great difficulty, and he immediately ordered the Aſſault to be given. The Action was warm and vigorous, but he was at laſt repulſed with loſs, and obliged to abandon his Deſign. Hiſtory abounds with Examples of this kind.

XXIV. HAVING thus given ſome Account of the Fortifications of the Ancients, deſcribed the principal Machines made uſe of by them in their Sieges, and explained their Conduct in *the Attack and Defence of Places*; I might here, agreeably to what I have done in the Chapter upon *Battles*, entertain the Reader with a Deſcription of ſome of the moſt celebrated Sieges of Antiquity, in order to give him the juſter Idea of this part of War. But as this would too much ſwell the DISCOURSE, and is beſides rather curious than uſeful, becauſe of the great Changes that have been introduced by the invention

invention of Artillery and Gun-powder, I ſhall content myſelf with referring to the Hiſtorians themſelves, where theſe Sieges are related at large. *Thucydides*, *Polybius*, *Livy*, and *Joſephus* furniſh abundant Examples of this kind. The moſt curious and remarkable are thoſe of *Platæa* by the *Lacedæmonians* and *Thebans*; of *Syracuſe* by the *Athenians*; of *Lilybæum*, *Syracuſe*, *Carthage*, and *Numantia* by the *Romans*; but above all of *Aleſia* by *Julius Cæſar*, and of *Jeruſalem* by *Titus Veſpaſian*. Theſe two laſt are ſo minutely and circumſtantially deſcribed; the one by *Cæſar*, who formed and conducted it; the other by *Joſephus*, who was an Eye-witneſs of all that paſſed, that whoever peruſes them attentively, will meet with every thing that is worth knowing upon this Subject, and be enabled to form a clear and comprehenſive Judgment of the high degree of perfection to which the Ancients, and in particular the *Romans*, had carried this important Branch of the *Art of War*.

C. JULIUS

GALLIA VETVS

Galli apud Cesarem nominati & descripti

IN BELGICA

Atrebas
Comius.

Eburones
Ambiorix
Cativulcus.

Bellovaci
Corbeus
Vertiscus.

Nervij
Boduognatus
Vertico.

Treviri
Induciomarus
Cingetorix.

Sueßiones
Divitiacus
Galba.

Remi
Antebrogius
Iccius.

IN CELTICA

Aedui
Cavarillus
Cotus
Convictolitanus
Dumnorix
Divitiacus
Eporedorix
Liscus
Litavicus
Surus
Vedeliacus
Verdumarus.

Helvetij
Orgetorix
Verodoctius
Numenius
Divicus.

Sequani
Casticus
Catamantales

Senones
Cavarinus
Moritasgus
Acco
Drapes.

Andes
Dumnacus.

Lemovix
Sedulius.

Carnutes
Tasgetius
Cotuatus
Conetodunus
Guturvatus.

Vnellus
Viridovix.

Cadurcus
Luterius.

Arverni
Vercingetorix
Celtillus
Gobanitio
Vergasillaunus
Critognatus
Epasnactus.

Aulercus
Camulogenus

Nitiobriges
Ollovico
Theutomatus.

Helvij
Caburus
C. Val. Donatianus

IN AQUITANIA

Piso
Adcantuanus.

BRI-
Londinum
TANNIAE
PARS.
Tamesis flu.
Cantium
MARI-
NICI
Iccium portus
Morini
At
Ve
GER
Am

OCEANUS BRITANNICUS

BEL^DD
Caletes.
Bellocassij sive Velocasses.
Sequana fluvius
Ambibari.
Lexobij.
Aulercij, qui Eburouices.
Ambisitates.
Sesunij.
Lutetia
Osisimi
ARMORI-CEA, *Sive* MARITIMÆ CIVITATES.
Lemovices.
Curiosolites.
Aulerci, *qui* Cenomani.
Vnelli.
CEL^DD
Caruntes.
Druidum sedes.
Aulerci *qui* Diablintres.
Rhedones.
Veneti.
Turones.
Andes.
Ligeris fluvius
Noviodunum
1.2.3.4. opida Venetorum, que Cæsar describit at non nominat.
Venetorum insulæ
Venetia
Cadetes.
Ligeris fluvi.
Nannetes.
Pictones.
Bitu
TAE, SIVE
Santones.
Lemovic
Lemovicum
OCEANUS GAL^DD
Petrocorij
Garumni.
A^DD
Cocosates.
Garumna fluvius
Cadurci
Helv
Uxellodunum
Vocates.
Heleuter
AQUI-
TANICUS
QVI^DD
Garites.
PR
Tarbelli.
TA^DD
Tolosa
Tarusates
Preciani.
Tarusatum opidum
Cantabri
Ausci.
Tolosates.
HISPANIAE
Bigerriones.
NI.
Sibutates.
Pyrenæi montes
Elu-
sates.
Sontiates.
Sontiatum opidum
PARS

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
52 51 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42

N^o 5

Milliaria Gallica
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Milliaria Germanica
5 10 15 20 25 30

GERMANIAE MAGNAE PARS.

GALLIAE CITERIORIS (QVÆ ET ITALIAE) PARS.

PROVINCIA Romana.

MEDITERRANEI MARIS PARS

Rhenus flu. Batavorum insula Mosa fluvius Vacales fl. Sicambri. Paemani. Ambivariti. napij Grudij. Gordu ni. Leuaci. Mosa fluvius Rhenus fluvius Cis rhenani. Vbij. Pleumosij. Scaldis fluvius Cicronis castra Aduaticor op. Vatuca Advatici. Eburones. Iccius portus Morini. Catuaci. Centrones. Nemetocerna Sabis flu. Caeresi. Segni. Atrebates. Veromandui. Nervij. Condrusi. Labieni castra Treviri Essui. si. Ambiani. Samarobrina ARDVENNA SILVA Bellovaci. Noviodunum Suessones. Bibrax Durocortum Bratuspantium Axona flu. Remi. Mediomatrices Tulingi. Triboces. Parisij. Matrona fluvius Cavillonum Leuci. Meldae. Melodunum Harudes. Rauraci. Linggones Agendicum Senones. Genabum Vellaunodunum Vogesus mons Arar flu. a Magetrobia Rhenus flu. Nantuates. Sequana fluvius Ligeris fluvius Avaricum Noviodunum Mandubij Vesontio Sequani. Tigurinus Pagus. Helueti. Alexia Ager Sequanus totus Gallie optimus Jura mons Verbigenus Pagus. Leponti. Alpes montes Bituriges. Aedui, Sive Bibracte Harudes. Latobrigi. Gergobina Aedua civitas. Cabilonum Murus a Caesare factus Lemanus lacus Seduni. Rhodanus fluvius Veragri. Boia Ambarri. Elaver fluvius Arar flu. Geneva Octodurus Boij. Sebusiani. Gergovia Matiscona LI. Centrones. Aruerni. Allobroges. Rhodanus fluvius Garoceli. Ligeris fluvi. Vienna Ocelum Gebenna mons Helvij. Vocontij. Aulerci, qui Brannouices. Rhuteni. Ambuareti. Tolosa Gabali. Brannouij. Caturiges. Arecomici. Nitiobriges. Albici. Arelate Volcæ. Narbona Massillia Taurois Sontiatum opidum

Gallorum aliquot populorũ elogia, sive descriptiones apud Cesarem.

GALLI, sive CELTAE in his Aedui fratres consanguineiq; Romanorum dicti, ob veterẽ ac perpetuam erga PR. fidem. his in omni Gallia summa auctoritas.

Helvetij reliquos Gallos virtute superant

Senones. civitas inprimis magnę inter Gallos auctoritatis

Sequani per se minus valebant

Veneti. his longe amplissima auctoritas: omnis orę maritimæ scientia, et usu rerum nauticarum ceteros antecedunt.

Boij egregia virtute cogniti

Ambarri necessarij et consanguinei Aeduorum.

BELGAE, his maxima virtus; et omnium Gallorum fortissimi, Horum

Nervij maxime feri, & magnæ virtutis. pedestribus valebant copijs

Treviri quorum virtutis opinio singularis. cultu et feritate non multum a Germanis differebant.

Remi officiosi Romanis in Gallicis bellis, et secundum dignitatis locum apud hos obtinebant.

Eburones civitas ignobilis et humilis

Bellovaci plurimum valent virtute et auctoritate hominumq; numero Item magna apud hos virtutis opinio.

Aduatici ex Cimbris Teutonisque procreati sunt.

Condrusi Trevirorum clientes.

Vbij ceteris humaniores. horum civitas florens et ampla.

AQUITANI hominum multitudo his; optima gens ad bellum gerendum.

Sontiates hi equitatu plurimum valent.

Galli apud Cesarem nominati & descripti

IN BELGICA

Atrebas
Comius.

Eburones
Ambiorix
Cativulcus.

Bellovaci
Corbeus
Vertiscus.

Nervij
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Treviri
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Sueßiones
Divitiacus
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Remi
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Iccius.

IN CELTICA

Aedui
Cavarillus
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Convictolitanus
Dumnorix
Divitiacus
Eporedorix
Liscus
Litavicus
Surus
Vedeliacus
Verdumarus.

Helvetij
Orgetorix
Verodoctius
Numenius
Divicus.

Sequani
Casticus
Catamantales

Senones
Cavarinus
Moritasgus
Acco
Drapes.

Andes
Dumnacus.

Lemovix
Sedulius.

Carnutes
Tasgetius
Cotuatus
Conetodunus
Guturvatus.

Vnellus
Viridovix.

Cadurcus
Luterius.

Arverni
Vercingetorix
Celtillus
Gobanitio
Vergasilaunus
Critognatus
Epasnactus.

Aulercus
Camulogenus

Nitiobriges
Ollovico
Theutomatus.

Helvij
Caburus
C. Val. Donatianus

IN AQUITANIA
Piso
Adcantuanus.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

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C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK I.

I. THE whole Country of *Gaul* is divided into three Parts: of which the *Belgians* inhabit one; the *Aquitains* another; and a People, called in their own Language *Celts*, in ours *Gauls*, the third. Theſe all differ from each other in their Language, Cuſtoms, and Laws. The *Gauls* are divided from the *Aquitains* by the River *Garonne*, and by the *Marne* and the *Seine* from the *Belgians*. Of all theſe Nations the *Belgians* are the moſt warlike; as being fartheſt removed from the Culture and Refinements of the Province, and but little reſorted to by Merchants, who furniſh the means of Luxury and Voluptuouſneſs. They are alſo ſituated next to the *Germans*, who inhabit beyond the *Rhine*, with whom they are continually engaged in War. For this Reaſon likewiſe the *Helvetians* are diſtinguiſhed by their Bravery beyond the reſt of the *Gauls*; becauſe they are almoſt conſtantly at war with the *Germans*, either for the Defence of their own Territories, or acting themſelves as the Aggreſſors. One of theſe Diviſions, that which we have ſaid was poſſeſſed by the *Gauls*, begins at the River *Rhone*, and is bounded by the *Garonne*, the Ocean, and the Territories of the *Belgians*. It touches alſo, towards the *Helvetians* and *Sequani*, upon the River *Rhine*, extending itſelf northward. The Country of the *Belgians*, commencing from the remoteſt Confines of *Gaul*, ſtretches as far as the lower *Rhine*, running all the way between the North and Eaſt. *Aquitain* extends from the *Garonne* to the *Pyrenean* Mountains, and that part of the Ocean which borders upon *Spain*. Its Situation is North-Weſt.

II. *ORGETORIX* was by far the richeſt and moſt illuſtrious of the *Helvetians*. This Nobleman, in the Conſulſhip of *M. Meſſala* and *M. Piſo*, prompted by an aſpiring Ambition, formed a Confederacy of the principal Men of the State; and perſuaded the People to quit their Country in a Body, repreſenting: "that "as they ſurpaſſed all the Nations around them in Valour, it would be eaſy "for them to gain the intire Sovereignty of *Gaul*." He the ſooner brought them into this Deſign, becauſe the *Helvetians*, by the nature of their Situation, are every where confined within very narrow Territories: On one ſide by the *Rhine*, a broad and deep River, which ſeparates their Country from that of the *Germans*: On the other by Mount *Jura*, a high Ridge of Hills, which runs between them and the *Sequani*: Laſtly, by the Lake *Lemanus*, and the River *Rhone*, which is the Boundary on the ſide of the *Roman* Province. By this

this means it happened, that they could not ſo eaſily enlarge their Territories, or make Conqueſts on the neighbouring States; which, to Men of a warlike Spirit, and fond of Fighting, was abundant cauſe of Diſcontent: For being a numerous People, and of great Fame for their Bravery, they thought themſelves much too ſtraitned in a Country, which was but two hundred and forty Miles in length, and about one hundred and eighty in breadth.

III. URGED by theſe Conſiderations, and ſtill more by the Authority and Perſuaſions of *Orgetorix*, they reſolved to provide every thing neceſſary for an Expedition; to buy up a great number of Waggons and Carriage-Horſes; to form large Magazines of Corn, that they might have ſufficient to ſupply them in their March; to eſtabliſh Peace and Amity with the neighbouring States. They imagined two Years would be ſufficient for theſe Preparations, and obliged themſelves by a Law to begin their March on the third. The whole Management of this Deſign was committed to *Orgetorix*, who undertook an Embaſſy to the neighbouring States. On this Occaſion he perſuaded *Caſticus*, the Son of *Catamantales*, of the Nation of the *Sequani*, whoſe Father had for many Years enjoyed the Sovereignty over that People, and been ſtiled Friend and Ally by the Senate of *Rome*, to poſſeſs himſelf of the ſupreme Authority in his own Country, which his Father had held before him. He likewiſe perſuaded *Dumnorix* the *Æduan*, the Brother of *Divitiacus*, who was at that time the leading Man in his own State, and greatly beloved by the People, to attempt the ſame among the *Æduans:* and the more to ſecure him to his Intereſt, gave him his Daughter in Marriage. He told them, "That "they might with the greateſt Facility accompliſh their Deſigns; as he was "himſelf aſſured of attaining the ſupreme Authority in his own State, which "was without Diſpute the moſt powerful and conſiderable of all *Gaul*; and "would then employ his whole Intereſt and Forces, to eſtabliſh them in their "reſpective Sovereignties." Moved by theſe Conſiderations, they reciprocally bound themſelves by a ſolemn Oath; not doubting, when they had once attained the chief Sway in their ſeveral States, with the united Forces of three ſuch powerful and mighty Nations, to render themſelves Maſters of all *Gaul*. The *Helvetians* having Notice of this Deſign, obliged *Orgetorix*, according to the Cuſtom of their Country, to anſwer to the Charge brought againſt him in Chains: and had he been found guilty, the Law condemned him to be burnt alive. On the Day appointed for his Trial, he aſſembled all his Slaves and Domeſticks, amounting to ten thouſand Men; and all his Clients and Debtors, of which the Number was very great: By their means he reſcued himſelf out of the Hands of his Judges. While the People, provoked at this Contempt of the Laws, were preparing to ſupport their Authority by Force, and the Magiſtrates had aſſembled a great Number of Men for that Purpoſe; *Orgetorix* died: Nor are the *Helvetians* without Suſpicion of his having made away with himſelf.

IV. AFTER his Death, the *Helvetians* ſtill continued to proſecute with the ſame Diligence, the Deſign they had formed of quitting their Country. When they had completed their Preparations, they ſet fire to all their Towns, to the Number of twelve; to their Boroughs and Villages, which amounted to four hundred; and to their other private Buildings. They likewiſe burnt all their Corn, except what they had reſolved to carry along with them; that having no Hope of returning to their own Country, they might be the more diſpoſed to confront all Dangers. Each Man had Orders to carry out with him Proviſions for three Months. The *Rauraci*, *Tulingians*, and *Latobrigians*, neighbouring

A. *Mount Jura*. B. *The Lake Lemanus*. C. *The Helvetian Army*. D. *Geneva*. E. *The single Roman*
G. *The new levied Troops raised by Cæsar in Narbonese Gaul.*

N.º 6.



man Legion which Cæsar had with him. **F.** *The Rhone.*

bouring Nations, being perſuaded to follow the ſame Counſel, likewiſe ſet fire to their Towns and Villages, and joined with them in the Expedition. The *Boians* too, who had formerly inhabited beyond the *Rhine*, and paſſing over into *Noricum*, had ſettled in that Country, and poſſeſſed themſelves of *Noreia* its Capital City, were aſſociated into the Deſign.

V. THERE were only two Ways by which they could march out of their own Country: One through the Territories of the *Sequani*, between Mount *Jura* and the *Rhone*, narrow and difficult, inſomuch that in ſome Places a ſingle File of Waggons could hardly paſs. The impending Mountain was beſides very high and ſteep, ſo that a handful of Men was ſufficient to ſtop them. The other lay through our Province, far eaſier and readier; becauſe the *Rhone*, which flows between the Confines of the *Helvetians* and *Allobrogians*, a People lately ſubjected to the *Romans*, was in ſome Places fordable: And *Geneva*, a frontier Town of the *Allobrogians*, adjoining to the Territories of the *Helvetians*, had a Bridge belonging to this laſt People. They therefore doubted not, either of perſuading the *Allobrogians*, who as yet ſeemed to bear no great Affection to the People of *Rome*; or at leaſt of obliging them by Force, to grant them a Paſſage through their Territories. Every thing being now ready for the Expedition, they appointed a Day for their general Rendezvous on the Banks of the *Rhone*. The Day fixed on was the Twenty-eighth of *March*, in the Conſulſhip of *L. Piſo* and *A. Gabinius*.

VI. *CÆSAR* having notice of theſe Proceedings, and that it was the Deſign of the *Helvetians* to attempt a Paſſage through the Province, haſtened his Departure from *Rome*; and poſting by great Journeys into farther *Gaul*, came to *Geneva*. He began with breaking down the Bridge over the *Rhone*; and as there was at that time but one *Roman* Legion in *Tranſalpine Gaul*, he ordered great Levies to be made throughout the whole Province. The *Helvetians* being informed of his Arrival, deputed ſeveral Noblemen of the firſt Rank, with *Numeius* and *Verodoctius* at their head, to wait upon him in the name of the State, and repreſent, "that they meant not to offer the leaſt Injury to "the *Roman* Province; that Neceſſity alone had determined them to the De- "ſign of paſſing through it, becauſe they had no other way by which to di- "rect their march; that they therefore intreated they might have his Permiſſion "for that purpoſe." But *Cæſar* bearing in mind, that *L. Caſſius* the Conſul had been ſlain, and his Army routed, and made to paſs under the Yoke by the *Helvetians*, did not think proper to grant their Requeſt. Neither could he perſuade himſelf, that Men ſo ill affected to the People of *Rome*, if permitted to paſs through the Province, would abſtain from Acts of Hoſtility and Violence. However, that he might gain time, till the Troops he had ordered to be raiſed could aſſemble; he told the Ambaſſadors he would conſider of their Demand, and that if they returned by the Nineteenth of *April*, they ſhould have his final Anſwer. Meanwhile with the Legion he then had, and the Soldiers that came in to him from all Parts of the Province, he ran a Wall ſixteen Feet high, and nineteen Miles in length, with a Ditch, from the Lake *Lemanus* into which the *Rhone* diſcharges itſelf, to Mount *Jura*, which divides the Territories of the *Sequani* from the *Helvetians*. This Work finiſhed, he raiſed Redoubts from ſpace to ſpace, and manned them with Troops, that if the Enemy ſhould attempt to force a Paſſage, he might be in a condition to hinder them. When the Day appointed came, and the Ambaſſadors returned for an Anſwer, he told them; that he could not, conſiſtent with the Uſage and

Behaviour of the People of *Rome* on the like Occaſions, grant any Troops a Paſſage through the Province: and ſhould they attempt it by Force, he let them ſee he was prepared to oppoſe them.

VII. THE *Helvetians* driven from this Hope, endeavoured to force the Paſſage of the River; ſome with Boats coupled together, or Floats which they had prepared in great Numbers; others by the Fords of the *Rhone*, where was the leaſt Depth of Water; ſometimes by Day, but oftener in the Night: but being repulſed by the Strength of the Works, the Concourſe of the Troops, and the Diſcharge of Darts, they at laſt abandoned the Attempt. There was ſtill one Way left through the Territories of the *Sequani*, by which however, without the Conſent of the Natives, they could not march, becauſe of the Narrowneſs of the Paſs. As they were not able to prevail by their own Application, they ſent Ambaſſadors to *Dumnorix* the *Æduan*, that thro' his Interceſſion they might obtain this Favour of the *Sequani*. *Dumnorix* by his Popularity and Generoſity had great Influence with the *Sequani*, and was alſo well affected to the *Helvetians*, becauſe from among them he had married the Daughter of *Orgetorix*. Beſides, urged by ambitious Views, he was framing to himſelf Schemes of Power, and wanted to have as many States as poſſible bound to him by Offices of Kindneſs. He therefore charged himſelf with the Negotiation, obtained for the *Helvetians* the Liberty of paſſing through the Territories of the *Sequani*, and engaged the two Nations mutually to give Hoſtages: The *Sequani*, not to moleſt the *Helvetians* in their march; and the *Helvetians*, to paſs without offering any Inſult or Injury to the Country.

VIII. *CÆSAR* ſoon had Intelligence of their march, and that they now deſigned to paſs through the Country of the *Sequani* and *Æduans* into the Territories of the *Santones*, which border upon thoſe of the *Toloſatians*, a State that makes Part of the *Roman* Province. Should this happen, he foreſaw many Inconveniencies likely to ariſe, from the Neighbourhood of a warlike and diſaffected People, in an open and plentiful Country. For theſe Reaſons he gave the Command of the new Works he had raiſed to *T. Labienus* his Lieutenant, and he himſelf haſtened by great Journeys into *Italy*. There he raiſed two Legions, and drew three more, that were cantoned round *Aquileia*, out of their Winter-quarters; and with theſe five Legions, took the neareſt way over the *Alps* into farther *Gaul*. The *Centrones*, *Graioceli*, and *Caturigians*, ſeizing the higher Grounds, endeavoured to oppoſe his march. But having repulſed them in ſeveral Encounters, he in ſeven Days after ſetting out from *Ocelum*, a City in the extreme Confines of the nearer Province, arrived among the *Vocontians*, whoſe Territories lie within the farther Province. Thence he led his Army into the Country of the *Allobrogians*; and croſſing their Territories, entered upon the Lands of the *Seguſians*. Theſe are the firſt on the other ſide the *Rhone*, beyond the Boundaries of the *Roman* Province.

IX. THE *Helvetians* had by this time marched their Forces through the narrow Paſs of Mount *Jura*, and the Territories of the *Sequani*; and were come into the Country of the *Æduans*, plundering their Lands. The *Æduans*, unable to defend themſelves and Poſſeſſions from the Violence of their Enemies, ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to requeſt Aid. They told him, " That ſuch at " all times had been their Merit with the People of *Rome*, that they might " challenge greater Regard, than to have their Lands laid waſte, their Children " led into Captivity, and their Towns aſſaulted and taken, almoſt in the very

" Sight

A. *Geneva*. B. *The Bridge of Geneva cut down*. C. *The Helvetians*. D. *The Wall sixteen fo*
Redoubts for defending the Wall. H. *The Helvetians attempting to pass the Rhone with F*

N.º 7.



icteen foot high with a Ditch before it. **E.** *The Lake Lemanus.* **F.** *Mount Jura.* **G.** *The*
e with Floats and Boats coupled together, are repulsed. **I.** *The Disposition of Cæsar's Posts.*

G.R. III.
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

Cæsar attacks and cuts to pieces a Canton of

A. *The three Cantons of the Helvetians that had already paſsed the River.* B. *The fou*

D. *Their Cavalry on the right Wing.* F. *The Haſtati and Principes.* G. E. *The Triar*

N°. 8.



on of the Helvetians on this side the Arar.—
The fourth Canton that still remained on this side the Arar. C. *The Roman Velites.*
e Triarii. H. *The River Arar.*

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

A. *The River Arar.* B. *The Helvetian Forces.* C. *Cæsar*

N°9



sar's Legions. D. *The Tigurine Canton on this side the Arar.*

" Sight of a *Roman* Army." At the ſame time alſo the *Ambarri*, Friends and Allies of the *Æduans*, ſent to inform him: " That compelled to abandon the " open Country, they could hardly defend their Towns from the Rage of the " Enemy." The *Allobrogians* likewiſe, who had Dwellings and Poſſeſſions beyond the *Rhone*, fled to him for Protection, and aſſured him: " That there was " nothing left them but a naked and deſolate Country." Whereupon *Cæſar*, moved by theſe Complaints and Remonſtrances, reſolved not to wait 'till the Fortunes of his Allies ſhould be conſumed, and the *Helvetians* arrive in the Territories of the *Santones*.

X. THE River *Arar* flows into the *Rhone*, thro' the Confines of the *Æduans* and *Sequani*, with a Current incredibly ſmooth and gentle, inſomuch that it is impoſſible to diſtinguiſh by the Eye, which way its Waters glide. The *Helvetians* were at this time employed in paſſing it on Floats and a Bridge of Boats. When *Cæſar* was informed by his Spies, that three Parts of their Forces were got over the River, and that the fourth ſtill remained on this Side; he left his Camp about midnight with three Legions, and came up with the Party of the Enemy that had not yet paſſed. As he found them unprepared, and incumbered with their Baggage, he attacked them immediately, and killed a great Number on the Spot. The reſt fled, and ſheltered themſelves in the neareſt Woods. This was called the *Tigurine* Canton, being one of the four into which the whole Body of the *Helvetians* are divided. This very Canton, in the Memory of our Fathers, marching out of their own Territories, had vanquiſhed and killed the Conſul *L. Caſſius*, and obliged his Army to paſs under the Yoke. Thus, whether by Chance, or the Direction of the immortal Gods, that Part of the *Helvetian* State which had brought ſo ſignal a Calamity upon the *Roman* People, were the firſt to feel the Weight of their Reſentment. In this *Cæſar* avenged not only the publick, but likewiſe his own domeſtick Injuries; becauſe in the ſame Battle with *Caſſius*, was ſlain alſo *L. Piſo* his Lieutenant, the Grandfather of *L. Piſo*, *Cæſar*'s Father-in-law.

XI. AFTER this Battle, that he might come up with the remaining Forces of the *Helvetians*, he cauſed a Bridge to be made acroſs the *Arar*, and carried over his Army. The *Helvetians* diſmayed at his ſudden Approach, as he had ſpent only one Day in paſſing the River, which they had with the utmoſt Difficulty accompliſhed in twenty, ſent an Embaſſy to him, at the head of which was *Divico*, who had been General of the *Helvetians* in the War againſt *Caſſius*. He addreſſed *Cæſar* to this Effect: " That if the People of *Rome* were diſpoſed to " conclude a Peace with the *Helvetians*, they would go and ſettle in whatever " Country *Cæſar* ſhould think fit to aſſign them: but if they perſiſted in the " Deſign of making War, he would do well to call to mind the ancient Diſ- " grace of the *Roman* People, and the Valour of the *Helvetic* Nation: That in " having ſurpriſed one of the Cantons, while the others, who had paſſed the " River, could not return to ſuccour it, there was no Reaſon to be much elated " on the Advantage, nor to deſpiſe his Enemies: That the *Helvetians* had learned " of their Anceſtors, to depend more on Courage than on Cunning and Am- " buſhes; and it therefore imported him to beware, not to render the Place " where they were then poſted famous and memorable with Poſterity, by a new " Defeat of the *Roman* People, and the Deſtruction of their Army."

XII. TO this *Cæſar* replied: " That he therefore the leſs doubted of the Iſſue, " as he well knew all the Circumſtances of the Affair to which the *Helvetians* " referred;

" referred; and reſented them the more ſtrongly, as they had happened unde-
" ſervedly to the *Roman* People: That had they been conſcious of any Injury on
" their Side, it would have been eaſy for them to have kept upon their Guard;
" but herein were they deceived, that neither did they know of any thing which
" might give them cauſe of Fear, nor could they apprehend they had any
" thing to fear without cauſe: That ſuppoſing him inclined to overlook old
" Injuries, could they expect he would alſo forget their late Inſults, in attempt-
" ing, againſt his Will, to force a Paſſage through the Province, and laying
" waſte the Territories of the *Æduans*, *Ambarri*, and *Allobrogians*? That their
" boaſting ſo inſolently of their Victory, and wondering that Vengeance had
" been deferred ſo long, were a new Set of Provocations. But they ought to
" remember, that the immortal Gods were ſometimes wont to grant long Im-
" punity, and a greater run of Proſperity to Men, whom they purſued with the
" Puniſhment of their Crimes, that by the ſad Reverſe of their Condition, Ven-
" geance might fall the heavier. Tho' theſe were juſt Grounds of Reſentment,
" yet, if they would ſatisfy the *Æduans* and their Allies for the Ravages com-
" mitted in their Country, as likewiſe the *Allobrogians*, and give Hoſtages for
" the performance of their Promiſes, he was ready to conclude a Peace with
" them." *Divico* replied: " That ſuch were the Inſtitutions of the *Helvetians*,
" derived from their Anceſtors, that they had been accuſtomed to receive, not
" to give Hoſtages; and that no body knew it better than the *Romans*."
Having returned this Anſwer, he departed.

XIII. THE next Day they decamped. *Cæſar* did the ſame; and ordered all the Cavalry, whom, to the Number of four thouſand, he had raiſed in the Province, and drawn together from the *Æduans* and their Allies, to go before, and obſerve the Enemy's march. But preſſing too cloſe upon their Rear, they were obliged to engage in a diſadvantageous Place, and loſt a few Men. The *Helvetians*, encouraged by this Succeſs, as having, with no more than five hundred Horſe, repulſed ſo great a Multitude, began to face us more boldly, and ſometimes to ſally from their Rear, and attack our Van. *Cæſar* kept back his Men from fighting; thinking it ſufficient for the preſent, to ſtraiten the Enemy's forages, and prevent their ravaging and plundering the Country. In this manner the Armies marched for fifteen Days together; inſomuch that between our Van, and the Rear of the *Helvetians*, the Diſtance did not exceed five or ſix Miles.

XIV. IN the mean time *Cæſar* daily preſſed the *Æduans* for the Corn which they had promiſed in the name of the Publick. For by reaſon of the coldneſs of the Climate, (*Gaul*, as we have ſaid, lying conſiderably to the North,) he was ſo far from finding the Corn ripe in the Fields, that there was not even ſufficient Forage for the Horſes. Neither could he make uſe of thoſe Supplies which came to him by the way of the *Arar*, becauſe the *Helvetians* had turned off from the River, and he was determined not to leave them. The *Æduans* put him off from day to day with fair Speeches; ſometimes pretending that it was bought up, and ready to be ſent; ſometimes, that it was actually on the way. But when he ſaw no End of theſe Delays, and that the Day approached for delivering out Corn to the Army; calling together their Chiefs, of whom he had a great Number in his Camp; among the reſt *Divitiacus*, and *Liſcus* their ſupreme Magiſtrate, who is ſtiled *Vergobret* in the Language of the Country, and created yearly, with a Power of Life and Death; he ſeverely inveighed againſt them: " That at a time when Corn was neither to be procured for

" Money

" Money, nor had out of the Fields, in ſo urgent a Conjuncture, and while " the Enemy was ſo near, they had not taken care to ſupply him;" adding, " that as he had engaged in that War chiefly at their Requeſt, he had the " greater Reaſon to complain of their abandoning him."

XV. UPON this, *Liſcus*, moved by *Cæſar*'s Speech, thought proper to declare what he had hitherto concealed: " That there were ſome among them " whoſe Authority with the People was very great; and who, tho' but private " Men, had yet more Power than the Magiſtrates themſelves: That theſe, by " artful and ſeditious Speeches, alarmed the Multitude, and perſuaded them to " keep back their Corn; inſinuating, that if their own State could not obtain " the Sovereignty of *Gaul*, it would be better for them to obey the *Helvetians*, " *Gauls* like themſelves, than the *Romans*; there not being the leaſt Reaſon to " queſtion, but theſe laſt, after having ſubdued the *Helvetians*, would, along " with the reſt of *Gaul*, deprive the *Æduans* alſo of their Liberty: That the " very ſame Men gave Intelligence to the Enemy of all the Deſigns of the *Ro-* " *mans*, and whatſoever was tranſacted in their Camp; his Authority not being " ſufficient to reſtrain them: Nay, that tho' compelled by neceſſity, he had now " made a diſcovery of the whole matter to *Cæſar*, he was not ignorant of the " danger to which he expoſed himſelf by ſuch a Conduct; and had, for that " reaſon, choſen to be ſilent, as long as he thought it conſiſtent with the ſafety " of the State." *Cæſar* perceived, that *Dumnorix*, the Brother of *Divitiacus*, was pointed at by this Speech. But as he was unwilling that theſe matters ſhould be debated in the preſence of ſo many Witneſſes, he ſpeedily diſmiſſed the Council, retaining only *Liſcus*. He then queſtion'd him apart on what he had juſt ſaid, and was anſwered with greater courage and freedom. He put the ſame Queſtions to others alſo in private, who all confirmed the truth of what had been told him: " That *Dumnorix* was a Man of an enterpriſing Spirit, fond of Re- " volutions, and in great favour with the People, becauſe of his liberality: " That he had for many Years farmed the Cuſtoms, and other publick Revenues " of the *Æduans*, at a very low price; no one daring to bid againſt him: That " by this means he had conſiderably increaſed his Eſtate, and was enabled to " extend his Bounty to all about him: That he conſtantly kept a great number " of Horſemen in pay, who attended him wherever he went: That his Intereſt " was not confined merely to his own Country, but extended likewiſe to the neigh- " bouring States: That the better to ſupport this Intereſt, he had married his Mo- " ther to a Man of principal rank and authority among the *Biturigians*, had himſelf " taken a Wife from amongſt the *Helvetians*, and matched his Siſter and the reſt " of his Kindred into other the moſt powerful States: That he favoured and " wiſhed well to the *Helvetians* on the ſcore of that Alliance, and perſonally hated " *Cæſar*, and the *Romans*, becauſe by their arrival his Power had been diminiſhed, " and *Divitiacus* his Brother reſtored to his former Credit and Authority: That " ſhould the *Romans* be overthrown, he was in great hopes of obtaining the Sove- " reignty by means of the *Helvetians*. On the contrary, ſhould they prevail, he " muſt not only give up theſe Hopes, but even all Expectation of retaining the In- " fluence he had already acquired." *Cæſar* likewiſe found upon Inquiry, that in the laſt Engagement of the Horſe, *Dumnorix*, who commanded the *Æduan* Cavalry, was the firſt that fled, and by that flight ſtruck a Terror into the reſt of the Troops.

XVI. THESE things appearing, and other undoubted circumſtances concurring to heighten his Suſpicions: That he had procured for the *Helvetians* a

Paſſage through the Territories of the *Sequani*: That he had effected an exchange of Hoſtages between the two Nations: That he had done all this not only without Permiſſion from him, or his own State, but even without their Knowledge and Participation: That he was accuſed by the chief Magiſtrate of the *Æduans*: They ſeemed altogether a ſufficient ground to *Cæſar*, why he ſhould either himſelf take cognizance of the Matter, or order the State to proceed againſt him. One thing, however, ſtill kept him in ſuſpence; the Conſideration of his Brother *Divitiacus*, a Man of ſingular Probity, Juſtice, and Moderation; a faithful Ally of the *Roman* People, and on the foot of Friendſhip with *Cæſar*. That he might not therefore give offence to one for whom he had ſo great a Value: before he took any farther Step in the Affair, he ſent for *Divitiacus*; and having removed the uſual Interpreters, addreſſed him by *C. Valerius Procillus*, a Prince of the Province of *Gaul*, his intimate Friend, in whom he repoſed the greateſt Confidence. He put him in mind of what had been ſaid of *Dumnorix* in his own preſence in the Council of the *Gauls*, and repeated the freſh Complaints made to himſelf againſt him in private. He urged, and even requeſted, that without Offence to him, he might either proceed againſt him himſelf, or order the State to take the Matter under Conſideration. *Divitiacus* embracing *Cæſar* with many Tears, begged him not to take any ſevere Reſolution againſt his Brother. "He was ſenſible," he told him, "of the truth of all that was alledged, and "had himſelf more reaſon to be diſſatisfied than any Man: that at a time "when his Authority was great, both at home and in the other Provinces of "*Gaul*, and his Brother but little conſidered on account of his Youth, he had "uſed all his Intereſt to bring him into Credit: That though *Dumnorix* had "made uſe of that Power acquired by his means, to diminiſh his Favour with "the People, and even to urge on his Ruin, he nevertheleſs ſtill found himſelf "ſwayed by natural Affection, and a Regard for the Eſteem of the Publick: "That ſhould his Brother meet with any rigorous Treatment from *Cæſar*, while "he himſelf poſſeſſed ſo large a ſhare of his Favour, all Men would believe it "done with his Conſent, and the Minds of the *Gauls* be for ever alienated "from him." *Cæſar* obſerving his concern, took him by the Hand, comforted him, deſired him to make an end of ſpeaking, aſſured him, that ſuch was his Regard for him, he would for his ſake overlook not only his own Injuries, but even thoſe of the Republick. He then ſent for *Dumnorix*, call'd him into his Brother's Preſence, declared the Subjects of Complaint he had againſt him, mentioned what he himſelf knew, what was laid to his Charge by the State, and admoniſhed him for the future to avoid all cauſe of Suſpicion; adding, that he would forgive what was paſt for the ſake of his Brother *Divitiacus*. He appointed, however, ſome to have an Eye over him, that he might be informed of his Behaviour, and of thoſe he converſed with.

XVII. THE ſame Day, having learnt by his Scouts, that the Enemy had poſted themſelves under a Hill about eight Miles from his Camp, he ſent out a Party to view the Ground, and examine the aſcent of the Hill. Theſe reporting it to be extremely eaſy, he detached *T. Labienus* his Lieutenant about midnight, with two Legions, and the ſame Guides who had examined the Ground the Day before; and having acquainted him with his Deſign, ordered him to get poſſeſſion of the top of the Hill. He himſelf ſet out three Hours after with the reſt of the Army, by the ſame Rout the *Helvetians* had taken, and ſent all the Cavalry before. *P. Conſidius*, an Officer of Reputation, who had ſerved in the Army of *L. Sylla*, and afterwards in that of *M. Craſſus*, advanced with a ſmall Party to get Intelligence.

XVIII.



A. *Cæsar sends away his Horse.* B. *Cæsar's Cavalry.* C. *The four veteran Legions drawn up*
F. *The Baggage.* G. *The Helvetian Phalanx.* H. *The Helvetian Cavalry.* I. *The fifteen thousand*

N°10



wn up in three Lines. D. *The two new levied Legions.* E. *The Auxiliary Troops.*
housand Boians and Tulingians. K. *The Baggage and Carriages.*

XVIII. AT day-break, when *Labienus* had got poſſeſſion of the Top of the Hill, and *Cæſar* was within a Mile and a half of the Enemies Camp; while they in the mean time, as he afterwards learnt from the Priſoners, knew nothing either of his, or *Labienus*'s Approach: *Conſidius* came galloping back, and aſſured *Cæſar*, that the Summit of the Mountain was poſſeſſed by the Enemy, and that he had ſeen the *Gallick* Arms and Enſigns there. *Cæſar* retired to a neighbouring Hill, and drew up his Men in order of Battle. *Labienus*, whoſe Inſtructions were, not to engage the Enemy till he ſaw the reſt of the Army approaching their Camp, that the Attack might be made on all ſides at the ſame time; having gained the Top of the Hill, waited the Arrival of our Men, without ſtirring from his Poſt. At length, when the Day was far ſpent, *Cæſar* underſtood by his Spies, that *Labienus* was in poſſeſſion of the Mountain, that the Enemy had decamped, and that *Conſidius*, blinded by Fear, had reported what he never ſaw. The reſt of that Day he followed the Enemy at the uſual diſtance, and encamped within three Miles of them.

XIX. THE Day after, as the time drew near for delivering out Corn to the Army, and as he was not above eighteen Miles from *Bibracte*, the Capital of the *Æduans*, where he hoped to find ſufficient Supplies for the Subſiſtence of his Troops; he quitted the Purſuit of the *Helvetians*, and directed his march thither. The Enemy being informed of this Motion by ſome Deſerters, who had belonged to the Troop of *L. Emilius*, an Officer of Horſe among the *Gauls*; and either aſcribing it to Fear in the *Romans*, the rather, becauſe they had not attacked them the Day before, though poſſeſſed of the higher Ground; or flattering themſelves with the Hopes of intercepting their Proviſions: all on a ſudden changed their Reſolution, and inſtead of continuing their former march began to purſue and harraſs our Rear. *Cæſar* obſerving this, retired to a neighbouring Hill, and ſent his Cavalry to ſuſtain the Charge of the Enemy. In the mean time he drew up his four veteran Legions in three Lines towards the middle of the Hill; in ſuch manner, that the two Legions newly raiſed in *Ciſalpine Gaul*, and all the Auxiliaries, were poſted above them; and the whole Mountain was covered with his Troops. He ordered all the Baggage to be brought into one Place, and committed it to the Charge of thoſe who ſtood on the upper Part of the Hill. The *Helvetians* following with all their Forces, drew their Carriages likewiſe into one Place; and having repulſed our Cavalry, and formed themſelves into a Phalanx, advanced in cloſe Order to attack our Van.

XX. *CÆSAR* having firſt ſent away his own Horſe, and afterwards thoſe of all his Officers, that by making the Danger equal, no Hope might remain but in Victory; encouraged his Men, and began the Charge. The *Romans*, who fought with the Advantage of the higher Ground, pouring their Darts upon the Enemy from above, eaſily broke their Phalanx; and then fell upon them Sword in Hand. What greatly incumbered the *Gauls* in this Fight, was, that their Targets being many of them pierced and pinned together by the Javelins of the *Romans*, they could neither draw out the Javelins, becauſe forked at the Extremity, nor act with Agility in the Battle, becauſe deprived in a manner of the uſe of their left Arms: ſo that many, after long toſſing their Targets to and fro to no purpoſe to diſengage them, choſe rather to throw them away, and expoſe themſelves without Defence to the Weapons of their Enemies. At length however, being overpowered with Wounds, they began to give ground; and obſerving a Mountain at about a Mile's diſtance, gradually retreated thither.

Having

Having gained the Mountain, and our Men purſuing them; the *Boians* and *Tulingians*, who to the Number of fifteen Thouſand covered their Retreat, and ſerved as a Guard to their Rear, falling upon the *Romans* in Flank as they advanced, began to ſurround them. This being perceived by the *Helvetians*, who had retired to the Mountain, they again returned upon us, and renewed the Fight. The *Romans* facing about, charged the Enemy in three Bodies; their firſt and ſecond Line making head againſt thoſe who had been forced to retreat, and their third ſuſtaining the Aſſault of the *Boians* and *Tulingians*. The Battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful; but the Enemy being at laſt obliged to give way, one Part withdrew towards the Hill whither they had before retreated, and the reſt ſheltered themſelves behind the Carriages. During this whole Action, tho' it laſted from One o'clock in the Afternoon till Evening, no Man ſaw the Back of an Enemy. The Fight was renewed with great Obſtinacy at the Carriages, and continued till the Night was far ſpent: for the *Gauls* making uſe of their Carts by way of a Rampart, darted their Javelins upon us from above; and ſome thruſting their Lances through the Wheels of the Waggons, wounded our Men. After a long Diſpute, we at laſt got poſſeſſion of their Baggage and Camp. A Son and Daughter of *Orgetorix* were found among the Priſoners. Only an hundred and twenty Thouſand of the Enemy ſurvived this Defeat; who retreating all that Night, and continuing their march without Intermiſſion, arrived on the fourth Day in the Territories of the *Lingones*. The *Romans* mean while made no Attempt to purſue them; the Care of their wounded, and of burying their Dead, obliging them to continue upon the Spot three Days. *Cæſar* ſent Letters and Meſſengers to the *Lingones*, not to furniſh them with Corn or other Neceſſaries, if they would avoid drawing upon themſelves the ſame Treatment with the Fugitives; and after a Repoſe of three Days, ſet forward to purſue them with all his Forces.

XXI. THE *Helvetians*, compelled by an extreme Want of all Things, ſent Ambaſſadors to him to treat about a Surrender. Theſe meeting him on the Way, and throwing themſelves at his Feet; in ſuppliant Terms, and with many Tears, begged for Peace. *Cæſar* gave them no expreſs Anſwer at that time; only ordered the *Helvetians* to wait for him in the Place where they then were, which they did accordingly. Upon his Arrival, he demanded Hoſtages, their Arms, and the Slaves who had deſerted to their Camp. As the Execution of all this took up ſome time; about four thouſand Men of the Canton called *Urbigenus*, either fearing Puniſhment ſhould they deliver up their Arms, or induced by the Hopes of eſcaping; becauſe in ſo great a Multitude they fancied their Flight might be concealed, nay perhaps remain altogether unknown; ſtole out of the Camp in the beginning of the Night, and took the Rout of *Germany* and the *Rhine*. *Cæſar* being informed of it, diſpatched Orders to thoſe through whoſe Territories they muſt paſs, to ſtop and ſend them back wherever they ſhould be found, if they meant to acquit themſelves of favouring their Eſcape. He was obeyed, and the fugitive *Urbigenians* were treated as Enemies. All the reſt, upon delivering the Hoſtages that were required of them, their Arms, and the Deſerters, were admitted to a Surrender. The *Helvetians*, *Tulingians*, and *Latobrigians*, had Orders to return to their own Country, and rebuild the Towns and Villages they had burnt. And becauſe having loſt all their Corn, they were utterly without the means of ſubſiſting themſelves, he gave it in charge to the *Allobrogians* to ſupply them. *Cæſar*'s Deſign in this was, that the Lands deſerted by the *Helvetians* might not be left



A. *Cæsar's Army in three Lines.* B. *The Baggage drawn together into one Place.* C. *The two new Legions lately levied in* … *form of a Phalanx march up to the first Line of the Romans.* F. *The Boians & Tulingians posted in the Rear of the Enem* … *nearest Hill.* I. *The first and second Line of the Romans pursuing them.* K. *The third Line oppos'd to the Helvetian Rear*

N°. 11



levied in heither Gaul. D. The Disposition of the Troops appointed to guard the Baggage. E. The Helvetians in
f the Enemy. G. The Helvetian Baggage & Carriages brought into one place. H. The Helvetians retreating to the
etian Rear Guard. I. The Boians and Tulingians attack the Romans in Flank. M. The Roman Auxiliaries.

G.R. III



A. *Cæsar's Baggage*. B. *The Roman Army in three Lines*. C. *The Auxiliary Troops*. D. *The Field*
Line of the Romans attack them there. G. *The Boians and Tulingians attack the Romans in*

N° 12.



he Field of Battle. E. *The Helvetians retreat to the nearest Mountain.* F. *The first and second ians in Flank.* H. *The third Line face about to receive them.*

left vacant, leſt the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*, drawn by the goodneſs of the Soil, ſhould be tempted to ſeize them, and thereby become Neighbours to the *Allobrogians* and the *Roman* Province in *Gaul*. The *Boians*, at the Requeſt of the *Æduans*, who eſteemed them highly on account of their Valour, were permitted to ſettle in their Territories; where they aſſigned them Lands, and by degrees admitted them to all the Rights and Privileges of Natives. A Roll was found in the *Helvetian* Camp, written in *Greek* Characters, and brought to *Cæſar*. It contained a Liſt of all who had ſet out upon this Expedition capable of bearing Arms; likewiſe of the Children, Women, and old Men. By this it appeared, that the Number of the *Helvetians* was two hundred and ſixty-three Thouſand, of the *Tulingians* thirty-ſix Thouſand, of the *Latobrigians* fourteen Thouſand, of the *Rauraci* twenty-three Thouſand, of the *Boians* thirty-two Thouſand; in all three hundred and ſixty-eight Thouſand, of which ninety-two Thouſand were fit to bear Arms. A Review being made, by *Cæſar*'s Command, of thoſe that returned to their own Country, the Number was found to be an hundred and ten Thouſand.

XXII. THE War with the *Helvetians* being ended, Ambaſſadors from all Parts of *Gaul*, Men of principal Conſideration in their ſeveral States, waited upon *Cæſar* to congratulate his Succeſs. They told him; "That tho' they "were ſenſible the People of *Rome*, in the War againſt the *Helvetians*, meant "chiefly to avenge the Injuries formerly received from that Nation, yet had "the Event of it been highly advantageous to all *Gaul*; becauſe in a time of "full Proſperity, the *Helvetians* had left their Territories with deſign to make "War upon the other States; that having brought them under Subjection, they "might chooſe themſelves a Habitation at pleaſure, and render all the reſt of the "Country tributary." They requeſted, "That they might have his Permiſſion "to hold by a Day prefixed, a general Aſſembly of all the Provinces of *Gaul*; "there being ſome things they wanted to diſcuſs and propoſe to him, which "concerned the whole Nation in common." Leave being granted accordingly, they fixed the Day for the Aſſembly, and bound themſelves by an Oath, not to diſcover their Deliberations to any, unleſs named for that purpoſe by general Conſent.

XXIII. UPON the riſing of the Council, the ſame Chiefs of the States as before, returned to *Cæſar*, and begged to be admitted to confer with him in private, of Matters that regarded their own and the common Safety. Their Deſire being granted, they all threw themſelves at his Feet, and with Tears repreſented; "That it was of no leſs Importance to them to have their preſent "Deliberations kept ſecret, than to ſucceed in the Requeſt they were going to "make; becauſe ſhould any Diſcovery happen, they were in danger of being "expoſed to the utmoſt Cruelties." *Divitiacus* the *Æduan* ſpoke in the name of the reſt. He told him; "That two Factions divided all *Gaul*; one headed "by the *Æduans*, the other by the *Averni*; that after a Contention of many "Years between theſe for the Superiority, the *Averni* and *Sequani* came at laſt "to a Reſolution of calling in the *Germans*: That at firſt only fifteen Thouſand "had croſſed the *Rhine*; but being a wild and ſavage People, and greatly "liking the Cuſtoms, Manners, and plenteous Country of the *Gauls*, others "ſoon followed; inſomuch that at preſent there were not leſs than an hundred "and twenty Thouſand of them in *Gaul*: That the *Æduans*, and their Allies, "had frequently tried their Strength againſt them in Battle; but by a Succeſſion of Defeats had loſt all their Nobility, Senate, and Cavalry: That

" broken by theſe Calamities and Loſſes, tho' formerly they had held the firſt " ſway in *Gaul*, both by their own Valour, and the Favour and Friendſhip of " the People of *Rome*, yet now they were reduced to the neceſſity of ſending " their principal Noblemen as Hoſtages to the *Sequani*, and of obliging them- " ſelves by an Oath, neither to demand their Hoſtages back, nor implore the " Aſſiſtance of the *Roman* People, nor refuſe a perpetual Submiſſion to the " Dominion and Authority of the *Sequani*: That he alone of all the *Æduans* " had refuſed to take the Oath, or give his Children for Hoſtages, and on that " account had fled his Country, and came to *Rome* to implore the aſſiſtance of " the Senate; as being the only Man in the State, whom neither the obligation " of an Oath, nor the reſtraint of Hoſtages, withheld from ſuch a Step: That " after all it had fared worſe with the victorious *Sequani*, than with the van- " quiſhed *Æduans*; becauſe *Arioviſtus* King of the *Germans* had ſeated him- " ſelf in their Territories, had ſeized a third of their Lands, the moſt fertile in " all *Gaul*, and now ordered them to give up another third in behalf of the " *Harudes*, who had paſſed the *Rhine* a few Months before with twenty-four " thouſand Men, and wanted a Settlement and Habitations: That in a few " Years all the native *Gauls* would be driven from their Territories, and all " the *Germans* tranſplant themſelves over the *Rhine*, the Climate being far " ſuperior to that of their own Country, and the way of living not admitting " a Compariſon: That *Arioviſtus*, ever ſince the defeat of the *Gauls* at *Ama-* " *getobria*, had behaved with unheard of Tyranny and Haughtineſs, demand- " ing the Children of the firſt Nobility as Hoſtages, and exerciſing all man- " ner of Cruelties upon them, if his Orders were not implicitly followed in " every thing: That he was a Man of a ſavage, paſſionate, and imperious " Character, whoſe Government was no longer to be born; and unleſs ſome " reſource was found in *Cæſar* and the People of *Rome*, the *Gauls* muſt all fol- " low the Example of the *Helvetians*, and like them abandon their Country, " in order to find ſome other Habitation and Settlement, remote from the " *Germans*, wherever Fortune ſhould point it out to them: That were theſe " Complaints and Repreſentations to come to the knowledge of *Arioviſtus*, he " made no doubt of his inflicting the ſevereſt Puniſhments upon all the " Hoſtages in his Hands: but that it would be eaſy for *Cæſar*, by his own " Authority, and that of the Army he commanded; by the fame of his late " Victory, and the terror of the *Roman* Name; to hinder any more *Ger-* " *mans* from paſſing the *Rhine*, and to defend *Gaul* from the Inſults of " *Arioviſtus*."

XXIV. WHEN *Divitiacus* had made an end of ſpeaking, all who were preſent, with many Tears, began to implore *Cæſar*'s Aid. He obſerved that the *Sequani* alone did nothing of all this; but penſive, and with downcaſt Looks, kept their Eyes fixed upon the Ground. Wondering what might be the Cauſe, he queſtioned them upon it. Still they made him no Anſwer, but continued ſilent, as before, with the ſame Air of Dejection. When he had interrogated them ſeveral times, without being able to obtain one Word in return, *Divitiacus* the *Æduan* again reſumed the Diſcourſe, and obſerved: " That the Condition " of the *Sequani* was by ſo much more deplorable and wretched than that of " the reſt of the *Gauls*; as they alone durſt not, even in ſecret, complain of their " Wrongs, or apply any where for Redreſs; and no leſs dreaded the Cruelty of " *Arioviſtus*, when abſent, than if actually preſent before their Eyes: That " other States had it ſtill in their Power to eſcape by flight; but the *Sequani*, " who had received him into their Territories, and put him in poſſeſſion of all

" their

" their Towns, were expoſed upon Diſcovery to every kind of Torment." *Cæſar* being made acquainted with theſe Things, encouraged the *Gauls*, and promiſed to have a regard to their Complaints. He told them: " That he was in great " Hopes *Arioviſtus*, induced by his Interceſſion, and the Authority of the People " of *Rome*, would put an end to his Oppreſſions." Having returned this Anſwer, he diſmiſſed the Aſſembly.

XXV. MANY urgent Reaſons occurred upon this Occaſion to *Cæſar*, why he ſhould conſider ſeriouſly of the Propoſals of the *Gauls*, and redreſs the Injuries of which they complained. He ſaw the *Æduans*, Friends and Allies of the People of *Rome*, held in ſubjection and ſervitude by the *Germans*, and compelled to give Hoſtages to *Arioviſtus* and the *Sequani*; which, in the preſent flouriſhing State of the *Roman* Affairs, ſeemed highly diſhonourable both to himſelf and the Commonwealth. He ſaw it likewiſe of dangerous Conſequence, to ſuffer the *Germans* by little and little to tranſport themſelves over the *Rhine*, and ſettle in great multitudes in *Gaul*. For that fierce and ſavage People, having once poſſeſſed themſelves of the whole Country of *Gaul*, were but too likely, after the Example of the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, to break into the *Roman* Province, and thence advance to *Italy* itſelf; more eſpecially as the *Rhone* was the only Boundary by which the *Sequani* were divided from the Territories of the Republick. It therefore appeared neceſſary to provide without Delay againſt theſe Evils; and the rather, becauſe *Arioviſtus* was become ſo inſolent, and took ſo much upon him, that his Conduct was no longer to be endured.

XXVI. FOR theſe Reaſons he thought proper to ſend Ambaſſadors to *Arioviſtus*, to deſire he would appoint a Place for an Interview, that they might diſcourſe together about ſome publick Affairs of the higheſt Importance to them both. *Arioviſtus* replied: " That if he had wanted any thing of *Cæſar*, he " would himſelf have waited on him for that purpoſe; and if *Cæſar* had any " thing to deſire of him, he muſt likewiſe come in Perſon to demand it: That " for his own part, he could neither venture into theſe Provinces of *Gaul* where " *Cæſar* commanded without an Army, nor bring an Army into the Field " without great Trouble and Expence: That he beſides wondered extremely, " what Buſineſs, either *Cæſar*, or the People of *Rome*, could have in his Divi- " ſion of *Gaul*, which belong'd to him by right of Conqueſt." This Anſwer being reported to *Cæſar*, he again ſent an Embaſſy to him to this effect: " That ſince, notwithſtanding the great Obligations he lay under both to him- " ſelf and the People of *Rome*, in having, during his Conſulſhip, been declared " King and Ally by the Senate; he yet manifeſted ſo little Acknowledgment to " either, as even to refuſe an Interview, and decline treating of Affairs that re- " garded the common Intereſt; theſe were the Particulars he required of him: " Firſt, not to bring any more *Germans* over the *Rhine* into *Gaul*. Secondly, " to reſtore the Hoſtages he had taken from the *Æduans*, and permit the *Se- " quani* likewiſe to do the ſame. Laſtly, to forbear all Injuries towards the " *Æduans*, and neither make war upon them nor their Allies. That his com- " pliance with theſe Conditions would eſtabliſh a perpetual Friendſhip and " Amity between him and the People of *Rome*. But if he refuſed Conditions " ſo juſt; as the Senate had decreed in the Conſulſhip of *M. Meſſala* and " *M. Piſo*, that whoever had the charge of the Province of *Gaul*, ſhould, as " far as was conſiſtent with the Intereſt of the Commonwealth, defend the " *Æduans*, and the other Allies of the People of *Rome*; he thought himſelf " bound not to overlook their juſt Complaints."

XXVII.

XXVII. TO this *Arioviſtus* replied: "That by the Laws of War, the Conqueror had a right to impoſe what Terms he pleaſed upon the Conquered: That in conſequence of this, the People of *Rome* did not govern the vanquiſhed by the Preſcriptions of another, but according to their own Pleaſure: That if he did not intermeddle with the *Roman* Conqueſts, but left them to the free enjoyment of their Rights, no more ought they to concern themſelves in what regarded him: That the *Æduans* having tried the fortune of War, had been overcome and rendered tributary; and it would be the higheſt Injuſtice in *Cæſar* to offer at diminiſhing his juſt Revenues: That he was reſolved not to part with the Hoſtages the *Æduans* had put into his hands; but would nevertheleſs engage, neither to make War upon them nor their Allies, provided they obſerved the Treaty he had made with them, and regularly paid the Tribute agreed upon; if otherwiſe, the title of Friends and Allies of the People of *Rome* would be found to ſtand them but in little ſtead: That as to *Cæſar*'s menace of not overlooking the Complaints of the *Æduans*, he would have him know, no one had ever entered into a War with *Arioviſtus*, but to his own Deſtruction: That he might when he pleaſed bring it to a trial, and would, he doubted not, ſoon be made ſenſible what the invincible *Germans*, trained up from their Infancy in the exerciſe of Arms, and who for fourteen Years together had never ſlept under a Roof, were capable of atchieving."

XXVIII. AT the ſame time that *Cæſar* received this Anſwer, Ambaſſadors alſo arrived from the *Æduans* and *Treviri*. From the *Æduans*, to complain: "That the *Harudes*, who had lately come over into *Gaul*, were plundering their Territories; inſomuch, that even by their Submiſſions and Hoſtages they were not able to obtain Peace of *Arioviſtus*." From the *Treviri*, to inform him: "That an hundred Cantons of the *Suevians*, headed by two Brothers, *Naſua* and *Cimberius*, were arrived upon the Banks of the *Rhine*, with deſign to croſs that River." *Cæſar* deeply affected with this Intelligence, determined to undertake the War without delay, leſt this new Band of *Suevians*, joining the old Forces of *Arioviſtus*, ſhould enable him to make a greater reſiſtance. Having therefore with all diligence provided for the ſubſiſtence of his Army, he advanced towards him by great marches.

XXIX. THE third Day he was informed that *Arioviſtus* approached with all his Forces to take poſſeſſion of *Veſontio*, the Capital of the *Sequani*; and that he had already got three days march beyond his own Territories. *Cæſar* judged it by all means neceſſary to prevent him in this Deſign, as the Town itſelf was not only full of all ſorts of warlike Ammunition, but likewiſe ſtrongly fortified by Nature, and commodiouſly ſituated for carrying on the War. For the River *Doux* forming a Circle round it, as if deſcribed with a pair of Compaſſes, leaves only an Interval of ſix hundred Feet, which is alſo inacceſſible by reaſon of a very high and ſteep Mountain, whoſe Roots are waſhed on each Side by the River. This Mountain is ſhut in with a Wall, which forming a Citadel, joins it to the Town. Hither *Cæſar* marched Day and Night without intermiſſion; and having poſſeſſed himſelf of the Place, put a Garriſon into it.

XXX. WHILST he tarried here a few Days, to ſettle the Order of his Convoys and Supplies, the Curioſity of our Men, and the Talk of the *Gauls*, (who proclaimed on all Occaſions the prodigious Stature of the *Germans*, their invincible Courage, and great Skill in Arms; inſomuch that in their frequent Encounters

Encounters with them, they had found it impoſſible to withſtand their very Looks) ſpread ſuch a ſudden terror thro' the whole Army, that they were not a little diſturbed by the Apprehenſions it occaſioned. This Fear firſt began amongſt the military Tribunes, the Officers of the Allies, and others that had voluntarily followed *Cæſar* from *Rome*; who being but little acquainted with military Affairs, lamented the great Danger to which they fancied themſelves expoſed. Some of theſe, upon various Pretences, deſired leave to return. Others, out of ſhame, and unwilling to incur the ſuſpicion of Cowardiſe, continued in the Camp. But theſe laſt, incapable of putting on a chearful Countenance, and at times even unable to ſuppreſs their Tears, ſculked in their Tents, either bemoaning their Fate, or diſcourſing with their Companions upon the common Danger. Wills were made all over the Camp, and the Conſternation began to ſeize even thoſe of more experience, the veteran Soldiers, the Centurions, and the Officers of the Cavalry. Such among them as affected a greater ſhew of Reſolution, ſaid it was not the Enemy they feared, but the narrow Paſſes and vaſt Foreſts that lay between them and *Arioviſtus*, and the Difficulty there would be in furniſhing the Army with Proviſions. Some even told *Cæſar*, that when he gave Orders for marching, the Army, attentive to nothing but their Fears, would refuſe to obey.

XXXI. *CÆSAR* obſerving the general Conſternation, called a Council of War; and having ſummoned all the Centurions of the Army to be preſent, inveighed againſt them with great ſeverity; for preſuming to enquire, or at all concern themſelves, which way, or on what deſign they were to march. "*Arioviſtus*," he told them, "during his Conſulſhip, had earneſtly ſought the "Alliance of the *Roman* People. Why therefore ſhould any one imagine, he "would ſo raſhly and haſtily depart from his Engagements? That on the con-"trary, he was himſelf firmly perſuaded, that as ſoon as he came to know "his Demands, and the equal Conditions he was about to propoſe to him, he "would be very far from rejecting either his Friendſhip, or that of the People "of *Rome*. But if urged on by Madneſs and Rage, he was reſolved upon "War, what, after all, had they to be afraid of? Or why ſhould they diſtruſt "either their own Bravery, or his Care and Conduct? That they were to deal "with Enemies of whom trial had been already made in the memory of their "Fathers, when by the Victory of *C. Marius* over the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, the "Army itſelf acquired no leſs Glory than the General who commanded it: "That trial had likewiſe been lately made of them in *Italy*, in the ſervile "War, when they had alſo the Advantage of being exerciſed in the *Roman* "Diſcipline; on which Occaſion it appeared, how much Reſolution and Con-"ſtancy were able to effect; ſince they had vanquiſhed in the End thoſe very "Enemies armed and fluſhed with Victory, whom at firſt they had without "Cauſe dreaded even unarmed. In fine, that they were the very ſame *Ger-*"*mans*, with whom the *Helvetians* had ſo often fought, not only in their own "Country, but in *Germany* itſelf, and for the moſt part come off victorious, "tho' they had by no means been a match for our Army: That if the defeat "and flight of the *Gauls* gave uneaſineſs to any, theſe would readily find upon "enquiry, that *Arioviſtus* confining himſelf many Months to his Camp and "Faſtneſſes, and declining a general Action, had thereby tired out the *Gauls* "with the length of the War; who deſpairing at laſt of a Battle, and begin-"ning to diſperſe, were thereupon attacked and routed, rather by Conduct and "Craft, than the ſuperior Valour of the *Germans*. But tho' a Stratagem of "this kind might take with a rude and uncultivated People, yet could not

" even the *German* himſelf hope that it would avail againſt a *Roman* Army:
" That as to thoſe who ſheltered their Cowardiſe under the Pretence of nar-
" row Paſſes, and the Difficulty of procuring Proviſions, he thought it ar-
" gued no ſmall Preſumption in them, either to betray ſuch a diſtruſt of their
" General's Conduct, or offer to preſcribe to him what he ought to do: That
" theſe things fell properly under his Care: That the *Sequani*, *Leuci*, and
" *Lingones* were to furniſh him with Proviſions: That the Corn was now ripe
" in the Fields; and that themſelves would ſoon be Judges as to what regarded
" the Ways: That the Report of the Army's refuſing to obey him gave him
" not the leaſt Diſturbance; becauſe he very well knew, that no General had
" ever been ſo far ſlighted by his Soldiers, whoſe ill Succeſs, Avarice, or other
" Crimes, had not juſtly drawn that Misfortune upon him: That in all theſe
" reſpects he fancied himſelf ſecure, as the whole courſe of his Life would
" witneſs for his Integrity, and his good Fortune had ſhewn itſelf in the War
" againſt the *Helvetians:* That he was therefore reſolved to execute without
" delay, what he otherwiſe intended to have put off a little longer; and would
" give Orders for decamping the very next Night, three Hours before Day, that
" he might as ſoon as poſſible know, whether Honour and a ſenſe of Duty,
" or an ignominious Cowardiſe had the aſcendant in his Army: Nay, that
" ſhould all the reſt of the Troops abandon him, he would nevertheleſs march
" with the tenth Legion alone, of whoſe Fidelity and Courage he had no
" manner of doubt, and which ſhould ſerve him for his *Pretorian* Guard."
Cæſar had always principally favoured this Legion, and placed his chief Confi-
dence in it, on account of its Valour.

XXXII. THIS Speech made a wonderful Change upon the Minds of all, and begot an uncommon Alacrity and Eagerneſs for the War. The tenth Legion in particular, returned him thanks by their Tribunes, for the favourable Opinion he had expreſs'd of them, and aſſured him of their readineſs to follow him. Nor were the other Legions leſs induſtrious, by their Tribunes and principal Centurions, to reconcile themſelves to *Cæſar*; proteſting they had never either doubted or feared, nor ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to the General, to direct in matters of War. Having accepted of their Submiſſion, and informed himſelf by means of *Divitiacus*, in whom of all the *Gauls* he moſt confided, that by taking a Circuit of above forty Miles, he might avoid the narrow Paſſes, and lead his Army thro' an open Country; he ſet forward three Hours after midnight, as he had ſaid; and after a march of ſeven Days ſucceſſively, underſtood by his Scouts, that he was within four and twenty Miles of *Arioviſtus*'s Camp.

XXXIII. *ARIOVISTUS* being informed of his Arrival, ſent Ambaſſadors to acquaint him: " That he was now willing to accept of an Interview,
" as they were come nearer one another, and he believed it might be done
" without Danger." *Cæſar* did not decline the Propoſal, imagining he was now diſpoſed to liſten to Reaſon, ſince he offered that of his own accord, which he had before refuſed at his requeſt: Neither was he without hope, that in regard of the Benefits he had received, both from himſelf and the People of *Rome*, he would, upon knowing his Demands, deſiſt from his Obſtinacy. The fifth Day after was appointed for the Interview. Mean-time, as Ambaſſadors were continually paſſing and repaſſing, *Arioviſtus*, under pretence that he was afraid of an Ambuſcade, demanded: " That *Cæſar* ſhould bring no Infantry with
" him to the Conference: That they ſhould both come attended by their Ca-

" valry

" valry only: That otherwiſe he could not reſolve to give him a meeting." *Cæſar* unwilling to drop the Deſign of the Interview; but neither caring to truſt his Safety to the *Gauls*; thought the beſt way was, to diſmount all the *Gallick* Cavalry, and give their Horſes to the Soldiers of the tenth Legion, who had the greateſt ſhare of his Confidence; that in caſe of Danger, he might have a Guard on which he could rely. This being done accordingly, one of the Soldiers of that Legion ſaid pleaſantly enough; " That *Cæſar* had done " even more for them than he had promiſed; that he had only given them " hopes of becoming his *Pretorian* Guard; and that now he had raiſed them " to the Rank of Horſe."

XXXIV. THERE was a large Plain, and in the midſt of it a riſing Ground of conſiderable height, equally diſtant from both Camps. At this Place, by Appointment, the Conference was held. *Cæſar* ſtationed the Legionary Soldiers, whom he had brought with him on the Horſes of the *Gauls*, two hundred Paces from the Mount. *Arioviſtus* did the ſame with the *German* Cavalry. The Converſation was on horſeback, each being accompanied by ten Friends or principal Officers, for ſo *Arioviſtus* had deſired. When they were come to the Place; *Cæſar* began by putting him in mind of the Favours he had received both from himſelf and the People of *Rome*; " That he had been ſtiled Friend " and Ally by the Senate; that very conſiderable Preſents had been ſent him; " that theſe Honours, conferred by the *Romans* on very few, and only for ſignal " Services to the State, had yet been beſtowed on him, not on account of any " juſt Claim on his Side, but merely by the Favour of *Cæſar*, and the Bounty " of the Senate." He told him likewiſe, " of the juſt and ancient Alliance " between the *Romans* and the *Æduans*; of the many and honourable Decrees " of the Senate in their Favour: That they had always held the firſt Rank and " Authority in *Gaul*, even before their Alliance with *Rome*: That it was the " conſtant Maxim of the *Roman* People, not only to defend their Friends and " Allies in the poſſeſſion of their juſt Rights, but likewiſe to ſtudy the Enlarge- " ment of their Honour, Intereſt, and Dignity: That it could never therefore " be ſuppoſed, they would ſubmit to ſee them ſtript of thoſe Privileges which " had belonged to them, before they were received into their Friendſhip." In fine, he concluded with repeating the ſame Demands which he had before made by his Ambaſſadors; " That he would not make War upon the *Æduans* " or their Allies; that he would reſtore their Hoſtages; that if he could not " oblige any of the *Germans* to repaſs the *Rhine*, at leaſt he would ſuffer no " more of them to come into *Gaul*."

XXXV. *ARIOVISTUS* ſpoke little to *Cæſar*'s Demands, but enlarged greatly on his own Virtues: " That he had croſſed the *Rhine*, not of his own " motion, but invited and intreated by the *Gauls* themſelves: That the great " Hopes and Expectations they had given him, had been his only Inducement " to quit his Country and Relations: That he had Settlements in *Gaul* aſſigned " by the *Gauls* themſelves; Hoſtages voluntarily ſent; and a Tribute in Con- " ſequence of the Rights of War; it being the conſtant Practice of Conquerors, " to impoſe that Mark of Subjection on thoſe they had ſubdued: That he had " not made War upon the *Gauls*, but the *Gauls* upon him: That though all " their ſeveral States had united againſt him, and brought up their Forces with " deſign to cruſh him, he had yet found means to vanquiſh and diſperſe them " in one Battle: That if they were again reſolved to try the Fortune of War, " he was ready and prepared to receive them; but if they rather choſe Peace,

" it

" it was unjuſt in them to refuſe a Tribute, which they had hitherto voluntarily " paid: That the Friendſhip of the People of *Rome* ought to be an Honour and " Security to him, not a Detriment; nor had he courted it in any other view: " but if by their Alliance he muſt ſubmit to loſe his Tributes, and his Right " over the People he had ſubdued, he was no leſs willing to give it up, than " he had been ambitious to obtain it: That he had indeed brought over a " Multitude of *Germans* into *Gaul*, yet not with any Deſign of diſturbing the " Country, but merely for his own Security; as appeared by his not coming " but at the Requeſt of the Natives; and his not attacking them, but defending " himſelf: That his Arrival in *Gaul* was prior to that of the *Romans*, whoſe " Army had never till that time paſſed the Boundaries of their own Province. " What could they mean by coming into a Country that belonged to him? " Or why ſhould they concern themſelves with a part of *Gaul* that was no leſs " his Property, than the Province itſelf was that of the People of *Rome*? If " it would not be allowable in him to make any Attempt upon their Poſſeſſions, " neither could they without Injuſtice diſturb him in the Enjoyment of his " Rights. That as to the pretence of Alliance between the *Romans* and *Æduans*, " he was not ſo much a *Barbarian*, nor ſo wholly a Stranger to the Affairs of " the World, as not to know; that neither had the *Æduans* aſſiſted the *Romans*, " in the late War againſt the *Allobrogians*; nor received any Aſſiſtance from " them, in their many Conflicts with himſelf and the *Sequani*. That he ought " to be jealous of *Cæſar*'s pretended Regard to the *Æduans*; and had but too " much reaſon to ſuſpect, that the Continuance of the *Roman* Army in *Gaul* " could be with no other Deſign than that of oppreſſing him. That if he did " not therefore depart, and withdraw his Troops out of thoſe Parts, he would " no longer look upon him as a Friend, but an Enemy. That he was well " aſſured, ſhould he even ſlay him in Battle, he ſhould do a Pleaſure to many " of the Nobles and great Men at *Rome*, who had explained themſelves to him " by Couriers, and whoſe Favour and Friendſhip he might procure by his " Death: but that if he would retire, and leave him in the undiſturbed Poſ- " ſeſſion of *Gaul*, he would not only amply reward him, but engage, at his " own Coſt and Hazard, to put an end to any War *Cæſar* ſhould think fit " to undertake."

XXXVI. MANY Reaſons were offered by *Cæſar*, in return to this Speech, why he could not depart from his firſt Demands: " That neither his own " Honour, nor that of the People of *Rome*, would ſuffer him to abandon " Allies, who had deſerved ſo well of the Commonwealth: That it no way " appeared to him, wherein *Arioviſtus* had a juſter Claim to the poſſeſſion of " *Gaul* than the *Romans*: That the *Averni* and *Ruteni* had been ſubdued by " *Q. Fabius Maximus*; who yet contented with their Submiſſion, had neither " reduced their Country into a Province, nor ſubjected it to a Tribute: That " if Antiquity of Title was to decide, the *Romans* had an undoubted Right " to the Sovereignty of *Gaul*: If, on the contrary, the Decree of the Senate was " to take place, *Gaul* muſt remain free, and ſubject only to its own Laws."

XXXVII. WHILST theſe things paſſed at the Interview, *Cæſar* was informed, that *Arioviſtus*'s Cavalry were drawing nearer the Mount, and had even aſſaulted the *Romans* with Stones and Darts. *Cæſar* immediately broke off the Conference, retreated to his own Men, and ſtrictly charged them to forbear all Acts of Hoſtility towards the Enemy. He did not fear the Succeſs of an Action, with that choſen Legion, againſt the *German* Cavalry; but he was willing to maintain



A. Cæsar's Camp. B. Ariovistus's Camp. C. Cæsar's first and second Line in Arms. D. His third Thousand light armed Foot to retard the Works.



his third Line employed in fortifying the Camp. E. Ariovistus detaches his Cavalry and sixteen

maintain a Conduct perfectly clear, and not give the Enemy the leaſt handle to aſſert, that they had been treacherouſly drawn into an Ambuſcade by a pretended Conference. When it was known in the Camp, with what haughtineſs *Arioviſtus* had behaved at the Interview; that he had ordered the *Romans* to depart out of *Gaul*; that his Cavalry had fallen upon *Cæſar*'s Guard; and that an end had thereby been put to the Conference; a much greater Alacrity and Deſire of fighting ſpread themſelves thro' the whole Army.

XXXVIII. TWO Days after, *Arioviſtus* ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, to propoſe a renewal of the negotiation begun; and that he would either again appoint a Day for a Conference, or depute ſome one to bring the Treaty to a Concluſion. *Cæſar* ſaw no reaſon for granting a ſecond Interview, more eſpecially when he conſidered, that the time before, the *Germans* could not be reſtrained from falling upon our Men. Neither was he inclined to ſend any of his principal Officers; it ſeeming too great a venture, to expoſe them to the perfidy of theſe Barbarians. He therefore caſt his Eyes upon *C. Valerius Procillus*, the Son of *C. Valerius Caburus*, a young Man of great Merit and Politeneſs, whoſe Father had been made free of the City by *C. Valerius Flaccus*. His ſingular Integrity, and knowledge of the Language of the *Gauls*, which *Arioviſtus*, by reaſon of long ſtay in thoſe Parts, ſpoke readily; fitted him in a particular manner for this Embaſſy: and as he was likewiſe one, towards whom it would no way avail the *Germans* to uſe any treachery, he thought him leſs liable to an Inſult of that kind. *M. Mettius* was joined in Commiſſion with him, who was allied to *Arioviſtus* by the rights of Hoſpitality. Their Inſtructions were, to hear the *German*'s Propoſals, and carry back a report of them to *Cæſar*. But no ſooner were they arrived in *Arioviſtus*'s Camp, than in preſence of the whole Army, calling out to know their Buſineſs, and whether they were come as Spies, he commanded them to be put in Irons, without ſuffering them to make any reply.

XXXIX. THE ſame Day he came forward with all his Forces, and lodged himſelf under a Hill, about ſix Miles from our Camp. The Day after he went two Miles beyond it, to cut off *Cæſar*'s Communication with the *Æduans* and *Sequani*, from whom he received all his Proviſions. *Cæſar*, for five Days continually, drew up his Men in order of Battle before the Camp, that if *Arioviſtus* had a mind, he might not be without an Opportunity of coming to an Engagement. The *Germans* kept all that time within their Lines; only we had daily Skirmiſhes with their Cavalry, whoſe manner of fighting was this. They had about ſix thouſand Horſe, who choſe a like number out of the Foot, each his Man, and all remarkable for ſtrength and agility. Theſe continually accompanied them in Battle, and ſerved as a Rear-Guard, to which, when hard preſſed, they might retire: If the Action became dangerous, they advanced to their relief: If any Horſeman was conſiderably wounded, and fell from his Horſe, they gathered round to defend him: If ſpeed was required, either for a haſty Purſuit, or ſudden Retreat, they were become ſo nimble and alert by continual Exerciſe, that laying hold of the mains of the Horſes, they could run as faſt as they.

XL. *CÆSAR* finding that *Arioviſtus* declined a Battle, thought it neceſſary to provide for the freedom of his Convoys. With this view he marked out a Place for a Camp, ſix hundred Paces beyond that of the Enemy, whither he marched with his whole Army drawn up in three Lines. The firſt and

ſecond Line had Orders to continue under Arms, and the third to employ themſelves in fortifying the Camp. *Arioviſtus* ſent ſixteen thouſand light-armed Foot, and all his Horſe, to alarm our Men, and hinder the Work. But *Cæſar* remained firm to his firſt Deſign, ordering the two Lines that continued under Arms to keep off the Enemy, and the third to go on with the Intrenchments. The Work being finiſhed, he left two Legions there, with part of the Auxiliaries, and carried back the other four to his former Camp. The next Day he aſſembled all his Troops from both Camps, drew them up according to Cuſtom, and offered the Enemy battle: But they ſtill refuſing to come to an Engagement, he retired again about Noon. *Arioviſtus* then detached part of his Forces to attack the leſſer Camp. A ſharp Conflict enſued, that laſted 'till Night. At Sun-ſet *Arioviſtus* thought proper to ſound a Retreat, after many Wounds given and received. *Cæſar* inquiring of the Priſoners, why *Arioviſtus* ſo obſtinately refuſed an Engagement, found: that it was the Cuſtom among the *Germans*, for the Women to decide by Lots and Divination, when it was proper to hazard a Battle; and that theſe had declared, the Army could not be victorious, if they fought before the new Moon.

XLI. THE Day after, *Cæſar* having left a ſufficient Guard in his two Camps, ranged all the auxiliary Troops before the leſſer Camp, placing them directly in view of the Enemy for the greater ſhew, becauſe the number of legionary Soldiers was but inconſiderable, compared with that of the *Germans*. Then advancing at the head of all his Forces in three Lines, he marched quite up to the Enemy's Camp. Upon this the *Germans*, compelled by Neceſſity, appeared before their Intrenchments; and having diſtributed their Troops by Nations, and diſpoſed them at equal diſtances one from another, the *Harudes*, *Marcomani*, *Tribocci*, *Vangiones*, *Nemetes*, *Seduſians*, and *Suevians*; encompaſſed the whole Army with a line of Carriages, to take away all hopes of Safety by flight. The Women mounted upon theſe Carriages, weeping and tearing their Hair, conjured the Soldiers as they advanced to Battle, not to ſuffer them to become Slaves to the *Romans*. *Cæſar* having appointed a Lieutenant and Queſtor to each Legion, to ſerve as Witneſſes of every Man's Courage and Behaviour, began the Battle in perſon at the head of the right Wing, obſerving the Enemy to be weakeſt on that ſide. The Signal being given, our Men charged ſo briskly, and the Enemy advanced ſo ſwiftly and ſuddenly to meet them, that the *Romans* not having time to throw their Darts, betook themſelves immediately to their Swords. But the *Germans* quickly caſting themſelves into a Phalanx, according to the Cuſtom of their Country, ſuſtained the ſhock with great firmneſs. Many of our Soldiers leaped upon the Phalanx, tore up the Bucklers of the Enemy with their Hands, and wounded thoſe that lay under them. Their left Wing was ſoon routed and put to flight; but on the right they had the Advantage, and were like to overpower the *Romans* by their numbers. Young *Craſſus*, who commanded the Cavalry, and was more at liberty than thoſe immediately engaged in the fight, obſerving this, made the third Line advance to ſupport them. Upon this the Battle was renewed, and the Enemy every where put to the rout: Nor did they ceaſe their flight 'till they had reached the Banks of the *Rhine*, about fifty Miles diſtant from the place of Combat. There only a few eſcaped; ſome by ſwimming, others by Boats. Of this laſt number was *Arioviſtus*, who imbarking in a ſmall Veſſel he found by the edge of the River, got ſafe to the other ſide. All the reſt were cut to pieces in the Purſuit by our Cavalry.

Arioviſtus

A MARCOMAN.

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

A. *Craſsus detaches the third Line to sustain the right Wing of the Romans.* B. *Cæsar's Right Wing* ... *Foot.* G. *The German Horse.* H. *The German Army encompaſsed with their Carriages to prevent all H*...



Right Wing. C. *His Left*. D. *His Cavalry on both Wings*. E. *His Body of Reserve*. F. *The German*
ent all Hopes of escaping by Flight. I. *Cæsar's lesser Camp*. K. *His greater Camp*. L. *His reserve Squa-*
drons

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G.R. III.
BRITISH MUSEUM

Arioviſtus had two Wives; one a *Suevian*, whom he had brought with him from *Germany*; the other a *Norican*, Siſter to King *Vocion*, whom he had married in *Gaul*. Both periſhed in this flight. Of his two Daughters, one was killed, the other taken Priſoner. *C. Valerius Procillus*, whom his Keepers dragged after them in their flight, bound with a triple Chain, fell in with *Cæſar* in perſon, as he was purſuing the *German* Cavalry. Nor was the Victory itſelf more grateful to that General, than his good Fortune in recovering out of the hands of the Enemy a Man, the moſt diſtinguiſhed for his Probity of the whole Province of *Gaul*, his intimate and familiar Friend; and to find the Joy and Succeſs of that Day no way diminiſhed or clouded, by the loſs of a Perſon he ſo highly eſteemed. *Procillus* told him, that Lots had been thrice drawn in his own preſence, to decide whether he ſhould be burnt alive upon the Spot, or reſerved for another time; and that the Lot three times favourable, had preſerved his life. *Mettius* was likewiſe recovered and brought.

LXII. THIS Battle being reported beyond the *Rhine*, the *Suevians*, who were advanced as far as the Banks of that River, thought proper to return to their own Country. But retreating in diſorder and confuſion, they were attacked by the *Ubians*, a People bordering upon the *Rhine*, and many of them cut to pieces. *Cæſar* having in one Campaign put an end to two very conſiderable Wars, went into Winter-Quarters ſomewhat ſooner than the Seaſon of the Year required. He diſtributed his Army among the *Sequani*, left *Labienus* to command in his abſence, and ſet out himſelf for *Ciſalpine Gaul*, to preſide in the Aſſembly of the States.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK II.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. *The Confederacy of the* Belgians *againſt the People of* Rome. III. *The* Rhemi *ſubmit upon the Approach of* Cæſar. IV. *And inform him of the Strength and Deſigns of the Confederates.* VI. Cæſar *paſſes the* Axona *with his Army.* VII. Bibrax, *a Town belonging to the* Rhemi, *aſſaulted by the* Belgians. VIII. Cæſar *relieves it, and obliges the* Belgians *to retire.* IX. *The Armies drawn up on both ſides, but without coming to an Engagement.* XI. *The* Belgians *deſpairing of Succeſs, decamp and return home.* XII. Cæſar *attacks their Rear, and makes great Slaughter.* XIII. *He then marches againſt the* Sueſſiones, *and obliges them to ſubmit.* XIV. *Advancing next into the Country of the* Bellovaci, *he pardons them at the Interceſſion of* Divitiacus. XVI. *The* Ambiani *ſurrender, but the* Nervians *ſtand on their Defence.* XXIII. *They are defeated however in a long and bloody Engagement, and almoſt all cut off.* XXIX. Cæſar *prepares to attack the* Attuatici. XXXI. *They ſubmit.* XXXIII. *But falling treacherouſly upon the* Romans *during the Night.* XXXIV. *Are many of them cut to pieces, and the reſt ſold for Slaves.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK II.

I. IN the Winter, whilſt *Cæſar* was in hither *Gaul*, as we have intimated above; he was alarmed by frequent Reports, which were alſo confirmed by Letters from *Labienus*, that all the *Belgians*, who, as has been ſaid, poſſeſſed one of the three Diviſions of *Gaul*, had joined in a League againſt the People of *Rome*, and ratified it by an Exchange of Hoſtages. The Cauſes of this Confederacy were: Firſt, their Fear leſt the *Romans*, having ſubdued all the reſt of *Gaul*, ſhould next turn their Arms againſt them: And then the Perſuaſions and Importunity of ſome among the *Celtæ*; many of whom, as they had greatly diſliked the Neighbourhood of the *Germans* in *Gaul*, ſo were they no leſs diſpleaſed to ſee a *Roman* Army take up Winter-quarters and grow habitual in the Country: Others, from a Levity and Inconſtancy of Temper, were fond of every Project that tended to a Revolution. In fine, ſome were influenced by ambitious Views, it being uſual in *Gaul*, for ſuch as were moſt powerful in their ſeveral States, and had Men and Money at command, to exerciſe a kind of Sovereignty over their Fellow-ſubjects, which they foreſaw would be greatly checked by the Authority and Credit of the *Romans* in *Gaul*.

II. *CÆSAR*, rouſed by theſe Meſſages and Reports, levied two new Legions in hither *Gaul*; and early in the Spring, ſent *Q. Pedius* his Lieutenant to conduct them over the *Alps*. Himſelf, as ſoon as there began to be Forage in the Fields, came to the Army. He commiſſioned the *Senones*, and other *Gauls* who bordered on the *Belgians*, to inform themſelves of the Motions and Deſigns of the Confederates, and ſend him from time to time an exact Account. They all agree in their Reports; that they were levying Troops, and drawing their Forces to a general Rendezvous. Whereupon thinking he ought no longer to delay marching againſt them, and having ſettled the neceſſary Supplies for his Army he decamped, and in fifteen Days arrived on the Confines of the *Belgians*.

III. AS his Approach was ſudden, and much earlier than had been expected; the *Rhemi*, who of all the *Belgians* lay the neareſt to *Celtic Gaul*, diſpatched *Iccius* and *Autobrogius*, the two principal Men of their State, to repreſent to *Cæſar:*

Cæſar: "That they put themſelves and Fortunes under the Power and Protection "of the *Romans*, as having neither approved of the Deſigns of the reſt of the "*Belgians*, nor had any ſhare in their Confederacy againſt the People of *Rome:* "That on the contrary, they were ready to give Hoſtages, to execute his Com- "mands, to receive him into their Towns, and to furniſh him with Corn and "other Supplies for his Army: That indeed the reſt of the *Belgians* were all "in Arms, and that the *Germans* on this ſide the *Rhine* had aſſociated with "them: Nay, that ſo univerſal and prevalent was the Infatuation, they had "not even been able to draw off the *Sueſſiones*, a People united to them by the "neareſt Ties of Blood and Friendſhip, who were ſubject to the ſame Laws, "lived under the ſame Form of Government, and acknowledged but one "common Magiſtrate."

IV. *CÆSAR* inquiring of the Ambaſſadors, what States had taken up Arms, of what Name and Conſideration, and what Forces they could bring into the Field; found: That the *Belgians* were for the moſt part *Germans* originally, who having formerly croſſed the *Rhine*, had been drawn by the Fertility of the Country to ſettle in thoſe Parts, after driving out the ancient Inhabitants: That in the late Irruption of the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, when all the other Provinces of *Gaul* were over-run, they alone had ventured to ſtand upon their Defence, nor ſuffered the *Barbarians* to ſet foot in their Territories; whence it happened, that preſuming on ſo well known an Inſtance of their Bravery, they laid claim to great Authority, and challenged high military Renown. As to their Numbers, the *Rhemi* told him they could give him the moſt exact Information; becauſe in conſequence of their Affinity and Neighbourhood, they had Opportunities of knowing what Quota of Men each particular State had promiſed to furniſh in the common Council of *Belgium*. "That the *Bellovaci* "held the moſt diſtinguiſhed Rank, as ſurpaſſing all the other States in Proweſs, "Authority, and Number of Forces: That they were able to muſter an hun- "dred Thouſand fighting Men, and had promiſed out of that Number ſixty "Thouſand choſen Troops, in conſideration of which they demanded the "whole Adminiſtration of the War. That next to them in Dignity were the "*Sueſſiones*, a People bordering upon their own Territories, and poſſeſſed of a "very large and fruitful Country, over which even of late Years *Divitiacus* had "been King, one of the moſt powerful Princes of all *Gaul*, and who beſides "his Dominions in thoſe Parts, reigned alſo over *Britain:* That their preſent "Sovereign was *Galba*, whoſe ſingular Prudence and Juſtice had procured him, "by the Conſent of all the Confederates, the ſupreme Command in the War: "That theſe had within their Territories twelve fortified Towns, and promiſed "to bring into the Field fifty Thouſand Men. That the like Number had "been ſtipulated by the *Nervians*, who inhabiting the remoteſt Provinces of "*Gaul*, were eſteemed the moſt fierce and warlike of all the *Belgian* Nations. "That the *Atrebatians* were to furniſh fifteen Thouſand: The *Ambiani* ten "Thouſand: The *Morini* twenty-five Thouſand: The *Menapians* nine Thou- "ſand: The *Caletes* ten Thouſand: The *Velocaſſians* and *Veromanduans* the "like Number: The *Atuatici* twenty-nine Thouſand: And the *Condruſians*, "*Eburones*, *Ceresians*, and *Pæmani*, all comprehended under the common Name "of *Germans*, forty Thouſand.

V. *CÆSAR* exhorting the Men of *Rheims* to continue firm in their Alliance, and promiſing amply to reward their Fidelity, ordered the whole Body of their Senate to repair to his Camp, and the Sons of their principal Nobility to be



A. *The River Axona.* B. *Cæsar's Camp.* C. *The Bridge over the Axona, where Cæsar places a Guard.*
an Troops. G. *Cæsar's Redoubts at the Extremities of the two Ditches.* H. *The Moraſs between the*

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

Guard. D. *Cæsar's Ditch of four hundred Paces*. E. *The Plain before the Camp*. F. *The Belgi-*
een the two Armies. I. *The Hill where Cæsar was encamped*. K. *The Battle between ỹ Horse*.

be brought him as Hoſtages; all which was accordingly performed by the Day appointed. He then addreſſed himſelf to *Divitiacus* the *Æduan*, repreſenting in the warmeſt manner, of what Conſequence it was to the common Cauſe, to divide the Forces of the Enemy, that he might not be reduced to the Neceſſity of encountering ſo great a multitude at once. This he told him, might eaſily be effected, if the *Æduans* would march their Forces into the Territories of the *Bellovaci*, to plunder and lay waſte the Country. With theſe Inſtructions he diſmiſſed him.

VI. MEAN-TIME, being informed by his Scouts, and the People of *Rheims*, that all the Forces of the *Belgians* were marching towards him in a Body, and that they were even advanced within a few Miles, he made all the haſte he could to paſs his Army over the *Axona*, which divides the *Rhemi* from the reſt of the *Belgians*, and encamped on the farther ſide of that River. By this Situation he ſecured all behind him, covered one Side of his Camp with the River, and rendered the Communication with the *Rhemi*, and thoſe other States, whence he expected to be ſupplied with Proviſions, ſafe and eaſy. Adjoining to his Camp was a Bridge over the River; there he placed a ſtrong Guard, and left *Q. Titurius Sabinus* his Lieutenant on the other Side with ſix Cohorts. He then drew round his Camp a Ditch eighteen Foot broad, ſtrengthened with a Rampart twelve Foot high.

VII. THE *Belgians* in their march fell furiouſly upon *Bibrax*, a Town belonging to the *Rhemi*, about eight Miles diſtant from *Cæſar*'s Camp. The Inhabitants with great difficulty held out againſt that Day's Aſſault. The manner of ſtorming a Town is the ſame among the *Belgians* as among the *Gauls*: For having ſurrounded the Walls with the whole Body of their Army, and by a continual diſcharge from their Slings cleared the Ramparts, they approach the Gates under covert of their Bucklers, and undermine the Walls. This was eaſy in the preſent Caſe; becauſe the Multitude employed in throwing Stones and Darts was ſo great, that none of the Garriſon durſt appear upon the Walls. When Night had put an end to the Aſſault, *Iccius*, who then commanded in the Town, a Man of principal Rank and Authority among the *Rhemi*, and one of thoſe who had come Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to treat about a Peace, diſpatched Meſſengers to acquaint him, that unleſs he was ſpeedily relieved, it would be impoſſible for him to hold out any longer.

VIII. HEREUPON *Cæſar*, making uſe of thoſe for Guides who had come expreſs to his Camp from *Iccius*, detached about midnight a Party of *Cretan* and *Numidian* Archers, with ſome *Balearean* Slingers, to the aſſiſtance of the Garriſon. Their Arrival encouraged the beſieged to ſtand upon their defence, and inſpired them with hopes of repulſing the Enemy, who now began to deſpair of ſucceſs, when they heard that a Reinforcement had entered the Town. Wherefore, after a ſhort ſtay before the Place, having plundered all the Country round about, and burnt the Houſes and Villages wherever they came, they marched in a Body towards *Cæſar*'s Camp, and poſted themſelves within two Miles of his Army, incloſing a ſpace of more than eight thouſand Paces in Circumference, as near as could be computed from the Smoke and Fires of their Camp.

IX. *CÆSAR* at firſt reſolved to avoid coming to a Battle, as well on account of the numbers of the Enemy, as the high Opinion entertained of their

Courage. He ſuffered the Horſe however to engage daily in ſmall Skirmiſhes, that he might the better judge of the Valour of the *Belgian* Troops, and the Reſolution and Bravery of his own Men. Finding that the *Romans* were nothing inferior to the Enemy in Courage, he reſolved to wait for them before his Camp; the Ground being very commodious, and as it were formed by Nature for the reception of an Army. For the Hill on which the Camp ſtood, riſing with an eaſy aſcent from the Plain, was but juſt of a ſufficient breadth on the Side facing the Enemy, to receive the ſeveral Lines of the Army drawn up in Order of Battle. On the right Hand and on the left the deſcent was ſteep; whereby the Mountain ſwelling in front, but gradually abating its declivity as you advanced towards the bottom, came at laſt to a Plain. Along each Side of the Hill *Cæſar* dug a Trench of about four hundred Paces in length, and built Forts at the extremities, where he placed Engines to repulſe the Enemy, ſhould they offer to attack him in flank, or endeavour, during the Fight, to ſurround him with their numbers. Theſe Diſpoſitions being made, and having left the two new levied Legions in his Camp, as a Body of Reſerve in caſe of Need, he drew up the other ſix in order of Battle. The *Belgians* likewiſe drew up their Troops, and ſtood fronting our Army.

X. BETWEEN *Cæſar* and the Enemy there was a ſmall Moraſs. The *Belgians* waited to ſee if we would paſs it: Our Men on the other hand were ready in Arms, that ſhould the Enemy attempt to come over, they might fall upon them, and take advantage of their Confuſion. Mean-time the Cavalry on both Sides engaged; but as neither Army would hazard the paſſage of the Moraſs, *Cæſar*, who had the better in the Skirmiſh of the Horſe, led back his Men to their Camp. The *Belgians* marched directly towards the *Axona*, which, as we have ſaid, lay behind our Camp; and having found a Ford, endeavoured to paſs over part of their Army. Their Deſign was, if poſſible, to make themſelves maſters of the Fort where *Q. Titurius* commanded, and break down the Bridge; or, ſhould they fail in that Attempt, to ravage and lay waſte the Territories of the *Rhemi*, whence our Army was ſupplied with Proviſions.

XI. *CÆSAR* being informed of theſe things by *Titurius*, croſſed the Bridge with his Cavalry, light-armed *Numidians*, Archers, and Slingers, and marched to attack the Enemy. A very ſharp Conflict enſued: For the *Romans* falling upon them while they were yet paſſing the River, and by reaſon of their Diſorder unable to defend themſelves, ſlew great numbers. The reſt, who with undaunted Courage advanced upon the Bodies of their Companions, were repulſed by the multitude of Darts from our Men; and the Cavalry ſurrounding thoſe that were already got over, put them all to the Sword. The *Belgians* being thus diſappointed, both in their deſign upon *Bibrax*, and the paſſage of the *Axona*; finding too that Proviſions began to be ſcarce, and that our Army could not be drawn to fight them at a diſadvantage, called a Council of War. It was there judged moſt expedient to ſeparate, and return every Man to his own Country; with a Reſolution however to aſſemble from all Parts, in defence of that State, whoſe Territories ſhould be firſt invaded by the *Romans:* For they concluded it much ſafer to carry on the War at home, where they might have Proviſions and every thing at command, than venture a Battle within the Confines of a foreign State. Theſe Reaſons were at the ſame time backed by a ſtill more powerful Conſideration: for the *Bellovaci* having Intelligence that *Divitiacus* and the *Æduans* were advancing towards their

A. *The Enemy on their March to the River Axona.* B. *Ca*

B. *Cæsar's Cavalry planted to oppose their Paſsage.*

their Territories, could not be reſtrained from marching directly homewards, to defend their own Country.

XII. THIS Reſolution being taken; about the ſecond Watch of the Night, they left their Camp with great Noiſe and Tumult, regarding neither the Order of their march, nor the due ſubordination of Command, but each Man preſſing for the foremoſt Rank, that he might get the ſooner home, inſomuch that their Retreat had all the Appearance of a precipitate Flight. *Cæſar*, who had immediate Notice of this from his Spies, apprehending ſome Stratagem, becauſe he as yet knew nothing of the Reaſon of their departure, would not ſtir out of his Trenches. But early in the Morning, upon more certain Intelligence of their Retreat, he detached all the Cavalry, under the Command of *Q. Pedius* and *L. Arunculeius Cotta*, his Lieutenants, to haraſs and retard them in their march. *T. Labienus* had Orders to follow with three Legions. Theſe falling upon their Rear, and purſuing them many Miles, made a dreadful ſlaughter of the flying Troops. Whilſt the Rear, upon finding themſelves attacked, faced about, and valiantly ſuſtained the Charge of our Men; the Vanguard, as fancying themſelves out of danger, were not to be reſtrained either by Neceſſity or the Voice of their Commanders, but upon hearing the Alarm behind them, broke their Ranks, and betook themſelves to flight. Thus the *Romans*, with little or no Loſs on their ſide, continued the Slaughter all the remaining part of the Day. About Sun-ſet they gave over the Purſuit, and in obedience to the Orders they had received, returned to their Camp.

XIII. THE next Day, before the Enemy had time to rally, or recover out of their Conſternation, *Cæſar* led his Army into the Territories of the *Sueſſiones*, which join to thoſe of the *Rhemi*; and after a long march reached *Noviodunum*. He was in hopes of carrying the Town by Aſſault, becauſe he underſtood it was deſtitute of a Garriſon: But as the Ditch was broad, and the Wall very high, the Defendants, tho' few in number, withſtood all his Efforts. Wherefore having fortified his Camp, he began to provide Engines, and get every thing in readineſs for a Siege. Mean-time ſuch of the *Sueſſiones* as had eſcaped the late Slaughter, threw themſelves during the night into the Town. But *Cæſar* advancing his Preparations with great Expedition, and approaching under cover of his Mantelets to the very Walls, where he caſt up a Mount, and planted his battering Towers; the *Gauls* aſtoniſhed at the greatneſs of the Works, as having never ſeen or heard of any ſuch before; and at the Diſpatch wherewith they were carried on, ſent Deputies to treat about a Surrender, and by the Mediation of the *Rhemi* obtained Conditions of Peace.

XIV. *CÆSAR* having received the principal Men of their State as Hoſtages, amongſt whom were the two Sons of *Galba* their King; and obliged them to deliver up all their Arms, admitted the *Sueſſiones* to a Surrender, and led his Army againſt the *Bellovaci*. Theſe retiring with their Effects into *Bratuſpantium* their capital City, and underſtanding that *Cæſar* was advanced within five Miles of the Town, ſent a Deputation of all their old Men, who came forth in venerable Proceſſion to meet him, ſignifying by out-ſtretched Hands, and in the moſt ſubmiſſive Terms, that they put themſelves under his Power and Protection, nor pretended to appear in Arms againſt the People of *Rome:* and when he approached ſtill nearer the City, and encamped within view of the Walls, the Women and Children from the Ramparts, with extended Arms,

Arms, acccording to the Cuſtom of their Country, beſought the *Romans* for Peace.

XV. HEREUPON *Divitiacus*, who after the Retreat of the *Belgian* Army, had diſmiſſed the *Æduans*, and returned to *Cæſar*'s Camp, interpoſed in their behalf, repreſenting: "That the *Bellovaci* had always lived in ſtrict "Friendſhip and Alliance with the *Æduans*: That the artful Inſinuations of "their Chiefs, who miſrepreſented *Cæſar*, as one that had enſlaved the *Æduan* "State, and held it under an ignominious Tyranny and Oppreſſion, had alone in- "duced them to forſake their ancient Allies, and take up Arms againſt the People "of *Rome*: That the Authors of this Advice, ſeeing its pernicious Effects, and "the Ruin they had brought upon their Country, were retired into *Britain*: "That not only the *Bellovaci* themſelves, but the *Æduans* too, in their be- "half, implored his Clemency and Forgiveneſs: That in granting their Re- "queſt, he would greatly enlarge the Credit and Authority of the *Æduans* "among the *Belgian* States; which was of ſo much the greater moment, as in "all their Wars they were wont to have recourſe to them for Aſſiſtance." *Cæſar*, out of regard to *Divitiacus* and the *Æduans*, promiſed to grant them Pardon and Protection; but as they were poſſeſſed of very extenſive Territories, and ſurpaſſed in Power and number of Forces all the other *Belgian* States, he demanded ſix hundred Hoſtages.

XVI. THESE being accordingly delivered, together with all their Arms, *Cæſar* left their City, and advanced into the Country of the *Ambiani*; who ſubmitted immediately upon his Approach. Adjoining to them were the *Nervians*; of whoſe Manners and Genius *Cæſar* inquiring, found: "That "they ſuffered no reſort of Merchants into their Cities, nor would allow of the "importation of Wine, or other Commodities tending to Luxury; as imagin- "ing that thereby the Minds of Men were enfeebled, and their martial Fire "and Courage extinguiſhed: That they were Men of a warlike Spirit; but "altogether unacquainted with the Refinements of Life: That they continually "inveighed againſt the reſt of the *Belgians*, for ignominiouſly ſubmitting to "the *Roman* Yoke, and abandoning the ſteddy Bravery of their Anceſtors: "In fine, that they had openly declared their Reſolution, of neither ſending "Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, nor accepting any Terms of Peace." *Cæſar*, after a march of three Days croſs their Territories, underſtood from ſome Priſoners: "That he was now advanced within ten Miles of the *Sambre*, on the other "ſide of which the Enemy had poſted themſelves, and there waited the "coming up of the *Romans*: That they had been joined by the *Atrebatians* "and *Veromanduans*, neighbouring Nations, whom they had perſuaded to take "part in, and ſhare the Fortune of the War: That they expected alſo to be "reinforced by the *Atuatici*, who were already on their march: And that all "their Women, and ſuch as on account of their Age were unfit to bear "Arms, had been conveyed to a Place of ſafety, inacceſſible by reaſon of the "Marſhes that ſurrounded it."

XVII. *CÆSAR*, upon this Intelligence, ſent his Scouts and Centurions before, to chooſe out a convenient Place for his Camp. Mean-time, as many of the *Belgians* who had lately ſubmitted, and alſo not a few *Gauls*, followed the *Roman* Army; ſome of theſe, as was afterwards known from the Priſoners, obſerving the Order and Diſpoſition of our march, deſerted in the Night to the Enemy,

Enemy, and informed them: "That the ſeveral Legions were ſeparated from "one another, by a number of Carriages poſted between them: That they "would therefore have a favourable Opportunity, as ſoon as the firſt Legion "was arrived in the Camp, and while the reſt were yet a great way behind, "of falling upon it incumbered with the Baggage, and obtaining an eaſy "Victory; by which, and the plunder of the Carriages, they would ſtrike "ſuch a terror thro' the whole Army, as muſt neceſſarily draw after it a total "Defeat." This Advice was the more readily liſtened to, becauſe of old the *Nervians*, being very weak in Horſe, (nor even as yet have they greatly increaſed their Strength this way, placing their whole Confidence in their Foot,) in order to ſecure themſelves againſt the Inroads of the Cavalry of the neighbouring Nations, had every where fortified the Country with Barricades of young Trees; which being ſplit in the middle, and bent down on both ſides; the void Spaces were ſo cloſely interwoven with Brambles, Thorns, and a multitude of Boughs iſſuing from the Trees themſelves, that they formed a Fence not only impoſſible to be paſſed, but even to be ſeen through. As theſe therefore muſt greatly impede and perplex the march of the *Roman* Army, they thought the Advice given them by the *Belgians* was by no means to be neglected.

XVIII. THE Place choſen by our Men for their Camp was a Hill, running with an even deſcent from the ſummit, 'till it reached the Banks of the *Sambre*. Directly oppoſite to this, on the farther ſide of the River, and at the diſtance of about two hundred Paces, was another Hill, of a like acclivity with the former, plain and open round the bottom, but covered on the top with Woods, ſo thick that they hindered the Proſpect. Among theſe Woods the Enemy lay concealed, and only a few Squadrons of Horſe appeared on the open Ground by the River-ſide, whoſe depth in that Place did not exceed three Foot.

XIX. *CÆSAR* having ſent the Cavalry before, followed himſelf with the reſt of the Army. But the Order and Diſpoſition of his march differed from the Account given in to the Enemy by the *Belgians*. For knowing that the *Nervians* were near, he led up ſix Legions in front, ready equipped for Battle, according to his uſual Cuſtom. After them followed the Baggage of the whole Army; and then the two new Legions, who cloſed the march, and ſerved as a Guard to the Carriages. Mean-time the *Roman* Cavalry, with the Slingers and Archers, having paſſed the River, engaged the Enemy's Horſe: But as they retired from time to time into the Woods, and again ſallied upon our Men, who durſt not purſue them beyond the open Ground; the ſix Legions that formed the Van coming up during theſe ſucceſſive Rencounters, began to intrench themſelves. When the firſt Line of our Carriages appeared within ſight of thoſe that lay concealed in the Woods, which was the time previouſly concerted by the Enemy for giving the Onſet: the *Nervians*, who ſtood ready drawn up within the Thicket, and had mutually exhorted one another to a reſolute Behaviour, ruſhed ſuddenly forward with all their Forces, and fell furiouſly upon our Cavalry. Theſe being eaſily repulſed and broken; they ran down with incredible ſpeed to the *Sambre*, inſomuch that at one and the ſame inſtant, they ſeemed to be in the Woods, in the River, and charging our Men on the other ſide. Nor were they leſs expeditious in mounting the Hill, and attacking thoſe who were employed in fortifying the Camp.

XX. NOW had *Cæſar* all the Parts of a General upon his Hands at once: to erect the Standard, which was the Signal for the Men to fly to Arms: to proclaim the Battle by ſound of Trumpet: to draw off the Soldiers from the Works: to recal thoſe that were gone to fetch Materials for the Rampart: to draw up the Army in order of Battle: to encourage his Men: and give the Word of Onſet: in moſt of which he was prevented by the ſhortneſs of the Time, and the ſudden Aſſault of the Enemy. In this Emergency, two things chiefly contributed to the preſervation of the *Romans:* One, the Ability and Experience of the Soldiers, who practiſed in former Battles, knew their Duty, and what was expedient in the preſent Conjuncture, no leſs than the Officers themſelves: The other, the Orders given by *Cæſar* to his ſeveral Lieutenants, not to quit the Works, and the Legions where they commanded, 'till the Fortifications of the Camp were finiſhed. For theſe, upon ſeeing the Danger, and ſudden approach of the Enemy, waited not for new Inſtructions from the General, but gave forth ſuch Orders, as their own Prudence, and the preſent Neceſſity ſuggeſted.

XXI. *CÆSAR* having made the neceſſary Diſpoſitions, ran to encourage his Men; and, as Chance ordered it, fell in with the tenth Legion. When exhorting them in few Words to exert their wonted Bravery, and manfully ſuſtain the Aſſault without terror or diſmay; as he ſaw the Enemy within reach of Dart, he gave the Signal to engage. Haſtening thence to another quarter of the Field, he found the Battle already begun. So ſhort was the time allowed us to prepare ourſelves, and ſuch the Reſolution and Impetuoſity of the *Nervians* in ruſhing to the Encounter, that neither could the Officers find leiſure to regulate the Enſigns, nor the Soldiers to put on their Helmets, or uncaſe their Targets. Each Man, as he arrived from the Works, joined himſelf to the firſt Standard that came in his way, that he might not loſe that time in looking for his own Company, which was to be employed in fighting the Enemy.

XXII. THE Army being drawn up, rather according to the nature of the Place, the declivity of the Hill, and the particular neceſſity of the Time; than agreeable to Order and the Rules of War: as the Legions were forced to engage ſeparately, ſome in one Place, ſome in another; and the View of the Fight was every where interrupted by the thick Hedges deſcribed above: it was not poſſible in theſe Circumſtances, to diſtinguiſh with any certainty, where to ſend the neceſſary Supplies; how to provide againſt the Exigencies of the Field; nor indeed for one Man to have an Eye to all the Occurrences that called for Notice and Redreſs. In ſuch an unequal Situation of Things therefore, much room was left for the various Events and Interpoſition of Fortune.

XXIII. THE Soldiers of the ninth and tenth Legions, who were upon the left of the Army, having caſt their Darts, advanced againſt the *Atrebatians*, with whom it was their fortune to engage. Theſe now weary, breathleſs, and overpowered with Wounds, were quickly driven from the higher Ground quite back to the *Sambre*, where the *Romans* ſtill preſſing them Sword in hand, ſlew great numbers as they endeavoured to paſs the River. Nor did our Men decline purſuing them to the other ſide: but following too far, 'till they were drawn into a Place of diſadvantage, the Enemy ſuddenly faced about, and renewed the Charge; yet were a ſecond time obliged to betake themſelves



A. *The Hill running with an even Descent to the Banks of the Sambre.* B. *The Sambre.* C. *The Hill on the ot*
two Legions that closed the March and served as a Guard to the Carriages. F. *The Horse and light armed I*
driven from the higher Ground quite croſs the River. K. *The twelfth Legion posted in the right Wing.* L. *The*
Order to attack these two Legions. O. P. *The eleventh and eighth Legions drive the Veromanduans from the*
Sambre. R. *A Party of Nervians penetrate as far as Cæsar's Camp.* S. *The Servants belonging to Cæsars Army whe*

N°. 18



on the other side of the River fronting Cæsar's Camp. **D.** *The Baggage of Cæsar's whole Army.* **E.** *The armed Foot who were twice put to Rout.* **G.** *The tenth Legion.* **H.** *The ninth Legion.* **I.** *The Atrebatians* **L.** *The seventh Legion at a small distance from the twelfth.* **M. N.** *The Nervians advancing in close from the higher Ground to the very Banks of the River.* **Q.** *The Veromanduans retreating towards the Army who had gone out in quest of Plunder, seeing the Enemy so near, hastily betake themselves to Flight.*

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themſelves to flight. So likewiſe, in another Quarter of the Field, the eleventh and eighth Legions, having overthrown the *Veromanduans* againſt whom they fought, drove them from the higher Ground to the very Banks of the River.

XXIV. AS by this means the Front, and left Side of the *Roman* Camp, lay in a manner quite expoſed; for the twelfth Legion, and not far from that the ſeventh, were poſted in the right Wing: The *Nervians* headed by *Boduognatus* their King, advanced thither in a cloſe Body; and whilſt one Party endeavoured to ſurround the Legions by taking them in Flank, the reſt mounted the Hill in order to get poſſeſſion of the Camp. At the ſame time our Cavalry, with the light-armed Infantry, who in the very beginning of the Engagement had been repulſed and broken, as we have related above; returning to the Camp, and meeting the Enemy in Front, again betook themſelves to Flight. The Servants too of the Army, who from the top of the Hill had beheld our Men victorious, and purſuing the Enemy croſs the River; having ſallied out for the ſake of Plunder: when they now looked back, and ſaw the *Nervians* in poſſeſſion of the Camp, fled with the utmoſt Precipitation. This Confuſion was ſtill more increaſed by the Clamour and Uproar of thoſe that attended the Carriages; inſomuch that the Panick ſpreading on all ſides, each Man thought of providing for his Safety by Flight. The Cavalry of *Treves*, who were in the higheſt Eſteem among the *Gauls* for their Valour, and had been ſent by the State to reinforce *Cæſar*'s Army; alarmed by theſe ſeveral Appearances: when they ſaw our Camp filled with multitudes of the Enemy; the Legions overpowered, and in a manner quite ſurrounded; the Horſe, Archers, Slingers, and *Numidians*, routed, diſperſed, and flying on all hands: Imagining all was loſt, returned to their own Country, and reported; that the *Romans* were utterly overthrown, and their Camp and Baggage in poſſeſſion of the Enemy.

XXV. *CÆSAR* having encouraged the tenth Legion, haſtened to the right Wing of the Army. He there found his Men overpowered by the Enemy; the Enſigns of the twelfth Legion all crowded into one place, and the Soldiers themſelves ſtanding ſo cloſe together, that they had not room to uſe their Arms; all the Centurions of the fourth Cohort ſlain, the Standard-bearer killed, and the Standard taken; the Centurions of the other Cohorts almoſt all either killed or dangerouſly wounded; among theſe *P. Sextius Baculus*, the firſt Centurion of the Legion, a Man of great Courage, ſo weakened by the multitude of his Wounds, that he was hardly able to ſupport himſelf; the reſt diſcouraged and avoiding the Fight, and ſome even running away, becauſe abandoned by the Troops that were to ſuſtain them; the Enemy preſſing vigorouſly in Front from the lower Ground, and at the ſame time flanking the Legions on either ſide with great Fury; in a word, things reduced to the laſt Extremity, and no Body of Reſerve to reſtore the Battle. Whereupon ſnatching a Buckler from a Soldier who ſtood in the Rear of the Legion, for he himſelf was come thither without one; and preſſing to the Front of the Battle; he called the Centurions by Name, encouraged the reſt, and commanded the Soldiers to advance the Enſigns, and widen their Ranks, that they might be the more at liberty to uſe their Swords. His Arrival inſpiring the Men with hope, and reviving their Courage, as every one was ambitious of diſtinguiſhing himſelf in the preſence of his General, and even in his greateſt Extremity redoubled his Efforts; the Progreſs of the Enemy was a little checked.

XXVI.

XXVI. *CÆSAR* obſerving that the ſeventh Legion, which fought at ſome diſtance from the other, was likewiſe very much preſſed by the Enemy, commanded the military Tribunes to draw the two Legions together by degrees, and joining them back to back, oppoſe the Enemy with a double Front. This being done; as they were now in a Condition to ſupport each other, and no longer feared being ſurrounded, they began to make a more vigorous Oppoſition, and fight with greater Courage. Mean-time the two new Legions, that formed the Rear of our Army, and had been appointed to guard the Baggage; hearing of the Battle, advanced with all poſſible ſpeed, and were ſeen by the *Nervians* from the top of the Hill: And *T. Labienus*, who had made himſelf Maſter of the Enemy's Camp, obſerving from the higher Ground how matters went on our ſide, detached the tenth Legion to our Aſſiſtance. Theſe underſtanding, by the Flight of our Cavalry and Servants, the Diſtreſs we were in, and the Danger that threatned the Camp, the Legions, and the General, made all the haſte they could to join us.

XXVII. THE Arrival of this Detachment produced ſo great a Change in our Favour, that many of the Soldiers, who before lay oppreſſed with Wounds, now reſuming Courage, and ſupporting themſelves with their Shields, renewed the Fight. Nay the very Servants of the Camp, obſerving the Conſternation of the Enemy, unarmed as they were, ruſhed amongſt their armed Battalions. The Cavalry too, ſtriving by extraordinary Efforts of Valour to wipe away the Ignominy of their late Flight, charged the Enemy in all Places where the void Spaces between the Legions ſuffered them to advance. Mean-time the *Nervians*, tho' now reduced to the laſt Extremity, exerted themſelves with ſuch determined Courage, that their front Ranks being cut off, thoſe who ſtood behind mounted the Bodies of the ſlain, and thence continued to maintain the Fight; and when theſe too by their Fall had raiſed a Mountain of Carcaſes, ſuch as remained aſcending the Pile, poured their Javelins upon us as from a Rampart, and even returned the Darts thrown at them by our Men. Fame therefore deceived not in proclaiming ſo loudly the Bravery of a People, who thus adventured to croſs a very broad River, climb the ſteepeſt Banks, and ruſh upon an Enemy poſſeſſed of all the Advantages of Ground: Difficulties, which though ſeemingly unſurmountable, appeared yet as nothing to Men of their Reſolution and Magnanimity.

XXVIII. THE Battle being ended, and the Name and Nation of the *Nervians* in a manner quite extinguiſhed; the old Men, who with the Women and Children, as we have related above, had been conveyed into a Place ſurrounded with Bogs and Marſhes; hearing of this terrible Overthrow, and judging that nothing would now be able to ſtop the Progreſs of the Conquerors, or protect the Conquered from their victorious Arms, reſolved, with the Conſent of all that ſurvived the late Diſaſter, to ſend Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, and ſurrender themſelves. Theſe, in reciting the Calamities of their Country, repreſented: That of ſix hundred Senators, there remained only three; and that from ſixty Thouſand fighting Men, they were reduced to five hundred. *Cæſar*, as a proof of his Compaſſion towards this brave and unfortunate People, readily took them under his Protection, allowing them free and full Poſſeſſion of their Towns and Territories, and ſtrictly commanding all the neighbouring Nations, to abſtain from Injuries and Wrongs.

XXIX. THE *Atuatici*, of whom mention has been made above, being upon their march with all their Forces to join the *Nervians*, and hearing of their Defeat, immediately returned home: when abandoning all their other Towns and Caſtles, they conveyed themſelves and their Riches into a Place of great ſtrength, which Nature had fortified with uncommon Care. For it was on every ſide ſurrounded with high Rocks and Precipices, having only one Avenue of about two hundred Foot broad, that approached the Town with a gentle riſing. Here they raiſed a double Wall of prodigious height, whereon, as a farther Security, they laid great numbers of huge Stones, and ſtrong pointed Beams. This People were deſcended from the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, who, in their march towards the *Alps* and *Italy*, left their heavy Baggage on this ſide the *Rhine*, with a Detachment of ſix thouſand Men to guard it. Theſe, after the final Overthrow of their Countrymen, being for many Years haraſſed and perſecuted by the neighbouring States; ſometimes invading others, ſometimes defending themſelves; at laſt, with the Conſent of all the bordering Nations, obtained Peace, and choſe this Place for a Habitation.

XXX. ON the firſt arrival of the *Roman* Army, they made frequent Sallies from the Town, and engaged our Men in ſmall Skirmiſhes. But *Cæſar* having drawn a Line of Contravallation, twelve Feet high, fifteen Miles in Circumference, and every where well fortified with Redoubts; they kept themſelves within their Walls. When we had now finiſhed our Approaches, caſt up a Mount, and were preparing a Tower of Aſſault behind the Works; they began at firſt to deride us from the Battlements, and in reproachful Language ask the meaning of that prodigious Engine, raiſed at ſuch a diſtance! With what Hands or Strength, Men of our ſize and make, (for the *Gauls*, who are for the moſt part very tall, deſpiſe the ſmall ſtature of the *Romans*,) could hope to bring forward ſo unwieldy a Machine againſt their Walls?

XXXI. BUT when they ſaw it removed, and approaching near the Town, aſtoniſhed at the new and unuſual Appearance, they ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to ſue for Peace. Theſe being accordingly introduced, told him: "That "they doubted not but the *Romans* were aided in their Wars by the Gods "themſelves; it ſeeming to them a more than human Task, to tranſport with "ſuch facility an Engine of that amazing height, by which they were brought "upon a level with their Enemies, and enabled to engage them in cloſe "Fight: That they therefore put themſelves and Fortunes into his Hands, re-"queſting only, that if his Clemency and Goodneſs, of which they had heard "ſo much from others, had determined him to ſpare the *Atuatici*, he would "not deprive them of their Arms: That the neighbouring Nations were almoſt "all their Enemies, as envying their ſuperior Valour; nor would it be poſſible "for them to defend themſelves from their Attacks, if their Arms were taken "away: In fine, that if ſuch muſt be their Fate, they would rather chooſe to "undergo any Fortune from the Hands of the *Romans*, than expoſe themſelves "to be cruelly butchered by thoſe over whom they had been wont to exer-"ciſe dominion."

XXXII. TO this *Cæſar* replied: "That in regard of his uſual Conduct on "theſe Occaſions, rather than for any merit of theirs, he was willing to grant "them terms of Peace, provided they ſubmitted before the Battering-Ram "touched their Walls; but that no Surrender would be accepted, unleſs they

" agreed to deliver up their Arms: That he would take the ſame care of them " as he had before done of the *Nervians*, and lay his expreſs Commands upon " the neighbouring Nations, to abſtain from all Injuries towards a People who " had put themſelves under the Protection of the *Romans*." The Ambaſſadors returning with this Anſwer to their Countrymen, they accepted in Appearance the Conditions offered them by *Cæſar*, and threw ſo vaſt a Quantity of Arms into the Ditch before the Town, that the Heap almoſt reached to the top of the Wall. Nevertheleſs, as was afterwards known, they retained about a third part, and concealed them privately within the Town. The Gates being thrown open, they enjoyed Peace for the remaining part of that Day.

XXXIII. IN the Evening *Cæſar* ordered the Gates to be ſhut, and the Soldiers to quit the Town, that no Injury might be offered to the Inhabitants during the night. Whereupon the *Atuatici*, in conſequence of a Deſign they had before concerted, imagining that the *Romans*, after the ſurrender of the Place, would either ſet no Guard at all, or at leaſt keep watch with leſs precaution: Partly arming themſelves with ſuch Weapons as they had privately retained, partly with Targets made of Bark or Wicker, and covered over haſtily with Hides; made a furious Sally about midnight with all their Forces, and charged our Works on that ſide where they ſeemed to be of eaſieſt Acceſs.

XXXIV. THE Alarm being immediately given by lighting Fires, as *Cæſar* had before commanded; the Soldiers ran to the Attack from the neighbouring Forts. A very ſharp Conflict enſued: For the Enemy now driven to Deſpair, and having no hope but in their Valour, fought with all poſſible Bravery, though the *Romans* had the Advantage of the Ground, and poured their Javelins upon them both from the Towers and the top of the Rampart. About four Thouſand were ſlain upon the ſpot, and the reſt obliged to retire into the Town. Next Day the Gates were forced, no one offering to make the leaſt Reſiſtance; and the Army having taken poſſeſſion of the Place, the Inhabitants, to the Number of fifty-three Thouſand, were ſold for Slaves.

XXXV. ABOUT the ſame time *P. Craſſus*, whom *Cæſar* had ſent with a Legion againſt the *Venetians*, *Unellians*, *Oſiſmians*, *Curioſolitæ*, *Seſuvians*, *Aulerci*, and *Rhedones*, Maritime States inhabiting along the Sea-coaſt; diſpatched Meſſengers to acquaint him, that all theſe Nations had ſubmitted to the Dominion and Authority of the *Romans*.

XXXVI. THE Campaign being ended, and all the Provinces of *Gaul* ſubdued; ſuch was the Opinion conceived of this War amongſt all the *Barbarians* round about, that even the Nations beyond the *Rhine* ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, offering to give Hoſtages, and ſubmit to his Commands. But he being then in haſte to return to *Italy* and *Illyricum*, ordered them to attend him the next Spring. Mean-time, having diſpoſed his Army into Winter-quarters in the Territories of the *Andes*, *Turones*, and *Carnutes*, which States lay the neareſt to the Provinces that had been the ſeat of the War, he himſelf ſet out for *Italy*. The Senate being informed of theſe Succeſſes by *Cæſar*'s Letters, decreed a Thankſgiving of fifteen Days: A Number never allowed to any General before.

C. JULIUS

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK III.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. *The* Nantuates, Veragrians, *and* Seduni, *fall unexpectedly upon* Ser. Galba, Cæſar's *Lieutenant.* III. *But are overthrown with great Slaughter.* VI. Galba *leads back his Legion into the Country of the* Allobrogians. VII. *At the ſame time the* Venetians *and other States bordering upon the Ocean revolt.* IX. Cæſar *prepares to attack them, not without great Difficulty.* X. *He divides his Army, and diſtributes it into the ſeveral Provinces of* Gaul. XII. *The Advantages of the* Venetians, *and the manner of their Defence.* XIII. *A Deſcription of their Shipping, and its ſuitableneſs to the nature of the Coaſt.* XIV. Cæſar *finding it in vain to attack them by Land, comes to a naval Engagement with them, and gets the Victory.* XVII. *Mean-time* Q. Titurius Sabinus *his Lieutenant, by an artful Stratagem defeats the* Unellians. XXI. *At the ſame time* P. Craſſus *in* Aquitain, *having vanquiſhed the* Sotiates, *obliges them to ſubmit* XXIV. *Together with ſeveral other States of the ſame Province.* XXIX. Cæſar *attacks the* Morini *and* Menapians *with ſucceſs; but the Seaſon being far advanced, he is obliged to ſend his Army into Winter-Quarters.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK III.

I. *CÆSAR*, upon his departure for *Italy*, ſent *Sergius Galba* with the twelfth Legion, and part of the Cavalry, againſt the *Nantuates*, *Veragrians*, and *Seduni*, whoſe Territories extend from the Confines of the *Allobrogians*, the Lake *Lemanus*, and the River *Rhone*, all the way to the top of the *Alps*. His deſign in this Expedition was, to open a free paſſage over thoſe Mountains to the *Roman* Merchants, who had hitherto travelled them with great danger, and ſubject to many grievous Exactions. *Galba*, whoſe Orders alſo were, to put the Legion into Winter-Quarters in thoſe parts, if he ſaw it neceſſary; after ſome ſucceſsful Encounters, and making himſelf maſter of ſeveral Forts, was addreſſed by Ambaſſadors from all the Nations round. Having ſettled the terms of Peace, and received Hoſtages for their Fidelity; he reſolved to quarter two Cohorts among the *Nantuates*; and himſelf, with the other Cohorts, to winter in a Town of the *Veragrians*, called *Octodurus*. This Town, which is ſituated in the midſt of a Valley, upon a Plain of no great extent, is bounded on all ſides by very high Mountains. As it was divided into two parts by a River, he left one part to the *Gauls*, and aſſigned the other to his Legion for their Winter-Quarters, commanding it to be fortified with a Ditch and Rampart.

II. AFTER many Days ſpent here, and that Orders had been given for the bringing in of Corn to ſupply the Camp; he was ſuddenly informed by his Spies, that the *Gauls* had abandoned in the Night that part of the City allotted to them, and that the impending Mountains were covered with great multitudes of the *Veragrians* and *Seduni*. Many Reaſons conſpired to induce the *Gauls* to this ſudden Reſolution of renewing the War, and falling upon our Men. Firſt, the ſmall number of the *Roman* Troops, who were therefore deſpiſed by the Enemy, as not amounting in all to one Legion; two entire Cohorts having been detached, and even of thoſe that remained with *Galba*, many being gone out in queſt of Proviſions: And then their Perſuaſion, that by reaſon of the inequality of the Ground, where it would be eaſy for them to pour upon us from the tops of the Mountains, and overwhelm us with their Darts, our Men would not be able to ſtand the very firſt Aſſault. Add to all this their inward

Regret, at ſeeing their Children torn from them under the name of Hoſtages; and that they firmly believed it to be the deſign of the *Romans*, in ſeizing the ſummits of the Mountains, not only to open a free Paſſage over the *Alps*, but to ſecure to themſelves the perpetual Poſſeſſion of thoſe Parts, and annex them to the adjoining Province.

III. UPON this Intelligence *Galba*, who had neither compleated the Fortifications of his Camp, nor laid in ſufficient ſtore of Corn and other Proviſions; as little apprehending an Inſurrection of this kind, among a People that had ſubmitted and given Hoſtages; having ſpeedily aſſembled a Council of War, began to ask their Advice in the preſent Exigence. As the Danger which threatened them was ſudden and unexpected, and as they ſaw the Mountains on every ſide covered with multitudes of armed Soldiers; inſomuch that there was no room to hope, either for Succours, or any Convoys of Proviſion, becauſe the Enemy were in poſſeſſion of all the Avenues to the Camp: Some believing the Caſe to be altogether deſperate, propoſed to abandon the Baggage, and attempt by a Sally the recovery of their old Quarters. But the greater number were for reſerving this Expedient to the laſt extremity, and in the mean time to wait the deciſion of Fortune, and in the beſt manner they were able defend the Camp.

IV. AFTER a ſhort Space, and even before there was ſufficient time for the putting in execution what had been reſolved on; the Enemy, at a Signal given, came ruſhing upon us from all parts, and begun the Aſſault by a ſhower of Stones and Darts. Our Men at firſt made a brave and vigorous Reſiſtance, plying them with their Javelins from the Ramparts, whence not a ſingle Weapon was diſcharged in vain: And as any part of the Camp appeared hard preſſed for want of Men to defend it, thither they ran, and made head againſt the Aſſailants. But in this the *Gauls* had greatly the Advantage, that when fatigued with the length of the Fight, they found themſelves under a neceſſity to retire, freſh Men ſucceeded in their place; whereas on our ſide, by reaſon of the ſmall number of Troops, no reſource of this kind was left: So that not only ſuch as were wearied with fighting were yet obliged to continue in their Poſts; but we could not even permit the wounded to retire, or for a Moment abandon the Charge.

V. THE Battle had now laſted upwards of ſix Hours without Intermiſſion; inſomuch that the *Romans* not only found their Strength greatly exhauſted, but even began to be in want of Weapons, wherewith to annoy the Enemy. The *Gauls*, on the other hand, urged the Combat with greater Fury than ever; and meeting with but a faint Reſiſtance, fell to demoliſhing the Rampart, and filling up the Ditch. All was giving way before them, when *P. Sextius Baculus*, a Centurion of the firſt Rank, the ſame, who as we have related above, received ſo many Wounds in the Battle againſt the *Nervians*; as likewiſe *C. Voluſenus*, a military Tribune, one equally diſtinguiſhed for his Conduct and Bravery; came to *Galba*, and repreſented: That the only Refuge now left, was by a ſudden Sally, to put all upon the iſſue of a bold Attack. Accordingly *Galba*, calling the Centurions together, by them gave immediate Notice to the Soldiers, to keep for ſome time only on the defenſive; and having provided themſelves with the Weapons thrown at them by the Enemy, and a little recovered their Strength, upon a Signal given, to ſally out of the Camp, and place all their hopes of Safety in their Valour. Theſe Orders were exactly

exactly followed: and the *Romans* ruſhing furiouſly upon the Enemy from all parts, neither gave them time to comprehend the meaning of ſo unexpected an Attack, nor to recover out of the Confuſion into which it had thrown them. Thus Fortune changing Sides, they every where ſurrounded and put to the Sword the *Gauls*, who had ſo lately entertained hopes of maſtering our Camp. Of thirty thouſand armed Troops, which Number, as appeared afterwards, were preſent in this Aſſault, more than ten thouſand periſhed in the Field. The reſt fled in great Terror and Confuſion, and were even forced to abandon the ſummits of the Mountains. The *Romans* ſeeing the Enemy entirely diſperſed, and obliged every where to throw down their Arms, quitted the Purſuit, and retired within their Intrenchments.

VI. AFTER this Battle; *Galba*, unwilling a ſecond time to expoſe himſelf to the inconſtancy of Fortune, and beſides conſidering, that he had met with an Oppoſition he little expected, when he firſt reſolved to winter in theſe Parts; above all, finding himſelf in great want of Corn and Forage; the next Day ſet fire to the Town, and began his march back into the Province. As there was no Enemy in the Field to diſturb or oppoſe him in his Retreat, he brought the Legion ſafe into the Country of the *Nantuates*, and thence into the Territories of the *Allobrogians*, where he put them into Winter-Quarters.

VII. THE Inſurrection being thus entirely quelled, *Cæſar* for many Reaſons believed, that *Gaul* was now reſtored to a ſtate of perfect Tranquillity. The *Belgians* had been overcome, the *Germans* expelled, and the *Seduni*, and other Inhabitants of the *Alps*, forced to ſubmit. He therefore in the beginning of Winter ventured upon a Progreſs into *Illyricum*, from a deſire he had to viſit thoſe Nations, and acquaint himſelf with the Country; when all on a ſudden a new War broke out in *Gaul*. The Occaſion of it was as follows: The ſeventh Legion, commanded by young *Craſſus*, was quartered among the *Andes*, a People bordering upon the Ocean. As there was great ſcarcity of Corn in theſe Parts, *Craſſus* ſent ſome Officers of the Cavalry, and military Tribunes, to ſolicit a Supply from the neighbouring States. Of this number were *T. Terraſidius*, ſent to the *Euſubians*; *M. Trebius Gallus*, to the *Curioſolitæ*; and *Q. Velanius*, and *T. Silius*, to the *Venetians*.

VIII. THIS laſt State is by far the moſt powerful and conſiderable of all the Nations inhabiting along the Sea-Coaſt: and that not only on account of their vaſt Shipping, wherewith they drive a mighty Traffick to *Britain*; and their Skill and Experience in naval Affairs, in which they greatly ſurpaſs the other maritime States: But becauſe lying upon a large and open Coaſt, againſt which the Sea rages with great violence, and where the Havens being few in number, are all ſubject to their Juriſdiction; they have moſt of the Nations that trade in thoſe Seas tributaries to their State. Among them the Revolt began by detaining *Silius* and *Velanius*; as by this means they hoped to recover the Hoſtages they had put into the Hands of *Craſſus*. The neighbouring States, moved by their Authority and Example, as the *Gauls* are in general very ſudden and forward in their Reſolves, detained for the ſame Reaſon *Trebius* and *Terraſidius*; and ſpeedily diſpatching Ambaſſadors from one to another, they by their Princes entered into a Confederacy, of acting in all things with common Conſent, and alike expoſing themſelves to the ſame iſſue of Fortune; earneſtly ſoliciting at the ſame time the other Provinces, rather to

to ſtand up in defence of that Liberty they had received of their Anceſtors, than tamely ſubmit to the ignominious Yoke of the *Romans*. All the Nations upon the Sea-Coaſt coming readily into this Alliance, they jointly ſent Ambaſſadors to *Craſſus*, to acquaint him; That if he expected to have his Officers reſtored, he muſt firſt ſend them back their Hoſtages.

IX. *CÆSAR* having Intelligence of theſe things from *Craſſus*, and being then at a great diſtance from *Gaul*, ordered in the mean time; that a number of Galleys ſhould be built upon the *Loire*, a River which runs into the Ocean; and that Mariners, Rowers, and Pilots, ſhould be drawn together from the Province. Theſe Orders being executed with great diſpatch, he himſelf, as ſoon as the Seaſon of the Year permitted, came to the Army. The *Venetians*, and other States in Alliance with them, having notice of his Arrival; and reflecting at the ſame time upon the greatneſs of their Crime, in detaining and loading with Irons Ambaſſadors, a Name ever looked upon amongſt all Nations as ſacred and inviolable; began to make Preparations proportioned to the Danger that threatened them; more eſpecially to provide themſelves with all kinds of warlike Stores; and that with ſo much the greater Alacrity and Confidence, as the Nature and Situation of the Country gave them good hopes of being able to defend themſelves. They knew that the Paſſes by Land were every where cut aſunder, by the many Friths and Arms of the Ocean, that run up in thoſe Parts; and that the Approach by Sea was not leſs difficult, on account of the ſmall number of Harbours, and the little Knowledge the *Romans* had of the Coaſt. Neither did they imagine it poſſible for our Army, to continue long in that Country, by reaſon of the great ſcarcity of Corn: And ſhould even all theſe Expectations deceive them, they had ſtill a mighty Confidence in the ſtrength and number of their Shipping. The *Romans*, they were ſenſible, had but a very inconſiderable Fleet; and were beſides perfect Strangers to the Ports, Iſlands, and Shallows of the Coaſt, where the chief weight of the War was like to fall. At the ſame time they foreſaw, that our Pilots, accuſtomed only to the Navigation of the *Mediterranean*, a Sea bounded and ſhut in on all ſides by the Continent, muſt needs find themſelves greatly at a loſs, when they came to enter the vaſt and open Spaces of the wide *Atlantick* Ocean. In conſequence of theſe Reflexions, and the Reſolutions formed upon them, they ſet about fortifying their Towns, and conveying all their Corn into Places of ſtrength, ordering as many Ships as could be got together to rendezvous in the *Venetian* Ports; it appearing, that *Cæſar* intended to begin the War by attacking that State. They likewiſe brought over to their Alliance the *Oſiſmians*, *Lexovians*, *Nannetes*, *Ambiani*, *Morini*, *Diablintes*, and *Menapians*; and diſpatched Ambaſſadors into *Britain*, which lies over-againſt their Coaſt, to ſolicit Aſſiſtance from thence.

X. ALL theſe Difficulties before-mentioned attended the proſecution of this War: But *Cæſar* was urged by many Conſiderations to undertake and carry it on with Vigour: The Inſult offered to the Commonwealth in detaining the *Roman* Knights: A Revolt, and Inſurrection, after Submiſſion, and Hoſtages given: The Confederacy of ſo many States: Above all his Fear, leſt by neglecting to oppoſe theſe firſt Commotions, he ſhould give Encouragement to the other Provinces of *Gaul* to follow the Example. Reflecting therefore upon the Genius and Temper of the *Gauls*, fond of Revolutions, and ever forward and ready to engage in new Wars; and conſidering at the ſame time, that it was the

the natural Bent and Diſpoſition of Mankind, to aſpire after Liberty, and abhor the Yoke of Servitude; he determined, before the Infection ſhould ſpread wider, to divide his Army, and diſtribute it into the ſeveral Provinces of *Gaul*.

XI. PURSUANT to this Deſign, *T. Labienus* his Lieutenant was ſent with the Cavalry to *Treves*, whoſe Territory extends along the Banks of the *Rhine*. To him he gave it in charge, to take a Progreſs to *Rheims*, and the other *Belgian* States, in order to retain them in Obedience; as likewiſe to oppoſe the *Germans*, ſhould they attempt by Force the Paſſage of the River; a Report then prevailing that they had been invited over by the *Belgians*. *P. Craſſus*, with twelve Legionary Cohorts, and a great Body of Horſe, had Orders to march into *Aquitain*, to prevent the Arrival of any Supplies from that Quarter, and the Junction of the Forces of ſo many powerful Nations. *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, at the head of three Legions, entered the Country of the *Unellians*, *Curioſolitæ*, and *Lexovians*, to find Employment for the Troops that had been drawn together in thoſe Parts. To young *Brutus* he gave the Command of the Fleet, and of all the Veſſels from *Gaul*, which he had ordered to be fitted out by the *Santones*, *Pictones*, and other Provinces that continued in Obedience; ſtrongly recommending to him at the ſame time, to uſe the greateſt Diſpatch, and ſail with all Expedition for the *Venetian* Coaſt. He himſelf, at the head of the Land-army, ſet out upon his march thither.

XII. THE Situation of moſt of the Towns in thoſe Parts is ſuch, that ſtanding upon the Edges of Promontories, or upon Points of Land that run out into the Sea, there is no approaching them with an Army at high-water, which happens always twice in twelve Hours. Neither is it poſſible for a Fleet to draw near: becauſe upon the Receſs of the Tide, the Ships would be in danger of being daſhed againſt the Shallows and banks of Sand. Both theſe Reaſons therefore concurred to ſecure their Towns from Aſſault: And if at any time, by the greatneſs of the Works carried on againſt them, and huge artificial Mounts, that ſerved to prevent the Ingreſs of the Sea, and were raiſed to an Height nearly equalling their Walls, they ſaw themſelves reduced to Extremity; then, by bringing up their Ships, of which they had always a great Number in readineſs, they eaſily found means to carry off their Effects, and withdraw into the neareſt Towns, where they again defended themſelves by the ſame Advantages of Situation as before. In this manner did they elude all *Cæſar*'s Attempts during a great part of the Summer, and that with ſo much the more Succeſs, becauſe our Fleet was kept back by Tempeſts, and found the Navigation extremely dangerous in that vaſt and boundleſs Ocean, where the Tides are great, and the Havens both few in Number, and at a conſiderable diſtance one from another.

XIII. FOR the *Venetian* Ships were built and fitted out in this manner. Their Bottoms were ſomewhat flatter than ours, the better to adapt themſelves to the Shallows, and ſuſtain without Danger the regreſs of the Tides. Their Prows were very high and erect, as likewiſe their Sterns, to bear the hugeneſs of the Billows, and the violence of Tempeſts. The Body of the Veſſel was entirely of Oak, to ſtand the Shocks and Aſſaults of that tempeſtuous Ocean. The Benches of the Rowers were made of ſtrong Beams of about a Foot in breadth, and faſtened with iron Nails an Inch thick. Inſtead of Cables they ſecured their Anchors with Chains of Iron; and made uſe of Skins, and a ſort of thin pliant Leather, by way of Sails: either becauſe they

wanted Canvas, and were ignorant of the Art of making Sail-cloth; or, which is more probable, becauſe they imagined that Canvas-ſails were not ſo proper to bear the Violence of Tempeſts, the Rage and Fury of the Winds, and to govern Ships of that Bulk and Burden. Between our Fleet, and Veſſels of ſuch a make, the nature of the Encounter was this; that in Agility, and a ready Command of Oars, we had indeed the Advantage; but in other Reſpects, regarding the Situation of the Coaſt, and the Aſſaults of Storms, all things ran very much in their Favour: For neither could our Ships injure them with their Beaks, ſo great was their Strength and Firmneſs; nor could we eaſily throw in our Darts, becauſe of their height above us: Which alſo was the Reaſon, that we found it extremely difficult to grapple the Enemy, and bring them to cloſe Fight. Add to all this, that when the Sea began to rage, and they were forced to ſubmit to the Pleaſure of the Winds, they could both weather the Storm better, and more ſecurely truſt themſelves among the Shallows, as fearing nothing from the Rocks and Cliffs, upon the Receſs of the Tide. The *Romans*, on the other hand, had reaſon to be under a continual dread of theſe and ſuch like Accidents.

XIV. *CÆSAR* having taken many of their Towns, and finding that he only fatigued his Army to no purpoſe, becauſe he could neither prevent the Retreat of the Enemy, nor force their Garriſons to a Surrender; reſolved to wait the Arrival of his Fleet. Which being accordingly come up, was no ſooner deſcried by the *Venetians*, than about two hundred and twenty of their beſt Ships, well equipped for Service, and furniſhed with all kind of Weapons, ſtood out to Sea, and drew up in order of Battle againſt us. Neither *Brutus* who commanded the Fleet, nor the Centurions and military Tribunes who had the Charge of particular Veſſels, knew what Courſe to take, or in what manner to conduct the Fight. For they were no Strangers to the Strength and Firmneſs of the *Venetian* Shipping, which rendered them proof againſt our Beaks: And when they had even raiſed Turrets upon the Decks, yet being ſtill over-topped by the lofty Sterns of the Enemy, the *Romans* could not with any Advantage throw in their Darts; whereas thoſe ſent by the *Gauls*, coming from above, deſcended with great Violence on our Men. In this Exigence, a particular kind of Inſtrument uſed by the Mariners, proved of ſignal Service in giving a favourable Iſſue to the Combat. They had provided themſelves with long Poles, armed at one end with ſharp Scythes, not unlike thoſe made uſe of in attacking the Walls of Towns. With theſe they laid hold of the Enemy's Tackle, and drawing off the Galley by the extreme Force of Oars, cut aſunder the Ropes that faſtened the Sail-yards to the Maſt. Theſe giving way, the Sail-yards neceſſarily came down; inſomuch that as all the Hopes and Expectations of the *Gauls* depended etirely on their Sails and Rigging, by depriving them of this Reſource, we at the ſame time rendered their Veſſels wholly unſerviceable. The reſt depended all together upon the Valour of the Troops, in which the *Romans* had greatly the Advantage; and the rather, becauſe they fought within View of *Cæſar* and the whole Army, ſo that not a ſingle Act of Bravery could paſs unobſerved: For all the adjoining Hills and Eminences, which afforded a near Proſpect of the Sea, were covered with our Men.

XV. THE Enemy's Sail-yards being, as we have ſaid, cut down; and many of their Ships ſingly ſurrounded by two or three of ours at a time; the *Romans* uſed their utmoſt Endeavours to board them. Which the *Venetians* obſerving, and that we had already made ourſelves Maſters of a great part of their Fleet;

as

as they could fall upon no Expedient to prevent ſo great a Misfortune, they began to think of providing for their Safety by flight. Accordingly they tacked about, in order to have the Advantage of the Wind; when all of a ſudden ſo dead a Calm enſued, that not a Veſſel could ſtir out of its Place. Nor could any thing have fallen out more opportunely towards putting at once a final Period to the War; for the *Romans* attacking their Ships one after another, took them with eaſe; inſomuch that of all that vaſt Number that came out againſt us, but a very few, under favour of the Night, eſcaped ſafe to Land, after a Conflict that continued from nine in the Morning 'till Sun-ſet.

XVI. THIS Battle put an end to the War with the *Venetians*, and all the Nations upon the Sea-Coaſt. For as the entire Body of their Youth, and all thoſe alſo of more advanced Age, who were capable of ſerving their Country by their Credit and Counſels, were preſent in the Action; and as they had likewiſe drawn together their whole naval Strength: Such as ſurvived this Defeat, having neither any place of refuge whereunto to retire, nor means left of defending their Towns, ſurrendered themſelves and their all to *Cæſar*'s Mercy. But he thought it neceſſary to proceed againſt them with the greater Severity, that he might impreſs upon the Minds of the *Gauls* for the future, a more inviolable Regard to the ſacred Character of Ambaſſadors. Having therefore cauſed all their Senators to be put to death, he ordered the reſt to be ſold for Slaves.

XVII. DURING theſe Tranſactions againſt the *Venetians*, Q. *Titurius Sabinus* entered the Territories of the *Unellians*, at the head of the Troops put under his Command by *Cæſar*. *Viridovix* was inveſted with the ſupreme Authority in theſe Parts, and had been appointed General in chief, by all the States concerned in the Revolt; out of which he had drawn together a very numerous and powerful Army. Nay but a very few Days before, the *Aulerci*, *Eburovices*, and *Lexovians*, having maſſacred their Senate, becauſe they refuſed to engage in the War, had ſhut their Gates againſt the *Romans*, and joined themſelves to *Viridovix*. Beſides all this, he had very much ſtrengthened his Army by the great numbers that flocked to him from all parts of *Gaul*; Men of deſperate Fortunes, or accuſtomed to live by robbery, whom the hopes of Plunder, and love of War, had drawn off from the daily Labours of their Calling, and the Cares of Agriculture.

XVIII. *SABINUS* kept cloſe within his Camp, which was ſituated in a manner every way advantageous; while *Viridovix*, who had poſted himſelf at the diſtance of about two Miles, daily drew out his Men, and offered him Battle. This Behaviour of the *Roman* General, not only drew upon him the Contempt of the Enemy, but occaſioned alſo ſome murmuring among his own Troops, and filled the *Gauls* with ſo high a Conceit of his Fear, that they even adventured to come up to his very Trenches. The Reaſon of his acting in this manner was, that he thought it not juſtifiable in a Lieutenant, in the Abſence of the Commander in chief, to hazard a Battle with ſo ſuperior an Army, unleſs upon Terms of evident Advantage.

XIX. HAVING confirmed them in this Belief, that his Reſerve was the effect of Fear; he made choice of a certain *Gaul* from among the Auxiliaries, a Man of Addreſs, and every way qualified for carrying on his Deſign. Him he

he perſuaded by great Rewards, and ſtill greater Promiſes, to go over to the Enemy, inſtructing him at the ſame time in the Part he was to act. This *Gaul* coming to their Camp as a Deſerter, laid before them the Fear of the *Romans*, and the Extremities to which *Cæſar* was reduced in the War againſt the *Venetians*: Nor did he fail to inſinuate, that there was great Reaſon to believe *Sabinus* intended the next Night privately to draw off his Army, and march to *Cæſar*'s Aſſiſtance. No ſooner was this heard by the *Gauls*, than they all cried out with one Voice, that they ought not to loſe ſo fair an Occaſion of Succeſs, but go and attack the *Roman* Camp. Many Reaſons concurred to fix them in this Reſolution: The Reſerve of *Sabinus* for ſome Days paſt: The Intelligence from the Deſerter confirming their belief of his Fear: The want of Proviſions, of which they had taken no great Care to lay in a ſufficient Stock: The Hopes conceived from the *Venetian* War: And in fine, that readineſs with which Men are apt to believe what falls in with their Expectations and Wiſhes. Urged by theſe Conſiderations, they would not ſuffer *Viridovix* and the reſt of the General Officers to diſmiſs the Council, before they had obtained their Conſent for the taking up of Arms, and falling upon the *Roman* Camp. The Propoſal being at laſt agreed to, they provided themſelves with Faſcines and Hurdles to fill up the Ditch, and joyfully began their march, as to a certain Victory.

XX. THE *Roman* Camp ſtood upon an Eminence, which roſe with a gentle Aſcent, for the ſpace of about a Mile. Hither the *Gauls* advanced with ſo much haſte, in order to come upon our Troops unprepared, that by that time they were arrived, they had run themſelves quite out of Breath. *Sabinus* having encouraged his Men, whom he ſaw eager to engage, gave the Word of Onſet. As the Enemy were very much incumbred with the Loads of Faſcines they had brought to fill up the Ditch, he ordered a ſudden Sally from two ſeveral Gates of the Camp: And ſo well did it ſucceed, by reaſon of the Advantage of the Ground, the Inexperience and Wearineſs of the *Gauls*, the Bravery of the *Roman* Troops, and their Ability acquired in former Battles; that the Enemy could not ſuſtain the very firſt Charge of our Men, but immediately betook themſelves to flight. The *Romans*, who were freſh and vigorous, purſuing them under all theſe Diſadvantages, put great numbers to the Sword; and the reſt being followed by the Cavalry, very few eſcaped the Slaughter. Thus at one and the ſame time *Sabinus* had an Account of the Defeat of the *Venetians* by Sea, and *Cæſar* of the Victory obtained by *Sabinus* at Land. All the ſeveral States in thoſe Parts readily ſubmitted to *Titurius*: For as the *Gauls* are very prompt and forward to undertake a War, ſo are they of a Diſpoſition that eaſily relents and gives way to the Strokes of Adverſity.

XXI. MUCH about the ſame time *P. Craſſus* arrived in *Aquitain*; a Country, which as we have before obſerved, for extent of Territory, and number of Inhabitants, is deſervedly accounted a third Part of *Gaul*. This General underſtanding that he was to conduct a War in thoſe Parts, where but a few Years before *L. Valerius Præconinus* had been ſlain, and his Army put to the rout; and whence *L. Manilius* the Proconſul had been driven with the loſs of his Baggage: ſoon became ſenſible that he muſt act with more than ordinary Circumſpection and Vigour. Having therefore made Proviſion of Corn, aſſembled his auxiliary Troops and Cavalry, and ſtrengthened his Army with a choice Body of Volunteers, drawn together by name from *Toulouſe*, *Carcaſo*, and *Narbonne*, which States make up that part of the *Roman* Province that lies the

neareſt

wanted Canvas, and were ignorant of the Art of making Sail-cloth; or, which is more probable, becauſe they imagined that Canvas-ſails were not ſo proper to bear the Violence of Tempeſts, the Rage and Fury of the Winds, and to govern Ships of that Bulk and Burden. Between our Fleet, and Veſſels of ſuch a make, the nature of the Encounter was this; that in Agility, and a ready Command of Oars, we had indeed the Advantage; but in other Reſpects, regarding the Situation of the Coaſt, and the Aſſaults of Storms, all things ran very much in their Favour: For neither could our Ships injure them with their Beaks, ſo great was their Strength and Firmneſs; nor could we eaſily throw in our Darts, becauſe of their height above us: Which alſo was the Reaſon, that we found it extremely difficult to grapple the Enemy, and bring them to cloſe Fight. Add to all this, that when the Sea began to rage, and they were forced to ſubmit to the Pleaſure of the Winds, they could both weather the Storm better, and more ſecurely truſt themſelves among the Shallows, as fearing nothing from the Rocks and Cliffs, upon the Receſs of the Tide. The *Romans*, on the other hand, had reaſon to be under a continual dread of theſe and ſuch like Accidents.

XIV. *CÆSAR* having taken many of their Towns, and finding that he only fatigued his Army to no purpoſe, becauſe he could neither prevent the Retreat of the Enemy, nor force their Garriſons to a Surrender; reſolved to wait the Arrival of his Fleet. Which being accordingly come up, was no ſooner deſcried by the *Venetians*, than about two hundred and twenty of their beſt Ships, well equipped for Service, and furniſhed with all kind of Weapons, ſtood out to Sea, and drew up in order of Battle againſt us. Neither *Brutus* who commanded the Fleet, nor the Centurions and military Tribunes who had the Charge of particular Veſſels, knew what Courſe to take, or in what manner to conduct the Fight. For they were no Strangers to the Strength and Firmneſs of the *Venetian* Shipping, which rendered them proof againſt our Beaks: And when they had even raiſed Turrets upon the Decks, yet being ſtill over-topped by the lofty Sterns of the Enemy, the *Romans* could not with any Advantage throw in their Darts; whereas thoſe ſent by the *Gauls*, coming from above, deſcended with great Violence on our Men. In this Exigence, a particular kind of Inſtrument uſed by the Mariners, proved of ſignal Service in giving a favourable Iſſue to the Combat. They had provided themſelves with long Poles, armed at one end with ſharp Scythes, not unlike thoſe made uſe of in attacking the Walls of Towns. With theſe they laid hold of the Enemy's Tackle, and drawing off the Galley by the extreme Force of Oars, cut aſunder the Ropes that faſtened the Sail-yards to the Maſt. Theſe giving way, the Sail-yards neceſſarily came down; inſomuch that as all the Hopes and Expectations of the *Gauls* depended etirely on their Sails and Rigging, by depriving them of this Reſource, we at the ſame time rendered their Veſſels wholly unſerviceable. The reſt depended all together upon the Valour of the Troops, in which the *Romans* had greatly the Advantage; and the rather, becauſe they fought within View of *Cæſar* and the whole Army, ſo that not a ſingle Act of Bravery could paſs unobſerved: For all the adjoining Hills and Eminences, which afforded a near Proſpect of the Sea, were covered with our Men.

XV. THE Enemy's Sail-yards being, as we have ſaid, cut down; and many of their Ships ſingly ſurrounded by two or three of ours at a time; the *Romans* uſed their utmoſt Endeavours to board them. Which the *Venetians* obſerving, and that we had already made ourſelves Maſters of a great part of their Fleet;

as

as they could fall upon no Expedient to prevent ſo great a Misfortune, they began to think of providing for their Safety by flight. Accordingly they tacked about, in order to have the Advantage of the Wind; when all of a ſudden ſo dead a Calm enſued, that not a Veſſel could ſtir out of its Place. Nor could any thing have fallen out more opportunely towards putting at once a final Period to the War; for the *Romans* attacking their Ships one after another, took them with eaſe; inſomuch that of all that vaſt Number that came out againſt us, but a very few, under favour of the Night, eſcaped ſafe to Land, after a Conflict that continued from nine in the Morning 'till Sun-ſet.

XVI. THIS Battle put an end to the War with the *Venetians*, and all the Nations upon the Sea-Coaſt. For as the entire Body of their Youth, and all thoſe alſo of more advanced Age, who were capable of ſerving their Country by their Credit and Counſels, were preſent in the Action; and as they had likewiſe drawn together their whole naval Strength: Such as ſurvived this Defeat, having neither any place of refuge whereunto to retire, nor means left of defending their Towns, ſurrendered themſelves and their all to *Cæſar*'s Mercy. But he thought it neceſſary to proceed againſt them with the greater Severity, that he might impreſs upon the Minds of the *Gauls* for the future, a more inviolable Regard to the ſacred Character of Ambaſſadors. Having therefore cauſed all their Senators to be put to death, he ordered the reſt to be ſold for Slaves.

XVII. DURING theſe Tranſactions againſt the *Venetians*, *Q. Titurius Sabinus* entered the Territories of the *Unellians*, at the head of the Troops put under his Command by *Cæſar*. *Viridovix* was inveſted with the ſupreme Authority in theſe Parts, and had been appointed General in chief, by all the States concerned in the Revolt; out of which he had drawn together a very numerous and powerful Army. Nay but a very few Days before, the *Aulerci*, *Eburovices*, and *Lexovians*, having maſſacred their Senate, becauſe they refuſed to engage in the War, had ſhut their Gates againſt the *Romans*, and joined themſelves to *Viridovix*. Beſides all this, he had very much ſtrengthened his Army by the great numbers that flocked to him from all parts of *Gaul*; Men of deſperate Fortunes, or accuſtomed to live by robbery, whom the hopes of Plunder, and love of War, had drawn off from the daily Labours of their Calling, and the Cares of Agriculture.

XVIII. *SABINUS* kept cloſe within his Camp, which was ſituated in a manner every way advantageous; while *Viridovix*, who had poſted himſelf at the diſtance of about two Miles, daily drew out his Men, and offered him Battle. This Behaviour of the *Roman* General, not only drew upon him the Contempt of the Enemy, but occaſioned alſo ſome murmuring among his own Troops, and filled the *Gauls* with ſo high a Conceit of his Fear, that they even adventured to come up to his very Trenches. The Reaſon of his acting in this manner was, that he thought it not juſtifiable in a Lieutenant, in the Abſence of the Commander in chief, to hazard a Battle with ſo ſuperior an Army, unleſs upon Terms of evident Advantage.

XIX. HAVING confirmed them in this Belief, that his Reſerve was the effect of Fear; he made choice of a certain *Gaul* from among the Auxiliaries, a Man of Addreſs, and every way qualified for carrying on his Deſign. Him he

he perſuaded by great Rewards, and ſtill greater Promiſes, to go over to the Enemy, inſtructing him at the ſame time in the Part he was to act. This *Gaul* coming to their Camp as a Deſerter, laid before them the Fear of the *Romans*, and the Extremities to which *Cæſar* was reduced in the War againſt the *Venetians*: Nor did he fail to inſinuate, that there was great Reaſon to believe *Sabinus* intended the next Night privately to draw off his Army, and march to *Cæſar*'s Aſſiſtance. No ſooner was this heard by the *Gauls*, than they all cried out with one Voice, that they ought not to loſe ſo fair an Occaſion of Succeſs, but go and attack the *Roman* Camp. Many Reaſons concurred to fix them in this Reſolution: The Reſerve of *Sabinus* for ſome Days paſt: The Intelligence from the Deſerter confirming their belief of his Fear: The want of Proviſions, of which they had taken no great Care to lay in a ſufficient Stock: The Hopes conceived from the *Venetian* War: And in fine, that readineſs with which Men are apt to believe what falls in with their Expectations and Wiſhes. Urged by theſe Conſiderations, they would not ſuffer *Viridovix* and the reſt of the General Officers to diſmiſs the Council, before they had obtained their Conſent for the taking up of Arms, and falling upon the *Roman* Camp. The Propoſal being at laſt agreed to, they provided themſelves with Faſcines and Hurdles to fill up the Ditch, and joyfully began their march, as to a certain Victory.

XX. THE *Roman* Camp ſtood upon an Eminence, which roſe with a gentle Aſcent, for the ſpace of about a Mile. Hither the *Gauls* advanced with ſo much haſte, in order to come upon our Troops unprepared, that by that time they were arrived, they had run themſelves quite out of Breath. *Sabinus* having encouraged his Men, whom he ſaw eager to engage, gave the Word of Onſet. As the Enemy were very much incumbred with the Loads of Faſcines they had brought to fill up the Ditch, he ordered a ſudden Sally from two ſeveral Gates of the Camp: And ſo well did it ſucceed, by reaſon of the Advantage of the Ground, the Inexperience and Wearineſs of the *Gauls*, the Bravery of the *Roman* Troops, and their Ability acquired in former Battles; that the Enemy could not ſuſtain the very firſt Charge of our Men, but immediately betook themſelves to flight. The *Romans*, who were freſh and vigorous, purſuing them under all theſe Diſadvantages, put great numbers to the Sword; and the reſt being followed by the Cavalry, very few eſcaped the Slaughter. Thus at one and the ſame time *Sabinus* had an Account of the Defeat of the *Venetians* by Sea, and *Cæſar* of the Victory obtained by *Sabinus* at Land. All the ſeveral States in thoſe Parts readily ſubmitted to *Titurius*: For as the *Gauls* are very prompt and forward to undertake a War, ſo are they of a Diſpoſition that eaſily relents and gives way to the Strokes of Adverſity.

XXI. MUCH about the ſame time *P. Craſſus* arrived in *Aquitain*; a Country, which as we have before obſerved, for extent of Territory, and number of Inhabitants, is deſervedly accounted a third Part of *Gaul*. This General underſtanding that he was to conduct a War in thoſe Parts, where but a few Years before *L. Valerius Præconinus* had been ſlain, and his Army put to the rout; and whence *L. Manilius* the Proconſul had been driven with the loſs of his Baggage: ſoon became ſenſible that he muſt act with more than ordinary Circumſpection and Vigour. Having therefore made Proviſion of Corn, aſſembled his auxiliary Troops and Cavalry, and ſtrengthened his Army with a choice Body of Volunteers, drawn together by name from *Toulouſe*, *Carcaſo*, and *Narbonne*, which States make up that part of the *Roman* Province that lies the

neareſt

neareſt to *Aquitain* ; he advanced with all his Forces into the Territories of the *Sotiates*. Theſe, upon the firſt notice of his Arrival, having levied a great Army, and attacking him in his march with the whole Body of their Cavalry, in which their chief ſtrength conſiſted, were nevertheleſs repulſed and purſued by our Men. But all on a ſudden their Infantry appearing in a Valley, where they had been deſignedly placed in Ambuſh, fell furiouſly upon the *Romans* diſordered with the Purſuit, and renewed the Fight.

XXII. THE Battle was long and obſtinate. For the *Sotiates*, proud of their former Victories, imagined that the Fate of all *Aquitain* depended ſingly on their Bravery. The *Romans*, on the other hand, were ambitious of ſhewing what they could atchieve under a young Leader, in the Abſence of their General, and unſupported by the reſt of the Legions. At length however, the Enemy overpowered with Wounds, betook themſelves to flight; and a great Slaughter enſuing, *Craſſus* marched immediately and inveſted their Capital; where meeting with a brave Reſiſtance, he was forced to make his Approaches by Towers and Mantelets. The Enemy ſometimes ſallying out, ſometimes carrying on their Mines to our very Works, (in which kind of Service the *Aquitains* are particularly skilful, as inhabiting a Country that abounds in Veins of Copper;) when they ſaw that the Diligence of the *Romans* enabled them to ſurmount all theſe Difficulties, ſent Ambaſſadors to *Craſſus*, and requeſted they might be admitted to a Surrender. Which being accordingly agreed to, they in Obedience to his Deſire delivered up their Arms.

XXIII. BUT while the *Romans* were wholly intent upon the execution of the Treaty: *Adiatomus*, who commanded in chief, endeavoured to eſcape on the other ſide of the Town, with a Body of ſix hundred ſworn Friends, who in the Language of the Country are called *Soldurians*. Their condition and manner of Life is this: To live in a perfect Community of Goods with thoſe to whom they have engaged themſelves in Friendſhip: If any Misfortune befals them, to ſhare in it, or make away with themſelves: Nor is there a ſingle Inſtance of any one upon Record, who upon the death of him to whom he had vowed a Friendſhip, refuſed to ſubmit to the ſame Fate. *Adiatomus*, as we have ſaid, endeavouring to make his Eſcape with this Body of Friends, and the Alarm being given on that Side of the Works, the Soldiers immediately ran to Arms; when a furious Combat enſued, in which he was at laſt repulſed, and driven back into the Town. He obtained however from *Craſſus* the ſame Conditions of Surrender as had been granted to the reſt of the Inhabitants.

XXIV. *CRASSUS* having received their Arms and Hoſtages, led his Troops into the Territories of the *Vocatians* and *Tarusatians*. But now the *Gauls*, rouſed by the unexpected Progreſs of the *Romans*, who had in a few Days after their Arrival made themſelves maſters of a Town ſtrongly fortified both by Art and Nature; began to ſend Ambaſſadors into all Parts; to join in a mutual League; to ratify their Engagements by an exchange of Hoſtages; and to levy Troops. Ambaſſadors were likewiſe diſpatched to all the States of hither *Spain* that bordered upon *Aquitain*, to ſolicit a Supply of Troops and Leaders: Upon whoſe Arrival, they immediately took the Field with great Confidence, and a numerous and well appointed Army. None were ſuffered to command but ſuch as had ſerved under *Sertorius*, and were

therefore accounted Men of conſummate Ability and Experience in the Art of War. Theſe, according to the Cuſtom of the *Romans*, made it their Study to chooſe a Camp to Advantage; to ſecure themſelves by Lines and Intrenchments; and to intercept our Convoys. *Craſſus* perceiving their Deſign; as his own Army was not ſtrong enough to admit of ſending out Detachments; and as the *Gauls* could upon all Occaſions employ numerous Parties, poſſeſs themſelves of the Paſſes, and at the ſame time have a ſufficient number of Troops to guard the Camp; by which means he foreſaw he muſt ſoon be reduced to great Straits for want of Proviſions, while the Enemy would be every Day growing more powerful: He for all theſe Reaſons reſolved not to delay coming to an Engagement. Having laid his Deſign before a Council of War, and finding them unanimous in their Approbation of it, he appointed the next Day for the Engagement.

XXV. EARLY in the Morning he drew all his Forces out of the Camp, and diſpoſing them in two Lines, with the auxiliary Troops in the Center, ſtood expecting what Reſolution the Enemy would take. But the *Gauls*, tho' they believed they might ſafely hazard a Battle, on account of their Numbers, their former Renown in War, and the Handful of Men they were to oppoſe; yet thought it would be ſtill better, by ſeizing the Paſſes, and intercepting our Convoys, to ſecure the Victory without Expence of Blood: And ſhould the want of Proviſions at length force the *Romans* to think of a Retreat; they might then fall upon them embaraſſed in their march, incumbered with their Baggage, and dejected by their Misfortunes. This Reſolution being approved by all their Leaders, they kept within their Camp, tho' our Men appeared before them in Order of Battle.

XXVI. *CRASSUS* perceiving their Deſign, and that this Delay ſerved rather to abate the Courage of the Enemy, and add freſh Spirits to his own Men, among whom an univerſal Cry aroſe, that he ought no longer to put off the Engagement, but march directly to their Camp: Having encouraged his Troops, he reſolved to give way to their preſent Ardor, and accordingly led them to the Aſſault. There ſome were employed in filling up the Ditch; others in driving the Enemy with their Darts from the Works; while the Auxiliaries, in whom *Craſſus* had no great Confidence, yet that they might appear to have ſome ſhare at leaſt in the Engagement, were appointed to carry Stones and Darts to them that fought, and to ſupply Materials for raiſing the Mount. At the ſame time the Enemy fought with great Conſtancy and Reſolution, and made no ſmall Havock with their Darts, which came upon us from above. During this warmth of Oppoſition, the Cavalry having taken a Compaſs round the Camp, came and told *Craſſus*, that the Intrenchments were not fortified with the ſame Care in all Parts, and that it would be eaſy to force an Entrance by the poſtern Gate.

XXVII. *CRASSUS* having exhorted the Officers of the Cavalry to encourage their Men by great Rewards and Promiſes, inſtructed them in the Part they were to act. They, in conſequence of the Orders they had received, drawing out four Cohorts, which having been left to guard the Camp, were quite freſh and fit for Action; and fetching with them a large Compaſs, that they might not be ſeen from the Enemy's Camp; while the Eyes and Minds of all were intent upon the Combat, fell ſuddenly upon that Part of the Intrenchments of which we have ſpoken above; and having forced their way

way through, were actually got within the Camp before they were ſo much as ſeen by the Enemy, or any Apprehenſion entertained of what they were about. Upon this a great Uproar being heard on that ſide, our Men redoubled their Efforts, and as always happens to Troops animated with the hopes of Victory, began to puſh the *Gauls* with greater Fury than ever. The Enemy thus ſurrounded on all ſides, and without hopes of retrieving their Affairs, endeavoured to make their Eſcape over the Rampart, and ſave themſelves by Flight. But being purſued by the Cavalry, who ſoon came up with them in theſe open and level Plains: of fifty thouſand Men that had been drawn together out of *Spain* and *Aquitain*, ſcarce a fourth Part eſcaped; nor did the Horſe return to the Camp till very late in the Evening, after they had quite tired themſelves with the Slaughter.

XXVIII. UPON the Report of this Defeat, the greateſt part of *Aquitain* immediately ſubmitted to *Craſſus*, and of their own accord ſent him Hoſtages. Of this number were the *Tarbelli*, *Bigerriones*, *Preciani*, *Vocates*, *Taruſates*, *Eluſates*, *Garites*, *Auſci*, *Garumni*, *Siburzates*, and *Cocaſates*. Only a few Nations, and thoſe the moſt remote, relying on the Seaſon of the Year, becauſe the Winter was at hand, neglected to take this ſtep.

XXIX. MUCH about the ſame time *Cæſar*, tho' the Summer was now almoſt ſpent; yet becauſe all the reſt of *Gaul* being ſubdued, the *Morini* and *Menapians* were ſtill in Arms, and had not ſent Ambaſſadors to treat about a Peace; reſolved to lead his Army againſt them, hoping he ſhould ſoon be able to put an end to that War. Their manner of oppoſing him was very different from that of the other *Gauls*. For underſtanding that the moſt powerful Nations, when it came to a Battle, had always been overthrown and put to rout; and inhabiting themſelves a Country that abounded in Woods and Marſhes, they retired thither with all their Effects. *Cæſar* coming to the Entrance of the Wood, began to intrench himſelf: and although no Enemy in the mean time appeared, yet no ſooner had our Men diſperſed themſelves in order to ſet about fortifying the Camp, than on a ſudden they came pouring upon us from all parts of the Wood, and charged with great Briskneſs. The *Romans* immediately flew to their Arms, and drove them back with conſiderable Slaughter; but adventuring a little too far into the Wood, loſt ſome Men.

XXX. *CÆSAR* ſpent the remaining Days in cutting down the Wood; and to ſcreen his Men from any ſudden and unexpected Attack, ordered the Trees that had been felled to be placed on each ſide the Army, that they might ſerve as a Barricade againſt the Attempts of the Enemy. Having with incredible Diſpatch advanced a great way into the Wood in a few Days, inſomuch that all their Cattle and Baggage fell into our Hands; they themſelves retired into the thicker and more covered ſpaces of the Foreſt. The Seaſon growing bad, we were forced to intermit the Work; and the Rains ſoon became ſo violent and continual, that the Soldiers could no longer endure to lie in their Tents. Wherefore *Cæſar*, having laid waſte their Lands, and ſet fire to their Towns and Houſes, led back his Army, and diſpoſed it into Winter-quarters among the *Aulerci*, *Lexovians*, and other States whom he had laſt ſubdued.

C. JULIUS

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK IV.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. *The* Uſipetes *and* Tenchtheri, German *Nations, expelled by the* Suevians, *come over into* Gaul. II. *The Manners and way of Life of the* Suevians. III. *And of the* Ubians. IV. *The* Uſipetes *and* Tenchtheri *drive the* Menapians *from their Habitations.* V. Cæſar *knowing the wavering and unſettled Temper of the* Gauls, *repairs early in the Spring to the Army.* VI. *Embaſſy of the* Germans *to* Cæſar, *and his Anſwer.* IX. *An Action between the Cavalry, in which the* Germans *have the advantage.* X. *But are afterwards driven from their Camp with great Slaughter.* XIII. *And purſued by* Cæſar, *who makes a Bridge over the* Rhine *for that purpoſe.* XVI. Cæſar *lays waſte the Territories of* Sigambri. XVII. *And having freed the* Ubians *from the ſervitude under which they lived, returns into* Gaul. XVIII. *He then paſſes over into* Britain. XXII. *And lands his Army with great difficulty, the Natives making a vigorous Oppoſition.* XXIV. *They are defeated at length, and ſend Ambaſſadors to ſue for Peace.* XXVI. Cæſar's *Fleet almoſt entirely ruined by a Storm, which induces the* Britons *to revolt.* XXIX. *Their way of fighting from their Chariots.* XXX. *Which diſconcerts the* Romans *at firſt.* XXXI. *But being again put to flight, they obtain Peace.* XXXII. *After which* Cæſar *returns into* Gaul. XXXIII. *And marching againſt the* Morini, *whom the hope of Plunder tempted to fall upon ſome of his detached Parties, obliges them to ſubmit.*

21 22 23 24 25 SEPT

52 51 50 49 48

BRITAN

OCEANUS GERMANICUS.

Scaldis ostium

Rheni ostium

Tamesis Flumen

Cantium promontorium

CANTIUM.

Dubris portus

NIÆ PARS.

Oceani Britannicum Gallicum

Ierium

Itium promontorium

Itius portus

OCEANUS BRITANICUS.

ATREBATES.

Nemetacum

Scaldis fl.

Bagacum

Samara fl.

Samarobriga

AMBIANI.

BELGIUM,

cujus incolæ

BELLOVACI.

CALETI.

VELLOCASSES.

Nemetocerna

Noviodunum

SUESSIONES

Bratuspatium Cæsaromagum

Esia fl.

LEXOBII.

Sequana fl.

RHEMI.

AULERCI ERUROVICES.

Matrona amnis

Lutetia

PARISII.

CARNUTES.

Autricum

Melicdunum

Sequana

Millia Passuum

20 40

Genabum

OCCIDENS

21 22 23 24 25 MER

No 19

GERMANIÆ CISRHENANÆ

ut circa Iulii Cæsaris fuit ætatem, descriptio.

Auctore PHIL. CLUVERIO.

SEPTENTRIO 26 27 28 29 30

MERIDIES 26 27 28 29 30

52 51 50 ORIENS 49 48

Rheni ostium

ostium

Rhenus amnis, terminus inter Germaniam et Galliam.

MARSI

BATAVORUM Insula.

Vahales Au.

Bata vi.

Mosa amnis

MENAPII.

Scaldes A.

ADUATICI.

Aduatuca

EBURONES

SEGNI. CONDRUSI.

Sigus flu.

Rhetico mons

Rhenus

UBII.

Mosa Au

Sabis A.

Bagacum

PÆMANI CÆRÆSI.

RVII.

Arduenna silva.

Sura Au.

Mosella fl.

TREVERI.

Rhenus Au.

Mænus Au.

SEDUSII.

Nava fl.

Nava fluvius

VANGIONES.

Axona fluvius

Durocortorum

Saravus sive Saravus fluvius

Divodurum

MEDIOMATRICI.

NEMETES

Mosella Au.

Matrona amnis

Taunus mons

LEUCI.

TREMARCO-MANNI.

BOCCI.

Vosegus mons.

Mosella Au.

SEQUANI.

Sequana A.

Araris A.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK IV.

I. THE following Winter, being that in which *Cn. Pompey* and *M. Craſſus* were Conſuls, the *Uſipetes* and *Tenchtheri*, *German* Nations, paſſed the *Rhine* in a great Body, not far from its Mouth. The Cauſe of their taking this Step was, that being much expoſed to the Hoſtilities of the *Suevians*, they had for many Years been haraſſed with continual Wars, and hindered from cultivating their Lands.

II. THE *Suevians* are by far the moſt warlike and conſiderable of all the *German* Nations. They are ſaid to be compoſed of an hundred Cantons, each of which ſends yearly into the Field a thouſand armed Men. The reſt, who continue in their ſeveral Diſtricts, employ themſelves in cultivating their Lands, that it may furniſh a ſufficient Supply both for themſelves and for the Army. Theſe again take up Arms the following Campaign, and are ſucceeded in the care of the Lands by the Troops that ſerved the Year before. Thus they live in the continual Exerciſe both of Agriculture and War. They allow of no ſuch thing as Property or private Poſſeſſion in the diſtribution of their Lands; their Reſidence, for the ſake of Tillage, being confined to a ſingle Year. Corn is not much in uſe among them, becauſe they prefer a milk or fleſh-diet, and are greatly addicted to Hunting. Thus the Quality of their Food, their perpetual Exerciſe, and free unconfined manner of Life (becauſe being from their Childhood fettered by no Rules of Duty or Education, they acknowledge no Law but Will and Pleaſure) contribute to make them ſtrong, and of an extraordinary Stature. They have likewiſe accuſtomed themſelves, though inhabiting a Climate naturally very cold, to bathe in their Rivers, and clothe themſelves only with Skins, which as they are very ſmall, leave great part of their Body quite uncovered. Merchants indeed reſort to them, but rather to purchaſe their Spoils taken in War, than import any Goods into the Country: for even Beaſts of Carriage, in which the *Gauls* take ſo much delight, that they are ready to purchaſe them at any price, are yet very little valued by the *Germans* when brought among them. And though thoſe of their own Country are both ſmall and very ill ſhaped, yet by daily Exerciſe they make them capable of all kinds of Service. Their Cavalry often diſmount in time of Action,

Action, to fight on foot; and their Horſes are ſo train'd, that they ſtir not from the place where they are left, but wait the return of their Riders, who betake themſelves to them again in caſe of Neceſſity. Nothing is more diſhonourable in their Account, or more oppoſite to their Cuſtoms, than the uſe of Horſe-furniture: and therefore however few themſelves, they ſcruple not to attack any Number of their Enemies whom they ſee ſo equipped. They ſuffer no Wine to be imported into their Territories, as imagining that it both enervates the Mind, and unfits the Body for Exerciſe and Labour. It is accounted much to the Honour of the Nation, to have the Country for a great way round them waſte and uninhabited; for by this they think is intimated, that the united Force of many States has been found inſufficient to withſtand their ſingle Valour. And hence it is, that on one ſide, the Country is ſaid to lie deſolate for the ſpace of ſix hundred Miles.

III. ON the other ſide they are bounded by the *Ubians*, heretofore a flouriſhing and potent People, and ſomewhat more civilized than the other *German* Nations; becauſe inhabiting along the Banks of the *Rhine*, they are much reſorted to by Merchants; and have beſides, by bordering upon the States of *Gaul*, given into many of their Cuſtoms. The *Suevians* having tried the Strength of this People in many Wars, and finding them too numerous and potent to be driven out of their Territories; prevailed yet ſo far as to impoſe a Tribute upon them, and very much reduce and weaken their Power.

IV. THE *Uſipetes* and *Tenchtheri*, of whom we have ſpoken above, were likewiſe engaged in this Quarrel; and after withſtanding the Power of the *Suevians* for many Years, were nevertheleſs at length driven from their Territories. Having wandered over many Regions of *Germany* during the ſpace of three Years, they arrived at laſt upon the Banks of the *Rhine*, towards thoſe Parts inhabited by the *Menapians*, who had Houſes, Lands, and Villages on both ſides the River. But alarmed at the Approach of ſo prodigious a Multitude, they abandoned all their Habitations beyond the *Rhine*; and having diſpoſed their Troops on this ſide the River, ſet themſelves to oppoſe the Paſſage of the *Germans*. Theſe having tried every Expedient; and finding they could neither force the Paſſage, becauſe of their want of Shipping; nor ſteal over privately, by reaſon of the Guards kept by the *Menapians*; counterfeited a Retreat into their own Country; and after three Days march ſuddenly turned back: when their Cavalry recovering all this Ground in the ſpace of one Night, eaſily overpowered the *Menapians*, little expecting or prepared for ſuch a Viſit: for having been appriſed by their Scouts of the Departure of the *Germans*, they had returned, fearleſs of Danger, to their Habitations beyond the *Rhine*. Theſe being all put to the Sword, and their Shipping ſeized; before the *Menapians* on this ſide had intelligence of their Approach, they paſſed the River: and ſeizing all their Towns and Houſes, ſupported themſelves the reſt of the Winter with the Proviſions there found.

V. *CÆSAR* being informed of theſe things, and dreading the Levity of the *Gauls*, who are very changeable in their Counſels, and fond of Novelties; determined to truſt nothing to their Reſolves. For it is the Cuſtom of that People to ſtop Travellers even againſt their will, and enquire of them what they have heard or know relating to any Affair: And in their Towns, upon the Arrival of a foreign Merchant, they gather round him in crowds, and oblige him to tell what Country he comes from, and how things ſtood at his Departure.

Moved

A SUEVIAN.

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Moved by theſe Reports, they often enter upon the moſt important Deliberations, and concert Meaſures they ſoon have cauſe to repent, as being founded wholly on vain Rumours, and Anſwers feigned for the moſt part deſignedly to pleaſe them. *Cæſar*, who was aware of this Cuſtom, fearing the War if neglected might become formidable, made all the haſte he could to join the Army. Upon his Arrival he found, that things were fallen out exactly as he had foreſeen. Some of the States of *Gaul* had ſent Ambaſſadors to the *Germans*, inviting them to leave the Banks of the *Rhine*, and aſſuring them that all their Demands ſhould be readily complied with. The *Germans*, allured by theſe Hopes, were already extending their Incurſions on all Sides, and had penetrated into the Territories of the *Eburones* and *Condruſians*, both which Nations are under the Protection of the *Treviri*. *Cæſar* having aſſembled the Chiefs of the *Gauls*, diſſembled his knowledge of their ſecret Deſigns; and endeavouring rather to win them over, and confirm them in their Alliance with the People of *Rome*, demanded a certain number of Cavalry of them, and prepared to march againſt the *Germans*.

VI. HAVING provided himſelf with Corn, and drawn together a ſelect Body of Horſe, he began his march towards thoſe Parts where he underſtood the *Germans* then were. When he was come within a few Days journey of their Camp, Ambaſſadors arrived from them, who addreſſed him to this effect: "That the *Germans* had no Deſign of being the firſt to begin a War with the "People of *Rome*; but neither, if they were attacked, would they decline "having recourſe to Arms: That it was the Cuſtom of their Nation, handed "down to them by their Anceſtors, rather to oppoſe the Efforts of their Ene"mies, than expect Relief from Remonſtrances: but thus far they were however "willing to own, that it was againſt their Inclination they were come into thoſe "Parts, having been driven from their Habitations: That if the *Romans* were "diſpoſed to accept of their Friendſhip, they might become very uſeful and ſer"viceable Allies, and would reſt ſatisfied either with ſuch Lands as they ſhould "think proper to aſſign them, or in the quiet Poſſeſſion of thoſe they had already "obtained by force of Arms: That they yielded in Valour to the *Suevians* "alone, for whom the immortal Gods themſelves were not an equal match; "but knew of no other Nation under Heaven able to reſiſt the Efforts of their "Bravery." *Cæſar* made ſuch a Reply as beſt ſuited his preſent Views, but the Concluſion of his Speech was to this purpoſe: "That he could enter into "no treaty of Friendſhip with them ſo long as they continued in *Gaul*: That "Men who had been unable to defend their own Territories were not likely to "gain Countries by force from others: That there were no uncultivated Lands in "*Gaul*, ſufficient to ſatisfy ſo great a Multitude, without invading the Proper"ties of others: But that, if they pleaſed, they might incorporate themſelves "with the *Ubians*, whoſe Ambaſſadors were then in his Camp, to complain "of the Injuries of the *Suevians*, and requeſt his Aid againſt their In"croachments: This he promiſed to obtain for them of the *Ubians*." The Ambaſſadors replied, they would report this to their Countrymen, and in three Days return with an Anſwer; requeſting in the mean time, that he would not advance with his Army. But this *Cæſar* refuſed; as knowing, that a few Days before they had ſent a great Body of Cavalry over the *Meuſe*, to forage and plunder in the Territories of the *Ambivariti*. He therefore concluded, that they only waited the return of this Party, and with that View were for interpoſing Delays.

VII. THE *Meuſe* riſes in the Mountains of *Vauſe*, in the Territories of the *Lingones*, and receiving a certain Branch of the *Rhine*, called the *Vahal*, forms with it the Iſland of the *Batavians*, about fourſcore Miles below which it diſcharges itſelf into the Sea. The *Rhine* itſelf takes its riſe in the Territories of the *Lepontians*, who inhabit the *Alps*; and after a long and rapid Courſe thro' the Country of the *Nantuates*, *Helvetians*, *Sequani*, *Mediomatrici*, *Treboci*, and *Treviri*, divides itſelf as it approaches nearer the Sea into ſeveral Channels, and forming a great number of very large Iſlands, inhabited for the moſt part by fierce and ſavage Nations, ſome of whom are reported to feed only on Fiſh and the Eggs of Birds; it at laſt diſcharges itſelf into the Ocean by many different Mouths.

VIII. *CÆSAR* being now only twelve Miles diſtant from the Enemy, was met upon his way by the Ambaſſadors on the Day appointed. They were very earneſt in their Requeſts that he would advance no farther: But not being able to prevail, intreated; that he would ſend to the Cavalry who made the Advance-Guard, to reſtrain them from beginning the Fight; and in the mean time permit them to ſend Ambaſſadors to the *Ubians:* from whoſe Senate and Magiſtrates if they could obtain the Conditions offered them by *Cæſar*, under the Sanction of a ſolemn Oath, they declared themſelves ready to accept them; requiring only that he would allow them the Space of three Days to bring Matters to a final Iſſue. But *Cæſar* imagining all theſe Proffers to have no other Tendency than the delay of a few Days, 'till their Cavalry ſhould arrive, told them nevertheleſs; that he would advance that Day only four Miles farther for the ſake of Water; but deſired their Chiefs to attend him the Day after, that he might know their Demands. Mean-time he ſent Orders to the Officers of the Cavalry who were gone before, not to attack the Enemy; and in caſe they ſhould be attacked themſelves, only to maintain their Ground, 'till he ſhould come up with the reſt of the Army.

IX. BUT the Enemy, upon ſeeing our Horſe advance, whoſe number amounted to five thouſand; whereas they themſelves did not exceed eight hundred, by reaſon of the Abſence of thoſe who had been ſent to forage beyond the *Meuſe*: yet falling ſuddenly upon the *Romans*, who had no Apprehenſion of their Deſign, becauſe they knew their Ambaſſadors had been with *Cæſar* a little before, and obtained a Day's Truce; they eaſily put them into Diſorder. And when our Men recovering a little began to make Reſiſtance, they according to Cuſtom diſmounted, and ſtabbing our Horſes under the Belly, and by that means overthrowing many of the Riders, in a very ſhort time put the reſt to flight: and ſo great was the Conſternation, that they continued driving them before them, 'till at laſt they came within ſight of the Army. In this Skirmiſh we loſt ſeventy-four Men, and among them *Piſo* of *Aquitain*, a Man of diſtinguiſhed Valour and illuſtrious Deſcent, whoſe Grandfather had been ſovereign Magiſtrate in his own State, and been honoured by the Senate of *Rome* with the title of Friend. This brave Officer, ſeeing his Brother ſurrounded by the Enemy, ran to his Aſſiſtance, and reſcued him: But his own Horſe being wounded, and he overthrown, the Enemy fell upon him, againſt whom nevertheleſs he made a brave Reſiſtance; 'till at laſt ſurrounded on all Sides, he fell overpowered with Wounds. Which his Brother perceiving, who was by this time out of Danger, and had got to a conſiderable Diſtance; ſetting Spurs to his Horſe, he ruſhed among the thickeſt of the Enemy, and was ſlain.

X.



A. *The German Camp*. B. *Cæsar advancing with all his Forces*. C. *Cæsar's Cavalry terrified by their late*

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by their late Defeat. D *The Rhine.* E *The Meuse.* F *The Germans routed and flying towards the River.*

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X. AFTER this Battle, *Cæſar* reſolved neither to give audience to their Ambaſſadors, nor admit them to Terms of Peace; ſeeing they had treacherouſly applied for a Truce, and afterwards of their own accord broke it. He likewiſe conſidered, that it would be downright Madneſs to delay coming to an Action 'till their Army ſhould be augmented, and their Cavalry join them; and the more ſo, becauſe he was perfectly well acquainted with the Levity of the *Gauls*, among whom they had already acquired a conſiderable Reputation by this ſucceſsful Attack, and to whom it therefore behoved him by no means to allow time to enter into Meaſures againſt him. Upon all theſe Accounts he determined to come to an Engagement with the Enemy as ſoon as poſſible, and communicated his Deſign to his Queſtor and Lieutenants. A very lucky Accident fell out to bring about *Cæſar*'s Purpoſe; for the Day after, in the Morning, the *Germans* perſiſting in their Treachery and Diſſimulation, came in great numbers to the Camp; all their Nobility and Princes making part of the Embaſſy. Their Deſign was, as they pretended, to vindicate themſelves in regard to what had happened the Day before; becauſe contrary to Engagements made and come under at their own Requeſt, they had fallen upon our Men: but their real Motive was, to obtain if poſſible another inſidious Truce. *Cæſar* overjoyed to have them thus in his Power, ordered them to be ſecured, and immediately drew his Forces out of the Camp. The Cavalry, whom he ſuppoſed terrified with the late Engagement, were commanded to follow in the Rear.

XI. HAVING drawn up his Army in three Lines, and made a very expeditious march of eight Miles, he appeared before the Enemy's Camp, before they had the leaſt Apprehenſion of his Deſign. All things conſpiring to throw them into a ſudden Conſternation, which was not a little increaſed by our unexpected Appearance, and the Abſence of their own Officers; and hardly any time being left them, either to take Counſel, or fly to Arms: they were utterly at a loſs what Courſe to take, whether to draw out their Forces and oppoſe the Enemy, or content themſelves with defending the Camp, or in fine, to ſeek for Safety in flight. As this Fear was evident from the Tumult and Uproar we perceived among them, our Soldiers, inſtigated by the Remembrance of their treacherous Behaviour the Day before, broke into the Camp. Such as could firſt provide themſelves with Arms made a ſhew of Reſiſtance, and for ſome time maintained the Fight amidſt the Baggage and Carriages. But the Women and Children (for the *Germans* had brought all their Families and Effects with them over the *Rhine*) betook themſelves to flight on all Sides. *Cæſar* ſent the Cavalry in purſuit of them.

XII. THE *Germans* hearing the Noiſe behind them, and ſeeing their Wives and Children put to the Sword, threw down their Arms, abandoned their Enſigns, and fled out of the Camp. Being arrived at the confluence of the *Rhine* and the *Meuſe*, and finding it impoſſible to continue their flight any farther; after a dreadful Slaughter of thoſe that pretended to make reſiſtance, the reſt threw themſelves into the River; where what with Fear, Wearineſs, and the force of the Current, they almoſt all periſhed. Thus our Army, without the loſs of a Man, and with very few wounded, returned to their Camp, having put an end to this formidable War, in which the number of the Enemy amounted to four hundred and thirty thouſand. *Cæſar* offered thoſe whom he had detained in his Camp liberty to depart: but they dreading the Reſentment



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ment of the *Gauls*, whoſe Lands they had laid waſte, choſe rather to continue with him, and obtained his Conſent for that purpoſe.

XIII. THE War with the *Germans* being ended, *Cæſar* for many Reaſons reſolved to carry his Army over the *Rhine*. But what chiefly ſwayed with him was, that as he found the *Germans* were eaſily prevailed upon to tranſport their Forces into *Gaul*, he thought it might be of no ſmall Service to alarm them upon their own Account, by letting them ſee, that the *Romans* wanted neither Ability nor Reſolution to paſs the *Rhine* with an Army. Add to all this, that the Cavalry of the *Uſipetes* and *Tenchtheri*, who, as we have related above, had paſſed the *Meuſe* for the ſake of Forage and Plunder, and by that means eſcaped the Diſaſter of the late Fight; upon hearing of the Defeat of their Countrymen, had repaſſed the *Rhine*, retired into the Territories of the *Sicambrians*, and joined their Forces to theirs. And upon *Cæſar*'s ſending Deputies to require, that theſe Troops, which had preſumed to make War upon him and the *Gauls*, might be delivered up, he had received for Anſwer: "That the *Rhine* was the Boundary of the *Roman* Empire: That if he "thought it unjuſtifiable in the *Germans* to paſs over into *Gaul* without his "leave, upon what Pretence could he claim any Power or Authority beyond "the *Rhine*?"

XIV. BUT the *Ubians*, who alone of all the Nations beyond the *Rhine* had ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, entered into an Alliance with him, and given him Hoſtages, earneſtly intreated him to come over to their Aſſiſtance, they being very hard preſſed by the *Suevians*: "Or, if the Affairs of the Com-"monwealth would not allow of his being there in Perſon, that he would "only order his Army to croſs the *Rhine*, which would both be ſufficient for "their preſent Support, and alſo ſecure them for the time to come. Be-"cauſe ſuch was the Reputation and Opinion conceived of a *Roman* Army, "even amongſt the moſt remote *German* Nations, from their defeating *Ario-"viſtus*, and the ſucceſs of the laſt Battle, that their Friendſhip and Name "would alone be a ſufficient Defence. They promiſed likewiſe a great "number of Ships for the tranſporting of the Army.

XV. *CÆSAR* for all theſe Reaſons above-mentioned, determined to croſs the *Rhine*. But to make uſe of Shipping appeared to him neither ſafe, nor ſuitable to the Dignity of the *Roman* Name. Wherefore, altho' he underſtood that the making of a Bridge would be attended with very great Difficulties, on account of the breadth, depth, and rapidity of the River; yet was he of opinion, that in this manner alone ought he to carry over his Army, or lay aſide the Deſign altogether. The form therefore and contrivance of the Bridge was thus: Two Beams, each a Foot and a half thick, ſharpened a little towards the lower end, and of a length proportioned to the depth of the River, were joined together at the diſtance of about two Feet. Theſe were ſunk into the River by Engines, and afterwards ſtrongly driven with Rammers, not perpendicularly, but inclined according to the direction of the Stream. Directly oppoſite to theſe, at the diſtance of forty Feet lower down, were placed two other Beams joined together like the former, but ſloping againſt the current of the River. Theſe Stakes were kept firm by a large Beam, extended from one to the other, and which being two Feet in thickneſs, exactly filled the Interval of the two Stakes, and was ſtrongly faſtened at either end with iron Nails,



A. *The two Beams, each a foot and half thick, joined at two feets distance.* B. *The two Beams opposite to these extended from one to the other.* D. *The Braces.* E. *The Planks over which the Earth & Turf were laid.* F. *The Veſsels and Trunks of Trees.* H. *One of the foot & half Stakes by itself.* I. *The two-foot Beam inserted between the Stakes.* M. *A seperate Figure of one of the Braces.* P. *The Machine for driving the double Stakes.*

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

to these, joined in the same manner. C. *The Beam two feet thick, inserted between the double Stakes, &*
F. *The Buttresses to support the Bridge against the violence of the Current.* G. *The upper Defences against*
tween the double Stakes. K. *The double Stakes joined at the distance of two feet.* L. *The Braces that joined*

BRITISH MUSEUM

Nails, ſo contrived, that the Violence of the Stream ſerved only to bind the Work faſter together. This being continued through the whole Breadth of the River, he ordered Planks to be laid acroſs, which for the greater convenience of paſſing, were further covered with Hurdles. Towards the lower part of the Stream other Stakes were ſunk in the form of Buttreſſes, which ſupported the Bridge againſt the Violence of the Current; and above, at ſome diſtance, there were others; that if Trunks of Trees or Veſſels ſhould be ſent down the River by the Enemy, to deſtroy the Work, the Shock might be broken by theſe Defences, and the Bridge thereby ſecured from damage.

XVI. THE Bridge being finiſhed within ten Days from the time they began to fetch the Materials, *Cæſar* led over his Army; and leaving a ſtrong Guard on each ſide of the River, marched directly into the Territories of the *Sicambri*. Mean-time Ambaſſadors arriving from ſeveral States to deſire Peace, and court his Alliance, he gave them a very favourable Reception, and appointed them to ſend Hoſtages. The *Sicambri*, when they underſtood that the Bridge was begun, by Advice of the *Uſipetes* and *Tenchtheri* who had taken Shelter among them, reſolved upon a Retreat: and having abandoned their Territories, and carried off all their Effects, withdrew into the neighbouring Woods and Deſarts.

XVII. *CÆSAR*, after a ſhort ſtay in their Country, having burnt all their Houſes and Villages, and cut down their Corn, marched into the Territories of the *Ubians*. As he had promiſed theſe laſt his Aſſiſtance againſt the Attempts of the *Suevians*, he underſtood from them: that the *Suevians* being informed by their Spies of the Bridge built upon the *Rhine*, had, according to their Cuſtom, called a Council, and diſpatched Orders into all Parts for the People to forſake their Towns, and convey their Wives, Children, and Effects into the Woods; commanding at the ſame time, that all ſuch as were able to bear Arms ſhould meet at the Place of general Rendezvous, which they had appointed towards the middle of the Country, reſolving there to wait the Arrival of the *Romans*, and give them Battle. *Cæſar*, upon this Intelligence, having accompliſhed all he intended in carrying his Army over the *Rhine*, by ſpreading an univerſal Terror among the *Germans*, taking Vengeance of the *Sicambri*, and ſetting the *Ubians* at liberty; after a ſtay of only eighteen Days beyond the *Rhine*, thinking he had done enough both for his own Reputation and the ſervice of the Republick, led back his Army into *Gaul*, and broke down the Bridge.

XVIII. THOUGH but a ſmall part of the Summer now remained; for in thoſe Regions, *Gaul* ſtretching very much to the North, the Winters begin early; *Cæſar* nevertheleſs reſolved to paſs over into *Britain*, having certain Intelligence, that in all his Wars with the *Gauls*, the Enemies of the Commonwealth had ever received Aſſiſtance from thence. He indeed foreſaw, that the Seaſon of the Year would not permit him to finiſh the War; yet he thought it would be of no ſmall advantage, if he ſhould but take a View of the Iſland, learn the Nature of the Inhabitants, and acquaint himſelf with the Coaſt, Harbours, and Landing-places, to all which the *Gauls* were perfect Strangers. For almoſt none but Merchants reſort to that Iſland; nor have even they any Knowledge of the Country, except the Sea-coaſt, and the Parts oppoſite to *Gaul*. Having therefore called together the Merchants from all Parts, they could neither inform him of the largeneſs of the Iſland, nor what or how

powerful the Nations were that inhabited it, nor of their Cuſtoms, Art of War, or the Harbours fit to receive large Ships. For theſe Reaſons, before he embarked himſelf, he thought proper to ſend *C. Voluſenus* with a Galley, to get ſome knowledge of theſe things; commanding him, as ſoon as he had informed himſelf in what he wanted to know, to return with all expedition. He himſelf marched with his whole Army into the Territories of the *Morini*, becauſe thence was the neareſt Paſſage into *Britain.* Here he ordered a great many Ships from the neighbouring Ports to attend him, and the Fleet he had made uſe of the Year before in the *Venetian* War.

XIX. MEAN-WHILE the *Britons* having notice of his Deſign, by the Merchants that reſorted to their Iſland; Ambaſſadors from many of their States came to *Cæſar*, with an offer of Hoſtages, and Submiſſion to the Authority of the People of *Rome.* To theſe he gave a favourable Audience; and exhorting them to continue in the ſame mind, ſent them back into their own Country. Along with them he diſpatched *Comius*, whom he had conſtituted King of the *Atrebatians*; a Man in whoſe Virtue, Wiſdom, and Fidelity he greatly confided, and whoſe Authority in the Iſland was very conſiderable. To him he gave it in charge, to viſit as many States as he could, and perſuade them to enter into an Alliance with the *Romans*, letting them know at the ſame time, that *Cæſar* deſigned as ſoon as poſſible to come over in perſon to their Iſland. *Voluſenus* having taken a View of the Country, as far as was poſſible for one who had reſolved not to quit his Ship, or truſt himſelf in the hands of the *Barbarians*, returned on the fifth Day, and acquainted *Cæſar* with his Diſcoveries.

XX. WHILE *Cæſar* continued in thoſe Parts, for the ſake of getting ready his Fleet, Deputies arrived from almoſt all the Cantons of the *Morini*, to excuſe their late War with the People of *Rome*, as proceeding wholly from a national Fierceneſs, and their Ignorance of the *Roman* Cuſtoms; promiſing likewiſe an entire Submiſſion for the future. This fell out very opportunely for *Cæſar*, who was unwilling to leave any Enemies behind him, nor would the Seaſon of the Year have even allowed him to engage in a War: Beſides, he judged it by no means proper ſo far to entangle himſelf in theſe trivial Affairs, as to be obliged to poſtpone the Expedition into *Britain.* He therefore ordered them to ſend him a great Number of Hoſtages, and upon their being delivered, received them into his Alliance. Having got together about eighty Tranſports, which he thought would be ſufficient for the carrying over two Legions; he diſtributed the Gallies he had over and above, to the Queſtor, Lieutenants, and Officers of the Cavalry. There were beſides eighteen Tranſports detained by contrary Winds at a Port about eight Miles off, which he appointed to carry over the Cavalry. The reſt of the Army, under the Command of *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, and *L. Arunculeius Cotta*, were ſent againſt the *Menapians*, and thoſe Cantons of the *Morini* which had not ſubmitted. *P. Sulpicius Rufus* had the charge of the Harbour where he embarked, with a ſtrong Garriſon to maintain it.

XXI. THINGS being in this manner ſettled, and the Wind ſpringing up fair, he weighed Anchor about one in the Morning, ordering the Cavalry to embark at the other Port, and follow him. But as theſe Orders were executed but ſlowly, he himſelf about ten in the Morning reached the Coaſt of *Britain*, where he ſaw all the Cliffs covered with the Enemy's Forces. The nature of the

9 8 7 6 5 4

CALEDONI

Glota Æstuarium

Epidium prom

SELGOVÆ

NOVANTES

Leucopibia

Rinca

55

DARNII

VOLUNTII

Vinderius flu.

Monaeda

Eubonia

Menavia

Logia flu

54

OCEANUS

Dunium

Labnius flu.

Eblana

HIBERNIA

53

Ganganorum pr.

Adros inf.

Stucia flu.

Medona flu

Menapia

Sacrum prom.

52

Lunos vel Silunnos Inf.

DIMETÆ

Octopitarum prom.

Æstica

Brem

Iuna Æstuarium

Moriacum

LUGUVALLU

BRI

Epiacum

Morbium

GAN

Galagun

TES

Longovicus

Belisama

Mona

Segontium

Conovium

Varis

CORD

Deua

Mediolanum

Bouium

VICES

Maglona

Vriconiu

Bulleum

Iouentum

Tucrobius

Lobinus flu

Gouanium

Bleftium

Maridunnum

SILURES

Nidus

Bulæum

Leucar

Abone

Venta

Sabrina flu

Vxella æst

Iscalis

BEL

51

DUROTRIG

Durnovaria

Vidogladia

Tamara

Isaca

Tamaraft

DAMNONII

Vsella

Isacaft

Antivestæum quod et Bolerium prom.

Sigdeleles Sillinæ Insulæ

Ocrinum vel Damnoniorum prom.

Tenia ft.

OCEAN

7 6 5 4 3

BRITANNIA PROVINCIA ROMANORUM

OCEANUS GERMANICUS

FRETUM BRITANNICUM sive Oceanj

OCEANUS BRITANNICUS

Tueda flu.
Bremenium
OTALINI
Glanaventa
Tunocellum
Vallum
Gabrocentum
Condercum
Vedra flu.
Bremelonacum
Binonium
Brouocum
Galagum
Tesis flu
Baluiarium
Dunū Sinus
Sinus Salutis
Veterē
Levatræ
Caturactonium
BRANTO
VICI
Isurium
Olicana
Eboracum
Derventio
PARICI
Rogodunum
Calcarà
Coccium
Legelium
Danum
Agelocum
Pretorium
Ocellum prom.
Abus est
Lindum
CORITANI
CORNAUII
Condate
Maretinum
Elocetum
Penocrucium
Manuessedum
Vosocona
Rata
Vriconium
Bennones
Fons Verometum
Crolana
Gausenna
Durobrius
Metaris æstuarium
Branodunodunū
Sitomagus
Venta
Gari anonum
ICENI
Extensio
Combretoniū
Benaventa
Duroſi ponte
Camboritum
Iciani
Magni
Brangonium
Isananaria
Lactodorum
CATIEUCH-LANI
Magiouinium
Durocobriuum
Colonia
TRINO
Glenum
Abone
Corium
Verulamium
Camelodunum
BANTES
Cauenium
Conuenor inſu.
Tamius flu
Galena
ATREBATII
Vindonum
Sulloniacæ
Londinum
Trajectus
Aquæ Solis
Nouimagus
Durobrouis
Durolinum
Regulbium
Tanatus Inſ.
Rutupi
Dorobernia
Dubris
CANTIUM
Lemanis
Verlitio
BELGÆ
Brigæ
Venta Belgarum
RIGES
Sorbiodunum
REGNI
Clauſentum
Anderda
Othona
Portus Arundi.
Portus Magnus Trifantonis æſtu
Vectis Inſula
Antonina
Itium
MO
Geſſoriacum sive Bononia
RINI


9
55
DAR
VOL
TII
54
Eblana
53
Medona flu
Menapia
52
51
Antivestæ
Boleriu
Sillinæ

the Place was ſuch, that the Sea being bounded by ſteep Mountains, the Enemy might eaſily launch their Javelins upon us from above. Not thinking this therefore a convenient landing Place, he reſolved to lie by 'till three in the Afternoon, and wait the arrival of the reſt of his Fleet. Mean-while having called the Lieutenants and military Tribunes together, he informed them of what he had learnt from *Voluſenus*, inſtructed them in the Part they were to act, and particularly exhorted them to do every thing with readineſs and at a Signal given, agreeable to the Rules of military Diſcipline, which in Sea Affairs eſpecially required Expedition and Diſpatch, becauſe of all others the moſt changeable and uncertain. Having diſmiſſed them, and finding both the Wind and Tide favourable, he made the Signal for weighing Anchor, and after ſailing about eight Miles farther, ſtopp'd over-againſt a plain and open Shore.

XXII. BUT the Barbarians perceiving our Deſign, ſent their Cavalry and Chariots before, which they frequently make uſe of in Battle; and following with the reſt of their Forces, endeavoured to oppoſe our landing. And indeed we found the Difficulty very great on many accounts: For our Ships being large, required a great depth of Water; and the Soldiers, who were wholly unacquainted with the Places, and had their Hands embarraſſed and loaden with a weight of Armour, were at the ſame time to leap from the Ships, ſtand breaſt-high amidſt the Waves, and encounter the Enemy; while they, fighting upon dry Ground, or advancing only a little way into the Water, having the free uſe of all their Limbs, and in Places which they perfectly knew, could boldly caſt their Darts, and ſpur on their Horſes, well inured to that kind of Service. All theſe Circumſtances ſerving to ſpread a Terror among our Men, who were wholly ſtrangers to this way of fighting; they puſhed not the Enemy with the ſame Vigour and Spirit as was uſual for them in Combats upon dry Ground.

XXIII. *CÆSAR* obſerving this, ordered ſome Gallies, a kind of Shipping leſs common with the Barbarians, and more eaſily governed and put in motion, to advance a little from the Tranſports towards the Shore, in order to ſet upon the Enemy in flank, and by means of their Engines, Slings, and Arrows, drive them to ſome diſtance. This proved of conſiderable ſervice to our Men: For what with the ſurpriſe occaſioned by the make of our Gallies, the motion of the Oars, and the playing of the Engines, the Enemy were forced to halt, and in a little time began to give back. But our Men ſtill demurring to leap into the Sea, chiefly becauſe of the depth of the Water in thoſe parts; the Standard-bearer of the tenth Legion, having firſt invoked the Gods for Succeſs, cried out aloud: 'Follow me, Fellow-Soldiers, unleſs you will betray the *Roman* Eagle into 'the Hands of the Enemy; for my part, I am reſolved to diſcharge my 'Duty to *Cæſar* and the Commonwealth.' Upon this he jumped into the Sea, and advanced with the Eagle againſt the Enemy: whereat our Men exhorting one another to prevent ſo ſignal a Diſgrace; all that were in the Ship followed him: which being perceived by thoſe in the neareſt Veſſels, they alſo did the like, and boldly approached the Enemy.

XXIV. THE Battle was obſtinate on both Sides: but our Men, as being neither able to keep their Ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow

follow their reſpective Standards; becauſe leaping promiſcuouſly from their Ships, every one joined the firſt Enſign he met; were thereby thrown into great Confuſion. The Enemy on the other hand being well acquainted with the Shallows; when they ſaw our Men advancing ſingly from the Ships, ſpurred on their Horſes, and attacked them in that perplexity. In one Place great numbers would gather round an handful of the *Romans:* others falling upon them in flank, galled them mightily with their Darts. Which *Cæſar* obſerving, he ordered ſome ſmall Boats to be manned, and ply about with Recruits. By this means the foremoſt Ranks of our Men having got firm footing, were followed by all the reſt; when falling upon the Enemy briskly, they were ſoon put to the rout. But as the Cavalry were not yet arrived, we could not purſue or advance far into the Iſland; which was the only thing wanting to render the Victory compleat.

XXV. THE Enemy being thus vanquiſhed in Battle, no ſooner got together after their Defeat, than they diſpatched Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to ſue for Peace; offering Hoſtages, and an entire Submiſſion to his Commands. Along with theſe Ambaſſadors came *Comius* the *Atrebatian*, whom *Cæſar*, as we have related above, had ſent before him into *Britain.* The Natives ſeized him as ſoon as he landed, and tho' he was charged with a Commiſſion from *Cæſar*, threw him into Irons. But upon their late Defeat they thought proper to ſend him back, throwing the Blame of what had happened upon the Multitude, and begged of *Cæſar* to excuſe a Fault proceeding from Ignorance. *Cæſar*, after ſome Complaints of their Behaviour, in that having of their own accord ſent Ambaſſadors to the Continent to ſue for Peace, they had yet without any Reaſon begun a War againſt him; told them at laſt he would forgive their Fault, and ordered them to ſend a certain number of Hoſtages. Part were ſent immediately, and the reſt, as living at ſome diſtance, they promiſed to deliver in a few Days. Mean-time they disbanded their Troops, and the ſeveral Chiefs came to *Cæſar*'s Camp, to manage their own Concerns, and thoſe of the States to which they belonged.

XXVI. A Peace being thus concluded four Days after *Cæſar*'s Arrival in *Britain*, the eighteen Tranſports appointed to carry the Cavalry, of whom we have ſpoken above, put to Sea with a gentle Gale. But when they had ſo near approached the Coaſt, as to be even within view of the Camp; ſo violent a Storm all on a ſudden aroſe, that being unable to hold on their Courſe, ſome were obliged to return to the Port whence they ſet out, and others driven to the lower end of the Iſland weſtward, not without great Danger. There they caſt anchor: but the Waves riſing very high, ſo as to fill the Ships with Water, they were again in the Night obliged to ſtand out to Sea, and make for the Continent of *Gaul.* That very Night it happened to be full Moon, when the Tides upon the Sea-Coaſt always riſe higheſt, a thing at that time wholly unknown to the *Romans.* Thus at one and the ſame time, the Gallies which *Cæſar* had made uſe of to tranſport his Men, and which he had ordered to be drawn up on the Strand, were filled with the Tide; and the Tempeſt fell ſuriouſly upon the Tranſports that lay at anchor in the Road. Nor was it poſſible for our Men to attempt any thing for their preſervation. Many of the Ships being daſhed to pieces, and the reſt having loſt their Anchors, Tackle, and Rigging,

ging, which rendered them altogether unfit for ſailing, a general Conſternation ſpread itſelf thro' the Camp. For there were no other Ships to carry back the Troops, nor any Materials to repair thoſe that had been diſabled by the Tempeſt. And as it had been all along *Cæſar*'s deſign to winter in *Gaul*, he was wholly without Corn to ſubſiſt the Troops in thoſe parts.

XXVII. ALL this being known to the *Britiſh* Chiefs, who after the Battle had repaired to *Cæſar*'s Camp, to perform the Conditions of the Treaty; they began to hold Conferences among themſelves. And as they plainly ſaw that the *Romans* were deſtitute both of Cavalry, Shipping, and Corn; and eaſily judged, from the ſmallneſs of the Camp, that the number of their Troops was but inconſiderable; in which Notion they were the more confirmed, becauſe *Cæſar* having brought over the Legions without Baggage, had occaſion to incloſe but a ſmall ſpot of Ground: they thought this a convenient Opportunity for taking up Arms, and by intercepting the *Roman* Convoys to protract the Affair 'till Winter; being confidently perſuaded, that by defeating theſe Troops, or cutting off their return, they ſhould effectually put a ſtop to all future Attempts upon *Britain*. Having therefore entered into a joint Confederacy, they by degrees left the Camp, and began to draw the Iſlanders together. But *Cæſar*, tho' he was not yet apprized of their Deſign, yet gueſſing in part at their Intentions, by the Diſaſter which had befallen his Fleet, and the Delays formed in relation to the Hoſtages, determined to provide againſt all Events. He therefore had Corn daily brought in to his Camp, and ordered the Timber of the Ships that had been moſt damaged to be made uſe of in repairing the reſt, ſending to *Gaul* for what other Materials he wanted. As the Soldiers were indefatigable in this Service, his Fleet was ſoon in a Condition to ſail, having loſt only twelve Ships.

XXVIII. DURING theſe Tranſactions, the ſeventh Legion being ſent out to forage according to Cuſtom; as part were employed in cutting down the Corn, and part in carrying it to the Camp, without ſuſpicion of attack; news was brought to *Cæſar*, that a greater Cloud of Duſt than ordinary was ſeen on that ſide where the Legion was. *Cæſar* ſuſpecting how matters went, marched with the two Cohorts that were upon Guard, ordering two others to ſucceed in their room, and all the Soldiers in the Camp to arm and follow him as ſoon as poſſible. When he was advanced a little way from the Camp, he ſaw his Men overpower'd by the Enemy, and with great difficulty able to ſuſtain the Fight, being driven into a ſmall Compaſs, and expoſed on every ſide to the Darts of their Adverſaries. For as the Harveſt was gathered in every where elſe, and one only Field left; the Enemy ſuſpecting that our Men would come thither to forage, had hid themſelves during the Night in the Woods; and waiting 'till our Men had quitted their Arms, and diſperſed themſelves to fall a reaping; they ſuddenly attacked them, killed ſome, put the reſt into diſorder, and began to ſurround them with their Horſes and Chariots.

XXIX. THEIR way of fighting with their Chariots is this: Firſt they drive their Chariots on all ſides, and throw their Darts; inſomuch that by the very terror of the Horſes, and noiſe of the Wheels, they often break the Ranks of the Enemy. When they have forced their way into the

midſt of the Cavalry, they quit their Chariots, and fight on Foot. Meantime the Drivers retire a little from the Combat, and place themſelves in ſuch manner as to favour the Retreat of their Countrymen, ſhould they be overpower'd by the Enemy. Thus in Action they perform the part both of nimble Horſemen, and ſtable Infantry: and by continual Exerciſe and Uſe have arrived at that Expertneſs, that in the moſt ſteep and difficult Places, they can ſtop their Horſes upon a full ſtretch, turn them which way they pleaſe, run along the Pole, reſt on the Harneſs, and throw themſelves back into their Chariots with incredible Dexterity.

XXX. OUR Men being aſtoniſhed and confounded with this new way of fighting, *Cæſar* came very timely to their Relief: for upon his Approach the Enemy made a ſtand, and the *Romans* began to recover from their Fear. This ſatisfied *Cæſar* for the preſent, who not thinking it a proper ſeaſon to provoke the Enemy, and bring on a general Engagement, ſtood facing them for ſome time, and then led back the Legions to the Camp. The continual Rains that followed for ſome Days after, both kept the *Romans* within their Intrenchments, and withheld the Enemy from attacking us. Meantime the *Britons* diſpatched Meſſengers into all parts, to make known to their Countrymen the ſmall number of the *Roman* Troops, and the favourable Opportunity they had of making immenſe Spoils, and freeing their Country for ever from all future Invaſions, by ſtorming the Enemy's Camp. Having by this means got together a great Body of Infantry and Cavalry, they drew towards our Intrenchments.

XXXI. *CÆSAR*, tho' he foreſaw that the Enemy, if beaten, would in the ſame manner as before eſcape the Danger by flight; yet having got about thirty Horſe, whom *Comius* the *Atrebatian* had brought over with him from *Gaul*; he drew up the Legions in order of Battle before the Camp: and falling upon the *Britons*, who were not able to ſuſtain the ſhock of our Men, ſoon put them to flight. The *Romans* purſuing them as long as their ſtrength would permit, made a terrible Slaughter; and ſetting fire to their Houſes and Villages a great way round, returned to the Camp.

XXXII. THE ſame Day Ambaſſadors came from the Enemy to *Cæſar* to ſue for Peace. *Cæſar* doubled the number of Hoſtages he had before impoſed upon them, and ordered them to be ſent over to him into *Gaul*, becauſe the Equinox coming on, and his Ships being leaky, he thought it not prudent to put off his return 'till Winter. A fair Wind offering, he ſet ſail a little after midnight, and arrived ſafe in *Gaul*. Two of his Tranſports not being able to reach the ſame Port with the reſt, were driven into a Haven a little lower in the Country.

XXXIII. IN theſe two Veſſels were about three hundred Soldiers, who having landed, and being upon their March to the Camp; the *Morini*, who had ſubmitted to *Cæſar* upon his ſetting out for *Britain*, drawn by the hopes of Plunder, ſurrounded them at firſt with only a few Men, and ordered them to lay down their Arms under pain of being put to the Sword. But they, caſting themſelves into an Orb, ſtood upon their Defence; when all on a ſudden ſix thouſand more of the Enemy appeared, rouzed by the noiſe of the Combatants. *Cæſar* having notice of what paſſed, ſent all his Cavalry

to

to the aſſiſtance of the *Romans*. Mean-while our Men withſtood all the Attacks of the Enemy, and bravely maintained the Fight for upwards of ſix Hours, having ſlain great Numbers of the *Morini*, while on their ſide only a few were wounded. But no ſooner did our Cavalry appear, than the Enemy, throwing down their Arms, betook themſelves to flight, and were almoſt all ſlain in the Purſuit.

XXXIV. THE Day after *Cæſar* ſent *T. Labienus*, with the Legions returned out of *Britain*, againſt the rebellious *Morini*; who being deprived by the Drought of the Benefit of their Marſhes, which had ſerved them for ſhelter the Year before, almoſt all fell into his Power. Mean-time *Q. Titurius*, and *L. Cotta*, who had been ſent againſt the *Menapians*, having laid waſte their Territories with Fire and Sword, and plundered their Habitations, returned to *Cæſar*, not being able to come up with the *Menapians* themſelves, who had retired into impenetrable Foreſts. *Cæſar* quartered all his Troops among the *Belgians*. Only two of the *Britiſh* States ſent Hoſtages into *Gaul*, the reſt neglecting to perform the Conditions of the Treaty. For theſe Succeſſes a Thankſgiving of twenty Days was decreed by the Senate.

C. JULIUS

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK V.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. Cæſar *leaving Orders with his Lieutenants in* Gaul *to build a Fleet, ſets out for* Italy *and* Illyricum, *where he puts a ſtop to the Incurſions of the* Piruſtæ. II. *Returning thence into* Gaul, *he marches againſt the* Treviri, *and quiets the Diſturbances in that Province.* IV. Dumnorix *withdrawing from the* Roman *Camp with the* Æduan *Cavalry, is purſued and ſlain.* VII. Cæſar *paſſes over into* Britain. VIII. *And forces the Enemy from the Woods in which they had taken ſhelter.* IX. *But underſtanding that his Fleet had ſuffered greatly by a Storm, he quits the purſuit of the* Britons, *repairs his Fleet, fortifies his Camp, and then returns againſt the Enemy.* X. *A deſcription of* Britain, *and its Inhabitants.* XI. Cæſar *defeats the* Britons *in various Encounters.* XIV. *Paſſes the* Thames. XIX. *Returns into* Gaul. XX. *And becauſe of the great ſcarcity of Corn, diſtributes his Legions among the ſeveral States.* XXI. Taſgetius *ſlain among the* Carnutes. XXII. Ambiorix *and* Cativulcus *excite ſeveral States to a Revolt.* XXIII. Ambiorix *by an artful Speech perſuades* Titurius *to quit his Camp, and attacking him in his march, cuts him off with his whole Party.* XXX. *Being afterwards joined by the* Nervians, *he falls upon* Cicero's *Camp.* XXXVI. *The noble Emulation of* Pulfio *and* Varenus. XXXVII. Cæſar *marches to* Cicero's *relief.* XLI. *The* Gauls *quit the Siege, and advance to meet him.* XLII. Cæſar *defeats them in Battle.* XLIV. *And to prevent their continual Revolts, reſolves to paſs the Winter in* Gaul. XLV. *The* Senones, Treviri, *and other States, bear the* Roman *Yoke with impatience.* XLVII. Indutiomarus *attacks* Labienus's *Camp.* XLIX. *But being ſlain in the Attempt, the* Gauls *ſeparate, and Tranquillity is in a great meaſure reſtored.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's COMMENTARIES OF HIS WARS IN GAUL.

BOOK V.

I. IN the Conſulſhip of *Lucius Domitius*, and *Appius Claudius*, *Cæſar* leaving his Winter-Quarters to go into *Italy*, as was his yearly Cuſtom, gave Orders to his Lieutenants, who had the charge of the Legions, to build as many Ships as poſſible during the Winter, and to repair ſuch as were old. He preſcribed the form and manner of building; ordering them to be ſomewhat lower than was uſual in the *Mediterranean*, for the the convenience of embarking and landing his Men; which he judged the more neceſſary, as he had obſerved, that by reaſon of the frequent returns of the Tide, there was leſs depth of Water upon the *Britiſh* Coaſt. He likewiſe commanded them to be built broader than ordinary, that they might receive the greater number of Horſes and Carriages; and to be contrived for lightneſs and expedition, to which the lowneſs of their Decks greatly contributed. He ſent to *Spain* for the Materials neceſſary in building and equipping them; and having finiſhed the Diet of *Ciſalpine Gaul*, ſet out for *Illyricum*, upon advice that the *Piruſtæ* were laying waſte the Province by their Incurſions. When he arrived there, he ordered the ſeveral States to furniſh their Contingents, and appointed a Place of general Rendezvous. The Report of this no ſooner ſpread among the *Piruſtæ*, than they ſent Ambaſſadors to inform him; that nothing had been done againſt the Province by publick Authority, and that they were ready to make what Satisfaction he required. *Cæſar*, pleaſed with their Submiſſion, ordered them to bring him Hoſtages, and named the Day by which they were to be delivered; threatening them with a fierce War in caſe of Diſobedience. Theſe being accordingly brought by the Day prefixed, he appointed Arbitrators between the contending States, to eſtimate the Damages, and determine what Reparation was to be made.

II. HAVING diſpatched theſe Affairs, and held a general Diet of the Province, he returned again into *Ciſalpine Gaul*, and thence went to the Army. Upon his Arrival, he viſited all the Quarters of the Legions; and found, that by the ſingular Diligence of the Soldiers, notwithſtanding the greateſt ſcarcity of Materials, no leſs than ſix hundred Tranſports, ſuch as we have deſcribed above, and twenty-eight Gallies, were in ſuch forwardneſs, that in a few

few Days they would be ready to be launched. Having praiſed his Soldiers, and thoſe whom he had ſet over the Works, he gave them what further Inſtructions he thought neceſſary, and ordered the whole Fleet to rendezvous at *Port-Itius*, whence he knew lay the moſt commodious Paſſage to *Britain*; it being there not above thirty Miles diſtant from the Continent. Leaving what Soldiers he thought neceſſary for this Purpoſe, he advanced at the head of four Legions without Baggage, and eight hundred Horſe, into the Country of the *Treviri*; becauſe they neither appeared at the general Diets of *Gaul*, nor ſubmitted to the Orders of the Commonwealth; and were beſides reported to be ſoliciting the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*.

III. THIS State is by far the moſt powerful of all *Gaul* in Horſe: They have likewiſe a very ſtrong and numerous Infantry; and, as we have before obſerved, border upon the *Rhine*. Two of their principal Men, *Indutiomarus* and *Cingetorix*, were at this time Competitors for the ſupreme Authority. *Cingetorix*, as ſoon as he heard of the arrival of *Cæſar* and the Legions, came to him, and aſſured him; that he and all of his Party would continue firm to their Duty, and never abandon the Intereſt of the *Romans*: At the ſame time he informed him of all that had paſſed among the *Treviri*. But *Indutiomarus*, drawing together great Numbers of Horſe and Foot, and ſecuring ſuch as were unable to bear Arms in the Foreſt of *Arden*, which extends from the *Rhine*, quite croſs the Country of *Treves*, to the Territories of the *Rhemi*; reſolved to try the fortune of War. But ſoon after, as ſeveral of the leading Men of the State, partly out of attachment to *Cingetorix*, partly terrified by the approach of the *Roman* Army, came to *Cæſar* to ſolicit in their own behalf, ſince they found themſelves incapable of effectually ſerving their Country: *Indutiomarus* fearing an univerſal Defection, ſent likewiſe Ambaſſadors to him to acquaint him: "That he had choſen to ſtay at home, and "forbear coming to the *Roman* Camp, with no other view but to keep the "State in its Duty; leſt, in the Abſence of the Nobility, the People might "have been drawn into ſome raſh Step: That the whole Country was now "at his Command; and he ready, with *Cæſar*'s Permiſſion, to attend him in "Perſon, and put his own Concerns, as well as thoſe of the State, under his "Protection." Tho' *Cæſar* well underſtood the Reaſon of his preſent Submiſſion, and by what Conſiderations he had been deterred from the proſecution of his firſt Deſign; yet unwilling to waſte the whole Summer in the Country of *Treves*, when every thing was in readineſs for his Expedition into *Britain*, he ordered *Indutiomarus* to attend him with two hundred Hoſtages. Theſe being accordingly brought, and among them the Son, and all the neareſt Relations of *Indutiomarus*, whom he had ſpecified by name; *Cæſar* encouraged and exhorted him to continue firm in his Duty. Nevertheleſs, aſſembling all the principal Men of *Treves*, he reconciled them one after another to *Cingetorix*, as well on account of his ſingular Merit, as becauſe he thought it of the greateſt Importance, to eſtabliſh thoroughly the Authority of a Man, of whoſe ſteddy and inviolable Attachment he had ſuch convincing Proof. *Indutiomarus* highly reſented this Proceeding, which tended ſo much to the dimunition of his Power; and as he had all along been an Enemy to the *Romans*, this new Affront provoked him ſtill more.

IV. THESE Affairs being ſettled, *Cæſar* arrived with his Legions at the Port of *Itius*. There he found, that about forty of his Ships, built in the Country of the *Belgians*, having been attacked by a Storm, and diſabled from continuing

continuing their Voyage, had been obliged to put back. The reſt were all equipped and rigged, ready to obey the firſt Signal. All the Cavalry of *Gaul*, about four thouſand in number, and the prime Nobility of the ſeveral States, met him likewiſe, by order, at this Place. His Deſign was, to leave only a few of theſe Nobles behind him in *Gaul*, on whoſe Fidelity he could rely; and to take the reſt with him to *Britain* as Hoſtages, the better to prevent any Commotions during his Abſence.

V. *DUMNORIX* the *Æduan*, of whom we have ſpoken above, was one of thoſe that attended him on this Occaſion. Him in particular he reſolved to carry along with him, as he knew him to be a lover of Novelties, ambitious, enterpriſing, and of great Intereſt and Authority among the *Gauls*. Beſides all this, he had publickly ſaid in an Aſſembly of the *Æduans*, that *Cæſar* had inveſted him with the Sovereignty of their State: which Reſolution, tho' by no means pleaſing to the *Æduans*, they yet durſt not ſend Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, either to oppoſe or get reverſed: Nor was *Cæſar* otherwiſe informed of the matter, but by thoſe whom he had placed about *Dumnorix*, to have an Eye over his Conduct. *Dumnorix*, at firſt, earneſtly petitioned to be left in *Gaul*; ſometimes pretending he was unuſed to ſailing, and afraid of the Sea; ſometimes urging religious Engagements, which required him to ſtay at home. But finding all his Endeavours to no purpoſe, he began to ſolicit the Chiefs of the *Gauls*, diſcourſing them apart, and adviſing them not to leave the Continent. The more to awaken their Fears, he told them: "That "*Cæſar* had his particular Reaſons for carrying with him all the Nobility of "*Gaul*; becauſe not daring to diſpatch them in their own Country, he was "in hopes of finding a favourable Opportunity to execute his cruel Purpoſe in "*Britain*." He therefore exhorted them to join in a mutual Alliance, and oblige themſelves by a ſolemn Oath, to purſue with common Conſent ſuch Meaſures as ſhould appear neceſſary for the preſervation of *Gaul*.

VI. THO' *Cæſar* was fully informed of theſe Practices; yet in conſideration of his ſingular Regard for the *Æduans*, he contented himſelf with endeavouring to check and traverſe his Deſigns: Determined notwithſtanding to continue inflexible, and at all hazards prevent any Misfortune to himſelf and the Commonwealth from a Spirit, which he found every Day growing more hardy and intrepid. Being therefore detained in this Place about five and twenty Days, during which the North-Weſt Wind, very common on that Coaſt, hindered him from ſailing; he ſtudied by the ways of Gentleneſs and Perſuaſion, to keep *Dumnorix* in his Duty, without neglecting however to watch all his Motions. At laſt, the Wind ſpringing up fair, he ordered the Horſe and Foot to embark. As this univerſally engaged the Attention of the Camp, *Dumnorix*, unknown to *Cæſar*, drew off the *Æduan* Cavalry, and began his march homeward. *Cæſar* being informed of it, immediately put a ſtop to the Embarkation; and poſtponing every other Conſideration, ordered out a ſtrong Party of Horſe to purſue and bring him back. If he made reſiſtance, or refuſed to obey, they had Orders to kill him: For he judged, that a Man who had ſlighted his perſonal Authority, would not pay any great regard to his Commands in his Abſence. When they had overtaken him, he refuſed to return; and defending himſelf Sword in hand, implored the Aſſiſtance of his Followers, often calling out, that he was free, and the Subject of a free State. The *Romans*, according to the Orders they had received, ſurrounded and ſlew him; upon which all the *Æduan* Cavalry returned to *Cæſar*.

VII. THIS Affair concluded; and *Labienus* being left in *Gaul* with three Legions, and two thouſand Horſe, to defend the Port, provide Corn, have an eye upon the Tranſactions of the Continent, and take meaſures accordingly; *Cæſar* weighed Anchor about Sun-ſet with five Legions, and the ſame number of Horſe he had left with *Labienus*; and advancing with a gentle South-wind, continued his Courſe till midnight, when he found himſelf becalmed: but the Tide ſtill driving him on, at day-break he ſaw *Britain* on his left. When again following the return of the Tide, he rowed with all his might, to reach that part of the Iſland which he had marked out the Summer before, as moſt convenient for Landing. And on this occaſion the Diligence of the Soldiers cannot be enough commended; who labouring inceſſantly at the Oar, urged the Tranſports and Ships of Burden ſo ſwiftly, that they equalled the Courſe of the Gallies. The whole Fleet reached the Coaſt of *Britain* about Noon: nor did any Enemy appear in view. But as *Cæſar* afterwards underſtood from the Priſoners; though a great Army of *Britons* had repaired to the Coaſt; yet terrified by the vaſt Number of Ships, which, together with thoſe of the laſt Year's Expedition, and ſuch as had been fitted out by particular Perſons for their own uſe, amounted to upwards of eight hundred; they retired haſtily from the Shore, and hid themſelves behind the Mountains.

VIII. *CÆSAR* having landed his Army, and choſen a proper Place for his Camp; as ſoon as he underſtood from the Priſoners where the Enemy's Forces lay; leaving ten Cohorts upon the Coaſt, together with three hundred Horſe, to guard his Fleet; he ſet out about midnight in queſt of the Enemy; being under the leſs concern for his Ships, becauſe he had left them at Anchor upon a ſmooth and open Shore, under the Charge of *Q. Atrius*. After a march of twelve Hours during the night, he came within ſight of the Enemy; who having poſted themſelves behind a River with their Cavalry and Chariots, attacked us from the higher Ground, in order to oppoſe our Paſſage: but being repulſed by our Horſe, they retreated towards the Woods, into a Place ſtrongly fenced both by Nature and Art, and which, in all probability, had been fortified before on occaſion of ſome domeſtick War: for all the Avenues were ſecured by ſtrong Barricades of felled Trees. They never ſallied out of the Wood but in ſmall Parties, thinking it enough to defend the Entrance againſt our Men. But the Soldiers of the ſeventh Legion, advancing under cover of their Shields, and having caſt up a Mount, forced the Intrenchments with little loſs, and obliged the Enemy to abandon the Wood. *Cæſar* forbid all purſuit; both becauſe he was unacquainted with the nature of the Country; and the Day being far ſpent, he reſolved to employ the reſt of it in fortifying his Camp.

IX. EARLY the next Morning, he divided his Troops both Horſe and Foot into three Bodies, and ſent them out in purſuit of the Enemy. They were advanced but a little way, and juſt come within ſight of the Rear of the *Britons*, when a Party of Horſe from *Atrius* came to *Cæſar*, and informed him, "That a dreadful Storm ariſing the Night before, had fallen violently "upon the Fleet, and driven almoſt all the Ships aſhore: That neither Anchors nor "Cables, nor all the Addreſs of the Mariners and Pilots, had been able to reſiſt "the Fury of the Tempeſt; which had done unſpeakable Damage to the "Fleet, by reaſon of the Ships running foul of one another." *Cæſar*, upon this Intelligence, recalls his Legions and Cavalry, commanding them to give over the Purſuit. He himſelf returns to his Ships, and finds every thing according



A. *Cæsar's Camp.* B. *The Fleet drawn on Shore and*

N°24



and inclosed within the Fortifications of the Camp.

cording to the Reports and Letters he had received; forty of them being entirely deſtroyed, and the reſt ſo damaged that they were hardly repairable. He therefore ſet all the Carpenters of the Army to work, and wrote for others to *Gaul*; ordering *Labienus* at the ſame time, with the Legions under his Command, to build what Ships he could. He thought it likewiſe ſafeſt, though a Work of great Labour and Difficulty, to draw all his Ships on ſhore, and incloſe them within the Fortifications of his Camp. Ten Days were ſpent in this Service, during which the Soldiers had no intermiſſion of Fatigue, not even in the Night. The Ships being in this manner ſecured, and the Camp ſtrongly fortified, he left the ſame Troops to guard it as before, and returned to the Place where he had quitted the Purſuit of the Enemy. Upon his Arrival he found the Forces of the *Britons* conſiderably increaſed. The chief Command and Adminiſtration of the War, was, by common Conſent, conferred on *Caſſibelanus*; whoſe Territories were divided from the Maritime States by the *Thames*, a River eighty Miles diſtant from the Sea. This Prince had hitherto been engaged in almoſt continual Wars with his Neighbours: but the Terror of our Arrival making the *Britons* unite among themſelves, they intruſted him with the whole Conduct of the War.

X. THE inland Parts of *Britain* are inhabited by thoſe, whom Fame reports to be Natives of the Soil. The Sea-coaſt is peopled with *Belgians*, drawn thither by the love of War and Plunder. Theſe laſt, paſſing over from different Parts, and ſettling in the Country, ſtill retain the Names of the ſeveral States whence they are deſcended. The Iſland is well peopled, full of Houſes built after the manner of the *Gauls*, and abounds in Cattle. They uſe braſs Money, and iron Rings of a certain weight. The Provinces remote from the Sea produce Tin, and thoſe upon the Coaſt Iron; but the latter in no great Quantity. Their Braſs is all imported. All kinds of Wood grow here the ſame as in *Gaul*, except the Fir and Beach-tree. They think it unlawful to feed upon Hares, Pullets, or Geeſe; yet they breed them up for their Diverſion and Pleaſure. The Climate is more temperate than in *Gaul*, and the Colds leſs intenſe. The Iſland is triangular, one of its Sides facing *Gaul*. The Extremity towards *Kent*, whence is the neareſt Paſſage to *Gaul*, lies Eaſtward: the other ſtretches South-weſt. This ſide extends about five hundred Miles. Another ſide looks towards *Spain* weſtward. Over-againſt this lies *Ireland*, an Iſland eſteemed not above half as large as *Britain*, and ſeparated from it by an interval equal to that between *Britain* and *Gaul*. In this interval lies the Iſle of *Mona*, beſides ſeveral other leſſer Iſlands, of which ſome write, that at the time of the Winter-ſolſtice, they have Night for thirty Days together. We could make out nothing of this upon Enquiry, only diſcovered by means of our Hour-glaſſes, that the Nights were ſhorter than in *Gaul*. The length of this Side is computed at ſeven hundred Miles. The laſt ſide faces the North-eaſt, and is fronted by no part of the Continent, only towards one of its Extremities it ſeems to eye chiefly the *German* Coaſt. It is thought to extend in length about eight hundred Miles. Thus the whole Iſland takes in a Circuit of two thouſand Miles. The Inhabitants of *Kent*, which lies wholly on the Sea-coaſt, are the moſt civilized of all the *Britons*, and differ but little in their Manners from the *Gauls*. The greater part of thoſe within the Country never ſow their Lands, but live on Fleſh and Milk, and go clad in Skins. All the *Britons* in general paint themſelves with Woad, which gives a bluiſh Caſt to the Skin, and makes them look dreadful in Battle. They are long-haired; and ſhave all the reſt of the Body except the Head and upper Lip. Ten or twelve

of

of them live together, having their Wives in common; eſpecially Brothers, or Parents and Children amongſt themſelves: but the Iſſue is always aſcribed to him who firſt eſpouſed the Mother.

XI. THE Enemy's Horſe, ſupported by their Chariots, vigorouſly charged our Cavalry on their march; yet we every where had the better, and drove them to their Woods and Hills: But after making great Slaughter, venturing to continue the Purſuit too far, we loſt ſome Men. Some time after, ſallying unexpectedly from the Woods, and falling ſuddenly upon our Men while employed in fortifying their Camp, a ſharp Conflict enſued between them and the advanced Guard. *Cæſar* ſent two Cohorts to their Aſſiſtance; whom the *Britons* charging in ſeparate Parties, ſo ſurpriſed with their new manner of fighting, that they broke through, routed them, and returned without Loſs. Q. *Laberius Durus*, a military Tribune, was ſlain on this occaſion: but ſome freſh Cohorts coming up, the *Britons* were at laſt repulſed.

XII. BY this Action, which happened within view of the Camp, and of which the whole Army were Spectators, it evidently appeared, that our heavy armed Legions, who could neither purſue thoſe that retired, nor durſt venture to forſake their Standards, were by no means a fit match for ſuch an Enemy. Nor could even the Cavalry engage without great danger; it being uſual for the *Britons* to counterfeit a Retreat, until they had drawn them a conſiderable way from the Legions; when ſuddenly quitting their Chariots, they charged them on foot, and by this unequal manner of fighting, made it alike dangerous to purſue or retire. Add to all this, that they never fought in a Body, but in ſmall Parties, and with conſiderable Intervals between. They had likewiſe their Detachments ſo placed, as eaſily to protect their flying Troops, and ſend freſh Supplies where needful.

XIII. THE next Day they ſtationed themſelves among the Hills, at a diſtance from our Camp, and appeared only in ſmall Bodies, nor ſeemed ſo forward to skirmiſh with our Cavalry as the Day before. But about Noon, *Cæſar* ordering out three Legions to forage, with all the Cavalry, under the Command of *C. Trebonius* his Lieutenant; they fell ſuddenly upon the Foragers on all ſides, and even attacked the Legions and Standards. Our Men vigorouſly returning the Charge, repulſed them; and the Cavalry finding themſelves ſupported by the Foot, continued the Purſuit till they had utterly broken them; inſomuch that great Numbers being ſlain, they could neither find an opportunity to rally, deſcend from their Chariots, or face about to make Reſiſtance. After this Defeat, the auxiliary Troops, which had come in from all Parts, returned ſeverally to their own Homes; nor did the Enemy, from this time, appear any more againſt us with their whole Forces.

XIV. *CÆSAR* perceiving their Deſign, marched towards the *Thames*, to penetrate into the Kingdom of *Caſſibelanus*. This River is fordable only in one place, and that not without great difficulty. When he arrived, he ſaw the Enemy drawn up in great Numbers on the other ſide. They had likewiſe ſecured the Bank with ſharp Stakes, and driven many of the ſame kind into the bottom of the River, yet ſo as to be covered by the Water. *Cæſar* having Intelligence of this from the Priſoners and Deſerters, ſent the Cavalry before, ordering the Legions to follow cloſe after; which they did with ſo much Expedition and Briskneſs, though nothing but their Heads was above the Water, that the

A BRITISH DRUID.

THE PORTRAITURE OF AN ANCIENT BRITON.

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A MALE BRITISH PICT.

BRITISH MUSEUM



A FEMALE BRITISH PICT.



A VIRGIN BRITISH PICT.

A BRITON bordering upon the PICTS.

N°39

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

A BRITISH FEMALE bordering upon the PICTS.

the Enemy, unable to ſuſtain their Charge, quitted the Banks, and betook themſelves to flight.

XV. *CASSIBELANUS*, as we have before intimated, finding himſelf unable to keep the Field, disbanded all his other Forces; and retaining only four thouſand Chariots, watched our Motions, always keeping at ſome diſtance from us, and ſheltering himſelf in Woods and inacceſſible Places, whither he had likewiſe made ſuch of the Inhabitants with their Cattle retire, as lay upon our Rout: and if at any time our Cavalry ventured upon a freer Excurſion into the Fields, to plunder and lay waſte the Country; as he was perfectly acquainted with all the Roads and Defiles, he would ſally from the Woods with ſome of the Chariots, and fall upon our Men diſperſed and in diſorder. Theſe frequent Alarms obliged us to be much upon our Guard; nor would *Cæſar* ſuffer the Cavalry to remove to any diſtance from the Legions, or to pillage and deſtroy the Country, unleſs where the Foot was at hand to ſuſtain them.

XVI. MEAN-TIME the *Trinobantes*, one of the moſt powerful States in thoſe parts, ſend Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*. Of this State was *Mandubratius*, who had fled for Protection to *Cæſar* in *Gaul*, that he might avoid the Fate of his Father *Imanuentius*, whom *Caſſibelanus* had put to death. The Ambaſſadors promiſed Obedience and Submiſſion in the name of the Province; and withal intreated him to defend *Mandubratius* againſt the Violence of *Caſſibelanus*, and reſtore him to the Government of their State. *Cæſar* ordered them to deliver forty Hoſtages, and furniſh his Army with Corn; ſending back at the ſame time *Mandubratius*. They yielded to his Demands without delay, ſent the appointed number of Hoſtages, and ſupplied him with Corn.

XVII. THE Protection granted to the *Trinobantes*, ſecuring them from the Inſults of the Soldiers; the *Cenimagni*, *Segontiaci*, *Ancalites*, *Bibroci*, and *Caſſi*, ſend Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, and ſubmit. From them he had Intelligence, that he was not far from the Capital of *Caſſibelanus*, which was ſituated amidſt Woods and Marſhes, and whither great numbers of Men and Cattle were retired. A Town among the *Britons* is nothing more than a thick Wood, fortified with a Ditch and Rampart, to ſerve as a place of Retreat againſt the Incurſions of their Enemies. Thither he marched with his Legions: and tho' the Place appeared to be extremely ſtrong both by Art and Nature, he nevertheleſs reſolved to attack it in two ſeveral Quarters. The Enemy, after a ſhort ſtand, were obliged at laſt to give way, and retire by another part of the Wood. Vaſt numbers of Cattle were found in the Place; and many of the *Britons* were either made Priſoners, or loſt their lives in the Purſuit.

XVIII. WHILE theſe things paſſed beyond the *Thames*, *Caſſibelanus* diſpatched Meſſengers to *Kent*, which, as we have before obſerved, was ſituated along the Sea-Coaſt. This Country was then under the Government of four Kings, *Cingetorix*, *Carnilius*, *Taximagulus*, and *Segonax*, who had Orders to draw all their Forces together, and fall ſuddenly upon the naval Camp of the *Romans*. But our Men ſallying upon them as they approached, made great Slaughter of their Troops, took *Cingetorix* one of their Leaders priſoner, and returned ſafe to the Camp. *Caſſibelanus*, upon the News of this Battle, diſcouraged by ſo many Loſſes, the devaſtation of his Territories, and above all

the Revolt of the Provinces; ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to ſue for Peace, by the Mediation of *Comius* of *Arras*.

XIX. *CÆSAR* deſigning to paſs the Winter in *Gaul*, becauſe of the frequent Commotions in that Country; and reflecting that but a ſmall part of the Summer remained, during which it would be eaſy to protract the War; demanded Hoſtages, and appointed the yearly Tribute which *Britain* was to pay to the *Romans*. At the ſame time he ſtrictly charged *Caſſibelanus*, to offer no Injury to *Mandubratius* or the *Trinobantes*. Having received the Hoſtages, he led his Troops back to the Sea-ſide, where he found his Fleet repaired. Orders were immediately given to launch it: and becauſe the number of Priſoners was exceeding great, and ſeveral Ships had been deſtroyed by the Tempeſt, he reſolved to carry over his Men at two Embarkations. Happily it ſo fell out, notwithſtanding the great number of Ships, and their frequent paſſing and repaſſing, that not one periſhed either this or the preceding Year, which had any Soldiers on board: whereas thoſe ſent empty to him from the Continent, as well the Ships concerned in the firſt Embarkation, as others built afterwards by *Labienus*, to the number of ſixty, were almoſt all driven back or loſt. *Cæſar* having waited for them a conſiderable time to no purpoſe, and fearing to loſe the proper Seaſon for ſailing, as the time of the Equinox drew near, choſe to ſtow his Men on board the few Ships he had: and taking the Opportunity of an extraordinary Calm, ſet ſail about ten at night, and by day-break brought his whole Fleet ſafe to the Continent of *Gaul*.

XX. HAVING laid up his Fleet, and held a general Aſſembly of the *Gauls* at *Samarobriva*; as the Crop had been very indifferent this Year by reaſon of the great Droughts, he was obliged to quarter his Legions otherwiſe than in former Winters, and canton them one by one in the ſeveral Provinces of *Gaul*. One Legion he quartered on the *Morini*, under the command of *C. Fabius*: another among the *Nervians*, under *Q. Cicero*: a third with the *Æduans*, under *L. Roſcius*: and a fourth in the Country of the *Rhemi*, on the Borders of the *Treviri*, under *Labienus*. Three were ſent into *Belgium*, over whom he appointed three Commanders; *M. Craſſus* his Queſtor, *L. Munatius Plancus*, and *C. Trebonius*. The eighth and laſt, which *Cæſar* had newly raiſed on the other ſide of the *Po*, was ſent, together with five Cohorts, among the *Eburones*, between the *Rhine* and the *Meuſe*, where *Ambiorix* and *Cativulcus* reigned. At the head of this Body were two Commanders; *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, and *L. Arunculeius Cotta*. By this diſtribution of his Legions, he thought he had found an eaſy Remedy againſt the ſcarcity of Corn: and yet they all lay within the compaſs of an hundred Miles, except that under *L. Roſcius*, for which he was in no pain, as being quartered in a very quiet and friendly Country. He reſolved however not to leave *Gaul*, 'till he had received advice from all his Lieutenants, and was aſſured that their Quarters were eſtabliſhed, fortified, and ſecured.

XXI. AMONG the *Carnutes* lived *Taſgetius*, a Man of diſtinguiſhed Birth, and whoſe Anceſtors had been poſſeſſed of the Sovereignty in that State. *Cæſar* had reſtored him to the Dignity of his Forefathers, in conſideration of his Virtue and Affection to him, and the many ſignal Services he had done him in all his Wars. It was now the third Year of his Reign, when his Enemies, many of whom were of his own State, conſpiring againſt him, openly aſſaſſinated him. The Affair was laid before *Cæſar*: who fearing leſt the great number

number concerned in the Plot might draw the State into a Revolt, ordered *L. Plancus*, with a Legion from *Belgium*, to march ſpeedily into the Country of the *Carnutes*, fix his Winter-Quarters in that Province, and ſeizing all who had been concerned in the murder of *Taſgetius*, ſend them Priſoners to him. Mean-time he was informed by his Lieutenants and Queſtors, to whom he had committed the care of the Legions, that they were ſeverally arrived at their appointed Quarters, and had fortified themſelves in them.

XXII. ABOUT fifteen Days after the arrival of the Legions in their Winter-Quarters, a ſudden Inſurrection and Revolt broke out among the *Eburones*, by the ſecret Practices of *Ambiorix* and *Cativulcus*. Theſe two Princes had been to meet *Sabinus* and *Cotta* on their Frontiers, and in a friendly manner had ſupplied them with Corn: but now inſtigated by *Indutiomarus* of *Treves*, they excited their People to take up Arms; and having ſurpriſed ſome Soldiers that were gone to cut Wood, came with a great Body of Troops to attack the *Roman* Camp. Our Men immediately flew to Arms, aſcended the Rampart, and ſending out a Detachment of *Spaniſh* Horſe, put their Cavalry to rout. Upon this, deſpairing of Succeſs, they drew off their Men from the Attack; and, according to their Cuſtom, demanded a Conference; pretending they had ſomething to ſay which concerned the common Intereſt, and might ſerve to put an end to the preſent Differences.

XXIII. ACCORDINGLY *C. Arpinius*, a *Roman* Knight, the Friend of *Q. Titurius*; and *Q. Junius* of *Spain*, who had frequently before been ſent by *Cæſar* to *Ambiorix*, were deputed to treat. *Ambiorix* addreſſed them in Words to this effect: "That he had in no ſort forgot the many Obligations "he lay under to *Cæſar*; who had freed him from the Tribute he had been "wont to pay the *Atuatici*; and who had reſtored him his Son and Nephew, "whom that People, after receiving them as Hoſtages, had treated as Slaves: "That the Hoſtilities he had juſt committed were not the effect of his own "private Animoſity to the *Romans*, but in conſequence of a Reſolution of the "State; where the Government was of ſuch a nature, that the People had "as much Power over him, as he over the People: That even the State "itſelf had been in a manner forced into this War, by a ſudden Confederacy "of all *Gaul*: That he could appeal to his own Weakneſs for the truth of "what he ſaid, being not ſo very unskilled in Affairs as to imagine, that the "Forces of the *Eburones* were a match for the Power of the *Romans*: That "it was a Project formed by all the States of *Gaul* in common, who had "agreed to ſtorm in one Day, the very Day on which he ſpoke, all the "Quarters of the *Roman* Army; ſo that no one might be able to ſuccour "another: That it was not eaſy for *Gauls* to reſiſt the Importunity of thoſe of "their own Nation, eſpecially in a Propoſal to act in concert for the recovery of "their Liberty: But that, after having performed what the common Voice of "his Country demanded, he thought he might now liſten to that of Gratitude: "That he found himſelf compelled by his Attachment to *Cæſar*, and by his "Friendſhip for *Sabinus*, to give notice of the extreme Danger to which the "Legion was expoſed: That a great Body of *Germans* had actually paſſed "the *Rhine*, and would be there in two Days at fartheſt: That *Sabinus* and "*Cotta* were to conſider, whether it would not be proper to retire with their "Troops, before the neighbouring States could be apprized of their Deſign, "and go and join *Labienus* or *Cicero*, who were neither of them diſtant much

"above

" above fifty Miles: That, as far as regarded himſelf, he engaged by all that " was ſacred to ſecure their Retreat thro' his Territories; and undertook it the " more readily, as he ſhould thereby not only diſcharge his Duty to his Coun- " try, in delivering it from the Inconvenience of wintering the *Romans*, but " at the ſame time manifeſt his Gratitude to *Cæſar*." Having made this Speech he withdrew.

XXIV. *ARPINIUS* and *Junius* reported what they had heard to the Lieutenants; who alarmed at the ſuddenneſs of the thing, thought the Information not to be neglected, tho' it came from an Enemy: Nor were they a little moved by this Conſideration, that it appeared to them altogether incredible, that the *Eburones*, a weak and inconſiderable State, ſhould of their own accord preſume to take up Arms againſt the *Romans*. They therefore laid the Matter before a Council of War, where a warm Debate aroſe. *L. Arunculeius*, with a great number of military Tribunes, and Centurions of the firſt rank, were againſt undertaking any thing haſtily, or quitting their Winter-Quarters, before they had received Orders to that purpoſe from *Cæſar*. They alledged: " That having ſtrongly fortified their Camp, they were able " to defend themſelves, even againſt all the Forces of the *Germans*: That the " late Attempt of the *Gauls* was a ſufficient Proof of this, whom they had " not only withſtood with Courage, but repulſed with Loſs: That they had " Proviſions in abundance, and might therefore ſecurely wait the arrival of " relief from *Cæſar* and the neighbouring Legions: In fine, that nothing could " be more diſhonourable, or argue greater want of Judgment, than in Affairs " of the higheſt moment, to take Meaſures upon the Information of an " Enemy." *Titurius*, on the other hand, exclaimed: " That it would be " then too late to think of retiring, when the Enemy in greater numbers, " and ſtrengthened by the acceſſion of the *Germans*, ſhould come up againſt " them; or when the Quarters next them ſhould have received ſome ſignal " Check: That the time for Deliberation was ſhort: That *Cæſar*, he made no " queſtion, was gone into *Italy*; it not being likely, that either the *Carnutes* " would have formed the Deſign of aſſaſſinating *Taſgetius*, or the *Eburones* " in ſo contemptuous a manner aſſaulted the *Roman* Camp, had they not been " aſſured of his Departure: That the Information of an Enemy weighed not with " him, but the real Circumſtances of Things. The *Rhine* was not far off. The " *Germans* were much exaſperated by the death of *Arioviſtus*, and their late fre- " quent Defeats. *Gaul* burnt with Impatience to throw off the *Roman* Yoke, " avenge the many Loſſes they had ſuſtained, and recover their former Glory in " War, of which now ſcarce a Shadow remained. In ſhort, who could imagine " that *Ambiorix*, without a certainty of being ſupported, would have embarked in " ſo dangerous an Enterprize? That his Opinion was in all Reſpects ſafe; becauſe, " if no ſuch Confederacy had been formed, they had nothing to apprehend in " marching to the neareſt Legion; if, on the contrary, all *Gaul* and *Ger-* " *many* were united, Expedition alone could ſave them from Deſtruction: " Whereas, by following the Advice of *Cotta*, and thoſe who were againſt a " Retreat; tho' the Danger perhaps might not prove immediate, yet were " they ſure in the end of periſhing by Famine." The Diſpute continued for ſome time; *Cotta*, and the principal Officers, ſtrongly oppoſing the march of the Troops. At laſt *Sabinus* raiſing his Voice, that he might be heard by the Soldiers without: " Be it ſo, then, (ſays he,) ſince you ſeem ſo reſolved: " I am not he among you who is moſt afraid of Death. But if any Mis- " fortune happens, thoſe who hear me will know whom to blame. In two

" Days,



A. *The Roman Troops formed into an Orb.* B. *The Baggage.* C. *Ambiorix's Troops appear sud*

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ppear suddenly on each side the Valley & attack the Romans in a Place of great Disadvantage.

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" Days, did not you oppoſe it, we might eaſily reach the Quarters next us; " and there, in conjunction with our Fellow-Soldiers, confront the common " Danger: whereas by keeping the Troops ſeparate and at a diſtance, you re- " duce them to the Neceſſity of periſhing by Sword or Famine."

XXV. THE Council was then going to riſe: but the Officers, ſurrounding their Generals, conjured them not to put all to hazard by their Diſſenſion and Obſtinacy. They told them, " That whatever Reſolution was taken, whether " to go or ſtay, the Danger was by no means great, provided they acted with " union among themſelves; but their Diſagreement threatned the Troops with " inevitable Deſtruction." The Debate continued till midnight: when at length *Cotta*, vanquiſhed by Importunity, yielded to the Opinion of *Sabinus*. Orders were given for marching by break of Day. The remainder of the Night was none of it employed in ſleep; each Man being taken up in chooſing what things to carry along with him, and what of his Winter-neceſſaries to leave behind. In ſhort, they did every thing to make their ſtay more dangerous; and by their Fatigue and want of Reſt, incapacitate themſelves for a vigorous Defence upon their march. At Day-break they left their Camp, not like Men acting by the Advice of an Enemy, but as if *Ambiorix* had been their particular Friend; marching in a very extended Column, and followed by a great Train of Baggage.

XXVI. THE Enemy judging from the Hurry and Motion in the Camp, that the *Romans* intended to leave it, placed themſelves in Ambuſcade in two Bodies in a Wood; where, well-ſheltered and covered from view, they waited at about two Miles diſtance their Arrival; and when the greateſt part of the Army had entered a large Valley, ſuddenly appearing on both ſides of it, they attacked them at the ſame time in Front and Rear, and obliged them to fight in a Place of great diſadvantage.

XXVII. THEN at length *Titurius*, like one who had neglected all the neceſſary Precautions, unable to hide his Concern, ran up and down among the Troops, and began to diſpoſe them in order of Battle; but with an Air ſo timid and diſconcerted, that it appeared he had no hopes of Succeſs; as happens for the moſt part to thoſe who leave all to the Moment of Execution. But *Cotta*, who had foreſeen that this might happen, and had therefore oppoſed the Departure of the Troops, omitted nothing in his power for the common Safety; calling to and encouraging the Men like an able General, and at the ſame time fighting with the Bravery of a common Soldier. And becauſe the great Length of the Column rendered it difficult for the Lieutenants to remedy all Diſorders, and repair expeditiouſly enough to the Places where their Preſence was neceſſary; Orders were given to quit the Defence of the Baggage, and form into an Orb. This Diſpoſition, though not improper in theſe Circumſtances, was nevertheleſs attended with very unhappy Conſequences; for being conſidered as the Effect of Terror and Deſpair, it diſcouraged our Men, and augmented the Confidence of the Enemy. Beſides, as unavoidably happens on ſuch Occaſions, many of the Soldiers quitting their Enſigns, haſtened to fetch from the Baggage what they had of moſt value, and filled all Parts with Uproar and Lamentation.

XXVIII. THE *Gauls* mean-while conducted themſelves with great Prudence; their Officers proclaimed through the Ranks, " That not a Man ſhould

" ſtir from his Poſt; that the Booty was theirs, and every thing belonging to " the *Romans* muſt certainly fall into their Hands: but that all depended upon " ſecuring the Victory." Our Men were not inferior to the Enemy either in Valour, Number, or way of fighting. Though they had neither General nor Fortune on their ſide, they hoped ſtill by their Bravery to ſurmount all Difficulties; and whenever any of the Cohorts ſallied out, ſo as to join the Enemy hand to hand, a conſiderable Slaughter of the *Gauls* enſued. This being perceived by *Ambiorix*, he ordered his Men to caſt their Darts at a diſtance, to avoid a cloſe Fight, retire before the *Romans* whenever they advanced, and purſue them as they returned to their Standards: in which way of fighting they were become ſo expert, by the lightneſs of their Arms, and daily Exerciſe, that it was impoſſible to do them any hurt. Theſe Orders were exactly followed; inſomuch that when any Cohort left the Orb, and came forward to attack the Enemy, they retreated and diſperſed in a moment: mean-while it uncovered its own Flanks, and expoſed them to the Darts on either ſide. The Danger was ſtill greater when they returned; for then not only the Troops that ſtood next them, but thoſe who had retired before them, ſurrounded and charged them on all hands. If, on the contrary, they choſe to continue in their Poſt; neither could their Valour any thing avail them, nor was it poſſible for Men ſtanding ſo cloſe together, to avoid the Darts of ſo great a Multitude. And yet notwithſtanding all theſe Diſadvantages, and the many Wounds they had received, they ſtill maintained their Ground; and though much of the Day was now ſpent, the Fight having continued from Sun-riſe till two in the Afternoon, they did nothing in all that time unworthy the Dignity of the *Roman* Name. At length *T. Balventius*, who the Year before had been made firſt Centurion of a Legion, a Man of diſtinguiſhed Courage, and great Authority among the Troops, had both his Thighs pierced with a Dart. *Q. Lucanius*, an Officer of the ſame Rank, endeavouring to reſcue his Son, whom he ſaw ſurrounded by the Enemy, was killed after a brave Reſiſtance. And *L. Cotta* the Lieutenant, encouraging the ſeveral Cohorts and Companies, received a Blow on the Mouth from a Sling.

XXIX. SO many Misfortunes quite diſpirited *Titurius*; who perceiving *Ambiorix* at a diſtance animating his Troops, ſent *Cn. Pompey* his Interpreter, to beg Quarter for himſelf and his Soldiers. *Ambiorix* replied; " That he " was ready to grant him a Conference if he deſired it: That he hoped to " prevail with the Multitude to ſpare the *Romans*; and that as to *Sabinus* him- " ſelf, he gave his Word no hurt ſhould be done him." *Sabinus* communicated this Anſwer to *Cotta*, propoſing that they ſhould leave the Battle, and go and confer with *Ambiorix*, from whom he was in hopes of obtaining Quarter both for themſelves and their Men. *Cotta* abſolutely refuſed to treat with an armed Enemy, and perſiſted in that Reſolution. *Sabinus* ordered the military Tribunes and principal Centurions that were about his Perſon to follow him, and when he drew near *Ambiorix*, being commanded to lay down his Arms, obeyed; charging thoſe that were with him to do the ſame. Mean-while, as they were treating about the Conditions, *Ambiorix* ſpinning out the Deliberations on purpoſe, he was by degrees ſurrounded and ſlain. Then the *Gauls*, according to their Cuſtom, raiſing a Shout, and calling out Victory, charged our Troops with great Fury, and put them into Diſorder. *L. Cotta*, fighting manfully, was ſlain, with the greateſt part of the Soldiers. The reſt retreated to the Camp they had quitted in the Morning; of whom *L. Petroſidius*, the Standard-bearer, finding himſelf ſore preſſed by the Enemy, threw the Eagle

Eagle within the Intrenchments, and was killed fighting bravely before the Camp. Thoſe that remained, with much ado, ſuſtained the Attack till Night; but finding themſelves without Hope, they killed one another to the laſt Man. A few who had eſcaped out of the Fight, got by different ways to *Labienus*'s Camp, and brought him the News of this ſad Event.

XXX. *AMBIORIX*, elated with this Victory, marched immediately at the head of his Cavalry into the Country of the *Atuatici*, which bordered upon his Territories; and travelling Day and Night without intermiſſion, left Orders for the Infantry to follow him. Having informed them of his Succeſs, and rouſed them to Arms, he the next Day arrived among the *Nervians*; and urged them not to loſe the preſent favourable Opportunity of freeing themſelves for ever from the Yoke of Slavery, and avenging the Injuries they had received from the *Romans*. He told them, "That two of their Lieutenants "had been ſlain, and a great part of their Army cut to pieces: That it would "be an eaſy matter, ſuddenly to attack and deſtroy the Legion quartered in "their Country under *Cicero:* and that he was himſelf ready to aſſiſt them "in the Enterpriſe." By this Speech he eaſily drew in the *Nervians*.

XXXI. ACCORDINGLY, having forthwith diſpatched Meſſengers to the *Centrones*, *Grudii*, *Levaci*, *Pleumoſians*, and *Gorduni*, who are all ſubject to their State; they aſſembled what Forces they could, and came unexpectedly upon *Cicero*'s Quarters, who as yet had heard nothing of the Fate of *Titurius*. Here likewiſe it unavoidably fell out, that the Soldiers ſent to cut Wood for Firing and the Fortifications of the Camp, were intercepted by the ſudden Arrival of their Cavalry. Having put all theſe to the Sword; the *Eburones*, *Atuatici*, and *Nervians*, with their Allies and Tributaries, amounting to a formidable Army, came and attacked the Camp. Our Men immediately flew to Arms, aſcended the Rampart, and with great difficulty ſuſtained that Day's Aſſault; for the Enemy placed all their hopes in Diſpatch, and firmly believed that if they came off Conquerors on this Occaſion, they could not fail of Victory every where elſe.

XXXII. *CICERO*'s firſt Care was to write to *Cæſar*, promiſing the Meſſengers great Rewards if they carried his Letters ſafe. But as all the ways were beſet by the Enemy's Troops, his Couriers were continually intercepted. Mean-while of the Materials brought for fortifying the Camp, an hundred and twenty Towers were built during the Night with incredible diſpatch, and the Works about the Rampart compleated. Next Day the Enemy, with a much greater Force than before, attacked the Camp, filled the Ditch, but were again repulſed by our Men. This continued for ſeveral Days together. The Night was wholly employed in repairing the Breaches made by Day, inſomuch that neither the ſick nor wounded were permitted to reſt. Whatever might be of uſe to reſiſt the next Day's Aſſault, was prepared with great diligence during the Night. Stakes were hardened in the Fire; Paliſades planted in great Number; Towers raiſed upon all Parts of the Rampart; and the whole ſtrengthened with a Parapet and Battlements. *Cicero* himſelf, though much out of order, would take no reſt, even during the Night; ſo that the Soldiers were obliged to force him from time to time to take ſome Repoſe.

XXXIII. MEAN-TIME ſuch of the *Nervian* Chiefs and Leaders, as had any Intimacy or Friendſhip with *Cicero*, deſired a Conference. This being

being agreed to, they addreſſed him in the ſame ſtrain as *Ambiorix* had before uſed towards *Sabinus*: "That all *Gaul* was in Arms: That the *Germans* had "paſſed the *Rhine:* That *Cæſar* and the reſt of the Troops were beſieged in "their Winter-Quarters." They told him likewiſe of the Fate of *Sabinus*; and, to gain Credit, produced *Ambiorix*; adding: "That it was in vain to "expect Relief from thoſe who were themſelves in the utmoſt diſtreſs: That "they meant not however any Injury to *Cicero* and the People of *Rome*, but "merely to prevent their wintering in the Country, and eſtabliſhing that "Practice into a Cuſtom: That he was therefore at liberty to leave his Quarters "without moleſtation, and retire in ſafety where he pleaſed." To this *Cicero* only anſwered: "That it was not uſual with the People of *Rome* to accept "Conditions from an armed Enemy: But if they would lay down their "Arms, he promiſed to interpoſe his Mediation, and permit them to ſend "Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, from whoſe Juſtice they might reaſonably expect "Redreſs."

XXXIV. THE *Nervians*, driven from this Hope, ſurrounded the Camp with a Line, whoſe Rampart was eleven Foot high, and Ditch fifteen Foot deep. They had learnt ſomething of this in their former Wars with *Cæſar*, and the Priſoners they had made gave them further Inſtructions. But being unprovided of the Tools neceſſary in this kind of Service, they were obliged to cut the Turf with their Swords, dig up the Earth with their Hands, and carry it in their Cloaks. And hence it will be eaſy to form ſome judgment of their Number: For in leſs than three Hours they compleated a Line of fifteen Miles in Circuit. The following Days were employed in raiſing Towers, proportioned to the height of our Rampart; and in preparing Scythes, and wooden Galleries, in which they were again aſſiſted by the Priſoners.

XXXV. ON the ſeventh Day of the Attack, a very high Wind ariſing; they began to throw red-hot Balls of Clay, and burning Javelins, upon the Barracks of the *Romans*, which after the manner of the *Gauls* were thatched with Straw. Theſe ſoon took fire; and the Flames were in a moment ſpread by the Wind into all parts of the Camp. The Enemy falling on with a mighty Shout, as if already ſecure of Victory, advanced their Towers and Galleries, and prepared to ſcale the Rampart. But ſuch was the Conſtancy and preſence of Mind of the Soldiers; that tho 'the Flames ſurrounded them on every ſide, and they were oppreſſed with the multitude of the Enemies Darts; tho' they ſaw their Huts, their Baggage, and their whole Fortunes in a blaze; yet not only did they continue firm in their Poſts, but ſcarce a Man offered ſo much as to look behind him; ſo intent were they on fighting and repelling the Enemy. This was much the hardeſt Day for our Troops; but had nevertheleſs this fortunate Iſſue, that far the greateſt number of the Enemy were on that Day wounded or ſlain: For as they had crowded cloſe up to the Rampart, thoſe behind prevented the front Ranks from retiring. The Flames abating by degrees, and the Enemy having brought forward one of their Towers to the very foot of the Rampart; the Centurions of the third Cohort drew off their Men a little, beckoning to the *Gauls*, and challenging them to enter: But as not a Man would run the hazard, they attacked them on all ſides with Stones, drove them from the Tower, and ſet it on fire.

XXXVI. IN this Legion were two Centurions of diſtinguiſhed Valour, *T. Pulfio*, and *L. Varenus*, who ſtood fair for being raiſed to the firſt Rank of their

A. *Cicero's Winter Quarters.* B.D. *The Line drawn round them by the Nervians, whose Rampart was*
to the Country of the Atuatici. E. *A Tower raised by the Nervians of equal height with the Roma*

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en foot high and Ditch fifteen foot deep. C. Ambiorix marching at the Head of the Cavalry in=
Rampart. F. The Roman Barracks in Flames. G. The Nervians attempting to scale the Rampart.

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their Order. Theſe were perpetually diſputing with one another the Pre-eminence in Courage, and at every Year's Promotion contended with great Eagerneſs for Precedence. In the heat of the Attack before the Rampart, *Pulfio* addreſſing *Varenus*: "What hinders you now, (ſays he;) or what more "glorious Opportunity would you deſire of ſignalizing your Bravery? This, "this is the Day for determining the Controverſy between us." At theſe Words he ſallied out of the Camp, and ruſhed amidſt the thickeſt of the *Gauls*. Nor did *Varenus* decline the Challenge; but thinking his Honour at ſtake, followed at ſome diſtance. *Pulfio* darted his Javelin at the Enemy, and transfixed a *Gaul* that was coming forward to engage him: who falling dead of the Wound, the Multitude advanced to cover him with their Shields, and all poured their Darts upon *Pulfio*, giving him no time to retire. A Javelin pierced his Shield, and ſtuck faſt in his Belt. This Accident entangling his right Hand, prevented him drawing his Sword, and gave the Enemy time to ſurround him. *Varenus* his Rival flew to his Aſſiſtance, and endeavoured to reſcue him. Immediately the Multitude quitting *Pulfio*, as fancying the Dart had diſpatched him, all turned upon *Varenus*. He met them with his Sword drawn, charged them hand to hand; and having laid one dead at his feet, drove back the reſt: But purſuing with too much eagerneſs, ſtept into a Hole, and fell down. *Pulfio* in his turn haſtened to extricate him; and both together, after having ſlain a multitude of the *Gauls*, and acquired infinite Applauſe, retired unhurt within the Intrenchments. Thus Fortune gave ſuch a turn to the Diſpute, that each owed his Life to his Adverſary; nor was it poſſible to decide, to which of them the Prize of Valour was due.

XXXVII. AS the Defence every day became more difficult and hazardous, chiefly by the great multitude of killed and wounded, which conſiderably leſſened the number of Defendants; *Cicero* ſent Letter upon Letter to inform *Cæſar* of his Danger. Many of theſe Couriers falling into the Enemy's Hands, were tortured to death within view of our Soldiers. There was at that time in the *Roman* Camp a *Nervian* of Diſtinction, by name *Vertico*, who in the beginning of the Siege had fled to *Cicero*, and given ample Proofs of his Fidelity. This Man, by the hopes of Liberty, and a promiſe of great Rewards, engaged one of his Slaves to carry a Letter to *Cæſar*. Having concealed it in his Javelin, and paſſed thro' the Camp of the *Gauls* without ſuſpicion, as being himſelf of that Nation, he arrived ſafe at *Cæſar*'s Quarters, who by this means was informed of the Danger of *Cicero* and the Legion.

XXXVIII. *CÆSAR* receiving the Letter about five in the Afternoon, immediately diſpatched a Meſſenger to *M. Craſſus*, who was quartered among the *Bellovaci*, twenty-five Miles off, ordering him to draw out his Legion at midnight, and march with all the expedition he could to join him. *Craſſus*, according to his Orders, came along with the Courier. He ſent likewiſe to *C. Fabius*, directing him to lead his Legion into the Country of the *Atrebatians*, which lay in the way to *Cicero*. He wrote to *Labienus*, if it could be done with ſafety, to meet him upon the Frontiers of the *Nervians*. He himſelf in the mean time aſſembled about four hundred Horſe from the neareſt Garriſons, reſolving not to wait for the reſt of the Army, which lay at too great a diſtance.

XXXIX. AT nine in the Morning he had notice from his Scouts of the Arrival of *Craſſus*. That Day he marched twenty Miles, leaving *Craſſus* with a

Legion at *Samarobriva*, where he had depoſited the Baggage, Hoſtages, publick Papers, and all the Proviſions which had been laid up for the Winter. *Fabius*, in conſequence of his Inſtructions, having made all the haſte he could, met him with his Legion. *Labienus*, who had been informed of the death of *Sabinus*, and the deſtruction of the Troops under his Command, and who ſaw all the Forces of *Treves* advancing againſt him; fearing leſt if he ſhould quit his Quarters, the Enemy might conſtrue it as a flight, and that it would be impoſſible for him to ſuſtain their Attack, eſpecially as they were fluſhed with their late Succeſs; wrote to *Cæſar*, informing him of the Danger that would attend the quitting his Camp, of the Diſaſter that had happened among the *Eburones*, and that all the Forces of the *Treviri*, both Horſe and Foot, were encamped within three Miles of him.

XL. *CÆSAR* approving his Reaſons; tho' he thereby found himſelf reduced from three to two Legions, was yet ſenſible that all depended upon expedition. He makes forced marches; and reaching the Territories of the *Nervians*, learnt from ſome Priſoners the ſtate of the Siege, and the danger the Legion was in. Immediately he engages a *Gauliſh* Horſeman, by the Promiſe of great Rewards, to carry a Letter to *Cicero*. It was wrote in *Greek* Characters, that if it fell into the Enemies Hands, it might not be intelligible to them. The Meſſenger had Orders, in caſe he found it impracticable to penetrate himſelf into the *Roman* Camp, to tie the Letter to a Javelin, and throw it in. In this Letter *Cæſar* ſent *Cicero* word, that he was already on the march to relieve him, and would be up very ſoon; exhorting him in the mean time, to defend himſelf with his wonted Bravery. The *Gaul*, dreading a diſcovery, threw the Letter into the Camp as he had been ordered: But the Javelin by accident ſticking in a Tower, remained there two Days unperceived. On the third a Soldier ſaw it, took it down, and brought it to *Cicero*,; who immediately read it in full Aſſembly, and diffuſed the common Joy thro' the whole Camp. At the ſame time they perceived the Smoke of the Villages fired by *Cæſar* in his march, which put the Arrival of the Succours beyond all doubt.

XLI. THE *Gauls* having notice of it alſo by their Scouts, thought proper to quit the Siege, and go to meet *Cæſar*. Their Army conſiſted of about ſixty thouſand Men. *Cicero*, now at liberty, applied again to *Vertico*, for the Slave ſpoken of above; and having admoniſhed him to uſe the utmoſt Diligence and Circumſpection, diſpatched him with a Letter to *Cæſar*, informing him that the Enemy had raiſed the Siege, and were advancing againſt him with all their Forces. *Cæſar* received the Letter about midnight, communicated the Contents to his Army, and exhorted them to meet the Enemy with Courage. Next day he decamped early, and after a march of four Miles, diſcovered the *Gauls* on the other ſide of a large Valley, with a River in front. It was dangerous to engage ſo great a Force upon unequal Ground. Knowing therefore that the Siege of *Cicero*'s Camp was raiſed, and having no longer any Reaſon to be in a hurry, he encamped in the moſt convenient Spot he could find, and compleated his Intrenchments. His Army conſiſting of no more than ſeven thouſand Men without Baggage, required at beſt but a very ſmall Camp; yet he purpoſely contracted it as much as poſſible, to inſpire the Enemy with the greater Contempt of him. Mean-time ſending out Scouts on all ſides, he endeavoured to find where he might croſs the Valley with moſt Safety.

XLII.

XLII. THE reſt of the Day paſſed in ſlight Skirmiſhes between the Cavalry near the Brook; but the main Body of the Army on both Sides kept within their Lines: The *Gauls*, in expectation of more Forces, which were not yet come up: *Cæſar*, that by pretending Fear, he might draw the Enemy on this ſide the Valley, and engage them before his Camp; or, if that could not be effected, that having diſcovered the Paſſes, he might be enabled to croſs the Valley and Rivulet with leſs danger. Early next Morning the Enemy's Cavalry coming up to our Camp, charged our Horſe; who, by *Cæſar*'s Orders, purpoſely gave ground, and retired behind the Works. At the ſame time he cauſed the Ramparts to be raiſed higher, the Gates to be barricaded, and cautioned the Soldiers, in the execution of theſe Orders, to run up and down tumultuouſly, and affect an air of Timidity and Concern. The Enemy, invited by all theſe Appearances, croſſed the Valley, and drew up in a very diſadvantageous Poſt. Our Men mean-while retiring from the Rampart, they approached ſtill nearer, caſt their Darts on all ſides within the Trenches, and ſent Heralds round the Camp to proclaim, that if any of the *Gauls* or *Romans* had a mind to come over to them, they ſhould be at liberty ſo to do 'till nine o' clock, after which no Quarter would be granted. Nay, ſo far did they carry their Contempt, that thinking they could not break in by the Gates, (which, to deceive them, were ſtopt up with ſingle rows of Turf,) ſome began to ſcale the Rampart, others to fill up the Ditch. But then *Cæſar* ſallying by all the Gates at once, and charging them briskly with his Cavalry, put them ſo precipitately to flight, that not a Man offered to make the leaſt Reſiſtance. Great numbers of them were ſlain, and the reſt obliged to throw down their Arms.

XLIII. NOT caring to purſue them far, on account of the Woods and Marſhes that lay in his way; and finding that conſiderable execution had been done upon the ſpot, he the ſame Day joined *Cicero* with all his Forces; where beholding the Towers, Galleries, and other Works of the *Gauls*, he could not help being ſtruck with Admiration. He then reviewed *Cicero*'s Legion, and found that not a tenth Man had eſcaped without Wounds; which gave him a juſt Idea of the greatneſs of the Danger to which they had been expoſed, and of the vigorous Defence they had made. He beſtowed great Commendations on the Legion, and its Commander; and addreſſed himſelf to the Centurions and military Tribunes by name, of whoſe Valour *Cicero* made honourable mention. He learnt particularly from the Priſoners all the Circumſtances of the unhappy Affair of *Sabinus* and *Cotta*: and calling the Soldiers together next Day, gave them an Account of the whole Tranſaction, comforted them, confirmed their Courage, and told them; that a Diſaſter occaſioned by the Imprudence and Raſhneſs of the Lieutenant, ought to give them the leſs Diſturbance; as by the Favour of the immortal Gods, and their Valour, Vengeance had followed ſo ſuddenly, that neither had the Joy of the Enemy for the Victory continued any time, nor their Grief for the Loſs remained long without allay.

XLIV. MEAN-TIME the Report of *Cæſar*'s Victory flew with incredible ſpeed thro' the Country of the *Rhemi* to *Labienus*. For tho' he lay at the diſtance of fifty Miles from *Cicero*'s Camp, whither *Cæſar* did not arrive 'till paſt three in the Afternoon; yet before midnight a Shout was raiſed at the Gates of his Camp, by which the *Rhemi* ſignified to him *Cæſar*'s Victory, and their own Congratulation on that Succeſs. The Report of this being carried

carried to to the *Treviri*; *Indutiomarus*, who the next Day had determined to attack *Labienus*'s Camp, made off in the Night, and retired with all his Forces into his own Country. *Cæſar* ſent back *Fabius* with his Legion to his former Quarters, reſolving to winter himſelf near *Samarobriva* with three Legions, diſtributed in three different Cantonments; and as all *Gaul* was in motion, to continue with the Army in perſon. For the defeat and death of *Sabinus* ſpreading every where, almoſt all the States of *Gaul* were meditating a Revolt; and with this view ſent Meſſengers and Deputies into all Parts, to concert Meaſures, and contrive where to begin the War. Nay they held Aſſemblies by Night in deſart Places; inſomuch that during the whole Winter, ſcarce a Day paſſed, but *Cæſar* had Intelligence of ſome new Reſolves or Inſurrections of the *Gauls*. Among the reſt, *L. Roſcius* his Lieutenant, who commanded the thirteenth Legion, ſent him word: that great numbers of *Gauls*, from the ſeveral States of *Armorica*, had aſſembled to attack him, and advanced within eight Miles of his Camp; but upon hearing of *Cæſar*'s Victory, had ſeparated ſo haſtily, that their Retreat had all the appearance of a Flight.

XLV. BUT *Cæſar* ſummoning the principal Noblemen of every State to attend him; partly by Menaces, making them ſenſible he was no Stranger to their Deſigns; partly by Exhortations, found means to keep the greateſt part of *Gaul* in its duty. The *Senones* however, a potent State, and of great Authority among the *Gauls*, formed the deſign of publickly aſſaſſinating *Cavarinus*, whom *Cæſar* had given them for a King; whoſe Brother *Moritaſgus* had held the Sovereignty at *Cæſar*'s arrival in *Gaul*, and whoſe Anceſtors had long been in poſſeſſion of the ſame Dignity. But he having Intelligence of the Plot, thought proper to fly; whereupon purſuing him to the very Frontiers, they drove him from his Palace and Throne: and ſending Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to juſtify their Conduct; upon his ordering their whole Senate to repair to him, they refuſed to ſubmit. So powerful was this Example amongſt the Barbarians, that ſome at laſt were found of Courage enough to begin the War; and ſo great a Change did it produce in the Inclinations of all: that except the *Æduans* and *Rhemi*, who had been always particularly diſtinguiſhed and favoured by *Cæſar*; the firſt, on account of their ancient and inviolable Fidelity to the People of *Rome*; the laſt, for their late Services in the *Gallick* War; ſcarce was there a ſingle State in all *Gaul* that did not incur ſuſpicion. Nor is this, in truth, ſo much to be wondered at; as for many other Reaſons, ſo particularly for this: that a People famed above all Nations for their military Virtues, could not with Patience bear to ſee themſelves ſo far ſtript of their former Renown, as to be forced to ſubmit to the Yoke of the *Romans*.

XLVI. *INDUTIOMARUS* and the *Treviri* ceaſed not, during the whole Winter, to ſend Ambaſſadors over the *Rhine*; ſoliciting the *German* States; offering them Money; and urging, that a great part of our Army having already been cut off, much the leaſt conſiderable remained. But no part of that Country could be perſuaded to come into their Deſigns: Becauſe having twice before tried their Fortune with the *Romans*, in the War with *Arioviſtus*, and in the Defeat of the *Tenchtheri*; they were reſolved, they told them, to run no more Hazards. *Indutiomarus*, diſappointed of this Hope, was not leſs active in drawing Forces together, ſoliciting Recruits from the neighbouring States, providing Horſes, and encouraging even Out-laws and Convicts, by the

the Promiſe of great Rewards, to engage in his Service. And ſo great an Authority had he by this means acquired in *Gaul*, that Ambaſſadors flocked to him from all Parts; ſome publickly, others in a private manner, to requeſt his Protection and Friendſhip.

XLVII. FINDING himſelf thus voluntarily applied to: on one ſide, by the *Senones* and *Carnutes*, impelled by a conſciouſneſs of the Guilt they had incurred; on the other, by the *Nervians* and *Atuatici*, who were preparing for a War with the *Romans*; and that if he once took the Field, Forces would not be wanting: he called an Aſſembly of the States in Arms. This, according to the Cuſtom of the *Gauls*, implies an actual commencement of War; and, by a ſtanding Law, obliges all their Youth to appear at the Diet in Arms; in which they are ſo extremely ſtrict, that whoſoever has the misfortune to come laſt, is put to death in ſight of the Multitude, with all manner of Torments. In this Aſſembly, *Cingetorix*, the head of the oppoſite Faction, and Son-in-law of *Indutiomarus*; who, as we have related above, had declared for *Cæſar*, and ſtill continued firm to him, was proclaimed a publick Enemy, and his Eſtate confiſcated. After which *Indutiomarus* acquainted the Council, that the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and ſeveral other States of *Gaul* had ſolicited his Aſſiſtance; that he accordingly intended to join his Forces with theirs, taking his rout thro' the Territories of the *Rhemi*, and giving up their Lands to be plundered; but that before he began his march, he was deſirous of maſtering the Camp of *Labienus*. To that end he gave the neceſſary Directions.

XLVIII. *LABIENUS*, whoſe Camp, both by the nature of the Ground, and the Fortifications he had added, was extremely ſtrong, feared nothing, either for himſelf or the Legion; but nevertheleſs was intent how he might give the Enemy ſome conſiderable Blow. Having therefore been informed by *Cingetorix* and his Adherents, of the Speech made by *Indutiomarus* in the Council of *Gaul*; he ſent Deputies to the neighbouring States, ſolicited Cavalry from all Parts, and appointed them a Day of Rendezvous. Mean-time *Indutiomarus*, with all his Cavalry, appeared almoſt every Day within ſight of the Camp; one while, to examine its Situation; another, to intimidate *Labienus*, or invite him to a Conference. On theſe Occaſions, it was uſual for the Enemy to caſt their Darts over the Rampart. *Labienus* kept his Men within the Works, and uſed all the Methods he could think of to make the *Gauls* believe he was afraid of them.

XLIX. *INDUTIOMARUS* approaching the Trenches every Day with greater Contempt than before: *Labienus* received into his Camp, by night, all the Cavalry he had ſent for from the neighbouring States; and was ſo careful to reſtrain his Men within their Lines, by Guards planted at all the Outlets, that it was impoſſible for the *Treviri* to get Intelligence of the Reinforcement he had received. Mean-time *Indutiomarus*, according to Cuſtom, came up to the Camp, and continued there the greater part of the Day. The Cavalry diſcharged their Darts over the Rampart, and in opprobrious Language challenged our Men to fight. The *Romans* making no Anſwer, they retired towards Night, but diſperſed and without Order. Then *Labienus*, ordering a ſudden Sally with all the Cavalry, ſtrictly cautioned and charged his Men, that as ſoon as they had put the *Gauls* to flight, (which happened according to his Expectation,) they ſhould all ſingle out *Indutiomarus*, nor offer

to wound a Man of the Enemy, till they ſaw him ſlain: for he was unwilling that any Delay, occaſioned by the Slaughter of the reſt, ſhould give him an Opportunity to eſcape. He promiſed great Rewards to the Man that ſhould kill him; and ſent the Cohorts after to ſuſtain the Horſe. The Deſign ſucceeded: for as all were intent upon *Indutiomarus* alone, he was overtaken and ſlain in paſſing a River, and his Head brought back to the Camp. Our Cavalry, in their Return, put all to the Sword that came in their way. Upon the news of this Defeat, the Forces of the *Eburones* and *Nervians* returned home, and *Gaul* was ſomewhat quieter the reſt of the Winter.

C. JULIUS

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK VI.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. Cæſar, *apprehending greater Commotions in* Gaul, *augments his Forces.* II. *He reduces the* Nervians *by a ſudden Invaſion.* III. *And admits the* Senones, Carnutes, *and* Menapians *to a Surrender.* VI. Labienus *pretending Fear, ſuddenly attacks and routs the* Treviri. IX. Cæſar *paſſes the* Rhine *a ſecond time.* X. *The* Suevians *prepare to oppoſe the* Romans. XI. *The Manners of the* Gauls *and* Germans *deſcribed.* XII. *The* Æduans *and* Sequani *at the head of two oppoſite Factions in* Gaul. *The* Sequani *declining in Power, the* Rhemi *ſubſtitute themſelves in their Place.* XIII. *Deſcription of the Druids.* XV. *The Religion of the* Gauls. XVI. *The* Gauls *and* Germans *differ much as to their Manners and Cuſtoms.* XXIII. *The* Hercynian *Foreſt.* XXIV. *A Bull with one Horn.* XXV. *Wild Aſſes.* XXVI. *Bufalos.* XXVII. Cæſar, *fearing the Want of Proviſions, repaſſes the* Rhine, *and marches againſt* Ambiorix. XXVIII. *The great Power of Fortune.* XXIX. Ambiorix *disbands his Troops, and counſels them to provide for their own Safety.* XXX. Cæſar *divides his Army, and marches in perſon in queſt of* Ambiorix. XXXI. *Is obliged to proceed with great Circumſpection in ravaging the Country.* XXXII. *The* Sicambri *croſs the* Rhine, *and fall upon* Cicero's *Camp.* XXXV. *The aſtoniſhing Bravery of* Sextius Baculus *upon this Occaſion.* XXXVII. *The* Romans *ſuffer ſome Loſs.* XXXVIII. *The* Germans *at length relinquiſh the Attack, and return home.* XL. Cæſar *lays waſte the Country of the* Eburones. Ambiorix *narrowly eſcapes being taken.* XLI. Cæſar *returns to* Italy.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK VI.

I. *CÆSAR*, for many Reaſons, expecting greater Commotions in *Gaul*, ordered his Lieutenants *M. Silanus*, *C. Antiſtius Reginus*, and *T. Sextius*, to levy Troops. At the ſame time he deſired of *Cn. Pompey* the Proconſul, that ſince he was himſelf detained by publick Affairs at *Rome*, he would ſet on foot the Legion he had inliſted in *Ciſalpine Gaul* during his Conſulſhip, and ſend it to him: for he conſidered it as of the utmoſt Importance towards ſecuring a proper Reſpect from the *Gauls* for the time to come, to give them ſuch an Idea of the Power of *Italy*, as might convince them that it was not only able ſpeedily to repair any Loſſes ſuſtained, but even to bring a greater Force into the Field. Friendſhip and the good of the Commonwealth equally determined *Pompey* to yield to this Requeſt: and the Levies being compleated with great diligence by the Lieutenants, three new Legions were formed and brought into *Gaul* before the end of Winter. Thus, having doubled the Number of Cohorts loſt under *Titurius*, he ſoon made the Enemy ſenſible, both by his Expedition and the Strength of the Reinforcement, of what they had to apprehend from the Power and Diſcipline of the *Romans*.

II. *INDUTIOMARUS* being ſlain, as we have related above, the *Treviri* conferred the Command on his Relations. They perſiſted likewiſe in ſoliciting the *Germans*, and making them offers of Money. But not being able to prevail with thoſe that lay neareſt them, they applied to ſome of the more remote States; and finding them inclined to treat, entered into a ſolemn Engagement with them, giving Hoſtages for Security of the Money ſtipulated, and aſſociating *Ambiorix* into the Confederacy. *Cæſar* informed of theſe things, and finding that he was threatned with War on all ſides; that the *Nervians*, *Atuatici*, and *Menapians*, with all the *Germans* on this ſide the *Rhine*, were actually in Arms; that the *Senones* refuſed to attend him according to Orders, and were tampering with the *Carnutes* and other neighbouring States; and that the *Treviri* were ſoliciting the *Germans* by frequent Embaſſies; he judged it would be neceſſary to open the Campaign early. Accordingly, without waiting till the Winter was at an end, he drew together the four neareſt Legions, and fell unexpectedly into the Territories of the *Nervians*, before they could

either aſſemble in a Body, or find means to ſave themſelves by Flight. Having carried off a great Number of Men and Cattle, enriched his Soldiers with the Booty, and laid waſte the Country; he compelled them to ſubmit and give Hoſtages, and then led back his Legions to their Winter-Quarters.

III. EARLY in the Spring, having ſummoned a general Aſſembly of *Gaul*, purſuant to his Deſign: as all the other States but the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and *Treviri* appeared; looking upon this as the beginning of a Revolt, and willing to poſtpone every thing elſe, he adjourned the Diet to *Paris*. This City was upon the Borders of the *Senones*, and had been united with them about an Age before; but was thought to have no ſhare in their preſent Revolt. Having declared the Adjournment to the Aſſembly, he the ſame Day ſet out with his Legions againſt the *Senones*, and by great Marches reached their Territories. *Acco*, who was at the head of the Confederacy, hearing of his Approach, ordered the Multitude to ſhelter themſelves in the Towns: but before that could be done, the *Romans* appeared. This obliged them to change their Meaſures, and ſend Deputies to *Cæſar* to implore Forgiveneſs. They were ſeconded by the *Æduans*, the old and faithful Allies of the *Romans*, at whoſe Requeſt *Cæſar* readily pardoned them; and the rather, becauſe the Summer being now come, he had no mind to ſpend the Seaſon for Action in proceeding formally againſt the Guilty. He ordered them to ſend an hundred Hoſtages, whom he committed to the Cuſtody of the *Æduans*. The *Carnutes* too, at the Interceſſion of the *Rhemi*, under whoſe Protection they were, having ſent Deputies and Hoſtages, obtained the ſame Conditions. *Cæſar* then went to the Aſſembly of the States, put an end to the Diet, and ordered the *Gauls* to provide him Cavalry.

IV. TRANQUILLITY being reſtored in theſe Parts, *Cæſar* turned all his Thoughts to the Management of the War with *Ambiorix* and the *Treviri*. He ordered *Cavarinus* to attend him with the Cavalry of the *Senones*, to prevent any new Commotions in his Abſence, either in conſequence of the Reſentment of that Prince, or the Hatred he had incurred of the State. And having thus ſettled all things to his mind, as he knew *Ambiorix* was determined not to hazard a Battle, he ſet himſelf to watch his other Deſigns.

V. THE *Menapians*, whoſe Territories border upon thoſe of the *Eburones*, are ſecured by Woods and Moraſſes on every ſide; and were the only People of *Gaul*, who had not ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to deſire a Peace. He knew *Ambiorix* was in good Intelligence with them; and that by means of the *Treviri*, he had alſo entered into an Alliance with the *Germans*. He therefore thought it beſt to deprive him of theſe Reſources, before he attacked him in perſon; leſt deſpairing of being able to defend himſelf, he ſhould either retire among the *Menapians*, or throw himſelf into the Arms of the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*. This Reſolution being taken, he ſent the Baggage of the whole Army to *Labienus* in the Country of the *Treviri*, ordered him a Reinforcement of two Legions, and marched himſelf againſt the *Menapians* with five Legions, who carried nothing with them but their Arms. That Nation truſting to their Situation, inſtead of aſſembling Forces, retreated to their Woods and Moraſſes, and carried all their Effects along with them. *Cæſar*, dividing his Forces with *C. Fabius* his Lieutenant, and *M. Craſſus* his Queſtor; and having ſpeedily finiſhed his Bridges; entered their Country in three Bodies, ſet all their Houſes and Villages on fire, and carried off ſuch Numbers of Men and Cattle, that the



A. *Labienus's Camp strongly intrenched.* B. *The Camp of the Treviri.* C. *The River betwee*
Army in Battalia. F. *The Army of the Gauls.* G. *The Troops detatched by Labienu*



between the two Camps. D. *The Roman Baggage collected into one Place.* E. *The Roman*
Albienus to guard the Baggage. H. *The Cavalry on the two Wings of y^e Roman Army.*

the *Menapians* were at laſt conſtrained to ſue for Peace. He granted it, on Condition they ſent him Hoſtages, and engaged not to admit *Ambiorix* or any one from him into their Territories; threatning to treat them as Enemies if they did. Theſe things ſettled, he left *Comius* of *Arras* there, with a Body of Horſe to keep them in Awe, and ſet out himſelf againſt the *Treviri*.

VI. WHILST *Cæſar* was thus employed, the *Treviri*, having drawn together a great Number of Horſe and Foot, were preparing to attack the Legion which had wintered in their Territories under *Labienus*. They were now advanced within two Days march of the Lieutenant's Camp, when they learnt that he had received a Reinforcement of two Legions from *Cæſar*. Upon this encamping at about fifteen Miles diſtance, they reſolved to wait for the Auxiliaries they expected from *Germany*. *Labienus* having Intelligence of their Deſign, and hoping their Raſhneſs might furniſh him with an Opportunity of fighting, left the Baggage under a Guard of five Cohorts; and with the twenty-five remaining, and all his Cavalry, marched towards the Enemy, and pitched his Camp about a Mile from them.

VII. BETWEEN *Labienus* and the Enemy was a River, with ſteep Banks, and difficult to paſs. And indeed neither was *Labienus* himſelf minded to try the Paſſage, nor did he expect the Enemy would offer at ſuch an Attempt. The hope of being joined by the Auxiliaries grew ſtronger in the Camp of the *Gauls* every Day. *Labienus* declared publickly in a Council of War; "That "as the *Germans* were ſaid to be upon their march, he was determined not "to expoſe himſelf and the Army to danger, but would decamp early next "Morning." This was ſoon carried to the Enemy; for as our Cavalry conſiſted moſtly of *Gauls*, it was natural for ſome of them to favour their Countrymen. *Labienus* aſſembling the military Tribunes and principal Centurions during the night, laid before them his real Deſign: and the better to betray the Enemy into a ſuſpicion of his being afraid, gave Orders for decamping with more Noiſe and Tumult than was uſual in a *Roman* Army. By this means his march had all the Appearance of a Flight; and the Enemy, whoſe Camp was ſo very near, had Notice of it before Day-break from their Spies.

VIII. SCARCE had our Rear got without the Trenches, when the *Gauls* encouraging one another not to loſe ſo fair a Prey, or ſtay in Expectation of the *Germans*, at a time the *Romans* were retreating in ſuch a Panick; and conſidering it as an Indignity, with ſo great a Superiority of Forces, to forbear attacking an handful of Men already put to Flight and incumbered with their Baggage; reſolved to paſs the River, and engage the *Romans*, notwithſtanding the Diſadvantage of the Ground. *Labienus*, who had foreſeen this; that he might draw them all over the River, continued the Feint of his march, and went on quietly. Then ſending the Baggage a little before, and ordering it to be placed upon a riſing Ground: "Behold, Fellow-ſoldiers, ſays he, the "Opportunity you ſo much deſired: You have the Enemy at a diſadvantage, "and in a Place where they cannot ſuſtain the Onſet: ſhew only under my "Command the Valour you have ſo often manifeſted to our General; think "him preſent, and that he ſees and obſerves you." At the ſame time he ordered them to face about, and form in Line of Battle; and detaching a few Troops of horſe to guard the Baggage, drew up the reſt on the two Wings. Our Men gave a ſudden Shout, and threw their Javelins. The Enemy, contrary to their Expectation, ſeeing thoſe whom they imagined put to flight, marching againſt them

them with diſplayed Banners, could not ſuſtain the very firſt Shock; but betaking themſelves immediately to flight, took Refuge in the neareſt Woods. *Labienus* purſuing with his Cavalry, put many of the Enemy to the Sword, and took a great Number of Priſoners; inſomuch that within a few Days the whole State was obliged to ſubmit: for the *Germans*, who were coming to their Aſſiſtance, upon hearing of their Defeat, returned home. The Relations of *Indutiomarus*, who had been the Authors of the Revolt, choſe likewiſe to retire with them, and abandon their Country. *Cingetorix*, who had always continued faithful to the *Romans*, was thereupon inveſted with the ſupreme Authority.

IX. *CÆSAR*, after his Arrival in *Treves*, from among the *Menapians*, reſolved for two Reaſons to paſs the *Rhine:* One, becauſe the *Germans* had aſſiſted the *Treviri* againſt the *Romans*: the other, to deprive *Ambiorix* of a Retreat into thoſe Parts. In conſequence of this Reſolution, he ſet about making a Bridge on the River, but ſomewhat higher up than before. As the Form and Manner was known, the Soldiers, by their extraordinary Diligence, finiſhed the Work in a few Days. Leaving a ſtrong Guard on the ſide of *Treves*, to prevent any ſudden Inſurrection in that Country, he carried over the reſt of his Army. The *Ubians*, who had before ſubmitted and given Hoſtages, ſent Ambaſſadors to him to vindicate their Conduct, and aſſure him, that they had neither ſent Troops to the Aſſiſtance of the *Treviri*, nor in any Inſtance departed from their Engagements. They urged and requeſted, that he would ſpare their Territories, and not, out of a general Hatred to the *Germans*, involve the Innocent in the Puniſhment of the Guilty. If he deſired more Hoſtages, they told him they were ready to ſend them. *Cæſar* finding upon Inquiry, that the Supplies had been ſent by the *Suevians*, accepted the Submiſſion of the *Ubians:* and preparing to march againſt the *Suevians*, informed himſelf of the Ways and Acceſſes to their Country.

X. A FEW Days after, he had Intelligence from the *Ubians*, that the *Suevians* were drawing their Forces to a general Rendezvous, and had ſent Orders to all the Nations under their Juriſdiction, to furniſh their Contingents of Horſe and Foot. Upon this, having furniſhed himſelf with Proviſions, and choſen a proper Place for his Camp, he ordered the *Ubians* to retire into their Towns with their Cattle and Effects; hoping that ſo unskilful and barbarous an Enemy, might eaſily be drawn by the want of Proviſions, to fight in a Place of Diſadvantage. He further injoined the *Ubians* to ſend Spies into all Parts, to learn the Deſigns and Motions of the *Suevians*. They readily complied, and in a few Days brought him back word; "That the "*Suevians*, upon certain Information of the Arrival of the *Roman* Army, had "retired to the remoteſt Part of the Country, with all their own Forces, and "thoſe of their Allies: that there they had reſolved to wait the coming up "of the *Romans*, at the Entrance of a Foreſt of immenſe Extent, called *Ba*-"*cenis*, which reached a great way into the Country, and ſerved as a Barrier "between the *Cheruſci* and *Suevians*, to prevent their mutual Incurſions."

XI. ON this Occaſion it may not be improper to ſay ſomewhat of the Manners of the *Gauls* and *Germans*, and the difference of Cuſtoms between theſe two Nations. A ſpirit of Faction prevails throughout *Gaul*, and that not only in their ſeveral States, Diſtricts, and Villages, but almoſt in every private Family. The Men of greateſt Eſteem and Conſideration among them,

are

are commonly at the head of these Factions, and give what turn they think proper to all publick Deliberations and Counsels. This Custom is of long standing, and seems designed to secure those of lower rank from the Oppression of the powerful: for the Leaders always take care to protect those of their Party, otherwise they would soon lose all their Authority. This equally obtains thro' the whole Continent of *Gaul*, the Provinces being in general divided into two Factions.

XII. WHEN *Cæsar* arrived in the Country, the *Æduans* were at the head of one Faction, and the *Sequani* of the other. These last being the weaker, because the *Æduans* had long bore the greatest sway, and had a number of considerable States in their dependence; they united with *Ariovistus* and the *Germans*, whom by great Presents and Promises they drew over the *Rhine* to their Assistance. This Alliance made them so powerful, that having worsted their Adversaries in several Battles, and killed almost all their Nobility; they forced the States dependent upon the *Æduans* to have recourse to them for Protection; obliged the *Æduans* themselves to give the Children of their principal Nobility as Hostages, swear publickly not to attempt any thing against the *Sequani*, and resign up to their possession a part of their Territories; and by this means rendered themselves in a manner Sovereigns of all *Gaul*. *Divitiacus*, in this Necessity, applied to the Senate of *Rome* for Relief, but without effect. *Cæsar*'s arrival soon changed the face of Affairs. The *Æduan* Hostages were sent back, their former Clients restored, and new ones procured them by *Cæsar*'s Interest; it appearing, that such as were under their Protection, enjoyed a more equal and milder Lot: by all which their Fortune and Authority being considerably enlarged, the *Sequani* were obliged to resign the Sovereignty. The *Rhemi* succeeded in their place: and as they were known to be in the same degree of Favour with *Cæsar*, such as could not get over their old Animosity to the *Æduans*, put themselves under their Protection. The *Rhemi* were extremely attentive to the Interests of their Clients, and thereby both preserved their old Authority, and that which they had newly acquired. Such therefore was the then Situation of *Gaul*, that the *Æduans* possessing indisputably the first Rank, the *Rhemi* were next in Consideration and Dignity.

XIII. OVER all *Gaul*, there are only two Orders of Men, in any degree of Honour and Esteem: for the common People are little better than Slaves, attempt nothing of themselves, and have no share in the publick Deliberations. As they are generally oppressed with Debt, heavy Tributes, or the Exactions of their Superiors; they make themselves Vassals to the Great, who exercise over them the same Jurisdiction, as Masters do over Slaves. The two Orders of Men, with whom, as we have said, all Authority and Distinctions are lodged, are the Druids and Nobles. The Druids preside in matters of Religion, have the care of publick and private Sacrifices, and interpret the will of the Gods. They have the direction and education of the Youth, by whom they are held in great honour. In almost all Controversies, whether publick or private, the decision is left to them: and if any Crime is committed, any Murder perpetrated; if any Dispute arises touching an Inheritance, or the limits of adjoining Estates; in all such Cases, they are the supreme Judges. They decree Rewards and Punishments; and if any one refuses to submit to their Sentence, whether Magistrate or private Man, they interdict him the Sacrifices. This is the greatest Punishment that can be inflicted among the *Gauls*; because such

as are under this Prohibition, are conſidered as impious and wicked: all Men ſhun them, and decline their Converſation and Fellowſhip, leſt they ſhould ſuffer from the Contagion of their Misfortunes. They can neither have recourſe to the Law for Juſtice, nor are capable of any publick Office. The Druids are all under one Chief, who poſſeſſes the ſupreme Authority in that Body. Upon his death, if any one remarkably excels the reſt, he ſucceeds: but if there are ſeveral Candidates of equal Merit, the Affair is determined by plurality of ſuffrages. Sometimes they even have recourſe to Arms before the Election can be brought to an Iſſue. Once a Year they aſſemble at a conſecrated Place in the Territories of the *Carnutes*, whoſe Country is ſuppoſed to be the middle of *Gaul*. Hither ſuch as have any Suits depending flock from all parts, and ſubmit implicitly to their Decrees. Their Inſtitution is ſuppoſed to come originally from *Britain*, whence it paſſed into *Gaul*; and even at this day, ſuch as are deſirous of being perfect in it, travel thither for Inſtruction. The Druids never go to War, are exempted from Taxes and military Service, and enjoy all manner of Immunities. Theſe mighty Encouragements induce multitudes of their own accord to follow that Profeſſion; and many are ſent by their Parents and Relations. They are taught to repeat a great number of Verſes by heart, and often ſpend twenty Years upon this Inſtitution: for it is deemed unlawful to commit their Statutes to Writing; tho' in other matters, whether publick or private, they make uſe of *Greek* Characters. They ſeem to me to follow this Method for two Reaſons: to hide their Myſteries from the knowledge of the Vulgar; and to exerciſe the Memory of their Scholars, which would be apt to lie neglected, had they Letters to truſt to, as we find is often the caſe. It is one of their principal Maxims that the Soul never dies, but after death paſſes from one Body to another; which, they think, contributes greatly to exalt Mens Courage, by diſarming Death of its Terrors. They teach likewiſe many things relating to the Stars and their motions, the magnitude of the World and our Earth, the nature of Things, and the power and prerogatives of the immortal Gods.

XIV. THE other Order of Men is the Nobles, whoſe whole Study and Occupation is War. Before *Cæſar*'s Arrival in *Gaul*, they were almoſt every Year at War, either offenſive or defenſive; and they judge of the power and quality of their Nobles, by his Vaſſals, and the number of Men he keeps in his Pay: for theſe are the only marks of Grandeur they make any Account of.

XV. THE whole Nation of the *Gauls* is extremely addicted to Superſtition: whence in threatning Diſtempers, and the imminent Dangers of War, they make no ſcruple to ſacrifice Men, or engage themſelves by Vow to ſuch Sacrifices; in which they make uſe of the Miniſtry of the Druids: for it is a prevalent Opinion among them, that nothing but the life of Man can atone for the life of Man; inſomuch that they have eſtabliſhed even publick Sacrifices of this kind. Some prepare huge Coloſſus's of *Oſier* Twigs, into which they put Men alive, and ſetting fire to them, thoſe within expire amidſt the Flames. They prefer for Victims ſuch as have been convicted of Theft, Robbery, or other Crimes; believing them the moſt accepable to the Gods: but when real Criminals are wanting, the innocent are often made to ſuffer. *Mercury* is the chief Deity with them: of him they have many Images, account him the Inventor of all Arts, their Guide and Conductor in their Journeys, and the Patron of Merchandize and Gain. Next to him are *Apollo*, and *Mars*,

THE CEREMONY OF A GE



GERMAN SACRIFICE.



A Huge COLOSSUS made of Ofier Twigs,
in which Men were burnt alive in Honour of the Gods.

N°. 38

GERMANS in their Military Habit.

GERMANS with their Hair tyed in a Knot, and clad in Skins.

N°. 36

Mars, and *Jupiter*, and *Minerva*. Their Notions in regard to them are pretty much the ſame with thoſe of other Nations. *Apollo* is their God of Phyſick; *Minerva* of Works and Manufactures; *Jove* holds the Empire of Heaven; and *Mars* preſides in War. To this laſt, when they reſolve upon a Battle, they commonly devote the Spoil. If they prove victorious, they offer up all the Cattle taken, and ſet apart the reſt of the Plunder in a Place appointed for that purpoſe: and it is common in many Provinces, to ſee theſe Monuments of Offerings piled up in conſecrated Places. Nay it rarely happens, that any one ſhews ſo great a Diſregard of Religion, as either to conceal the Plunder, or pillage the publick Oblations; and the ſevereſt Puniſhments are inflicted upon ſuch Offenders.

XVI. THE *Gauls* fancy themſelves to be deſcended from the God *Pluto*; which, it ſeems, is an eſtabliſhed Tradition among the Druids. For this Reaſon they compute the Time by Nights, not by Days; and in the Obſervance of Birth-days, new Moons, and the beginning of the Year, always commence the Celebration from the preceding Night. In one Cuſtom they differ from almoſt all other Nations; that they never ſuffer their Children to come openly into their preſence, until they are of age to bear Arms: for the Appearance of a Son in publick with his Father, before he has reached the age of Manhood, is accounted diſhonourable.

XVII. WHATEVER Fortune the Woman brings, the Husband is obliged to equal it out of his own Eſtate. This whole Sum, with its annual Product, is left untouched, and falls always to the ſhare of the Survivor. The Men have Power of Life and Death over their Wives and Children: and when any Father of a Family of illuſtrious Rank dies, his Relations aſſemble, and upon the leaſt ground of Suſpicion put even his Wives to the Torture like Slaves. If they are found guilty, Iron and Fire are employed to torment and deſtroy them. Their Funerals are magnificent and ſumptuous, according to their Quality. Every thing that was dear to the deceaſed, even Animals, are thrown into the Pile: and formerly ſuch of their Slaves and Clients as they loved moſt, ſacrificed themſelves at the Funeral of their Lord.

XVIII. IN their beſt regulated States they have a Law, that whoever hears any thing relating to the Publick, whether by rumor or otherwiſe, ſhall give immediate notice to the Magiſtrate, without imparting it to any one elſe: for the nature of the People is ſuch, that raſh and unexperienced Men, alarmed by falſe Reports, are often hurried to the greateſt Extremities, and take upon them to determine in matters of the higheſt Conſequence. The Magiſtrates ſtifle things improper to be known, and only communicate to the Multitude what they think needful for the ſervice of the Commonwealth: nor do the Laws permit to ſpeak of State Affairs, except in publick Council.

XIX. THE *Germans* differ widely in their Manners from the *Gauls*. For neither have they Druids to preſide in religious Affairs; nor do they trouble themſelves about Sacrifices. They acknowledge no Gods but thoſe that are Objects of Sight, and by whoſe Power they are apparently benefited; the Sun, the Moon, Fire. Of others they know nothing; not even by Report. Their whole Life is addicted to Hunting and War; and from their Infancy they are inured to Fatigue and Hardſhips. They eſteem thoſe moſt, who continue longeſt ſtrangers to Women; as imagining nothing contributes ſo much

to

to Stature, Strength, and Vigour of Body: but to have any Commerce of this kind before the age of twenty, is accounted in the higheſt degree ignominious. Nor is it poſſible to conceal any Irregularity this way; becauſe they bathe promiſcuouſly in Rivers, and are clothed in Skins, or ſhort Mantles of Fur, which leave the greateſt part of their Bodies naked.

XX. AGRICULTURE is little regarded among them, as they live moſtly on Milk, Cheeſe, and the Fleſh of Animals. Nor has any Man Lands of his own, or diſtinguiſhed by fixed Boundaries. The Magiſtrates, and thoſe in Authority, portion out yearly to every Canton and Family, ſuch a quantity of Land, and in what part of the Country they think proper; and the Year following remove them to ſome other Spot. Many Reaſons are aſſigned for this Practice: leſt ſeduced by Habit and Continuance, they ſhould learn to prefer Tillage to War: leſt a deſire of enlarging their Poſſeſſions ſhould gain ground, and prompt the ſtronger to expel the weaker: leſt they ſhould become curious in their Buildings, in order to guard againſt the extremes of Heat and Cold: leſt Avarice ſhould get footing amongſt them, whence ſpring Factions and Diſcords: in fine, to preſerve Contentment and Equanimity among the People, when they find their Poſſeſſions nothing inferior to thoſe of the moſt powerful.

XXI. IT is accounted honourable for States to have the Country all around them lie waſte and depopulated: for they think it an argument of Valour to expel their Neighbours, and ſuffer none to ſettle near them; at the ſame time that they are themſelves alſo the ſafer, as having nothing to apprehend from ſudden Incurſions. When a State is engaged in War, either offenſive or defenſive, they make choice of Magiſtrates to preſide in it, whom they arm with a Power of Life and Death. In time of Peace there are no publick Magiſtrates; but the Chiefs of the ſeveral Provinces and Clans adminiſter Juſtice, and decide Differences within their reſpective Limits. Robbery has nothing infamous in it, when committed without the Territories of the State to which they belong: they even pretend that it ſerves to exerciſe their Youth, and prevent the growth of Sloth. When any of their Princes in this caſe offers himſelf publickly in Council as a Leader, ſuch as approve of the Expedition riſe up, profeſs themſelves ready to follow him, and are applauded by the whole Multitude. They who go back from their Engagement are looked upon as Traitors and Deſerters, and loſe all Eſteem and Credit for the time to come. The Laws of Hoſpitality are held inviolable among them. All that fly to them for Refuge, on whatever Account, are ſure of Protection and Defence; their Houſes are open to receive them, and they plentifully ſupply their Wants.

XXII. FORMERLY the *Gauls* exceeded the *Germans* in Bravery, often made War upon them, and as they abounded in People beyond what the Country could maintain, ſent ſeveral Colonies over the *Rhine*. Accordingly the more fertile Places of *Germany*, in the neighbourhood of the *Hercynian* Foreſt, (which I find mentioned by *Eratoſthenes* and other *Greek* Writers under the name of *Orcinia*,) fell to the ſhare of the *Volcæ*, who ſettled in thoſe Parts, and have ever ſince kept poſſeſſion. They are in the higheſt Reputation for Juſtice and Bravery, and no leſs remarkable than the *Germans* for Poverty, Abſtinence, and Patience of Fatigue; conforming exactly to their Cuſtoms, both in habit and way of living. But the neighbourhood of the *Roman* Province, and an acquaintance with Traffick, has introduced Luxury and

A. *The Urus or Buffalo.* B. *A Bull nearly resembling*

ling a Stag with only one Horn. C. *A Kind of Wild Ass.*

GERMANS sleeping on Skins.



A. van. Buysen Sculp.

GERMANS in ſhort Mantles of Fur.

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and Abundance among the *Gauls*; whence becoming by little and little an unequal match for the *Germans*, and being worſted in many Battles, they no longer pretend to compare with them in Valour.

XXIII. THE *Hercynian* Foreſt, of which we have been juſt ſpeaking, is about nine Days Journey in breadth: for as the *Germans* are ignorant of the uſe of Meaſures, there is no other way of computing it. It begins from the Confines of the *Helvetians*, *Nemetes*, and *Rauraci*; and following directly the courſe of the *Danube*, extends to the Territories of the *Anartes* and *Dacians*. Thence turning from the River to the left, it runs thro' a multitude of different Regions: and tho' there are many in the Country, who have advanced ſixty Days Journey into this Foreſt; yet no one pretends to have reached the extremity of it, or diſcovered how far it extends. Many different ſpecies of Animals, unknown in other Countries, harbour here; the moſt remarkable of which, and that beſt deſerve to be mentioned, are theſe.

XXIV. THERE is a Bull that nearly reſembles a Stag, with only one Horn riſing from the middle of his Forehead, taller and ſtraighter than thoſe of our Cattle, and which at top divides into many large Branches. The Males and Females are ſhaped alike, and have Horns the ſame in ſize.

XXV. HERE are likewiſe a kind of wild Aſſes, ſhaped and ſpotted like Goats, but of a larger ſize; without Horns, or Joints in their Legs; that never lie down to ſleep; nor can raiſe themſelves, if by any Accident they are overthrown. They lean againſt Trees, which ſerve to ſupport them when they ſleep. Hence the Huntſmen, after having diſcovered their haunts, either looſen the Roots of the Trees, or ſaw them almoſt quite off; ſo that when the Animal, according to Cuſtom, reclines againſt them, they immediately give way, and both fall down together.

XXVI. A Third ſpecies of Animals are the Uri, nearly equalling the Elephant in bulk; but in colour, ſhape, and kind, reſembling a Bull. They are of uncommon ſtrength and ſwiftneſs, and ſpare neither Man nor Beaſt that comes in their way. They are taken and ſlain by means of Pits dug on purpoſe. This way of Hunting is frequent among the Youth, and ſerves to inure them to Fatigue. They who kill the greateſt number, and produce their Horns in publick as a Proof, are in high Reputation with their Countrymen. It is found impoſſible to tame them, or conquer their fierceneſs, tho' taken never ſo young. Their Horns, both in largeneſs, figure, and kind, differ much from thoſe of our Bulls. The Natives preſerve them with great care, tip their edges with Silver, and uſe them inſtead of Cups on their moſt ſolemn Feſtivals.

XXVII. *CÆSAR* underſtanding from the *Ubian* Scouts, that the *Suevians* were retired into their Woods; and fearing the want of Proviſions, becauſe, as we have already obſerved, the *Germans* are but little addicted to Agriculture; reſolved not to advance any farther. But to keep the Enemy ſtill under ſome awe of his Return, and prevent their ſending Succours to *Gaul*; having repaſſed the *Rhine*, he only broke down about two hundred Feet of his Bridge, on the *German* ſide; and to ſecure the reſt, built at the extremity a Tower of four Stories, where he left a Garriſon of twelve Cohorts,

and ſtrengthened the Place with all manner of Works. Young *C. Volcatius Tullus* had the charge of the Fort and Garriſon. He himſelf, as ſoon as the Corn began to be ripe, marched againſt *Ambiorix*; taking his way thro' the Foreſt of *Arden*, which is much the largeſt in all *Gaul*, and reaches from the Banks of the *Rhine*, and the Confines of *Treves*, quite to the *Nervians*, thro' a Space of more than five hundred Miles. *L. Minucius Baſilus* was ſent before with all the Cavalry, in hopes that the quickneſs of his march, and the opportunity of ſome lucky Conjuncture, might enable him to do ſomething conſiderable. He had orders to light no Fires in his Camp, the better to conceal his Approach from the Enemy; and *Cæſar* aſſured him, he would follow with all expedition. *Baſilus* exactly followed his Inſtructions; and coming ſuddenly and unexpectedly upon the *Gauls*, ſurpriſed great numbers of them in the Field. Being informed by them of the Place whither *Ambiorix* had retired with a few Cavalry, he marched directly againſt him.

XXVIII. BUT as Fortune has a conſiderable ſhare in all human Concerns, ſo particularly in thoſe of War. For as it was a very extraordinary Chance, that he ſhould thus come upon *Ambiorix* unprepared, and ſurpriſe him with his perſonal Arrival, before he had the leaſt notice of it from Fame or Report: ſo was it an equal effect of Fortune, that the *Gaul* himſelf, after having loſt his Arms, Horſes, and Chariots, ſhould yet find means to eſcape. This was principally owing to the ſituation of his Houſe, which was ſurrounded with a Wood; it being cuſtomary among the *Gauls*, in order to avoid the Heats, to build in the neighbourhood of Woods and Rivers. By this means his Attendants and Friends, poſſeſſing themſelves of a Defile, ſuſtained for a time the Attack of our Cavalry; during which, one of his Servants having provided him with a Horſe, he eſcaped into the Woods. Thus Fortune remarkably played her Part, both in bringing him into the Danger, and delivering him out of it.

XXIX. *AMBIORIX*, after his Eſcape, made no Attempt to draw his Forces together; nor is it known whether he acted in this manner out of Choice, as not thinking it ſafe to hazard a Battle; or becauſe he thought he ſhould not have ſufficient time, being ſurpriſed by the ſudden Arrival of the Cavalry, and believing that all the reſt of the Army followed. Diſpatching therefore Meſſengers privately thro' the Country, he counſelled every one to provide for his own Safety; upon which ſome took refuge in the Foreſt of *Arden*, and ſome in the adjoining Moraſſes. Thoſe who lived upon the Sea-Coaſt, hid themſelves in the Iſlands formed by the Tide at high Water: and many abandoning their Country altogether, truſted themſelves and their all to the Faith of Foreigners. *Cativulcus*, who jointly with *Ambiorix* was King of the *Eburones*, and had aſſociated with him in all his Deſigns, being of a very advanced Age, and unable to bear the Fatigues of War or Flight; after many Imprecations againſt *Ambiorix*, who had been the prime Contriver of the Revolt; poiſoned himſelf with an extract of Yew, a Tree very common in *Gaul* and *Germany*. The *Segni* and *Condruſi*, originally *German* Nations, whoſe Territories lay between thoſe of *Treves* and the *Eburones*, ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to intreat: "That he would not conſider them as Enemies, nor look "upon all the *Germans* on this ſide the *Rhine* as equally obnoxious: That they "had harboured no Thoughts of War, nor been any ways aiding to *Ambiorix*." *Cæſar* finding it to be ſo by the Anſwers of the Priſoners, ordered them to deliver



GERMANS with Shields made of Wicker, or the holloved Trunks of Trees.

BRITISH MUSEUM

No. 43

GERMANS cloathed in Skins.



GERMANS cloathed in Skins entire, with the Horns adapted to their Heads, so as to make themselves terrible.

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A GERMAN TROOPER ARMED.

GERMAN TROOPERS with their Helmets, Shields, & Lances.

Page 102.

70
47

A GERMAN mounted on a Shield, and proclaimed General by the Voices of the Multitude.



The Walls of Towns among the Gauls, built of alternate Courses of Stones and Beams.

GERMANS armed with Shields and Darts.

deliver up ſuch of the *Eburones* as had fled to them for Refuge; and promiſed, upon that Condition, not to moleſt their Territories.

XXX. THEN dividing his Army into three Bodies, he ſent all the Baggage to *Atuatuca*, a Caſtle ſituated almoſt in the heart of the Country of the *Eburones*, where *Titurius* and *Arunculeius* had been quartered during the Winter. This Place he choſe, as for other Reaſons, ſo likewiſe becauſe the Fortifications raiſed the Year before were ſtill entire, which would leſſen the Labour of his Soldiers. He left the fourteenth Legion to guard the Baggage, being one of the three lately levied in *Italy*, and brought thence into *Gaul*. *Q. Tullius Cicero* had the Charge both of the Legion and Fort, which was further ſtrengthened with an additional Guard of two hundred Horſe. The Army being thus divided; he ſent *T. Labienus*, with three Legions, towards the Sea-coaſt, and the Provinces that border upon the *Menapians*; *C. Trebonius*, with a like Number of Legions, to lay waſte the Country adjoining to the *Atuatici*; and reſolved to march himſelf with the other three towards the *Scheld*, which flows into the *Meuſe*, and to the Extremities of the Foreſt of *Arden*, whither he was informed *Ambiorix* had retired with a few Horſe. He promiſed, at his Departure, to return in ſeven Days; the Legion he had left in Garriſon being provided with Corn only for that time: and exhorted *Labienus* and *Trebonius*, if they found it conſiſtent with the publick Advantage, to return likewiſe with their Legions within the ſame ſpace; that joining counſel together, and taking their Meaſures from the Conduct of the Enemy, they might reſolve where next to carry the War.

XXXI. THERE was, as we have already obſerved, no formed Body of Troops, no Garriſon, no fortified Town to defend by Arms; but a Multitude diſperſed on all ſides. Wherever a Cave, or a Thicket, or a Moraſs offered them Shelter, thither they retired. Theſe Places were well known to the Natives; and great Care and Caution was required on our part, not for the Security of the whole Army, (which had no danger to fear whilſt in a Body, from Enemies diſperſed and full of Terror;) but for the Preſervation of each Individual. And yet even this regarded not a little the whole Army: for the Deſire of Plunder drew many of the Men to a great diſtance; and the Woods, full of Defiles and hidden Ways, hindered them from keeping together in a Body. If *Cæſar* meant to terminate the War altogether, and extirpate this Race of perfidious Men; the Soldiers muſt be divided into ſmall Parties, and detached on all ſides. If, on the contrary, he kept his Men together, as the Rules of War, and the *Roman* Diſcipline required; the Enemy were ſheltered by their Situation, nor wanted Boldneſs to form Ambuſcades, and cut off Stragglers. Amidſt theſe Difficulties, all poſſible Precautions were taken; and although the Soldiers were eagerly bent upon Revenge, yet *Cæſar* choſe rather not to puſh the Enemy too far, than expoſe his Men to danger. He therefore ſent Meſſengers to the neighbouring States, inviting them all by the hopes of Plunder, to join in the Deſtruction of the *Eburones*; chooſing rather to expoſe the Lives of the *Gauls* in the Woods, than of the Legionary Soldiers; and hoping by the Multitude employed againſt them, totally to extirpate the Name and Memory of a State, whoſe Revolt had rendered them ſo obnoxious. Accordingly great Numbers flocked ſuddenly thither from all Parts.

XXXII. THUS were the *Eburones* attacked on all ſides, and the Havock continued till the ſeventh Day, which *Cæſar* had appointed for returning to his Camp and Baggage. It then evidently appeared what Influence Fortune has over War, and how many Accidents ſpring from her Interpoſition. The Enemy being diſperſed and full of Terror, as we have related above; there remained no Body of Troops in the Field, to give any the leaſt ground of Fear. A Report ſpread among the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*, that the Territories of the *Eburones* were given up to Plunder, and all without diſtinction invited to ſhare in the Spoil. The *Sicambri*, who inhabit upon the *Rhine*, and had afforded a Retreat to the *Uſipetes* and *Tenchtheri*, as mentioned above; aſſembled immediately a Body of two thouſand Horſe, paſſed the River in Barks about thirty Miles below *Cæſar*'s Bridge and Fort, and advanced directly towards the Territories of the *Eburones*. Many of thoſe that fled, and had diſperſed themſelves up and down the Country, fell into their Hands; as likewiſe abundance of Cattle, of which the *Barbarians* are extremely covetous. Allured by this Succeſs they advanced farther. Neither Woods nor Moraſſes proved any Obſtacles to Men, trained up from their Infancy to Wars and Incurſions. Inquiring of the Priſoners concerning *Cæſar*, they underſtood that he was a great way off, and had left the Country with his whole Army. One in particular addreſſing them: "Why, ſays he, do you loſe time in purſuit of ſo "ſlight and trifling a Booty, when Fortune offers one of ſo much greater "Value. In three Hours you may reach *Atuatuca*, where the *Romans* have "depoſited all their Wealth. The Garriſon is hardly ſufficient to line the "Rampart, much leſs to ſally out of their Intrenchments." Urged by this hope, they left their preſent Booty in a Place of Safety, and marched directly to *Atuatuca*, being conducted by the Captive who had given them the Information.

XXXIII. *CICERO*, who hitherto had kept his Soldiers ſtrictly within the Camp, according to *Cæſar*'s Orders, nor ſuffered ſo much as a Servant to ſtraggle beyond the Lines; ſeeing the ſeventh Day arrive, began to deſpair of *Cæſar*'s Return, who, as he heard, was marched farther into the Country, and had ſent him no Notice of his Rout. Wherefore tired with the continual Murmurs of the Soldiers, who complained of his Patience, and told him they were kept like Men beſieged; and not ſuſpecting that any Accident could befal him, within the ſmall Extent of three Miles; eſpecially as the Enemy, oppoſed by nine Legions, and a very numerous Cavalry, were in a manner totally diſperſed and cut off; he ſent out five Cohorts to forage in an adjoining Field, ſeparated from the Camp only by a ſingle Hill. A great many ſick Men had been left behind by *Cæſar*, of whom about three hundred, that were now pretty well recovered, joined the Detachment. Theſe were followed by almoſt all the Servants of the Camp, together with a vaſt Number of Carts and Carriage-Horſes.

XXXIV. IN that very Inſtant, as Fortune would have it, the *German* Cavalry arrived; and without diſcontinuing their Courſe, endeavoured to force an immediate Entrance by the *Decuman* Gate. As their March had been covered by a Wood, they were not diſcovered till they were juſt upon the Camp; inſomuch that the Sutlers, who kept their Booths under the Rampart, had not time to retire within the Intrenchments. Our Men were ſo ſurpriſed at this ſudden and unexpected Attack, that the Cohort upon Guard

Guard could ſcarce ſuſtain the firſt Onſet. The Enemy ſpread themſelves on all ſides to find a Place of Entrance. The *Romans* with difficulty defended the Gates; the Rampart ſecuring them every where elſe. The whole Camp was in an Uproar, every one inquiring of another the Cauſe of the Confuſion; nor could they determine which way to advance the Standards, or where to poſt themſelves. Some reported the Camp was already taken: others, that the *Germans*, having deſtroyed *Cæſar* and his Army, were come victorious to ſtorm their Trenches. The greater Number, full of imaginary Fears, when they conſidered the Place in which they were encamped, called to mind the Fate of *Cotta* and *Titurius*, who periſhed in that very Fort. This univerſal Conſternation being perceived by the *Barbarians*, confirmed them in the Belief of what the Priſoners had told them, that there was ſcarce any Garriſon within to defend the Camp. They renewed their Endeavours to force the Intrenchments, and mutually exhorted one another, not to let ſo fair a Prize eſcape out of their hands.

XXXV. AMONG the ſick in Garriſon was *P. Sextius Baculus*, a Centurion of the firſt Rank, of whom mention has been made in former Battles, and who had not taſted Food for five Days. This Officer, anxious for his own Safety, and that of the Legion, ruſhed unarmed out of his Tent. He ſaw the Enemy at hand, and the Danger extreme. Snatching the firſt Arms that offered, he poſted himſelf in the Gate of the Camp. The Centurions of the Cohort upon Guard followed the Example, and for a while ſuſtained the Enemies Charge. *Sextius* expired under a multitude of Wounds, and was with difficulty carried off by the Soldiers. This ſhort Delay gave the reſt time to reſume their Courage; ſo far, at leaſt, as to mount the Rampart, and make a ſhew of defending themſelves.

XXXVI. MEAN-TIME our Foragers returning, heard the Noiſe at the Camp. The Cavalry advancing before, were ſoon apprized of the Danger. Here was no Fortification to ſhelter the frighted Troops. The new Levies, unexperienced in matters of War, fixed their Eyes upon the Tribunes and Centurions, waiting their Orders. Not a Man was found ſo hardy and reſolute, as not to be diſturbed by ſo unexpected an Accident. The *Germans* perceiving our Enſigns at a diſtance, gave over the Attack of the Camp, imagining at firſt it was *Cæſar* and the Legions, which the Priſoners had informed them were marched farther into the Country. But ſoon obſerving how few they were, they ſurrounded and fell upon them on all ſides.

XXXVII. THE Servants of the Camp fled to the neareſt riſing Ground; whence being immediately driven, they threw themſelves amongſt the Ranks of the Cohorts, and thereby increaſed their Terror. Some were for drawing up in form of a Wedge, and forcing their way thro' the Enemy: for as the Camp was ſo very near, they imagined, that if ſome fell, the reſt at leaſt muſt eſcape. Others were for retiring to an Eminence, and all ſharing there the ſame Fate. The veteran Soldiers, who had marched out with the Detachment, could not by any means reliſh this Propoſal: wherefore mutually encouraging one another, and being led by *C. Trebonius* a *Roman* Knight, under whoſe command they were, they broke thro' the midſt of the Enemy, and all to a Man arrived ſafe in the Camp. The Servants and Cavalry following them, and ſeconding their Retreat, were likewiſe by their Bravery preſerved. But

the Troops who had retired to the Hill, being unexperienced in military Affairs, could neither perſiſt in the Reſolution they had taken of defending themſelves from the higher Ground, nor imitate that briſk and vigorous Effort which they ſaw had been ſo ſerviceable to their Companions: but endeavouring to gain the Camp, quitted the advantage of their Situation. The Centurions, ſome of whom had been ſelected from veteran Legions, and on account of their Bravery promoted to higher Stations among the new Levies; fought reſolutely to maintain the Glory they had acquired, and endeavoured to ſell their Lives as dear as they could. Their Valour obliging the Enemy to fall back a little, part of the Troops, contrary to Expectation, reached the Camp. The reſt were ſurrounded and cut to pieces by the Barbarians.

XXXVIII. THE *Germans*, deſpairing to carry the Camp, as they ſaw our Men now prepared to defend the Works, repaſſed the *Rhine* with the Booty they had depoſited in the Woods. But ſo great was the Terror of the *Romans*, even after their Retreat, that *C. Voluſenus* arriving in the Camp the ſame Night with the Cavalry, could not perſuade them that *Cæſar* and the Army were ſafe. For Fear had taken ſo thorough a poſſeſſion of their Minds, that as if bereft of Underſtanding, they perſiſted in believing the Infantry was wholly deſtroyed, and that the Cavalry alone had eſcaped: it ſeeming to them altogether incredible, that the *Germans* would have dared to attack the Camp, had no Misfortune befallen the *Roman* Army. But *Cæſar*'s Arrival ſoon put an end to their Fears.

XXXIX. UPON his Return, being informed of what had happened, he only complained of the ſending out the Cohorts to forage; obſerving: "That in War nothing ought to be left to Fortune, whoſe "Power appeared evidently in the ſudden Arrival of the Enemy, and "much more in their coming up unperceived to the very Gates of the "Camp." But nothing in this whole Affair appeared to him more wonderful, than that the *Germans* having croſſed the *Rhine* with deſign to plunder the Territories of *Ambiorix*, ſhould by falling upon the *Roman* Camp do him a moſt acceptable Service.

XL. *CÆSAR* marched a ſecond time to harraſs the Enemy, and having drawn a great number of Troops together from the neighbouring States, ſent them into all Parts upon this Service. All the Houſes and Villages were ſet on fire: the Plunder was univerſal: the vaſt number of Men and Horſes not only deſtroyed great Quantities of Corn, but the Rains and advanced Seaſon made Havock of all that was left; inſomuch that if any of the Enemy eſcaped for the preſent, it ſeemed yet likely, that after the Retreat of the Army, they muſt periſh by Famine. As the Cavalry were divided into many Parties, they often came to Places, where the Priſoners not only informed them they had ſeen *Ambiorix* flying, but that he could even yet be ſcarce out of view. The Hope of coming up with him made them leave nothing unattempted, as imagining they would thereby gain the higheſt Favour with *Cæſar*, whoſe good Fortune wanted only this to render it compleat. But all their Endeavours were fruitleſs: for he ſtill found means to hide himſelf in the Woods and Moraſſes; whence removing privately in the Night, he eſcaped into other Regions, accompanied with only four Horſemen, in whom alone he durſt confide.

XLI. *CÆSAR* having deſtroyed the whole Country, led back his Army into the Territories of the *Rhemi*, with the loſs of only two Cohorts. There he ſummoned a general Aſſembly of *Gaul*, to examine into the Affair of the *Senones* and *Carnutes:* and having paſſed a ſevere Sentence againſt *Acco*, the Contriver of the Revolt, ordered him to be executed on the ſpot. Some fearing a like fate, fled: whom having baniſhed by a Decree of the Diet, he quartered two Legions in *Treves*, two among the *Lingones*, and the remaining ſix at *Agendicum*, in the Country of the *Senones*. And having provided the Army with Corn, he went, purſuant to his Deſign, into *Italy*, to hold the Aſſemblies of *Ciſalpine Gaul*.

C. JULIUS

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

BOOK VII.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. *The* Gauls *concert Meaſures for renewing the War.* II. *The* Carnutes *maſſacre a number of* Roman *Citizens at* Genabum. IV. Vercingetorix *excites his Followers to a Revolt, and by the conſent of many Nations is declared Generaliſſimo of the League.* VIII. Cæſar *ſuddenly invades* Auvergne. X. Vercingetorix *inveſts* Gergovia, *whither he is followed by* Cæſar. XI. Cæſar *makes himſelf maſter of* Vellaunodunum *and* Genabum. XII. Vercingetorix *quits the Siege of* Gergovia. Cæſar *poſſeſſes himſelf of* Noviodunum, *puts* Vercingetorix's *Cavalry to flight, and inveſts* Avaricum. XIII. *By Advice of* Vercingetorix, *the* Biturigians *ſet fire to their Towns, that they may not furniſh Subſiſtence to the* Romans. XVI. Cæſar *in great Straits for want of Corn.* XVII. *The two Armies near each other, but without coming to a Battle.* XIX. Vercingetorix, *accuſed of Treaſon, clears himſelf.* XXI. Cæſar *continues the Siege of* Avaricum. XXII. *The Conſtruction of the Walls of Towns among the* Gauls. XXIII. Avaricum, *after a reſolute defence, is at laſt taken by Storm.* XXVIII. Vercingetorix *conſoles his Men by a Speech.* XXIX. *And prepares with greater Forces to renew the War.* XXX. Cæſar *quiets the inteſtine Diviſions of the* Æduans. XXXII. *Sets out upon his march towards* Auvergne. XXXIII. *Paſſes the* Allier *by a Feint.* XXXIV. *And arriving before* Gergovia, *ſeizes an Eminence near the Town.* XXXV. *The* Æduans *form the deſign of a Revolt from the* Romans. XXXVIII. *But by* Cæſar's *Prudence and Diligence, are in ſome meaſure prevented.* XLI. Cæſar *carries three of the Enemy's Camps before* Gergovia. XLIV. *The* Romans *preſſing the Attack too far, are repulſed with great Slaughter.* XLIX. Cæſar *reprehends the temerity of his Soldiers.* L. *And reſolves to retire into the Country of the* Æduans. LII. Noviodunum *ſeized and ſet on fire by the treachery of the* Æduans. LIV. Labienus, *after a ſucceſsful Expedition againſt the* Pariſians, *returns to* Cæſar *with all his Forces.* LVII. *The Revolt of the* Æduans *followed by that of almoſt all* Gaul. LVIII. *Preparations for War.* LIX. *The* Gauls, *under the conduct of* Vercingetorix, *attack* Cæſar *in the Territories of the* Lingones. LXI. *But are routed with great Slaughter.* LXII. Cæſar *purſues them as far as* Aleſia. LXIII. *Deſcription of that Town.* LXIV. *The* Gauls *defeated in an Engagement between the Cavalry.* LXV. Vercingetorix *ſends away all his Horſe.* LXVI. Cæſar *ſurrounds* Aleſia *with Lines of Circumvallation and Contravallation.* LXIX. *The* Gauls, *drawing their Forces together, endeavour to raiſe the Siege.* LXXI. Critognatus's *Speech to the Garriſon of* Aleſia. LXXII. *The* Gauls *within and without the Town prepare to attack the* Romans. LXXIII. *A Battle of the Horſe, in which the* Romans *have the Advantage.* LXXIV. *The* Gauls *make ſeveral Attempts upon the* Roman *Lines, but are always repulſed with loſs.* LXXXI. *At length the* Romans *ſallying from their Intrenchments, defeat the* Gauls *with great Slaughter.* LXXXII. Aleſia *ſurrenders.* LXXIII. *The* Æduans *and* Averni *ſubmit.* Cæſar *ſends his Army into Winter-Quarters.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
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BOOK VII.

I. *CÆSAR* having quieted the Commotions in *Gaul*, went, as he deſigned, into *Italy*, to preſide in the Aſſembly of the States. There he was informed of the death of *P. Clodius:* and underſtanding farther, that the Senate had paſſed a Decree, ordering all the Youth of *Italy* to take up Arms, he reſolved to levy Troops over the whole Province. The Report of this ſoon ſpread into farther *Gaul:* and the *Gauls* themſelves, forward to encourage ſuch Rumors, added of their own accord what the Caſe ſeemed to require: "That *Cæſar* was detained by a domeſtick "Sedition, and could not, while theſe Diſorders continued, come to head "the Army." Animated by this Opportunity; they, who before lamented their ſubjection to the *Romans*, now began with more freedom and boldneſs to enter upon Meaſures of War. The leading Men of the Nation, concerting private Meetings among themſelves, in Woods and remote Places, complained of the death of *Acco*; remonſtrated, that ſuch might one time or other be their own Fate; and after bemoaning the common Fortune of their Country, endeavoured by all manner of Promiſes and Rewards, to draw over ſome to begin the War, and with the hazard of their own Lives, pave the way to the liberty of *Gaul.* But chiefly they thought it incumbent upon them, before their ſecret Conferences ſhould be diſcovered, to cut off *Cæſar*'s return to the Army. This appeared abundantly eaſy; becauſe neither would the Legions, in the abſence of their General, dare to quit their Winter-Quarters; nor was it poſſible for the General to join the Legions, without a Body of Troops to guard him. In fine, they concluded it was better to die bravely in the Field, than not recover their former Glory in War, and the Liberty they had received from their Anceſtors.

II. SUCH were the Debates in the private Councils of the *Gauls:* when the *Carnutes*, declaring their readineſs to ſubmit to any Danger for the common Safety, offered to be the firſt in taking up Arms againſt the *Romans.* And becauſe the preſent giving of Hoſtages might endanger a too early diſcovery of their Deſigns, they propoſed; that the other States ſhould bind themſelves by a ſolemn Oath, in preſence of the military Enſigns, which is the moſt

moſt ſacred Obligation among the *Gauls*, not to abandon them during the courſe of the War. This Offer of the *Carnutes* was received with univerſal Applauſe, the Oath required was taken by all preſent, and the time for Action being fixed, the Aſſembly ſeparated.

III. WHEN the appointed Day came; the *Carnutes*, headed by *Cotuatus* and *Conetodunus*, Men of deſperate Reſolution, flew upon a Signal given to *Genabum*; maſſacred the *Roman* Citizens ſettled there on account of Trade; among the reſt *C. Fuſius Cotta*, a *Roman* Knight of Eminence, whom *Cæſar* had appointed to ſuperintend the care of Proviſions; and plundered their Effects. The Fame of this ſoon ſpread into all the Provinces of *Gaul*. For when any thing ſingular and extraordinary happens, they publiſh it from Place to Place by Outcries, which being ſucceſſively repeated by Men ſtationed on purpoſe, are carried with incredible expedition over the whole Country. And thus it was on the preſent Occaſion. For what had been done at *Genabum* about Sun-riſe, was known before nine at Night in the Territories of the *Averni*, a diſtance of one hundred and ſixty Miles.

IV. FIRED by this Example, *Vercingetorix*, the Son of *Celtillus*, of the Nation of the *Averni*, a young Nobleman of great Power and Intereſt, whoſe Father had preſided over all *Celtic Gaul*, and for aiming at the Sovereignty been put to death by his Countrymen; calling his Clients and Followers together, eaſily perſuaded them to a Revolt. His deſign being diſcovered, the People immediately flew to Arms: and *Gobanitio* his Uncle, with the other principal Men of the State, dreading the Conſequences of ſo raſh an Enterpriſe, united all their Authority againſt him, and expelled him the City *Gergovia*. Yet ſtill he adhered to his former Reſolution, and aſſembling all the Outlaws and Fugitives he could find, engaged them in his Service. Having by this means got together a Body of Troops, he brought all to whom he applied himſelf to fall in with his Views; preſſed them to take up Arms for the common Liberty; and finding his Forces greatly increaſed, quickly drove thoſe out of the Territories of *Auvergne*, who had ſo lately expelled him the City *Gergovia*. Upon this he was ſaluted King by his Followers: and diſpatching Ambaſſadors into all Parts, exhorted them to continue firm to the Confederacy. The *Senones*, *Pariſians*, *Pictones*, *Cadurci*, *Turones*, *Aulerci*, *Lemovices*, *Andes*, and all the other Nations bordering upon the Ocean, readily came into the Alliance, and with unanimous conſent declared him Generaliſſimo of the League. Armed with this Authority, he demanded Hoſtages of the ſeveral States; ordered them to furniſh a certain number of Men immediately; appointed what quantity of Arms each was to prepare, with the time by which they muſt be in readineſs; and above all applied himſelf to have on foot a numerous Cavalry. To the moſt extreme Diligence, he joined an extreme rigor of Command; and by the ſeverity of his Puniſhments, obliged the irreſolute to declare themſelves: for in greater Faults, the Criminals, after having been tortured, were burnt alive: and for lighter Offences, ordering the Ears of the guilty to be cut off, or one of their Eyes put out, he ſent them thus mutilated home, to ſerve as an Example to the reſt, and by the rigor of their Sufferings to keep others in awe.

V. HAVING by the terror of theſe Puniſhments ſpeedily aſſembled an Army: he ſent *Luterius* of *Quercy*, a bold and enterpriſing Man, with part of the Forces againſt the *Rutheni*; and marched himſelf into the Territories of the

the *Biturigians*. The *Biturigians*, upon his Arrival, diſpatched Ambaſſadors to the *Æduans*, under whoſe Protection they were, to demand Succours againſt the Enemy. The *Æduans*, by advice of the Lieutenants *Cæſar* had left with the Army, ordered a ſupply of Horſe and Foot to the aſſiſtance of the *Biturigians*. This Body of Troops, advancing to the Banks of the *Loire*, which divides the *Biturigians* from the *Æduans*, halted there a few Days; and not daring to paſs that River, returned again to their own Country. The reaſon of this Conduct, according to the Report made to our Lieutenants, was an apprehenſion of Treachery from the *Biturigians*: for that People, as they pretended, had formed the deſign of ſurrounding them beyond the *Loire*, on one ſide with their own Troops, on the other with thoſe of *Auvergne*. Whether this was the real cauſe of their Return, or whether they acted perfidiouſly in the Affair, is what we have not been able to learn with certainty, and therefore cannot venture to affirm. The *Biturigians*, on their departure, immediately joined the Forces of the *Averni*.

VI. THESE things being reported to *Cæſar* in *Italy*; as the Troubles at *Rome* were in a great meaſure quieted by the Care and Vigilance of *Pompey*, he ſet out immediately for *Tranſalpine Gaul*. Upon his arrival there, he found it extremely difficult to reſolve, after what manner to rejoin the Army. For ſhould he order the Legions to repair to the Province, he foreſaw they would be attacked on their march in his abſence: and ſhould he himſelf proceed to the Quarters of the Legions, he was not without apprehenſions of Danger, even from thoſe States that ſeemingly continued faithful to the *Romans*.

VII. IN the mean-time *Luterius* of *Quercy*, who had been ſent into the Territories of the *Rutheni*, brought over that State to the Alliance of the *Averni*; advancing thence among the *Nitobrigians* and *Gabali*, he received Hoſtages from both Nations; and having got together a numerous Body of Troops, drew towards *Narbonne*, to attack the *Roman* Province on that ſide. *Cæſar* being informed of his Deſign, thought it firſt and principally incumbent upon him, to provide for the ſecurity of the Province. With this view he flew to *Narbonne*; confirmed the wavering and timorous; placed Garriſons in the Towns of the *Rutheni* ſubject to the *Romans*; alſo in thoſe of the *Volſcians*, *Toloſatians*, and other States bordering upon the Enemy: and having thus taken effectual Meaſures againſt *Luterius*, ordered part of the provincial Forces, with the Recruits he had brought from *Italy*, to rendezvous upon the Frontiers of the *Helvians*, whoſe Territories adjoin to thoſe of the *Averni*.

VIII. THESE Diſpoſitions being made, and *Luterius* checked and forced to retire, becauſe he did not think it adviſeable to venture among the *Roman* Garriſons; *Cæſar* advanced into the Country of the *Helvians*. Altho' the Mountains of the *Sevennes*, which ſeparate the *Helvians* from *Auvergne*, by the great depth of the Snow in that extreme rigorous Seaſon, threatened to obſtruct his march; yet having cleared away the Snow, which lay to the depth of ſix Feet, and with infinite Labor to the Soldiers opened a Paſſage over the Mountains, he at length reached the Confines of the *Averni*. As they were altogether unprepared, regarding the *Sevennes* as an impenetrable Barrier, impaſſable at that Seaſon even to ſingle Men, he ordered the Cavalry to ſpread themſelves on all ſides, and ſtrike as univerſal a Terror into the

Enemy as poſſible. Fame and Meſſengers from the State ſoon informed *Vercingetorix* of the Diſaſter befallen his Country. All the *Averni* gathered round him in a Body, and with Looks full of Diſmay, conjured him to regard their Fortunes, and not abandon them to the ravages of the *Roman* Army; more eſpecially, as he now ſaw the whole War pointed againſt them. *Vercingetorix*, moved by their Intreaties, put his Army upon the march, and quitting the Territories of the *Biturigians*, drew towards *Auvergne*.

IX. THIS *Cæſar* had foreſeen: and after a ſtay of two Days in thoſe Parts, ſet out under pretence of fetching a Reinforcement. He left young *Brutus* to command in his Abſence; charged him to diſperſe the Cavalry as wide as he could; and promiſed to return, if poſſible, within three Days. Then, deceiving the *Romans* themſelves, that he might the better impoſe upon the *Gauls*, he poſted by great Journeys to *Vienne*. There he found the new levied Cavalry whom he had ſent thither ſome time before: and travelling Day and Night without Intermiſſion, thro' the Country of the *Æduans*, to prevent by his expedition any Deſigns they might form againſt him; he at length reached the Confines of the *Lingones*, where two of his Legions wintered. Thence ſending immediately to the reſt, he drew them all together into a Body, before the *Averni* could be apprized of his Arrival.

X. *VERCINGETORIX*, upon Notice of this, led back his Army into the Territories of the *Biturigians*; and marching thence, reſolved to inveſt *Gergovia*, a Town belonging to the *Boii*, where they had been ſettled by *Cæſar* after the defeat of the *Helvetians*, and made ſubject to the *Æduan* State. This Step greatly perplexed the *Roman* General: if he continued encamped with his Legions in one Place during the reſt of the Winter, and abandoned the Subjects of the *Æduans* to the Attempts of the Enemy; he had reaſon to apprehend that the *Gauls*, ſeeing him afford no Protection to his Friends, would univerſally give into a Revolt: if, on the contrary, he took the Field early, he risked the want of Proviſion and Forage, by the great Difficulty of procuring Convoys. Reſolving however at all hazards, not to ſubmit to an Affront, that muſt for ever alienate the Hearts of his Allies; he preſſingly enjoined the *Æduans* to be very careful in ſupplying him with Proviſions: and diſpatching Meſſengers to the *Boii*, to inform them of his Approach, exhorted them to continue firm to their Duty, and ſuſtain with Courage the Aſſaults of the Enemy. Mean-while leaving two Legions and the Baggage of the whole Army at *Agendicum*, he ſet out upon his march to their Relief.

XI. ARRIVING the next Day before *Vellaunodunum*, a City of the *Senones*; that he might leave no Enemy behind him capable of obſtructing his Convoys, he reſolved to beſiege it, and in two Days compleated his Circumvallation. On the third, Deputies came from the Town to treat about a Surrender: when ordering them to deliver up their Arms, Horſes, and ſix hundred Hoſtages, he left *C. Trebonius*, one of his Lieutenants, to cauſe the Articles be put in Execution; and continuing his march with all Diligence, advanced towards *Genabum*. The *Carnutes*, to whom this City belonged, were drawing Troops together for its Defence; imagining that the Siege of *Vellaunodunum*, of which they had juſt then received Intelligence, would be a Work of ſome time. *Cæſar* reached the Place in two Days, encamped before it, and finding it began to be late, deferred the Aſſault 'till

next

next Morning. Mean-while he gave the neceſſary Orders to his Men: and becauſe the Town had a Bridge over the *Loire*, by which the Inhabitants might endeavour to eſcape in the night, he obliged two Legions to continue under Arms. A little before midnight, the *Genabians*, as he had foreſeen, ſtole ſilently out of the City, and began to paſs the River. Notice being given of this by his Spies; he ſet fire to the Gates, introduced the Legions whom he had kept in readineſs for that purpoſe, and took poſſeſſion of the Place. Very few of the Enemy eſcaped on this Occaſion; becauſe the narrowneſs of the Bridge and Paſſages obſtructed the flight of the Multitude. *Cæſar* ordered the Town to be plundered and burnt; diſtributed the Spoil among the Soldiers; and croſſing the *Loire* with his whole Army, advanced into the Territories of the *Biturigians*.

XII. *VERCINGETORIX*, upon notice of his Approach, quitted the Siege of *Gergovia*, and marched directly to meet him. *Cæſar* mean-while had ſat down before *Noviodunum*, a City of the *Biturigians*, that lay upon his Rout. The Inhabitants ſending Deputies to the Camp, to implore Forgiveneſs and Safety: that he might the ſooner accompliſh his Deſigns, in which Expedition had hitherto availed him ſo much, he ordered them to deliver up their Arms, Horſes, and a certain number of Hoſtages. Part of the Hoſtages had been already ſent; the other Articles of the Treaty were upon the point of execution; and even ſome Centurions and Soldiers had entered the Place, to ſearch for Arms and Horſes: when the Enemy's Cavalry, who were a little advanced before the reſt of the Army, appeared at a diſtance. Immediately the beſieged, upon this proſpect of Relief, ſetting up a Shout, flew to Arms, ſhut the Gates, and manned the Walls. The Centurions in the Town, judging from the Noiſe among the *Gauls*, that they had ſome new Project in view, poſted themſelves with their Swords drawn at the Gates; and getting all their Men together, retreated without loſs to the Camp. *Cæſar* ordering the Cavalry to advance, fell upon the Enemy's Horſe; and finding his Troops hard preſſed, ſuſtained them with ſome Squadrons of *Germans*, whom, to the number of about four hundred, he had all along retained in his Service. The *Gauls*, unable to ſtand their Charge, at length betook themſelves to flight, and were driven with great Slaughter to the main Body of their Army. Upon this the People of *Noviodunum*, terrified anew by the defeat of their Friends, ſeized all who had been inſtrumental in breaking the Capitulation, ſent them Priſoners to *Cæſar*'s Camp, and delivered up the Town. Theſe Affairs diſpatched, *Cæſar* directed his march towards *Avaricum*. As this was the ſtrongeſt and moſt conſiderable City of the *Biturigians*, and ſituate in the fineſt part of the Country, he eaſily perſuaded himſelf, that by the reduction of it, he ſhould bring the whole Nation under Subjection.

XIII. *VERCINGETORIX*, after ſo many ſucceſſive Loſſes, at *Vellaunodunum*, *Genabum*, *Noviodunum*; calling a general Council of his Followers, repreſented: "That it was neceſſary to reſolve upon a very dif-
"ferent Plan of War, from that which hitherto had been purſued; and above
"all things make it their Endeavour, to intercept the *Roman* Convoys and
"Foragers: That this was both a ſure and practicable Scheme, as they them-
"ſelves abounded in Horſe, and the Seaſon of the Year greatly favoured the
"Deſign: That the Ground as yet affording no produce, the Enemy muſt
"unavoidably diſperſe themſelves in the Villages for Subſiſtence, and give
"them daily opportunities of cutting them off by means of their Cavalry:
"That

" That where Life and Liberty were at ſtake, Property and private Poſſeſſion " ought to be neglected: That therefore the beſt Reſolution they could take " was, to ſet all their Houſes and Villages on fire, from the Territories of the " *Boii*, to wherever the *Romans* might extend their Quarters for the ſake of " Forage: That they themſelves had no reaſon to apprehend Scarcity, as they " would be plentifully ſupplied by thoſe States, whoſe Territories ſhould be- " come the ſeat of the War; whereas the Enemy muſt either be reduced to " the neceſſity of ſtarving, or making diſtant and dangerous Excurſions from " their Camp: That it equally anſwered the Purpoſe of the *Gauls*, to cut the " *Roman* Army to pieces, or ſeize upon their Baggage and Convoys; becauſe " without theſe laſt, it would be impoſſible for them to carry on the War: " That they ought to ſet fire even to the Towns themſelves, which were not " ſtrong enough by Art or Nature, to be perfectly ſecure againſt all Danger; as " by this means they would neither become Places of retreat to their own Men, " to ſcreen them from military Service; nor contribute to the ſupport of the " *Romans*, by the Supplies and Plunder they might furniſh: In fine, that " tho' theſe things were indeed grievous and terrible, they ought yet to eſteem " it ſtill more terrible and grievous, to ſee their Wives and Children dragged " into Captivity, and themſelves expoſed to Slaughter, which was the unavoid- " able Lot of the Vanquiſhed."

XIV. THIS Propoſal being approved by all, upwards of twenty Cities of the *Biturigians* were burnt in one Day. The like was done in other States. Nothing but Conflagrations were to be ſeen over the whole Country. And tho' the Natives bore this Deſolation with extreme Regret, they nevertheleſs conſoled themſelves with the hope, that an approaching and certain Victory, would ſoon enable them to recover their Loſſes. A Debate ariſing in Council about *Avaricum*, whether it would be proper to defend or ſet it on fire; the *Biturigians*, falling proſtrate at the Feet of the reſt of the *Gauls*, implored: " That they might not be obliged to burn with their own Hands, one of the " fineſt Cities of all *Gaul*, which was both the Ornament and Security of their " State; more eſpecially, as the Town itſelf, almoſt wholly ſurrounded by a " River and Moraſs, and affording but one very narrow Approach, was, " from the nature of its Situation, capable of an eaſy Defence." Their Requeſt prevailed; *Vercingetorix*, tho' he at firſt oppoſed, afterwards coming into the Deſign; partly moved by the Intreaties of the *Biturigians*, partly by the Compaſſion of the Multitude. A choſen Garriſon was immediately put into the Place.

XV. *VERCINGETORIX* followed *Cæſar* by eaſy marches, and choſe for his Camp a Place ſurrounded with Woods and Marſhes, about fifteen Miles diſtant from *Avaricum*. There he had hourly Intelligence by his Scouts, of all that paſſed before the Town; and ſent his Orders from time to time to the Garriſon. Mean-while he ſtrictly watched our Convoys and Foragers; ſet upon our diſperſed Parties, who were obliged to fetch Proviſions from a great diſtance; and in ſpite of all Endeavours to prevent it, by chooſing ſuch Times and Routs, as were moſt likely to deceive his Vigilance, very much incommoded them by his Attacks.

XVI. *CÆSAR* encamping on that ſide of the Town, where the intermiſſion of the River and Moraſs formed, as we have ſaid, a narrow Approach; began to raiſe a Mount, bring forward his battering Engines, and prepare

prepare two Towers of Aſſault; without troubling himſelf about Lines of Circumvallation, which the nature of the Ground rendered impoſſible. Meanwhile he was continually ſoliciting the *Æduans* and *Boii* for Corn: but received no great Supplies from either; partly occaſioned by the Negligence of the *Æduans*, who were not hearty in the Affair; partly by the want of Ability in the *Boii*, who poſſeſſing only a ſmall and inconſiderable Territory, ſoon conſumed all the produce of their own Lands. But tho' the Army laboured under the greateſt ſcarcity of Corn, thro' the Inability of the *Boii*, the want of Inclination in the *Æduans*, and the univerſal devaſtation of the Country: tho' they were even for many Days altogether without Bread, and had nothing to appeaſe their extreme Hunger, but the Cattle brought from diſtant Villages: yet not an Expreſſion was heard over the whole Camp, unworthy the Majeſty of the *Roman* Name, or the Glory they had acquired by former Victories. Nay, when *Cæſar* viſited the different Quarters of the Legions in perſon, and offered to raiſe the Siege, if they found the Famine inſupportable; they all with one Voice requeſted him not to do it, adding: "That during the many "Years they had ſerved under him, they never yet had met with any Check, "or undertaken ought in which they had not ſucceeded: That they could not "but look upon it as inglorious, to relinquiſh a Siege they had once begun; "and had rather undergo the greateſt Hardſhips, than not revenge the Blood "of the *Roman* Citizens, perfidiouſly maſſacred by the *Gauls* at *Genabum*." The ſame they ſaid to the Centurions and military Tribunes, intreating them to report their Sentiments to *Cæſar*.

XVII. AND now the Towers began to approach the Walls; when *Cæſar* was informed by ſome Priſoners, that *Vercingetorix* having conſumed all the Forage round him, had removed his Camp nearer to *Avaricum*, and was gone himſelf at the head of the Cavalry, and the light-armed Troops accuſtomed to fight in their Intervals, to form an Ambuſcade for the *Romans*, in a Place where it was ſuppoſed they would come next Day to forage. Upon this Intelligence, ſetting out about midnight in great Silence, he arrived next Morning at the Enemy's Camp. But they having had timely Notice of his Approach by their Scouts, inſtantly conveyed their Baggage and Carriages into a thick Wood, and drew up in order of Battle upon an open Hill. *Cæſar* then ordered all the Baggage to be brought together into one Place, and the Soldiers to prepare for an Engagement.

XVIII. THE Hill itſelf where the Enemy ſtood, riſing all the way with an eaſy aſcent, was almoſt wholly ſurrounded by a Moraſs, difficult and dangerous to be paſſed, tho' not above fifty Foot over. Here the *Gauls*, confiding in the ſtrength of their Poſt, and having broke down all the Bridges over the Moraſs, appeared with an air of Reſolution. They had formed themſelves into different Bodies, according to their ſeveral States; and planting ſelect Detachments at all the Avenues and Fords, waited with determined Courage, that if the *Romans* ſhould attempt to force their way thorow, they might fall upon them from the higher Ground while entangled in the Mud. To attend only to the nearneſs of the two Armies, they ſeemed as if ready to fight us on even Terms; but when the advantage of their Situation was conſidered, all this Oſtentation of Bravery, was eaſily diſcerned to be meer Shew and Pretence. Nevertheleſs the *Romans* full of Indignation, that the Enemy ſhould dare to face them with ſo ſmall a Space between, loudly demanded to be led to Battle. *Cæſar* checked their Ardor for the preſent, and endeavoured to

make them ſenſible, that in attacking an Army ſo ſtrongly poſted, the Victory muſt coſt extremely dear, and be attended with the loſs of many brave Men. To this he told them, he was the more averſe, becauſe finding them prepared to face every kind of Danger for his Glory, he thought he could not be too tender of the Lives of thoſe who merited ſo highly at his hands. Having by this Speech conſoled the Soldiers, he led them back the ſame Day to their Camp, and applied himſelf wholly to the carrying on of the Siege.

XIX. *VERCINGETORIX*, upon his return to the Camp, was accuſed by the Army of Treaſon. The removal of his Quarters nearer to thoſe of the Enemy; his departure at the head of all the Cavalry; his leaving ſo many Troops without a Commander in chief; and the opportune and ſpeedy Arrival of the *Romans* during his Abſence: All theſe, they ſaid, could not eaſily happen by chance, or without deſign; and gave great reaſon to believe, that he had rather owe the Sovereignty of *Gaul* to *Cæſar*'s Grant, than to the Favour and free Choice of his Countrymen. To this Charge he replied: "That the removal of his Camp was occaſioned by the want of Forage, and "done at their own expreſs Deſire: That he had lodged himſelf nearer to the "*Romans*, on account of the advantage of the Ground, which ſecured him "againſt all Attacks: That Cavalry were by no means wanted in a Moraſs, "but might have been extremely ſerviceable in the Place to which he had car-"ried them: That he purpoſely forbore naming a Commander in chief at "his Departure, leſt the Impatience of the Multitude ſhould have forced him "upon a Battle; to which he perceived they were all ſtrongly inclined, thro' "a certain weakneſs and effeminacy of Mind, that rendered them incapable "of long Fatigue: That whether Accident or Intelligence brought the *Ro-*"*mans* to their Camp; they ought to thank, in the one caſe Fortune, in the "other the Informer, for giving them an opportunity of diſcovering from the "higher Ground the inconſiderable Number, and deſpiſing the feeble Efforts "of the Enemy; who not daring to hazard an Engagement, ignominiouſly "retreated to their Camp: That for his part, he ſcorned treacherouſly to hold "an Authority of *Cæſar*, which he hoped ſoon to merit by a Victory, already "in a manner aſſured, both to himſelf and the reſt of the *Gauls*: That he "was willing even to reſign the Command, if they thought the Honor done "him by that Diſtinction too great for the Advantages procured by his Con-"duct. And, added he, to convince you of the Truth and Sincerity of my "Words, hear the *Roman* Soldiers themſelves." He then produced ſome Slaves, whom he had made Priſoners a few Days before in foraging, and by Severity and hard Uſage brought to his purpoſe. Theſe, according to the Leſſon taught them beforehand, declared: "That they were legionary Soldiers: That "urged by Hunger, they had privately ſtolen out of the Camp, to ſearch "for Corn and Cattle in the Fields: That the whole Army labored under "the like Scarcity, and was reduced to ſo weak a Condition, as no longer "to be capable of ſupporting Fatigue: That the General had therefore re-"ſolved, if the Town held out three Days longer, to draw off his Men from "the Siege. Such (ſaid *Vercingetorix*) are the Services you receive from the "Man whom you have not ſcrupled to charge with Treaſon. To him it is "owing, that without drawing a Sword, you ſee a powerful and victorious "Army almoſt wholly deſtroyed by Famine; and effectual care taken, that "when Neceſſity compels them to ſeek Refuge in a ſhameful Flight, no "State ſhall receive them into its Territories."

XX. THE whole Multitude ſet up a ſhout; and ſtriking, as their manner was, their Lances againſt their Swords, to denote their Approbation of the Speaker, declared *Vercingetorix* a conſummate General, whoſe Fidelity ought not to be queſtioned, and whoſe Conduct deſerved the higheſt Praiſes. They decreed, that ten thouſand Men, choſen out of all the Troops, ſhould be ſent to reinforce the Garriſon of *Avaricum*; it ſeeming too hazardous to rely upon the *Biturigians* alone for the defence of a Place, whoſe preſervation, they imagined, would neceſſarily give them the ſuperiority in the War.

XXI. AND indeed, tho' the Siege was carried on by our Men with incredible Bravery, yet were all their Efforts in a great meaſure rendered ineffectual, by the Addreſs and Contrivances of the *Gauls*. For they are a People of ſingular Ingenuity, extremely quick of Apprehenſion, and very happy in imitating what they ſee practiſed. They not only turned aſide our Hooks with Ropes, and after having ſeized them, drew them into the Town with Engines; but likewiſe ſet themſelves to undermine the Mount: in which they the more ſucceeded, becauſe the Country abounding with Iron Mines, they are perfectly skilled in that whole Art. At the ſame time they raiſed Towers on all parts of the Wall, covered them carefully with raw Hides, and continuing their Sallies Day and Night, either ſet fire to the Mount, or fell upon the Workmen. In proportion as our Towers increaſed in height, by the continual addition to the Mount; in like manner did they advance the Towers upon their Walls, by raiſing one Story perpetually over another: and counterworking our Mines with the utmoſt Diligence, they either filled them up with great Stones, or poured melted Pitch into them, or repulſed the Miners with long Stakes, burnt and ſharpened at the end; all which very much retarded the Approaches, and kept us at a diſtance from the Place.

XXII. THE fortified Towns among the *Gauls* have their Walls moſtly built in the following manner. Long maſſy Beams of Wood are placed upon the Ground, at the equal diſtances of two Feet one from another, and ſo as to conſtitute by their length the thickneſs of the Wall. Theſe being again croſſed over by others, which ſerve to bind them together, have their Intervals on the inſide filled up with Earth, and on the outſide with large Stones. The firſt Courſe thus compleated and firmly joined, a ſecond is laid over it; which allowing the ſame openings between the Beams, reſts them not immediately upon thoſe of the order below, but diſpoſes them artfully above their Intervals, and connects them as before with interjacent Earth and Stones. In this manner the Work is carried on to a proper height, and pleaſes the Eye by its uniform Variety, the alternate Courſes of Stones and Beams, running in even Lines, according to their ſeveral Orders. Nor is it leſs adapted to Security and Defence. For the Stones are proof againſt Fire, and the whole Maſs is impenetrable to the Ram; becauſe being ſtrongly bound together by continual Beams, to a depth of forty Foot, it can neither be disjointed nor thrown down.

XXIII. SUCH were the Obſtacles we met with in the Siege. But the Soldiers, tho' obliged to ſtruggle during the whole time, with Cold, Dirt, and perpetual Rains; yet by dint of Labor overcame all Difficulties, and at the end of twenty-five Days, had raiſed a Mount three hundred and thirty Feet broad, and eighty Feet high. When it was brought almoſt cloſe to the Walls,

Walls, *Cæſar* according to Cuſtom attending the Works, and encouraging the Soldiers to labor without intermiſſion; a little before midnight it was obſerved to ſmoke, the Enemy having undermined and fired it. At the ſame time they raiſed a mighty Shout, and ſallying vigorouſly by two ſeveral Gates, attacked the Works on both ſides. Some threw lighted Torches and dry Wood from the Walls upon the Mount, others Pitch and all ſorts of Combuſtibles; ſo that it was hard to determine on which ſide to make head againſt the Enemy, or where firſt to apply Redreſs. But as *Cæſar* kept always two Legions upon Guard in the Trenches, beſides great numbers employed in the Works, who relieved one another by turns: his Troops were ſoon in a Condition; ſome to oppoſe thoſe that ſallied from the Town; others to draw off the Towers, and make openings in the Mount; whilſt the whole Multitude ran to extinguiſh the Flames.

XXIV. THE Fight continued with great Obſtinacy during the remaining part of the Night: the Enemy ſtill entertained hopes of Victory; and perſiſted with the more firmneſs, as they ſaw the Mantles that covered the Towers burnt down, and the *Romans* unable to reſcue them for want of ſhelter. At the ſame time freſh Troops were continually ſent, to ſupply the place of thoſe that were fatigued; the Beſieged believing, that the ſafety of *Gaul* entirely depended upon the iſſue of that critical Moment. And here I cannot forbear mentioning a remarkable Inſtance of Intrepidity, to which I was myſelf a Witneſs on this Occaſion. A certain *Gaul* poſted before the Gate of the City, threw into the Fire Balls of Pitch and Tallow to feed it. This Man being expoſed to the diſcharge of a *Roman* Battery, was ſtruck thro' the Side with a Dart and expired. Another ſtriding over his Body, immediately took his Place. He alſo was killed in the ſame manner. A third ſucceeded: to the third a fourth: nor was this dangerous Poſt left vacant, 'till the Fire of the Mount being extinguiſhed, and the Enemy repulſed on all ſides, an end was put to the Conflict.

XXV. THE *Gauls* having tried all methods of Defence, and finding that none of them ſucceeded, conſulted next Day about leaving the Town; in Concert with, and even by the Order of *Vercingetorix*. This they hoped eaſily to effect in the Night; as that General's Camp was not far off, and the Moraſs between them and the *Romans*, would ſerve to cover their Retreat. Night came, and the Beſieged were preparing to put their Deſign in execution: when ſuddenly the Women running out into the Streets, and caſting themſelves at their Husbands Feet, conjured them with many Tears, not to abandon to the Fury of an enraged Enemy, them and their common Children, whom Nature and Weakneſs rendered incapable of Flight. But finding their Intreaties ineffectual; for in extreme Danger, Fear often excludes Compaſſion; they began to ſet up a loud Cry, and inform the *Romans* of the intended Flight. This alarmed the Garriſon, who apprehending the Paſſages would be ſeized by our Horſe, deſiſted from their Reſolution.

XXVI. NEXT Day *Cæſar* brought forward the Tower, and gave the neceſſary Directions about the Works. A heavy Rain chancing juſt then to fall, he thought it a favourable Opportunity for effecting his Deſign; as he obſerved the Wall to be leſs ſtrictly guarded. Wherefore ordering the Soldiers to abate a little of their Vigor, and having inſtructed them in what manner to proceed; he exhorted the Legions, who advanced under cover of the Machines, to ſeize

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at laſt the Fruit of a Victory acquired by ſo many Toils. Then, promiſing Rewards to thoſe who ſhould firſt ſcale the Town, he gave the ſignal of Attack. The *Romans* ruſhed ſuddenly upon the Enemy from all Parts, and in a moment poſſeſſed themſelves of the Walls.

XXVII. THE *Gauls* terrified at this new manner of Aſſault, and driven from their Towers and Battlements, drew up triangle-wiſe in the Squares and open Places, that on whatever ſide our Men ſhould come to attack them, they might face in order of Battle. But obſerving that we ſtill kept upon the Walls, and were endeavouring to get poſſeſſion of their whole Circuit; they began to fear they ſhould have no Outlet to eſcape by; and throwing down their Arms, ran tumultuouſly to the fartheſt part of the Town. There many fell within the City, the narrowneſs of the Gates obſtructing their flight: others were ſlain by the Cavalry without the Walls: nor did any one for the preſent think of Plunder. The *Romans* eager to revenge the Maſſacre at *Genabum*, and exaſperated by the obſtinate defence of the Place, ſpared neither old Men, Women, nor Children; inſomuch that of all that Multitude, amounting to about forty thouſand, ſcarce eight hundred, who had quitted the Town upon the firſt Alarm, eſcaped ſafe to *Vercingetorix*'s Camp. They arrived there late in the Night, and were received in great Silence: for *Vercingetorix* fearing leſt their entrance in a Body, and the Compaſſion it would naturally raiſe among the Troops, might occaſion ſome Tumult in the Camp, had ſent out his Friends, and the principal Noblemen of each Province, to meet them by the way, and conduct them ſeparately to the Quarters of their ſeveral States.

XXVIII. NEXT Day having called a Council, he conſoled and exhorted the Troops, not to be too much diſheartened, or caſt down by their late Misfortune: "That the *Romans* had not overcome by Bravery, or in the Field; "but by their Addreſs and Skill in Sieges, with which part of War the *Gauls* "were leſs acquainted: That it was deceiving themſelves to hope for Succeſs "in every meaſure they might think fit to purſue: That himſelf, as they all "knew, had never adviſed the defence of *Avaricum*, and could not but im-"pute the preſent Diſaſter to the Imprudence of the *Biturigians*, and the too "eaſy Compliance of the reſt: That he hoped however ſoon to compenſate it "by ſuperior Advantages, as he was uſing his utmoſt Endeavours to bring "over the other States, which had hitherto refuſed their Concurrence, and to "form one general Confederacy of all *Gaul*, againſt whoſe united Strength, "not the whole Earth would be able to prevail: That he had even in a great "meaſure effected his Deſign, and in the mean time only required of them, "for the ſake of the common Safety, that they would ſet about fortifying "their Camp, the better to ſecure them from the ſudden Attacks of the "Enemy." This Speech was not unpleaſing to the *Gauls*; and the rather, as notwithſtanding ſo great a Blow, *Vercingetorix* ſeemed to have loſt nothing of his Courage; neither withdrawing from publick view, nor ſhunning the ſight of the Multitude. They even began to entertain a higher Opinion of his Prudence and Foreſight, as from the firſt he had adviſed the burning of *Avaricum*, and at laſt ſent Orders to abandon it. And thus bad Succeſs, which uſually ſinks the Reputation of a Commander, ſerved only to augment his Credit, and give him greater Authority among the Troops. At the ſame time they were full of Hopes, from the Aſſurances he had given them, of ſeeing the other States accede to the Alliance. And now for the firſt time the *Gauls* ſet about forti-

fying their Camp; being ſo humbled by their late Misfortune, that tho' naturally impatient of Fatigue, they reſolved to refuſe no Labor impoſed upon them by their General.

XXIX. NOR was *Vercingetorix* leſs active on his ſide, to bring over the other Provinces of *Gaul* to the Confederacy, endeavouring to gain the leading Men in each by Preſents and Promiſes. For this purpoſe he made choice of fit Agents, who by their Addreſs, or particular Ties of Friendſhip, were moſt likely to influence thoſe to whom they were ſent. He provided Arms and Clothing for the Troops that had eſcaped from *Avaricum*; and to repair the Loſs ſuſtained by the taking of that Place, gave Orders to the ſeveral States, to furniſh a certain number of Men, and ſend them to the Camp by a Day prefixed. At the ſame time he commanded all the Archers, of which there were great numbers in *Gaul*, to be ſought out and brought to the Army. By theſe meaſures he ſoon replaced the Men whom he loſt at the Siege of *Avaricum*. Mean-while *Theutomatus*, the Son of *Ollovico*, and King of the *Nitobrigians*, whoſe Father had been ſtiled Friend and Ally by the Senate of *Rome*, came and joined him with a great Body of Horſe, which he had raiſed in his own Territories, and in the Province of *Aquitain*.

XXX. *CÆSAR* finding great plenty of Corn and other Proviſions at *Avaricum*, ſtayed there ſeveral Days to refreſh his Men, after the Fatigue and Scarcity they had ſo lately undergone. Winter was now drawing towards a period; and as the Seaſon itſelf invited him to take the Field, he reſolved to march againſt the Enemy, either to draw them out of the Woods and Marſhes, or beſiege them in their Faſtneſſes. While he was full of theſe Thoughts, Deputies arrived from the *Æduans*, to beg his Interpoſition and Authority, for ſettling the differences of their State. "Every thing there, they told him, threatned "an inteſtine War. For whereas it had all along been the Cuſtom to be "governed by a ſingle Magiſtrate, who poſſeſſed the ſupreme Power for the "ſpace of one Year; they had now two diſputing for that Title, each pre-"tending his Election was according to Law: That the one was *Convictolita-*"*nis*, an illuſtrious and popular young Nobleman; the other *Cotus*, of an "ancient Family, great Authority, and powerful Relations, whoſe Brother "*Videliacus* had exerciſed the ſame Office the Year before: That the whole "State was in Arms, the Senate divided, and each Party backed by their "Clients among the People; nor had they any other hopes of eſcaping a civil "War, but in his Care and timely Endeavours to put an end to the "Controverſy."

XXXI. ALTHO' *Cæſar* was ſenſible it would greatly prejudice his Affairs, to quit the purſuit of the War, and the Enemy; yet reflecting on the Miſchiefs that often ariſe from Diviſions, and deſirous if poſſible to prevent ſo powerful a State, in ſtrict Amity with the People of *Rome*, and which he had always in a particular manner cheriſhed and befriended, from having recourſe to the method of Violence and Arms, which might drive the Party that leaſt confided in his Friendſhip, to ſeek the Aſſiſtance of *Vercingetorix*; he reſolved to make it his firſt Care, to put a ſtop to the progreſs of theſe Diſorders. And becauſe by the Conſtitutions of the *Æduans*, it was not lawful for the ſupreme Magiſtrate, to paſs beyond the Limits of the State; that he might not ſeem to detract from their Privileges, he reſolved to go in perſon thither, and ſummoned the Senate and two Candidates to meet him at *Deciſe*.

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The Aſſembly was very numerous: when finding upon Enquiry, that *Cotus* had been declared chief Magiſtrate by his own Brother, in preſence of only a few Electors privately called together, without regard to Time or Place, and even contrary to the expreſs Laws of the State, which forbid two of the ſame Family, while yet both alive, either to hold the ſupreme Dignity, or ſo much as ſit together in the Senate; he obliged him to reſign in favour of *Convictolitanis*, who upon the Expiration of the Office of the preceding Magiſtrate, had been elected in all the Forms by the Prieſts.

XXXII. THIS Sentence being paſſed; and having exhorted the *Æduans* to lay aſide their Quarrels and Diviſions, and apply themſelves ſolely to the Buſineſs of the preſent War; to expect with confidence the full Recompence of their Services, as ſoon as the Reduction of *Gaul* was compleated; and to ſend him immediately all their Cavalry, with ten thouſand Foot, to form a Chain of Poſts for the Security of his Convoys; he divided his Army into two Parts. Four Legions, under the Conduct of *Labienus*, were ſent againſt the *Senones* and *Pariſians*. Six, headed by himſelf in perſon, marched along the Banks of the *Allier*, towards the Territories of the *Averni*, with deſign to inveſt *Gergovia*. Part of the Cavalry followed the Rout of *Labienus*; part remained with *Cæſar*. *Vercingetorix* having notice of this, broke down all the Bridges upon the *Allier*, and began his march on the other ſide of the River.

XXXIII. AS both Armies were continually in view, encamped almoſt over-againſt each other; and the Enemies Scouts ſo ſtationed, that it was impoſſible for the *Romans* to make a Bridge for carrying over their Forces: *Cæſar* began to be uneaſy, leſt he ſhould be hindered the greateſt part of the Summer by the River, becauſe the *Allier* is ſeldom fordable till towards *Autumn*. To prevent this Inconvenience, he encamped in a place full of Woods, over-againſt one of thoſe Bridges which *Vercingetorix* had cauſed to be broken down: and remaining there privately next Day with a good Body of Troops, formed by draughting every fourth Cohort, that the Number of Legions might ſtill appear compleat; he ſent forward the reſt of the Army with all the Baggage as uſual, ordering them to march as far as they could. When by the time of the Day he judged they might be arrived at the place of their Encampment, he ſet about rebuilding the Bridge, making uſe of the old Piles, whoſe lower part the Enemy had left ſtanding. Having ſoon compleated the Work, marched over the Troops he had with him, and choſen a proper Place for his Camp; he recalled the reſt of the Forces. *Vercingetorix*, upon Intelligence of this, advanced before by long marches, that he might not be obliged to fight againſt his Will.

XXXIV. *CÆSAR* after five Days march came before *Gergovia*, where he had a ſlight Engagement with the Enemy's Horſe: and having taken a View of the Place, which he found ſituated upon a very high Mountain, all whoſe Approaches were extremely difficult; he not only deſpaired of reducing it by Storm, but reſolved even to forbear inveſting it, until he had ſecured the neceſſary Supplies for his Army. *Vercingetorix* mean-while was encamped near the Town upon the Hill, where he had diſpoſed the Forces of the ſeveral States around him, in different Diviſions, ſeparated from one another by moderate Intervals. As his Army poſſeſſed all the Summits of the Mountain, whence there was any proſpect into the Plains below, they made a very formidable

midable Appearance. Every Morning by Day-break, the Chiefs of each State, who compoſed his Council, aſſembled in his Tent, to adviſe with him, or receive his Orders: nor did he ſuffer a ſingle Day to paſs without detaching ſome Cavalry, intermixed with Archers, to skirmiſh with the *Romans*, that he might make trial of the Spirit and Courage of his Men. There was a riſing Ground, that joined to the Foot of the Mountain on which the Town ſtood, excellently well fortified by Nature, as being very ſteep on all ſides, and of extreme difficult Acceſs. This Hill, though of ſuch importance to the Enemy, that by our getting poſſeſſion of it, we could in a great meaſure deprive them of Water and Forage, was yet but very indifferently guarded. *Cæſar* therefore leaving his Camp about midnight; before any Aſſiſtance could arrive from the Town, diſlodged the Enemy, ſeized the Hill, and having placed two Legions upon it to defend it, drew a double Ditch twelve Foot deep from the greater to the leſſer Camp, that the Soldiers might paſs and repaſs in ſafety, even ſingle and without a Guard.

XXXV. WHILE things were in this poſture before *Gergovia*, *Convictolitanis* the *Æduan*, to whom, as we have related above, *Cæſar* had adjudged the ſupreme Magiſtracy; being ſtrongly ſolicited by the *Averni*, and at length gained over by their Money, addreſſed himſelf to ſome young Noblemen, the chief of whom were *Litavicus* and his Brothers, of the moſt diſtinguiſhed Family of the Province. With theſe he ſhared the Reward he had received, and exhorted them to conſider: "That they were Subjects of a free State, and "born to command: that Liberty and Victory were retarded by the *Æduans* "alone, whoſe Authority reſtrained the other States, and whoſe Concurrence "in the common Cauſe would take from the *Romans* all Poſſibility of ſup- "porting themſelves in *Gaul:* that though he was himſelf under ſome Obli- "gation to *Cæſar*, at leaſt ſo far as a juſt and equitable Deciſion deſerved "that Name, he thought he owed ſtill more to his Country, and could ſee "no Reaſon why the *Æduans* ſhould rather have recourſe to the *Roman* "General, in what regarded their Laws and Cuſtoms, than the *Romans* in "the like Caſe to the *Æduans*." The Repreſentations of the Magiſtrate, and the Rewards he beſtowed, ſoon prevailed: they even offered to become the chief Conductors of the Enterpriſe; and nothing was wanting but to conſult of proper means for accompliſhing the deſign, as it was eaſily foreſeen, that the State would not be induced without great difficulty to engage in ſo dangerous a War. At laſt it was agreed, that *Litavicus* ſhould have the Command of the ten Thouſand Foot appointed to join *Cæſar*; that he ſhould begin his march; that his Brothers ſhould be ſent before to the *Roman* Camp; and that the reſt of the Project ſhould be then executed, according to a Plan previouſly concerted among them.

XXXVI. *LITAVICUS* having received the Command of the Army; when he was within about thirty Miles of *Gergovia*, ſuddenly called the Troops together, and addreſſing them with Tears: "Whither, Fellow-Soldiers, "ſaid he, are we going? All our Cavalry, all our Nobility are ſlain. *Epo-* "*redorix* and *Virdumarus*, Men of the firſt Quality in the State, being ac- "cuſed by the *Romans* of Treaſon, are put to Death without Trial. Learn "theſe things of thoſe who have eſcaped this general Maſſacre: for as to me, "o'erwhelm'd as I am with Grief for the Loſs of my Brothers and Kinſmen, "I have neither Strength nor Voice to utter our Calamities." He then produced ſome whom he had beforehand inſtructed for that purpoſe, and who joining

joining in the ſame Story, told the Multitude: "That the greateſt part of the "*Æduan* Cavalry had been put to the Sword, under pretence of holding In- "telligence with the *Averni*; and that themſelves had eſcaped only in the "Crowd, by withdrawing during the general Slaughter." Upon this the whole Army called aloud to *Litavicus*, intreating him to provide for their Safety. "As if, ſaid he, there was room for Counſel; or any Choice left, "but that of marching directly to *Gergovia*, and joining the *Averni*. Can "we doubt, after ſo black an Inſtance of *Roman* Perfidy, but that they are "already on their way to compleat the Maſſacre? Let us therefore, if ought "of Spirit or Courage remains in our Breaſts, revenge the Death of our Coun- "trymen ſo undeſervedly ſlain, and put theſe inhuman Spoilers to the Sword." He then preſented ſome *Roman* Citizens, who had taken the opportunity of their march, for conducting a large Convoy of Corn and Proviſions to the Camp. Inſtantly the Convoy was plundered, the *Romans* themſelves put to Death with the moſt cruel Torments, and Meſſengers diſpatched through all the Territories of the *Æduans*, to ſpread the ſame Forgery of the Maſſacre of their Cavalry and Princes, and thereby rouſe them to a like Vengeance.

XXXVII. *EPOREDORIX* the *Æduan*, a young Nobleman of diſtinguiſhed Birth, and great Intereſt in the State; as likewiſe *Virdumarus*, of equal Age and Authority, though not ſo well deſcended; whom *Cæſar*, upon the Recommendation of *Divitiacus*, had raiſed from a low Condition to the higheſt Dignities: were both at this time in the *Roman* Camp, having come along with the Cavalry at *Cæſar*'s expreſs Deſire. Between theſe two was a Competition for Greatneſs; and in the late Diſpute about the Magiſtracy, the one had declared warmly for *Convictolitanis*, the other for *Cotus*. *Eporedorix* getting notice of *Litavicus*'s Deſign, came about midnight to *Cæſar*'s Tent, diſcovered the whole Plot, and intreated him to obviate the miſchievous Counſels of a few young Noblemen, and not ſuffer the State to fall off from the Alliance of the *Romans*, which he foreſaw muſt happen, ſhould ſo many thouſand Men once join the Enemy. For it was by no means probable, that either their own Relations would neglect their Safety, or the State itſelf make light of ſo great a part of its Forces.

XXXVIII. THIS piece of Intelligence gave *Cæſar* extreme Concern, becauſe he had always manifeſted a particular Regard to the *Æduans*. He therefore drew out immediately four Legions without Baggage, together with all the Cavalry: and becauſe the Affair ſeemed to depend wholly upon Diſpatch, would not even take time to contract his Camp, but left *C. Fabius* his Lieutenant, with two Legions, to defend it againſt the Enemy. Finding that *Litavicus*'s Brothers, whom he ordered to be ſeized, had ſome time before gone over to *Vercingetorix*, he began his march, exhorting the Soldiers to bear the Fatigue chearfully in ſo preſſing a Conjuncture. They followed with great Alacrity, and advancing about five and twenty Miles from *Gergovia*, came at laſt within ſight of the *Æduans*. *Cæſar* immediately detached the Cavalry againſt them, to retard and ſtop their march; but with ſtrict charge to abſtain from Bloodſhed. He ordered *Eporedorix* and *Virdumarus*, whom they believed ſlain, to ride up and down among the Squadrons, and call to their Countrymen. As they were ſoon known, and *Litavicus*'s Forgery thereby diſcovered; the *Æduans* ſtretched out their Hands, made Signs of Submiſſion, and throwing down their Arms, began to beg their Lives. *Litavicus*, with

his Clients, who by the Cuſtoms of the *Gauls*, cannot without Infamy abandon their Patrons, even in the greateſt Extremities of Fortune, eſcaped ſafe to *Gergovia*.

XXXIX. *CÆSAR* having diſpatched Meſſengers to the *Æduans*, to inform them, that his Lenity and Regard for their State, had prevailed with him to ſpare Troops, whom by the right of War he might have put to the Sword; after allowing the Army three hours reſt during the night, marched back to *Gergovia*. About half way he was met by a Party of Horſe, ſent by *Fabius*, to give him notice of the Danger that threatned his Camp. They told him: "That the Enemy had attacked it with all their Forces, and by ſending con- "tinual ſupplies of freſh Men, were like in the end to overpower the *Romans*, "whoſe Fatigue admitted of no Relaxation, becauſe the vaſt extent of Ground "they had to defend, obliged them to be perpetually upon the Rampart: "That the multitude of Arrows and Darts diſcharged by the *Gauls*, had "wounded many of the Soldiers, notwithſtanding the Protection received from "the Engines, which yet had been of good Service in beating off the Aſſail- "ants: That *Fabius*, upon the retreat of the Enemy, had cloſed up all the "Gates of the Camp but two, carried a Breaſtwork quite round the Rampart, "and made preparation for ſuſtaining a like Aſſault the next Day." *Cæſar* informed of theſe things, haſtened his march with all diligence, and ſeconded by the unuſual Ardor of the Troops, arrived in the Camp before Sun-riſe.

XL. WHILE theſe things paſſed at *Gergovia*, the *Æduans*, upon receipt of the firſt Diſpatches from *Litavicus*, ſtaid not for confirmation of the Report; but prompted partly by Avarice, partly by Revenge, and many by a native Raſhneſs, to which the *Gauls* in general are extremely addicted, being ready to catch up every flying Rumor as a certain Truth: flew immediately to Arms, plundered the *Roman* Citizens of their Effects, ſlaughtered their Perſons, or dragged them into Servitude. *Convictolitanis* fomented to the utmoſt this Fury, which had already taken but too faſt hold of the Multitude; that by plunging them into ſome deſperate Act of Violence, he might render a Retreat the more difficult and ſhameful. At his Inſtigation, they obliged *M. Ariſtius*, a military Tribune, who was upon his way to join the Army, to quit *Cabillonum*, promiſing not to moleſt him in his Journey: The ſame they did by ſeveral *Roman* Merchants, who had ſtopt there on account of Traffick; and attacking them treacherouſly on the Road, ſtripped them of their Baggage, inveſted Day and Night thoſe that made reſiſtance; and many being killed on both ſides, drew together a greater number of Men to effect their Deſign. Mean-while coming to underſtand, that all their Troops were in *Cæſar*'s power; they ran to *Ariſtius*, aſſured him that nothing had been done by publick Authority, ordered Informations to be brought againſt thoſe who had been concerned in pillaging the *Romans*, confiſcated the Eſtates of *Litavicus* and his Brothers, and ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to excuſe what had happened. All this they did with a view to the recovery of their Troops: but conſcious of Guilt; loth to part with the Plunder, in which great numbers had ſhared; and dreading the Puniſhment ſo groſs an Outrage deſerved; they began privately to concert meaſures of War, and by their Ambaſſadors ſolicited other States to join them. Tho' *Cæſar* was not ignorant of theſe Practices, he ſpoke with the greateſt mildneſs to the *Æduan* Deputies, aſſuring them of the continuance of his Favor, and that he would not

conſider

A. *The greater Camp*. B. *Gergovia*. C. *The leſser Camp*. D *The upper Part of the Hill crowded wi*
been covered with Troops and was now abandoned. F. *The Aeduans*. G. *The double Ditch extend*
I. *The Wall of large Stones six foot high*. K. *The Muleteers with Helmets to resemble Horsemen*. L.
of three of the Enemy's Camps. N. *The tenth Legion*. O. *T. Sextius posted at the Foot of the Hill wi*

ded with the Camps of the several Gallick States. E. *The Hill which sometime before had extending from the greater to the leſser Camp.* H. *Cæsar's Legion concealed in the Woods.* L. *Troops of Roman Horse.* M. *The Romans scale the outward Wall & poſſeſs themselves Hill with the Cohorts from the leſser Camp to cover the Retreat of the Legions.*

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conſider as the Crime of the whole Nation, what was owing only to the Imprudence and Levity of the Multitude. Apprehending however an univerſal Revolt of *Gaul*, and that he might be ſurrounded by the Forces of all the States at once, he began to think of retiring from *Gergovia*, and drawing his whole Army again into a Body; yet in ſuch manner, that a Retreat occaſioned by the fear of an Inſurrection, might not carry with it the Appearance of a Flight.

XLI. WHILE he was full of theſe Thoughts, an Opportunity ſeemed to offer of acting againſt the Enemy with ſucceſs. For coming into the leſſer Camp, to take a view of the Works, he obſerved a Hill, that ſome Days before was ſcarce to be ſeen for the Multitudes that covered it, now quite naked and deſtitute of Troops. Wondering what might be the Cauſe, he enquired of the Deſerters, who flocked daily in great numbers to the *Roman* Camp. They all agreed with our Scouts; that the back of the Hill was almoſt an even Ground, but narrow and woody in that part, where the Paſſage lay to the other ſide of the Town: That the Enemy were mightily afraid of loſing this Poſt, becauſe the *Romans*, who had already poſſeſſed themſelves of one Hill, by ſeizing the other likewiſe, would in a manner quite ſurround them; and being maſters of all the Outlets, might entirely cut off their Forage: That *Vercingetorix* had therefore drawn all his Forces on that ſide, with deſign to fortify the Paſſage.

XLII. *CÆSAR*, upon this Intelligence, diſpatched ſome Squadrons of Cavalry thither about midnight, ordering them to ride up and down the Place with as much Noiſe as poſſible. At Day-break he drew a great number of Mules and Carriage-Horſes out of the Camp, ſent away their uſual Harneſs, and furniſhing the Grooms and Waggoners with Helmets, that they might reſemble Horſemen, commanded them to march quite round the Hill. With theſe he joined a few Cavalry, who, for the greater ſhew, were to expatiate a little more freely; and the whole Detachment had Orders to move towards the ſame parts, taking a very large Circuit. All theſe Diſpoſitions were ſeen from the Town, which commanded a full view of the *Roman* Camp, tho' the diſtance was too great to diſtinguiſh Objects with certainty. At the ſame time *Cæſar*, the more effectually to deceive the Enemy, detached a Legion towards the ſame Eminence, and when it was advanced a little way, ſtationed it at the foot of the Hill, affecting to conceal it in the Woods. This increaſed the Jealouſy of the *Gauls* to ſuch a degree, that they immediately carried all their Forces thither to defend the Poſt. *Cæſar* ſeeing their Intrenchments abandoned, made his Soldiers cover the military Enſigns and Standards, and file off in ſmall Parties from the greater to the leſſer Camp, that they might not be perceived from the Town. He then opened his Deſign to his Lieutenants, whom he had appointed to command the ſeveral Legions, counſelling them above all things to moderate the Ardor of the Soldiers, that the hope of plunder, or deſire of fighting, might not carry them too far. He repreſented particularly the diſadvantage of the Ground, againſt which there was no Security but in Diſpatch; and told them, that this was not a regular Attack, but a ſudden Onſet, to be purſued no farther than Opportunity ſerved. Theſe Precautions taken, he gave the Signal to engage, and at the ſame time detached the *Æduans* by another Aſcent, to charge the Enemy on the Right.

XLIII.

XLIII. THE Wall of the Town, had no Breaks or Hollows intervened, was about twelve hundred Paces diſtant from the Plain below, meaſuring in a direct Line from the foot of the Mountain. The Circuit the Troops were obliged to take, to moderate the ſteepneſs of the Aſcent, added ſtill to this ſpace upon the march. Half way up the Hill, as near as the nature of the Ground would allow, the *Gauls* had run a Wall of large Stones, ſix Foot high, the better to defend themſelves againſt our Attacks. All between this and the Plain was left quite void of Troops by the Enemy; but the upper part of the Hill, to the very Walls of the Town, was crowded with the Camps of their ſeveral States. The Signal being given, the *Romans* immediately mounted the Hill, ſcaled the outward Wall, and poſſeſſed themſelves of three of the Enemy's Camps. Such too was the Expedition wherewith they carried them, that coming ſuddenly upon *Theutomatus* King of the *Nitobrigians*, as he was repoſing himſelf in his Tent about noon, he very narrowly eſcaped being taken; for he was obliged to fly away half naked, and had his Horſe wounded under him.

XLIV. *CÆSAR* having ſucceeded as far as his deſign required, ordered a Retreat to be ſounded; and the tenth Legion, which fought near his perſon, obeyed. The other Legions, not hearing the Signal, becauſe ſeparated from the General by a large Valley, were yet commanded to halt by the Lieutenants and military Tribunes, according to the Inſtructions given by *Cæſar* in the beginning. But elated with the hopes of a ſpeedy Victory, the flight of the Enemy, and the remembrance of former Succeſſes, they thought nothing impracticable to their Valor, nor deſiſted from the Purſuit, 'till they had reached the very Walls and Gates of the Town. Upon this a great Cry ariſing from all Parts, thoſe that were fartheſt from the Place of Aſſault, terrified by the Noiſe and Tumult, and imagining the Enemy already within the Gates, quitted the Town with Precipitation. The Women throwing their Money and Cloaths from the Walls, with naked Breaſts, and extended Arms, conjured the *Romans* to ſpare their Lives, and not, as at *Avaricum*, ſacrifice all to their Reſentment, without diſtinction of Age or Sex. Some being let down by their Hands from the Wall, delivered themſelves up to our Soldiers. *L. Fabius*, a Centurion of the eighth Legion, was that Day heard to ſay; that he had not yet forgot the Plunder of *Avaricum*, and was reſolved no Man ſhould enter the Place before him. Accordingly, having with the Aſſiſtance of three of his Company got upon the Town-Wall, he helped them one after another to do the like.

XLV. MEAN-WHILE the Troops, who, as we have related above, were gone to defend the Poſt on the other ſide of the Town; incited by the Cries of the Combatants, and the continual Accounts brought that the Enemy had entered the Place; ſending all the Cavalry before to ſtop the Progreſs of the *Romans*, advanced in mighty Crowds to the Attack. In proportion as they arrived, they drew up under the Wall, and augmented the number of thoſe who fought on their ſide. As they ſoon became formidable by their multitude; the Women, who a little before had implored the Compaſſion of the *Romans*, now began to encourage their own Troops, ſhewing their diſhevelled Hair, and producing their Children, according to the cuſtom of the *Gauls*. The Conteſt was by no means equal, either in reſpect of Number, or of the Ground; and the *Romans* already fatigued with the march and length of the

the Combat, were little able to ſuſtain the attack of freſh and vigorous Troops.

XLVI. *CÆSAR* obſerving the diſadvantage of the Ground, and the continual increaſe of the Enemy's Troops, began to be apprehenſive about the Event; and ſending to *T. Sextius* his Lieutenant, whom he had left to guard the leſſer Camp, ordered him to bring forth the Cohorts with all expedition, and poſt them at the foot of the Hill upon the Enemy's right; that if our Men ſhould give way, he might deter the *Gauls* from purſuing them. He himſelf advancing a little with the tenth Legion, waited the iſſue of the Combat.

XLVII. WHILE the Conflict was maintained with the utmoſt Vigour on both ſides; the Enemy truſting to their Poſt and Numbers, the *Romans* to their Courage; ſuddenly the *Æduans*, whom *Cæſar* had ſent by another Aſcent on the right, to make a Diverſion, appeared on the flank of our Men. As they were armed after the manner of the *Gauls*, this ſight greatly terrified the *Romans*; and tho' they extended their right Arms in token of Peace, yet ſtill our Men fancied it a Stratagem to deceive them. At the ſame time *L. Fabius* the Centurion, and thoſe who had got upon the Wall with him, being ſurrounded and ſlain, were thrown down by the Enemy from the Battlements. *M. Petreius*, a Centurion of the ſame Legion, who had endeavoured to force the Gates; finding himſelf overpower'd by the Enemy, and deſpairing of Safety, becauſe he was already covered with Wounds, turning to his Soldiers that had followed him, ſaid: "As I find it impoſſible to preſerve both "myſelf and you, I will at leaſt do my beſt to further your Eſcape, whom I "have brought into this Danger thro' too eager a deſire of Glory. Take ad-"vantage therefore of the preſent Opportunity." Then throwing himſelf upon the Enemy, he killed two, drove the reſt from the Gate, and ſeeing his Men run to his Aſſiſtance: "In vain, ſays he, do you endeavour to preſerve "my Life. My Blood and Strength forſake me. Go therefore, while you "may, and rejoin your Legion." Continuing ſtill to fight, he expired ſoon after, preſerving his Followers with the loſs of his own Life.

XLVIII. OUR Men thus preſſed on all ſides, were at length driven from the Place, with the loſs of forty-ſix Centurions: but the tenth Legion, which had been poſted a little more advantageouſly to cover their Retreat, checked the impetuous Purſuit of the *Gauls*; being ſuſtained by the Cohorts of the thirteenth Legion, who had quitted the leſſer Camp under *Sextius*, and poſſeſſed themſelves of an Eminence. The Legions having gained the Plain, immediately halted, and faced about towards the Enemy: but *Vercingetorix* drawing off his Troops from the foot of the Hill, retired within his Intrenchments. The *Romans* loſt that Day about ſeven hundred Men.

XLIX. *CÆSAR* aſſembling the Army next Day, ſeverely blamed the Temerity and Avarice of the Soldiers: "That they had taken upon themſelves "to judge how far they were to proceed, and what they were to undertake; "regarding neither the Signal to retreat, nor the Orders of their Officers. "He explained the diſadvantage of the Ground, and reminded them of his "own Conduct at the Siege of *Avaricum*, when having ſurpriſed the Enemy "without a General, and without Cavalry, he had rather choſen to give up a "certain Victory, than by attacking them in a difficult Poſt, hazard an in-

" conſiderable Loſs: That as much as he admired the aſtoniſhing Courage of " Men, whom neither the Intrenchments of ſeveral Camps, nor the height of " the Mountain, nor the Walls of the Town could check; ſo much did he " blame the Licentiouſneſs and Arrogance of Soldiers, who thought they " knew more than their General, and could ſee better than him the way to " Conqueſt: That he looked upon Obedience and Moderation in the purſuit " of Booty, as Virtues no leſs eſſential to a good Soldier, than Valour and " Magnanimity.

L. HAVING made this Speech, and in the end exhorted his Soldiers, not to be diſcouraged by their late Misfortune, nor aſcribe that to the Bravery of the Enemy, which was entirely owing to the diſadvantage of the Ground: as he ſtill perſiſted in his Deſign of retiring, he drew out his Legions, and formed them in order of Battle upon the Plain. But *Vercingetorix* not thinking proper to deſcend; after a ſmall and ſucceſsful Skirmiſh between the Cavalry, *Cæſar* returned again to his Camp. The like he did the following Day: when thinking he had done enough to confirm the Courage of his own Men, and abate the Pride of the *Gauls*, he decamped towards the Territories of the *Æduans*. As the Enemy made no Attempt to purſue him, he arrived the third Day on the Banks of the *Allier*, and having repaired the Bridge, paſſed over with his whole Army.

LI. HERE he was informed by *Eporedorix* and *Virdumarus*, that *Litavicus* was gone with all the Cavalry to ſolicit the *Æduans*; and it would be therefore neceſſary for themſelves to ſet out, in order to prevent his Deſigns, and confirm the State in their Attachment to the *Romans*. Tho' *Cæſar* was by this time abundantly convinced of the Perfidy of the *Æduans*, and plainly foreſaw, that their departure would only haſten the Revolt; he yet did not think proper to detain them, that he might give no ground of Offence, nor betray any Suſpicion of Diſtruſt. At parting, he briefly enumerated the Services he had done the *Æduans*: " How low and depreſſed he had found " them, ſhut up in their Towns, deprived of their Lands, without Troops, " Tributaries to their Enemies, and obliged to ſubmit to the ignominious de- " mand of Hoſtages: To what Power and Greatneſs they were now raiſed by " his Favour, ſo as not only to have recovered their former Conſideration in " *Gaul*, but even to exceed in Dignity and Luſtre all that appeared moſt " flouriſhing in the ancient Annals of their State." With this Charge he diſmiſſed them.

LII. *NOVIODUNUM* was a Town belonging to the *Æduans*, advantageouſly ſituated upon the Banks of the *Loire*. Here *Cæſar* had lodged all the Hoſtages of *Gaul*, his Proviſions, his military Cheſt, and great part of his own and his Army's Baggage. Hither alſo he had ſent many Horſes, bought up in *Italy* and *Spain* for the ſervice of the War. When *Eporedorix* and *Virdumarus* arrived at this Place, and were informed of the diſpoſition of the State: " That *Litavicus* had been received with great marks of Favour at " *Bibracte*, the capital City of the Province: That *Convictolitanis* the chief " Magiſtrate, and almoſt all the Senate, were gone thither to meet him: " That Ambaſſadors had been publickly ſent to *Vercingetorix*, to conclude a " Treaty of Peace and Alliance:" They thought the preſent favourable Opportunity was by no means to be neglected. Having therefore put the Garriſon of *Noviodunum*, with all the *Romans* found in the Place to the Sword; they

divided

divided the Money and Horſes between them, ordered the Hoſtages to be conducted to *Bibracte*; and not thinking themſelves ſtrong enough to defend the Town, ſet it on fire, that it might not be of any ſervice to the *Romans*. All the Corn they could in ſo ſhort a time, they carried away in Barks; and burnt the reſt, or threw it into the River. Then drawing together the Forces of the neighbouring Parts, they lined the Banks of the *Loire* with Troops; and to ſtrike the greater Terror, began to ſcour the Country with their Cavalry; hoping to cut off *Cæſar*'s Convoys, and oblige him, thro' want of Proviſions, to return into the *Roman* Province. This appeared the eaſier, as the *Loire* was conſiderably ſwelled by the melting of the Snow, and gave little room to think that it could be any where forded.

LIII. UPON advice of theſe Proceedings, *Cæſar* thought it neceſſary to uſe diſpatch; and if he muſt build a Bridge, endeavour to come to an Action with the Enemy, before they had drawn more Forces together. For he did not even then think it neceſſary to return to the *Roman* Province; not only as the Retreat itſelf would be inglorious, and the Mountains of the *Sevennes*, and the badneſs of the Ways, were almoſt inſuperable Obſtacles; but chiefly, becauſe he was extremely deſirous to rejoin *Labienus*, and the Legions under his Command. Wherefore marching Day and Night with the utmoſt Diligence, contrary to all Mens Expectation he arrived upon the Banks of the *Loire*; and his Cavalry very opportunely finding a Ford, which however took the Soldiers up to the Shoulders, he placed the Horſe higher up to break the force of the Stream, and carried over his Army without loſs; the Enemy being ſo terrified by his Boldneſs, that they forſook the Banks. As he found a great deal of Corn and Cattle in the Fields, the Army was plentifully ſupplied, and he directed his march towards the Country of the *Senones*.

LIV. WHILST *Cæſar* was thus employed, *Labienus* leaving the Levies which had lately arrived from *Italy*, at *Agendicum*, to guard the Baggage; marched with four Legions to *Lutetia*, a City of the *Pariſians*, ſituated in an Iſland of the *Seine*. Upon notice of his Approach, the Enemy drew a great Army together from the neighbouring States. The chief Command was given to *Camulogenus* an *Aulercian*, who tho' in a very advanced Age, was yet urged to accept of that Honour, on account of his ſingular Knowledge in the Art of War. This General obſerving there was a large Moraſs, whoſe Waters ran into the *Seine*, and obſtructed all the Paſſages round about, encamped there, to hinder the *Romans* from paſſing the River. *Labienus* at firſt endeavoured to force a Paſſage, filling up the Moraſs with Hurdles and Mold, to give firm footing to the Army. But finding the Attempt too difficult, he privately quitted his Camp about midnight, and returned towards *Melodunum*. This City belongs to the *Senones*, and is alſo ſituated in an Iſland of the *Seine*, as we before ſaid of *Lutetia*. He found there about fifty Boats, which he ſpeedily drew together, and manned them with his Soldiers. The Inhabitants terrified at this new manner of Attack, and being too few to defend the Place, becauſe the greater part of them had joined the Army of *Camulogenus*, yielded upon the firſt Summons. Having repaired the Bridge, which the Enemy had cut down ſome Days before, he croſſed the *Seine* there; and following the courſe of the River, marched back towards *Lutetia*. The Enemy having Intelligence of this by thoſe who eſcaped from *Melodunum*, ſet fire to *Lutetia*, broke down its Bridges, and covering themſelves with

with the Moraſs, encamped on the oppoſite Bank of the *Seine*, over-againſt *Labienus*.

LV. IT was now known that *Cæſar* had departed from *Gergovia*. The Revolt of the *Æduans*, and the univerſal Inſurrection of *Gaul*, were every where ſpread abroad by the Voice of Fame. The *Gauls* on all Occaſions gave out, that *Cæſar* finding his march obſtructed by the *Loire*, and being reduced to great ſtraits for want of Corn, had been forced to take the Rout of the *Roman* Province. At the ſame time the *Bellovaci*, naturally prone to throw off the Yoke, upon hearing of the Defection of the *Æduans*, began to raiſe Forces, and openly prepare for War. *Labienus* perceiving ſo great a Change in the Poſture of Affairs, ſoon ſaw the neceſſity of purſuing other Meaſures; and that it was not now his buſineſs to make Conqueſts, or give the Enemy Battle, but to ſecure his Retreat to *Agendicum*. On the one ſide he was preſſed by the *Bellovaci*, reputed the moſt warlike People of all *Gaul*; on the other by *Camulogenus*, with a numerous and well-appointed Army. Add to all this, that the Baggage of the Troops, and the Detachment appointed to guard it, were ſeparated from the Legions by a great River. So many Difficulties ſurrounding him at once, he ſaw no way to extricate himſelf but by his Valour and Preſence of Mind.

LVI. ACCORDINGLY in the Evening he called a Council of War; and having exhorted the Officers to execute his Orders with vigour and diſpatch, diſtributed the fifty Boats he had brought from *Melodunum* to as many *Roman* Knights, commanding them to fall down the River about nine at Night without noiſe, four Miles below *Lutetia*, and there wait his coming. Five Cohorts, ſuch as appeared leaſt fit for ſervice, were left to guard the Camp. The other five of the ſame Legion, with all the Baggage, had Orders to march up the River at midnight, with much tumult and buſtle, which was farther increaſed by means of ſome ſmall Barks ſent the ſame way, that made a mighty noiſe with their Oars. He himſelf ſetting out ſoon after with three Legions, advanced ſilently to the Boats that waited for him. There he ſurpriſed the Enemy's Scouts, who were ſtationed along the River, and had been prevented by a ſudden Storm from diſcerning his Approach. The whole Army was quickly carried over, by the care and diligence of the *Roman* Knights, to whom that Affair had been given in charge. Almoſt at the ſame inſtant the Enemy had notice, that an unuſual Tumult was heard in the *Roman* Camp; that a ſtrong Detachment had marched up the River, on which ſide likewiſe a great noiſe of Oars was heard; and that a little below they were paſſing the River in Boats. This Intelligence made the *Gauls* conclude, that the Legions, alarmed at the Revolt of the *Æduans*, were endeavouring to croſs the *Seine* in three different Places; for which Reaſon they likewiſe divided their Army into three Bodies. For leaving one Party to guard the Paſſage over-againſt our Camp, and detaching another towards *Metioſedum*, with orders to advance to the Place where the Boats had ſtopped, they marched with the reſt of their Forces againſt *Labienus*. By day-break our Troops had paſſed the River, and the Enemy's Army appeared in view. *Labienus* exhorting his Men to remember their wonted Bravery, the many Victories they had gained, and even to fancy themſelves in the immediate Preſence of *Cæſar*, under whoſe Conduct they had ſo often been ſucceſsful, gave the Signal of Battle. At the very firſt Charge, the ſeventh Legion, which formed the right Wing of the *Roman* Army, broke the Enemy's left, and put it to rout. But

the



A. *Agendicum*. B. *Melodunum*. C. *Lutetia*. D. *Labienus's Camp*. E. *The Camp of Camulogenus*. F
River at Midnight with great Noise. H. *Labienus poſsesses himself of Melodunum by means of fifty B*
Camulogenus to guard the Paſsage over against the Roman Camp. M. *The Detachment sent towa*



genus. F. *The Boats distributed among the Roman Knights*. G. *The five Cohorts marching up the*
of fifty Boats he finds there. I. *Labienus's Forces*. K. *Camulogenus's Forces*. L. *The Party left by*
t towards Metiosedum. N. *The Seine*. O. *The Moraſs whose Waters run into the Seine*.

the right Wing of the *Gauls*, which was engaged with the twelfth Legion, and where *Camulogenus* was preſent in Perſon to encourage his Men; though the firſt Ranks were deſtroyed by the *Roman* Javelins, ſtill maintained its Ground with the utmoſt Bravery, and ſeemed determined to conquer. The Diſpute was long and dubious; when the Tribunes of the ſeventh Legion having notice how matters went, faced about, and attacked the Enemy's Rear. Even then not a Man offer'd to fly; but at laſt, being ſurrounded on all ſides, they were cut to pieces with their General. The Party left behind to watch our Camp, hearing the Noiſe of the Battle, flew to the Aſſiſtance of their Countrymen, and poſted themſelves on a Hill: but not being able to ſuſtain the Aſſault of the victorious *Romans*, they ſoon mingled with the reſt of the Fugitives, and were cut to pieces by the Cavalry, thoſe only excepted who ſheltered themſelves in the Woods and Mountains. After this Victory, *Labienus* retreated to *Agendicum*, where he had left the Baggage of the whole Army; and from thence, with all his Forces, went and joined *Cæſar*.

LVII. THE Revolt of the *Æduans* gave new ſtrength to the Confederacy. Deputies were immediately diſpatched into all Parts. Intereſt, Money, and Authority were employed in their turns, to procure the concurrence of the States that ſtill continued quiet. The Hoſtages ſeized at *Noviodunum*, enabled the *Æduans* to compel ſuch as were refractory. They ſent to require of *Vercingetorix*, that he would come and concert with them meaſures for carrying on the War; and in particular inſiſted on being at the head of the League. But this Demand meeting with oppoſition, a general Aſſembly of *Gaul* was held at *Bibracte*, whither the Deputies of all the confederated Nations repaired, and after taking the Affair into Conſideration, confirmed *Vercingetorix* in the Title of Generaliſſimo. The *Rhemi*, *Lingones*, and *Treviri* were not preſent at this Aſſembly: the two firſt, becauſe they had reſolved to continue faithful to the *Romans*; and the *Treviri*, on account of their great diſtance, and the Employment found them by the *Germans*; which was the Reaſon that they took no part at all in this War, nor lent their Aſſiſtance to either ſide. The *Æduans* were greatly mortified at ſeeing themſelves excluded from the chief Command: they complained of this change in their Fortune, and began to regret the Loſs of *Cæſar*'s Favour. But as they were already too far engaged in the Revolt, they durſt not think of detaching themſelves from the Confederacy. It was not however without Reluctance, that *Eporedorix* and *Virdumarus*, two young Noblemen of the greateſt hopes, conſented to take Orders from *Vercingetorix*.

LVIII. AS he was now inveſted with the ſupreme Command, he enjoined the ſeveral States to ſend Hoſtages, appointed a Day for that purpoſe, and ordered all the Cavalry, to the number of fifteen Thouſand, to aſſemble with the utmoſt Expedition. He ſaid, "he was ſufficiently provided with Infantry, "as he had no mind to refer the Deciſion of the War to Fortune, or hazard "an uncertain Engagement; but abounding in Horſe, judged it the eaſier "and ſafer way, to intercept the *Roman* Convoys and Foragers: that in the "mean-time they muſt reſolve to deſtroy their Corn, ſet fire to their Houſes, "and patiently ſubmit to a preſent and private Loſs, which was to be re-"warded with Liberty and perpetual Empire." Having thus ſettled the Plan of the War, he commanded the *Æduans* and *Seguſians*, who border upon the *Roman* Province, to raiſe ten thouſand Foot: to theſe he joined eight hundred Horſe, and put them under the Conduct of *Eporedorix*'s Brother, with Orders

to attack the *Allobrogians*. At the ſame time he commiſſioned the *Gabali*, and the neareſt Cantons of *Auvergne*, to make an Irruption into the Territories of the *Helvians:* and the *Rutheni* and *Cadurci*, into thoſe of the *Volcæ Arecomici*. He neglected not however, by Meſſengers and private Emiſſaries, to ſound the Diſpoſition of the *Allobrogians*, whoſe Minds he hoped were not yet thoroughly reconciled to the *Roman* Yoke; endeavouring to gain the leading Men by Preſents, and the State by an Offer of the Sovereignty of the *Roman* Province.

LIX. TO oppoſe all theſe Attacks, two and twenty Cohorts were drawn together, which *L. Cæſar*, Lieutenant-General, levied in the Province; and with them prepared to make head on all ſides. The *Helvians* venturing to come to an Engagement with the Enemy, were defeated, and forced to ſhelter themſelves in their walled Towns, after having loſt *C. Valerius Donaturus*, the Son of *Caburus*, a Man of principal Rank in their State, with ſeveral other Perſons of Diſtinction. The *Allobrogians* placing Detachments at proper Diſtances along the Banks of the *Rhone*, guarded all the Acceſſes to their Country with great diligence and care. *Cæſar*, as he found the Enemy ſuperior in Cavalry, and that his Communication with *Italy* and the Province was cut off, ſo as to deprive him of all hopes of Succour from that Quarter, had recourſe to the *German* Nations beyond the *Rhine*, which he had ſubdued in the preceding Campaigns, and obtained from them a Supply of Horſe, with ſome light-armed Foot accuſtomed to fight amongſt them. Upon their Arrival, perceiving they were but indifferently mounted, he took the Horſes from the military Tribunes, Centurions, *Roman* Knights, and Volunteers, and diſtributed them among the *Germans*.

LX. WHILST theſe things paſſed, the Enemy's Forces from *Auvergne*, and the Cavalry of all the confederate States of *Gaul*, met at the general Rendezvous, and formed a very numerous Army. *Cæſar* marching through the Frontiers of the *Lingones*, into the Country of the *Sequani*, to be the nearer at hand to ſuccour the *Roman* Province; *Vercingetorix* lodged himſelf at about ten Miles diſtance, in three ſeveral Camps; and having aſſembled the Officers of the Cavalry, told them, " That the Seaſon of Victory was at " length arrived, when they ſaw the *Romans* obliged to abandon *Gaul*, and " ſeek a Retreat in the Province: that this indeed ſerved to ſecure Liberty for " the preſent, but was inſufficient to future Eaſe and Tranquillity, as they " would doubtleſs return with greater Forces than before, and perſiſt in the " Deſign of making War. It was therefore beſt to attack them now, while " they marched incumbered with their Baggage. If the Infantry faced " about, in order to aſſiſt the Horſe, they would thereby be unable to ad- " vance; but if, as was more likely, they abandoned the Baggage, to provide " for their own Safety, they would be deprived of every Convenience, and " return covered with Ignominy and Reproach: for as to the Enemy's Cavalry, " it was not once to be imagined, that any of them would ſo much as ſtir " from the Body of the Army. That to encourage them the more, and ſtrike " the greater Terror into the Enemy, he was reſolved to have the whole " Army under Arms before the Camp." Theſe Words were followed by the Acclamations of all the Cavalry, who propoſed taking an Oath never to return to their Homes, nor reviſit their Parents, Wives, and Children, if they did not twice pierce through the *Roman* Army from one end to the other.

A. *Vercingetorix's three Camps*. B. *His Cavalry in three Divisions*. C. *Cæsar's Cavalry a*
the Center. E. *The first Line*. F. *The second*. G. *The third*. H. *The Baggage*. I. *Detachmen*

N°.52.



valry divided into three Bodies. D. *The Infantry under Arms with the Baggage in*
achments sent from the Legions to support the Roman Cavalry. K. *The Gauls put to flight.*

A. *Alesia*. B. *Cæsar's Camp*. C. *The Hill eastward where the Forces of the Gauls were encamped*. D. *The*
G. *Two Rivers that washed the bottom of the Hill on two Sides*. H. *The Redoubts*. I. *An Engagement of*

N°. 53

D. The Ditch & Rampart six foot high. E. Cæsar's Cavalry. F. The Legions drawn out before y^e^ Camp
nent of the Horse in the Plain between the Hills. K. The Germans detatch'd by Cæsar to support the Romans.

LXI. THE Propoſal being approved, and the Oath adminiſter'd to all; *Vercingetorix* next Day divided his Cavalry into three Bodies, two of which appeared upon the Flanks of the *Roman* Army, while the third began to charge and harraſs it in front. Notice of this being given to *Cæſar*, he alſo formed his Horſe in three Diviſions, ordering them to advance againſt the Enemy. They made head on all ſides at once, the Infantry mean-while continuing quietly under Arms, with the Baggage placed in the center. Wherever the *Romans* gave way, or appeared hard preſſed by the Enemy, thither *Cæſar* ſent Detachments from the Legions; which both checked the Progreſs of the *Gauls*, and confirmed the Courage of our Men, as they thus ſaw themſelves ſure of being ſupported. At laſt the *Germans* on the right, having ſeized an Eminence, drove the Enemy before them, and purſued them with great Slaughter as far as the River, where *Vercingetorix* was poſted with the Infantry. The reſt of the *Gauls* perceiving the defeat of their Countrymen, and apprehenſive of being ſurrounded, betook themſelves likewiſe to flight. A dreadful Slaughter enſued on all ſides. Three *Æduan* Noblemen of the firſt Diſtinction were brought Priſoners to *Cæſar*; *Cotus*, General of the Cavalry, who the Year before had been competitor with *Convictolitanis* for the ſupreme Magiſtracy; *Cavarillus*, who after *Litavicus*'s Revolt, had been appointed to command the Infantry; and *Eporedorix*, who was Generaliſſimo of the *Æduan* Troops in the War againſt the *Sequani*, before *Cæſar*'s arrival in *Gaul*.

LXII. *VERCINGETORIX*, upon this total Rout of the *Gauliſh* Cavalry, drew off his Troops, whom he had formed in order of Battle before the Camp, and immediately retreated towards *Aleſia*, a Town belonging to the *Mandubii*; ordering the Baggage to follow him with all Expedition. *Cæſar* leaving his on a neighbouring Hill, under a Guard of two Legions, purſued the Enemy as far as Day would permit, cut three thouſand of their Rear to pieces, and arrived on the morrow before *Aleſia*. After examining the ſituation of the Town; as he ſaw the Enemy much daunted by the defeat of their Cavalry, which was the part of their Strength in which they chiefly confided, he exhorted his Soldiers not to be diſcouraged at the Labor they muſt undergo, and reſolved to inveſt the Place.

LXIII. THE City of *Aleſia* was ſituated on the top of a very high Hill, ſo as not to be taken without a formal Siege. The bottom of the Hill was waſhed on the two ſides by two Rivers. Before the Town was a Plain, extending about three Miles in length; but every where elſe, a ridge of Hills, whoſe Summits were nearly upon a level, ran round the Place at a moderate diſtance. Under the Walls, on the ſide facing the Eaſt, lay all the Forces of the *Gauls* encamped; who filled that whole Space, and were defended by a Ditch, and a Rampart ſix Foot high. The Line of Contravallation begun by the *Romans*, took in a Circuit of eleven Miles. The Camp was conveniently ſituated, and ſtrengthened with three and twenty Redoubts, in which Sentinels were placed by day, to give notice of any ſudden Irruption, and a ſtrong Guard, by night, to defend them in caſe of Aſſault.

LXIV. WHILST the *Romans* were employed in theſe Works, *Vercingetorix* ventured on another Engagement of the Horſe, in the Plain between the Hills, which, we have ſaid, extended about three Miles in length. The Conteſt was ſharply maintained on both ſides; but our Men at length beginning to give ground, *Cæſar* detached the *Germans* to their Aſſiſtance, and drew up

up the Legions in order of Battle before the Camp, that he might be ready to oppoſe any ſudden Irruption of the Enemy's Infantry. The ſight of the Legions revived the Courage of our Men: the Enemy were put to flight; and crowding upon one another in their Retreat, ſo obſtructed the Gates of the Camp, that it became in a manner impoſſible to enter. The *Germans* purſued them to their Intrenchments, where a very great Slaughter enſued. Some quitting their Horſes, endeavoured to paſs the Ditch, and get over the Rampart. *Cæſar* perceiving their Diſorder, ordered the Legions, whom he had drawn out before the Camp, to advance a little. This Motion no leſs alarmed the *Gauls* within the Rampart; who believing the whole Body of the *Roman* Army was coming to attack them, ſounded to Arms. Some in their fright fled into the Town; upon which *Vercingetorix*, fearing the Camp would be abandoned, ordered the Gates to be ſhut. At length the *Germans*, having ſlain great numbers of the Enemy, and taken a multitude of Horſes, returned from the Purſuit.

LXV. *VERCINGETORIX*, before our Line was compleated, reſolved to diſmiſs his Cavalry by night. At parting he enjoined them, "to repair "ſeverally to their reſpective States, and aſſemble all the Men capable of bear-"ing Arms. He ſet forth the many Services he had done them, and con-"jured them not to neglect his Safety, or abandon to the Cruelty of the Ene-"my, one who had deſerved ſo well of the common Liberty. He told "them, that if they were remiſs in the execution of his Orders, no leſs than "eighty thouſand choſen Men muſt periſh with him: That by computation, "he had ſcarce Corn for thirty Days: and that even with the utmoſt Oeco-"nomy it could be made to hold out but a very little longer." After giving theſe Inſtructions, he diſmiſſed them quietly about nine at night, on the ſide where the *Roman* Line was not yet finiſhed. He then ordered the People of the Town to bring in all their Corn, threatning them with death in caſe of Diſobedience. As there was a great number of Cattle in the Place, which had been driven thither by the *Mandubians*, he diſtributed them to the Soldiers man by man, reſolving to deliver out the Corn ſparingly and by meaſure. At the ſame time he made all his Forces enter the Town; and having thus ſettled the plan of his Defence, waited for the expected Succours.

LXVI. *CÆSAR* having notice of theſe things from the Priſoners and Deſerters, conſtructed his Lines in the following manner. He made a Ditch twenty Foot wide, with perpendicular Sides, giving it the ſame breadth at bottom as at top. All the other Works were four hundred Foot further off the Town than this Ditch. As his Lines included ſo great a Space, and therefore could not be alike guarded in all Parts, he judged this Precaution neceſſary, to ſecure them againſt ſudden Sallies by night, and ſcreen the Workmen from the Enemy's Darts by day. Obſerving this diſtance, he made two other Ditches, fifteen Foot broad, and as many deep; and filled the innermoſt, which lay in a low and level Ground, with Water from the River. Behind theſe was a Rampart of twelve Foot high, ſtrengthened with a Parapet and Battlements: and to prevent the Enemy from getting over, a Fraiſe ran along the foot of the Parapet, made of large Stakes, with their Branches cut in points, and burnt at the end like a Stag's Horns. The whole Work was flanked with Redoubts, eighty Foot diſtant one from another.

LXVII. BUT as the Soldiers were employed at the ſame time to fetch Wood and Proviſions, and to work at the Fortifications; which conſiderably leſſened



H. *The Ditch twenty foot wide.* H.C. *The Interval of four hundred foot.* C.C. *The two D*
ches beset with sharp Stakes. F.F. *The Pits in form of the Quincunx.* G.H. *The Spac*

N°. 54.



he two Ditches fifteen foot broad. **D.** *The Rampart of twelve foot high.* **EEE.** *The Tren-*
The Space betwen the Pits and the advanced Ditch sown with Crows Feet.

leſſened the number of Troops left to defend the Camp, many of them being at a diſtance on theſe Services: and as the *Gauls*, beſides, often ſallied at ſeveral Gates, with deſign to interrupt the Works: for all theſe Reaſons, *Cæſar* judged it neceſſary to make ſome addition to his Lines, that they might not require ſo many Men to guard them. He therefore took Trees of no great height, or large Branches, which he cauſed to be made ſharp at the ends; and running a Trench of five Feet deep before the Lines, he ordered them to be put into it, and made faſt at bottom, ſo that they could not be pulled up. This Trench was again filled up in ſuch a manner, that nothing but the Branches of the Head appeared, of which the Points muſt have run into thoſe who ſhould have endeavoured to paſs them. As there were five rows of them, interwoven in a manner with each other, they were unavoidable. The Soldiers called them Cippi. In the front of theſe he cauſed Pits of three Feet deep to be dug in form of the Quincunx, and ſomething narrower at bottom than at top. In theſe Pits he fixed ſtrong Stakes, about the thickneſs of a Man's Thigh, burnt and ſharpened at the top, which roſe only four Inches above the level of the Ground, into which they were planted three Feet deeper than the Pits, for the ſake of firmneſs. The Pits were covered over with Buſhes to deceive the Enemy. There were eight rows of them at the diſtance of three Feet from each other. They were called Lilies, from the reſemblance they bore to that Flower. In the front of all, he ſowed the whole Space between the Pits and the advanced Ditch with Crows-Feet of an extraordinary ſize, which the Soldiers called Spurs.

LXVIII. THESE Works compleated, he drew another Line of fourteen Miles in compaſs, conſtructed in the ſame manner as the former, and carried thro' the moſt even Places he could find, to ſerve as a Barrier againſt the Enemy without; that if the *Gauls* ſhould attack the Camp in his Abſence, they might not be able to ſurround it with the multitude of their Troops, or charge with equal Vigor in all Parts. At the ſame time, to prevent the Danger his Men might be expoſed to, by being ſent in queſt of Proviſions and Forage, he took care to lay in a ſufficient ſtock of both for thirty Days.

LXIX. WHILST theſe things paſſed before *Aleſia*, a general Council being held of the principal Noblemen of *Gaul*, it was not thought proper to aſſemble all that were able to bear Arms, as *Vercingetorix* deſired, but to order each Nation to furniſh a Contingent; leſt the Confuſion inſeparable from ſo great a multitude, ſhould bring on a ſcarcity of Proviſions, or render the obſervance of military Diſcipline impracticable. The *Æduans*, with their Vaſſals the *Seguſians*, *Ambivareti*, *Aulerci Brannovices*, and *Brannovii*, were rated at thirty-five thouſand. A like number was demanded from the *Averni*, in conjunction with their Dependents the *Cadurci*, *Gabali*, and *Velauni*. The *Senones*, *Sequani*, and *Biturigians*, *Xantones*, *Rutheni*, and *Carnutes*, were ordered each to furniſh twelve thouſand: the *Bellovaci*, ten thouſand: the *Lemovices*, the ſame number: the *Pictones*, *Turoni*, *Pariſians*, and *Sueſſiones*, each eight thouſand: the *Ambiani*, *Mediomatrici*, *Petrocorians*, *Nervians*, *Morini*, *Nitiobrigians*, and *Aulerci Cenomani*, each five thouſand: the *Atrebatians*, four thouſand: the *Bellocaſians*, *Lexovians*, and *Aulerci Eburovices*, each three thouſand: the *Rauraci* and *Boii*, thirty thouſand: the maritime and *Armorican* States, of which number are the *Curioſolites*, *Rhedones*, *Caletes*, *Oſiſmians*, *Lemovices*, *Venetians*, and *Unellians*, each ſix thouſand. The *Bellovaci* alone refuſed to furniſh the Troops required, pretending it was their

Deſign to wage an independent War with the *Romans*, without being ſubject to the control of any one: However, at the requeſt of *Comius*, for whom they had a great Reſpect, they ſent a Body of two thouſand Men.

LXX. THIS *Comius*, as we have related above, had been ſingularly faithful and ſerviceable to *Cæſar* in his *Britannick* Expedition; in conſideration of which, his State had been exempted from all Tribute, reſtored to the full enjoyment of its Laws and Privileges, and even enlarged, by having the Country of the *Morini* added to its Territories. But ſuch was the preſent Unanimity of the *Gauls*, in the Deſign of vindicating their Liberty, and recovering their wonted Reputation in War, that neither Benefits received, nor the ſtricteſt Ties of Friendſhip, could make any Impreſſion upon their Minds; but all with one Conſent flew to Arms, and contributed largely to the ſupport of the War. The Country of the *Æduans* was the general Rendezvous of the Army, which amounted to eight thouſand Horſe, and two hundred and forty thouſand Foot. Four Commanders in chief were appointed; *Comius* of *Arras*, *Virdumarus* and *Eporedorix* the *Æduans*, and *Vergaſillaunus* of *Auvergne*, Couſin-german to *Vercingetorix*. To theſe were added a ſelect number of Officers, choſen from among the ſeveral States, to ſerve by way of a Council of War. The whole Army advanced towards *Aleſia*, full of Courage and Confidence, and ſatisfied that the *Romans* would not ſuſtain the very ſight of ſo prodigious a Multitude; eſpecially in an Encounter attended with ſo much hazard, where they muſt be expoſed to a vigorous Sally from the Town, at the ſame time that they ſaw themſelves ſurrounded with ſuch Numbers of Horſe and Foot.

LXXI. MEAN-TIME the Troops ſhut up in *Aleſia*, having conſumed all their Proviſions, finding the Day appointed for the arrival of Succours expired, and knowing nothing of what was tranſacted among the *Æduans*, ſummoned a Council of War, to debate upon what was requiſite in the preſent Exigence. Various Opinions were propoſed: ſome adviſed a Surrender: others were for ſallying while yet their Strength would permit: amongſt the reſt *Critognatus*, a Man of the firſt Rank and Authority in *Auvergne*, addreſſed the Aſſembly in a Speech, which for its ſingular and deteſtable Inhumanity, deſerves a particular mention in this place. " I ſhall not, ſays he, take notice of the Opinion of thoſe, who en-
" deavour to ſhelter an ignominious Servitude, under the plauſible Name of a
" Surrender; ſuch ſhould neither be reckoned *Gauls*, nor ſuffered to come to
" this Council. Let me rather apply myſelf to them who propoſe a general
" Sally: for here, as all of you ſeem to think, we meet with ſomething wor-
" thy of our ancient Virtue. And yet I am not afraid to ſay, that it is at the
" bottom Weakneſs, and not Courage, that inſpires ſuch Thoughts, and ren-
" ders us unable to ſupport Want a few Days. It is eaſier to find thoſe who
" will voluntarily ruſh on Death, than ſuch as can patiently endure Pain.
" I ſhould not however be againſt this Propoſal, which I confeſs has ſomething
" generous in it, if only our own Lives were at ſtake. But in this Deliberation, we muſt keep all *Gaul* in view, whom we have called to our Aſſiſtance. How would it diſpirit our Relations and Friends, to ſee eighty thouſand
" of their Countrymen ſlaughtered in one Place, and be obliged to fight in
" the midſt of their dead Bodies! Deprive not then of your Aſſiſtance thoſe,
" who, to ſave you, have expoſed themſelves to the greateſt Dangers; nor
" thro' an inconſiderable Temerity, and miſtaken Valor, deſtroy at once all
" the Expectations of *Gaul*, and plunge her into perpetual Servitude. If the

" expected



K. *Comius and the other Gaulish Chiefs encamp on a Hill about five hundred Paces from th*
in length. I. *Their Infantry stationed on the Heights, yet so as to lie concealed from the View*
before the Town. G. *They fill up the nearest Ditch with their Facines.* H. *Cæsar disposing his*



from the Roman Lines. L. Their Cavalry cover the Plain under the Hill extending three Miles
e View of the Romans. D. The Besieged come forth with all their Forces and post themselves
sing his Army on both Sides the Works, orders the Cavalry to sally out upon the Enemy.

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" expected Succours are not arrived exactly at the appointed time, ought you " therefore to ſuſpect the Fidelity and Conſtancy of your Countrymen? And " can you think that it is for Amuſement only, that the *Romans* labor on thoſe " Lines towards the Country? Tho' you hear not from your Friends, becauſe " all Communication is hindered; yet you may learn the approach of the " Succours from your Enemies themſelves; who, thro' fear of them, work Day " and Night without ceaſing on thoſe Fortifications. What then ſhould I " propoſe? What but to do as our Anceſtors did in the War with the *Teu-* " *tones* and *Cimbri*, much leſs intereſting than that we are now engaged in. " Compelled to ſhut themſelves up in their Towns, and reduced to a Diſtreſs " equal to that we now experience, rather than ſurrender to their Enemies, " they choſe to ſacrifice to their Subſiſtence the Bodies of thoſe whom Age " incapacitated for War. Had we no ſuch Precedent to follow, yet ſtill I " ſhould eſteem it glorious, in ſo noble a Cauſe as that of Liberty, to inſtitute " and give one to Poſterity. For where had we ever a War upon our Hands " like that we are now engaged in? The *Cimbri*, after laying waſte *Gaul*, " and ſpreading Deſolation thro' the whole Country, withdrew however their " Forces at length, and repaired to other Regions, leaving us the full enjoyment of " our Laws, Cuſtoms, Lands, and Liberties. But the *Romans* inſtigated by En- " vy, and jealous of a People ſo renowned and powerful in War, aim and intend " nothing leſs than to eſtabliſh themſelves in our Cities and Territories, and re- " duce us to perpetual Servitude. This has ever been the Object of all their " Wars. If you are unacquainted with what paſſes in diſtant Countries, caſt " your Eyes upon the adjoining *Gaul*, which reduced into the form of a Pro- " vince, ſtript of its Laws and Privileges, and ſubjected to the arbitrary Sway of " the Conqueror, groans under an endleſs Yoke of Slavery." When all had de- livered their Opinions, a Reſolution was taken, that ſuch as by Age or Sickneſs were unfit for War, ſhould be obliged to quit the Town, and every Expedient be tried, rather than give into the Propoſal of *Critognatus:* but if Neceſſity urged, and Relief was long deferred, they determined upon ſubmitting to his Advice, preferably to Peace or a Surrender. The *Mandubii*, to whom the City be- longed, were driven thence with their Wives and Children. When they came to the *Roman* Lines, they with Tears petitioned to be received as Slaves, and ſaved from periſhing miſerably by Famine. But *Cæſar* having planted Guards along the Rampart, refuſed to admit them into his Camp.

LXXII. MEAN-WHILE *Comius*, and the other general Officers, on whom the chief Command had been conferred, arrived before *Aleſia* with all their Forces, and encamped on a Hill without the Town, not above five hun- dred Paces from the *Roman* Lines. The next Day they drew out their Ca- valry, and covered the whole Plain under the Hill, which, as we have already ſaid, extended three Miles in length. The Infantry were ſtationed at ſome diſtance on the Heights, yet ſo as to lie concealed from the view of the *Ro- mans*. As *Aleſia* commanded a full proſpect of the Plain below, the Succours were ſoon diſcovered by the Beſieged, who aſſembling in crowds, congratulated each other; and teſtified an univerſal Joy. Immediately they came forth with all their Forces, poſted themſelves before the Town, and having filled up the neareſt Ditch with Earth and Faſcines, prepared for a vigorous Sally, and every thing elſe that might happen.

LXXIII. *CÆSAR* having diſpoſed his whole Army on both ſides the Works, that in caſe of need, every Soldier might know his Poſt, and be ready to

to maintain it, ordered the Cavalry to ſally out upon the Enemy, and begin the Charge. The Camp running along the ridge of a riſing Ground, commanded a view of the Plain on all ſides; and the Soldiers to a man, with deep Attention, waited the iſſue of the Combat. The *Gauls* had interſperſed among their Cavalry ſome Archers and light-armed Troops, to ſuſtain them in caſe of need, and check the Impetuoſity of our Horſe. Several of the *Romans* being wounded by theſe at the firſt Charge, were obliged to quit the Battle. The *Gauls* now believing they had the Advantage, and ſeeing our Men overpowered by numbers, ſet up an univerſal Shout, as well within as without the Place, to give new life to their Troops. As the Action paſſed in the view of both Armies, who were of courſe Witneſſes to the Valor or Cowardiſe of the Combatants, the deſire of Applauſe, or fear of Ignominy, ſpurred on each Side to exert their utmoſt Bravery. After a Conflict that laſted from Noon 'till near Sun-ſet, Victory all the while continuing doubtful, the *Germans* in cloſe Order charged furiouſly the Enemy on one ſide, and forced them to give ground. Their flight leaving the Archers expoſed, they were all ſurrounded and cut to pieces. The Succeſs was equal in other parts of the Field, where our Men purſuing the Runaways to their Camp, gave them no time to rally. The Troops who had quitted *Aleſia*, deſpairing now almoſt of Victory, returned diſconſolate to the Town.

LXXIV. AFTER the interval of a Day, which was wholly ſpent in providing a great number of Faſcines, Scaling-Ladders, and iron Hooks; the *Gauls* iſſuing from their Camp at midnight in great ſilence, attacked the *Roman* Lines on the ſide of the Plain. They began with ſetting up a ſudden Shout, to advertiſe the beſieged of their arrival; threw their Faſcines into the Ditch; endeavoured by a diſcharge of Stones, Darts, and Arrows, to drive our Men from the Rampart; and practiſed every thing neceſſary to render the Storm ſucceſsful. At the ſame time *Vercingetorix*, hearing their Cries, ſounded to Arms, and led forth his Men to the Attack. The *Romans*, whoſe Poſts had been allotted them ſome Days before, flew to the Works, and with Slings, Darts, Bullets, and Engines, prepared on purpoſe, ſtruck a Terror into the Aſſailants. As the Parties could not ſee one another by reaſon of the darkneſs, many Wounds were received on both Sides, and a great number of Darts diſcharged from the Engines. But *M. Antonius* and *C. Trebonius*, who commanded on the ſide that was moſt preſſed by the Enemy, took care to draw out Parties from the more diſtant Redoubts, and ſend them where their Aſſiſtance was chiefly wanted.

LXXV. WHILE the *Gauls* kept at a diſtance from our Lines, they did great execution by the multitude of their Darts: but in proportion as they approached, they either intangled themſelves unawares among the Caltrops, or tumbling into the Wells were wounded by the pointed Stakes, or were pierced by the Darts diſcharged from the Towers and Rampart. After many Wounds given and received; finding, when Day appeared, that they had not forced any part of the Lines; and fearing to be taken in flank by ſome Troops that were ſallying from the Redoubts on the Eminence, they retreated to their Camp. Mean-while the Beſieged, after much time ſpent in preparing for a Sally, and filling up the advanced Ditch, finding that their Countrymen were retired, before they could ſo much as approach the Works, returned into the Town without effecting any thing.



A. *The Hill on the North of the Town.* B. *The Cavalry, partly following Cæsar, p*
Rear. C. *The Gauls endeavouring to force Cæsar's Lines.* D. *Vercingetorix ta*

N°. 56.



Cæsar, partly taking a Circuit round the outward Works, to fall upon the Enemy's
rix attacks Cæsar's Lines on the Side of the Town.

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LXXVI. THE *Gauls* thus twice repulſed with great Loſs, conſult what new meaſures they are to purſue; and adviſing with thoſe who knew the Ground, learnt from them the Strength and Situation of the upper Camp. North of the Town was a Hill of too great a compaſs to be taken into the Circumvallation; inſomuch that the *Romans* had been obliged to poſt themſelves on its Aſcent, in a very diſadvantageous Situation, becauſe their Camp was commanded by its Summit. *C. Antiſtius Reginus*, and *C. Caninius Rebilus*, Lieutenant-Generals, guarded this Quarter with two Legions. The Enemy's Generals, after informing themſelves of the nature of the Country by their Scouts, ſelected five and fifty thouſand of their beſt Troops, concerted privately among themſelves the Plan and Manner of acting, appointed the time for the Aſſault about noon, and aſſigned the Command of the Detachment to *Vergaſillaunus* of *Auvergne*, one of the four principal Leaders, and a near Relation of *Vercingetorix*. *Vergaſillaunus* leaving his Camp in the Evening, finiſhed his march by Day-break; and concealing his Troops behind a Hill, ordered the Soldiers to refreſh themſelves after their Fatigue. As ſoon as it was noon, he approached the Quarters of the two Legions. At the ſame time the Cavalry advanced into the Plain, and the whole Army drew out before the Camp.

LXXVII. *VERCINGETORIX* obſerving theſe Motions from the Citadel of *Aleſia*, led forth his Troops; carrying along with him the Faſcines, long Poles, covered Galleries, Hooks, and other Inſtruments he had prepared for the Aſſault. The Fight was maintained on all ſides at once; nor did the *Gauls* leave any thing unattempted, but flocked continually to thoſe parts of the Works which appeared to be weakeſt. The *Roman* Forces having ſo many Works to guard, were diſperſed in different Places, and ſcarce ſufficed for the defence of them all. What moſtly contributed to diſturb them was, the Cries of the Combatants behind, which informed them that their Safety depended on the Valor of others. For ſuch is the Conſtitution of the human Mind, as always to aggrandize abſent Objects, and magnify the Danger that is out of ſight.

LXXVIII. *CÆSAR* choſe a Poſt from whence he could ſee every thing, and then ſent Reinforcements where neceſſary. Both Parties called to mind, that now was the time for making the greateſt Effort. The *Gauls* had no hope of Safety, but in forcing the *Roman* Lines. Our Men again were ſenſible, that if they came off victorious on this Occaſion, all their Labors would be at an end. The chief ſtreſs of the Battle lay at the higher Fortifications, where *Vergaſillaunus* charged with his Detachment; becauſe the ſmall Eminence, which commanded the declivity of the Hill, gave the Enemy great Advantage. Some were employed in throwing Darts; others advanced to the Attack under cover of their Shields, freſh Men ſtill ſucceeding in the room of thoſe that were fatigued. The Earth they threw up againſt our Lines, not only enabled them to aſcend the Rampart, but entirely fruſtrated the deſign of the Works the *Romans* had made in the Ground. In fine, our Men had neither Strength nor Weapons left to make reſiſtance.

LXXIX. *CÆSAR* obſerving the danger they were in, ſent *Labienus* with ſix Cohorts to their Aſſiſtance; ordering him, if he found himſelf unable to defend the Works, to ſally out upon the Enemy; yet this only in caſe of Extremity. He himſelf went in perſon to the reſt of the Troops, exhorting

them to bear up courageouſly under their preſent Fatigue, and repreſenting, that the Fruit of all their former Victories depended upon the Iſſue of that critical Day and Hour. The Troops within the Place, deſpairing to force the Intrenchments on the ſide of the Plain, becauſe of the great Strength of the Works, attacked them in the more ſteep and difficult Places, whither they brought all the Inſtruments prepared for the Aſſault. They ſoon drove our Men from the Towers by a diſcharge of Darts, levelled the way with Earth and Faſcines, and began to cut down the Rampart and Breaſt-work with their Hooks.

LXXX. *CÆSAR* firſt ſent young *Brutus*, with ſix Cohorts; after him, *C. Fabius*, Lieutenant-General, with ſeven more; and laſt of all, as the Diſpute grew very warm, marched himſelf in perſon at the head of the whole Detachment. Having by this means reſtored the Battle, and forced the Enemy to retire, he haſtened to the ſide where *Labienus* was engaged. He drew four Cohorts from the neareſt Fort, ordered part of the Cavalry to follow him, and charged the reſt to take a Circuit round the outward Works, and fall upon the Enemy's Rear. *Labienus* finding that neither the Rampart nor Ditch were ſufficient to ſtop the Progreſs of the Enemy, drew together about thirty-nine Cohorts from the neareſt Forts, and ſent to inform *Cæſar* of his Deſign. *Cæſar* immediately quickened his march, that he might be preſent at the Action.

LXXXI. HIS Arrival being known from the Colour of his Garments, by which he uſed to diſtinguiſh himſelf in a Day of Battle; and the Troops and Cohorts he had ordered to follow him, appearing; all which were eaſily diſcerned from the higher Ground: the Enemy began the Charge. A mighty Shout was raiſed on both ſides, which being catched by thoſe on the Rampart, was carried quite round the Lines. Our Men, having caſt their Darts, fell upon the *Gauls* Sword in hand. At the ſame time the Cavalry appeared unexpectedly in their Rear: freſh Cohorts flocked continually to our Aſſiſtance: the Enemy took to flight, and in their Retreat were encountered by our Horſe: a dreadful Slaughter enſued. *Sedulius*, Chief and General of the *Lemovices*, was ſlain on the ſpot; *Vergaſillaunus* of *Auvergne* was made Priſoner in the purſuit; ſeventy-four Colours were taken, and brought to *Cæſar*; and out of ſo great a Multitude, very few regained the *Gauliſh* Camp. The Rout and Slaughter being obſerved from the Town, the Beſieged, deſpairing of Succeſs, drew off their Troops from the Attack. Inſtantly, upon the Report of this Diſaſter, the *Gauls* abandoned their Camp; and had not our Troops been wearied out by the continual Fatigue of the Day, and the frequent Reinforcements they were obliged to furniſh, the Enemy's whole Army might have been exterminated. At midnight *Cæſar* detached the Cavalry to purſue them, who falling in with their Rear, ſlew ſome, and took a great number of Priſoners. The reſt eſcaped to their ſeveral Habitations.

LXXXII. NEXT Day *Vercingetorix* aſſembling a Council, repreſented to the beſieged; "That he had undertaken that War, not from a Motive of "private Intereſt, but to recover the common Liberty of *Gaul:* and that, "ſince there was a Neceſſity of yielding to Fortune, he was willing to be-"come a Victim for their Safety, whether they ſhould think proper to appeaſe "the Anger of the Conqueror by his Death, or to deliver him up alive." A Deputation immediately waited on *Cæſar* to receive his Orders. He inſiſted on the ſurrender of their Arms, and the delivering up of all their Chiefs.

Having

Having accordingly ſeated himſelf at the head of his Lines before the Camp: their Leaders were brought; *Vercingetorix* delivered up; and their Arms thrown into the Ditch. Reſerving the *Æduans* and *Averni*, as a means to recover thoſe two potent Nations, he divided the reſt of the Priſoners among his Soldiers, giving to each one.

LXXXIII. THESE Affairs diſpatched, he marched into the Territories of the *Æduans*, where he received the Submiſſion of their State. There he was addreſſed by the Ambaſſadors of the *Averni*, who promiſed an entire Obedience to his Commands. He exacted a great number of Hoſtages; ſent his Legions into Winter-Quarters; and reſtored about twenty thouſand Captives to the *Æduans* and *Averni*. *T. Labienus*, with two Legions and the Cavalry, was quartered among the *Sequani*, jointly with *M. Sempronius Rutilus*. *C. Fabius*, and *L. Minutius Baſilus*, were ordered with two Legions into the Country of the *Rhemi*, to defend it againſt the Attempts of the *Bellovaci* their Neighbours. *C. Antiſtius Reginus* had his Station aſſigned him among the *Ambivareti*; *T. Sextius* among the *Biturigians*; and *C. Caninius Rebilus* among the *Rutheni*; each with one Legion. *Q. Tullius Cicero*, and *P. Sulpicius*, were placed at *Cabillo* and *Matiſco* upon the *Arar*, in the Country of the *Æduans*, to have the care of Proviſions. He himſelf reſolved to winter at *Bibracte*. The Senate being informed of theſe things by *Cæſar*'s Letters, a Proceſſion of twenty Days was decreed.

A CON-

A CONTINUATION OF

CÆSAR's COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

By *A. HIRTIUS PANSA.*

BOOK VIII.

THE ARGUMENT.

Panſa's *Preface.* I. *The* Gauls *form a Reſolution to renew the War.* II. Cæſar *falls unexpectedly upon the* Biturigians, *and compels them to ſubmit.* IV. *He afterwards diſperſes the* Carnutes *by the Terror of his Arms.* V. *The* Bellovaci *prepare for War.* VI. *Their Deſigns.* VII. Cæſar *endeavours to draw them to an Engagement, by inſpiring them with a Contempt of his ſmall Numbers.* VIII. *But as they carefully avoid a Battle, he reſolves to fortify his Camp.* XI. *The* Bellovaci *intercept the* Roman *Foragers.* XII. *Daily Skirmiſhes within view of the two Camps.* XIII. *The* Bellovaci *artfully counterfeit a Retreat.* XVI. *And falling upon the* Romans *from an Ambuſcade, after an obſtinate Fight, are entirely diſperſed.* XVII. *The* Bellovaci *and other States ſubmit.* XX. Cæſar *divides his Army.* XXI. Caninius *and* Fabius *relieve* Duracius, *beſieged by* Dumnacus *in* Limo. XXIV. Caninius *purſues* Drapes *and* Luterius. XXV. Fabius *obliges the* Carnutes *and other States to ſubmit.* XXVI. Drapes *and* Luterius *poſſeſs themſelves of* Uxellodunum. XXVII. Caninius *inveſts the Town.* XXVIII. *Intercepts a Convoy eſcorted by* Luterius. XXIX. *Attacks and carries the Camp of* Drapes. XXX. *And joining the Forces under* Fabius, *returns to the Siege of* Uxellodunum. XXXI, Cæſar *repairs to the Camp of* Caninius. XXXIII. *And depriving the Beſieged of Water, compels the Town to ſurrender.* XXXVII. *He then ſends his Army into Winter-Quarters.* XXXVIII. Comius, *defeated in an Engagement of Horſe, ſurrenders to* Antony. XLI. *The Year following* Gaul *being in perfect quiet,* Cæſar *goes into* Italy. XLII. *Where he is received with the higheſt Demonſtrations of Reſpect.* XLIII. *He returns to the Army, where he learns the Deſigns formed againſt him at* Rome. XLVI. *And thereupon ſets out again for* Italy.

A CONTINUATION of

CÆSAR's COMMENTARIES

OF HIS

WARS IN *GAUL.*

By *A. HIRTIUS PANSA.*

BOOK VIII.

IN conſequence of your repeated Importunities, *Balbus*, I have at laſt been prevailed with to engage in a very delicate Work; fearing leſt my daily Refuſals ſhould be conſtrued rather to flow from Idleneſs, than any ſenſe of the Difficulty of the Undertaking. I therefore here preſent you with a Continuation of *Cæſar*'s *Commentaries of his Wars in* Gaul, though not in any reſpect to be compared with what he himſelf wrote on the ſame Subject, nor with the *Memoirs of the Civil War*, which he likewiſe left behind him imperfect, and which I have in the ſame manner carried down from the Tranſactions at *Alexandria*, to the end, I will not ſay of our civil Diſſenſions, which are like to have no end, but of *Cæſar*'s Life. I would have all who read theſe Pieces know, with how much Reluctance I engaged in this Deſign; that I may be the more eaſily acquitted of the Charge of Arrogance and Folly, for preſuming to inſert my Writings amongſt thoſe of *Cæſar*. It is univerſally agreed, that the moſt elaborate Compoſitions of others, fall far ſhort of the Elegance of theſe Commentaries. He indeed intended them only as Memoirs for future Hiſtorians; but they are every where in ſuch high eſteem, as ſerves rather to diſcourage other Writers, than furniſh them for the Attempt. This Circumſtance the more commands our Admiration, becauſe while the reſt of the World can judge only of the Beauty and Correctneſs of the Work, we beſides know with what eaſe and diſpatch it was compoſed. *Cæſar* not only poſſeſſed the Talent of Writing in the higheſt perfection, but was likewiſe beſt able to unfold the Reaſons of thoſe military Operations, of which he was himſelf the Contriver and Director. On the contrary, it was my Misfortune to be preſent neither in the *Alexandrian* nor *African* Wars: And though I had many of the particulars relating to both from his own Mouth, yet we give a very different Attention to things, when we hear them only through an Admiration of their Novelty and Greatneſs, and when with a view of

tranſmitting

tranſmitting them to poſterity. But I forbear any farther Apologies, leſt in enumerating the Reaſons why my Work ought not be compared with that of *Cæſar*, I fall under the Suſpicion of flattering myſelf, that in the judgment of ſome, it may not ſeem altogether unworthy of that Honour. Adieu.

I. *GAUL* being wholly reduced, *Cæſar* was deſirous that his Troops might enjoy ſome Repoſe during the Winter, eſpecially after ſo long and fatiguing a Campaign, in which there had been no Intermiſſion from the Toils of War: but he ſoon underſtood, that ſeveral States were meditating a Revolt, and contriving all at once to take up Arms. The Cauſe aſſigned for this Conduct was not improbable: for though the *Gauls* were by this time fully ſenſible, that it was impoſſible for them to reſiſt the *Roman* Army entire, by any Forces they could bring into the Field; yet ſtill they thought, that if many States revolted together, and ſet on foot as many different Wars, the *Romans* would have neither Time nor Troops to ſubdue them all; and that though ſome among them muſt be Sufferers, their Lot would be the more ſupportable, as the Delay occaſioned by that Diverſion, might procure the Liberty of the whole Nation.

II. *CÆSAR*, to ſtifle this Opinion in its Birth, left *M. Antony* the Quæſtor to command in his Winter-Quarters; and ſetting out the laſt of *December* from *Bibracte*, with a Guard of Cavalry, went to the Camp of the thirteenth Legion, which he had placed among the *Biturigians*, not far from the Territories of the *Æduans*. To this he joined the eleventh Legion, whoſe Quarters lay neareſt; and leaving two Cohorts to guard the Baggage, marched with the reſt of the Army into the moſt fertile Parts of the Country of the *Biturigians*; who having large Territories, and abounding in Towns, had not been awed by the preſence of a ſingle Legion, from forming Confederacies, and preparing for War.

III. *CÆSAR* by his ſudden and unexpected Arrival, as was natural to ſuppoſe, found them unprepared and diſperſed up and down the Fields; inſomuch that they were eaſily ſurpriſed by the Horſe, before they could retreat into their Towns. For he had expreſly forbid ſetting fire to the Houſes, the uſual ſign of an Invaſion, that he might neither alarm the Enemy by the Conflagrations, nor expoſe himſelf to the want of Corn and Forage, if he ſhould advance far into the Country. Having made many Thouſands of the *Biturigians* Priſoners; ſuch as could eſcape the firſt coming of the *Romans*, fled in great Terror to the neighbouring States, relying either upon private Friendſhip, or the Ties of a mutual Confederacy. But all was to no purpoſe: for *Cæſar* by great marches ſoon reached their Places of Retreat, and making every Province anxious for its own Safety, left them no time to think of giving ſhelter to others. This Diligence confirmed the well-affected in their Duty, and obliged the Wavering to hearken to Conditions of Peace. The like Offers were made to the *Biturigians*; who ſeeing that *Cæſar*'s Clemency left the way ſtill open to his Friendſhip; and that the neighbouring States, upon delivery of Hoſtages, had been pardoned and received into Protection; reſolved to follow the Example. *Cæſar*, to recompenſe the Fatigue and Labour of his Soldiers, who in the Winter-ſeaſon, through difficult Ways, and during the moſt intenſe Colds, had followed him with incredible Patience and Conſtancy; promiſed a Reward of two hundred Seſterces to every private Man, and two thouſand to every Centurion: and having ſent back the Legions to their

their Winter-Quarters, returned again to *Bibracte*, after an abſence of forty Days.

IV. WHILST he was there employed in the diſtribution of Juſtice, Ambaſſadors arrived from the *Biturigians*, to implore his Aſſiſtance againſt the *Carnutes*, who were laying waſte their Country. Upon this Intelligence, tho' he had not reſted above eighteen Days, he immediately ſent for the ſixth and fourteenth Legions, which he had quartered along the *Arar* for the convenience of Proviſions, as has been related in the foregoing Book. With theſe two Legions he marched againſt the *Carnutes*; who hearing of his Approach, and dreading the ſame Calamities which others had been made to ſuffer, abandoned their Towns and Villages, conſiſting moſtly of little Cottages run up in haſte, to defend them from the Cold, (for moſt of their Cities had been deſtroyed in the late War,) and fled different ways. *Cæſar*, unwilling to expoſe his Soldiers to the ſeverity of the Storms, which commonly rage with the greateſt Violence at that Seaſon, fixed his Camp at *Genabum*; and lodged his Men, partly in the Huts lately built by the *Gauls*, partly in the old Houſes, whoſe Walls were ſtill ſtanding, and which he ordered to be thatched with Straw, that they might afford the better ſhelter to the Troops. But he ſent the Cavalry, and the auxiliary Foot, into all parts where he underſtood the Enemy were retired: nor without Succeſs; for they commonly returned loaden with Spoil. The *Carnutes* diſtreſſed by the difficulty of the Seaſon, the ſenſe of their Danger, (becauſe being driven from their Habitations, they durſt not continue long in any place for fear of our Parties,) and finding no protection in the Woods againſt the extreme Severity of the Weather; were at length diſperſed on all ſides with great Loſs, and ſcattered among the neighbouring States.

V. *CÆSAR* thinking it ſufficient in that difficult Seaſon, to have diſperſed the Troops that began to aſſemble, and prevented their rekindling the War; and being likewiſe well aſſured, as far as human Prudence could determine, that it would be impoſſible for them, during the enſuing Summer, to raiſe up any very dangerous War; left *C. Trebonius*, with the two Legions he had brought along with him, to winter at *Genabum*. Mean-while underſtanding by frequent Embaſſies from the *Rhemi*, that the *Bellovaci*, the moſt diſtinguiſhed for Bravery of all the *Belgian* and *Gallick* Nations, with ſome of the neighbouring States, under the conduct of *Correus* General of the *Bellovaci*, and *Comius* the *Atrebatian*, were raiſing an Army, and drawing their Forces to a general Rendezvous, with deſign to invade the Territories of the *Sueſſiones*, a People ſubject to the Juriſdiction of the *Rhemi*; he thought that both Honour and Intereſt required him to undertake the defence of Allies, who had deſerved ſo well of the Commonwealth. He therefore drew the eleventh Legion again out of its Winter-Quarters; wrote to *C. Fabius*, to march the two Legions under his command into the Country of the *Sueſſiones*; and ordered *Labienus* to ſend one of thoſe he was charged with. Thus, as far as the convenience of Winter-Quarters, and the nature of the War would allow, he employed the Legions alternately in Expeditions, giving himſelf, mean-while, no intermiſſion from Fatigue.

VI. WITH theſe Forces he marched againſt the *Bellovaci*, and encamping within their Territories, diſperſed his Cavalry on all ſides to make Priſoners, from whom he might learn the Enemy's Deſigns. The Horſe, in conſequence

of this Commiſſion, brought him back word, that the Lands and Houſes were in a manner quite abandoned, and that the few Priſoners they had found, after a moſt diligent Search, were not left to cultivate the Ground, but to ſerve as Spies. *Cæſar* inquiring of theſe, whither the *Bellovaci* were retired, and what might be their Deſigns, found: "That all of them capable of bearing Arms "had aſſembled in one Place, and been joined by the *Ambiani*, *Aulerci*, "*Caletes*, *Vellocaſſians*, and *Atrebatians*: That they had choſen for their Camp "a riſing Ground, ſurrounded with a difficult Moraſs, and diſpoſed of all "their Baggage in remote Woods: That a great many of their Chiefs were "concerned in the War, but the principal Authority reſted in *Correus*, becauſe "he was known to bear an implacable hatred to the *Roman* Name: That a "few Days before, *Comius* had left the Camp to ſolicit Aid of the *Germans*, "who were their neareſt Neighbours, and abounded in Troops: That it had "been reſolved among the *Bellovaci*, with conſent of all the Generals, and at "the earneſt deſire of the People; if *Cæſar* came at the head of only three "Legions, as was reported, to offer him Battle; leſt they ſhould be afterwards "obliged to fight upon harder and more unequal Terms, when he had got "his whole Army together: but if he brought greater Forces along with him; "to continue within their Camp, intercept his Corn and Convoys, and cut "off his Forage, which in that Seaſon of the Year was extremely ſcarce, and "very much diſperſed."

VII. THESE things being confirmed by the Teſtimony of all the Priſoners; *Cæſar*, who found their Deſigns full of Prudence, and remote from the uſual Temerity of Barbarians, reſolved by all manner of ways to draw them into a Contempt of his Numbers, that he might the more eaſily bring them to an Engagement. He had with him the ſeventh, eighth, and ninth Legions, all Veterans of approved Valor; and tho' the eleventh was not of equal ſtanding, nor had attained the ſame reputation of Bravery, they were yet a choſen Youth of great Hopes, who had ſerved under him eight Campaigns. Calling therefore the Army together, he laid before them the Advices he had received, and exhorted the Soldiers to preſerve their wonted Courage. At the ſame time, to draw the Enemy to an Engagement, by an appearance of only three Legions, he ſo contrived the order of his march, that diſpoſing the ſeventh, eighth, and ninth Legions in front; the Baggage, which, as in a haſty Expedition, was but moderate, behind them; and the eleventh Legion in the rear of all; no more Troops were in view, than what the *Gauls* themſelves had determined to hazard an Action againſt. The Army thus drawn up, formed a kind of Square, and arrived before the Enemy's Camp much ſooner than expected.

VIII. WHEN the *Gauls* perceived the Legions advancing ſuddenly againſt them in order of Battle with a ſteddy pace, they altered the Reſolution which had been reported to *Cæſar*; and either fearing the ſucceſs of the Battle, ſurpriſed at ſo ſudden an approach, or willing to know our further Deſigns, drew up before their Camp, without deſcending from the higher Ground. *Cæſar*, tho' deſirous to come to an Engagement; yet ſurpriſed at the multitude of the Enemy, and reflecting on the advantage of their Situation; as being ſeparated from him by a Valley, ſtill more conſiderable for its depth than breadth; contented himſelf for the preſent to encamp directly over-againſt them. He threw up a Rampart twelve Foot high, ſtrengthened by a proportionable Breaſt-work; and ſecured it by two Ditches, each fifteen Foot deep, with perpendicular Sides.

He

A. *The seventh Legion*. B. *The eighth Legion*. C. *The nint*



e ninth Legion. **D**. *The Baggage*. **E**. *The eleventh Legion*.

He likewiſe raiſed ſeveral Turrets of three Stories, and joined them to each other by Galleries, having little Parapets of Oſier before, that the Works might be defended by a double range of Soldiers; one of which fighting from the Galleries, and ſecure by their height, would with more Boldneſs and Advantage lanch their Darts againſt the Enemy; the other, tho' nearer Danger, and planted upon the Rampart itſelf, were yet ſcreened by the Galleries from the impending Darts. All the entrances to the Camp were ſecured by ſtrong Gates, over which he placed very high Towers.

IX. HE had a twofold Deſign in theſe Fortifications: one, by the greatneſs of the Works, to make the Enemy believe him afraid, and thereby increaſe their Preſumption and Confidence: the other, to enable him to defend his Camp with a few Troops, when it was neceſſary to go far in queſt of Corn and Forage. Mean-time there happened frequent Skirmiſhes between the two Camps, carried on for the moſt part with Arrows at a diſtance, by reaſon of a Moraſs that ſeparated the Combatants: ſometimes indeed the auxiliary *Gauls* and *Germans* croſſed the Moraſs, and purſued the Enemy: ſometimes again the Enemy having the Advantage, paſſed in their turn, and drove back our Men. And as we daily ſent out Parties to forage, who were obliged to diſperſe, and ſcatter themſelves from houſe to houſe over the whole Country; it now and then fell out, as was unavoidable in theſe Circumſtances, that our Foragers were ſurpriſed and cut to pieces by their Detachments. Theſe Loſſes, tho' very inconſiderable to us, as being moſtly confined to ſome Carriages and Servants, yet ſtrangely ſwelled the hopes of the Barbarians; and the more, as *Comius*, who had gone to fetch the *German* Auxiliaries, was now returned with a Body of Horſe. And tho' the number was not great, they not making in all above five hundred, the Enemy were nevertheleſs mightily encouraged by this Supply.

X. *CÆSAR*, after a ſtay of many Days, finding that the Enemy ſtill kept within their Camp, which was advantageouſly ſituated with a Moraſs in front: and conſidering at the ſame time, that he could neither force their Intrenchments without great Loſs, nor incloſe them with Works with ſo ſmall an Army; wrote to *Trebonius*, to ſend with all diligence for the thirteenth Legion, which was quartered among the *Biturigians* under the care of *T. Sextius*; and with that, and the two Legions under his own Command, make what haſte he could to join him. Mean-while he detached the Cavalry of *Rheims*, of the *Lingones*, and the other Provinces of *Gaul*, of which he had great numbers in his Camp, to guard by turns the Foragers, and protect them from the ſudden Incurſions of the Enemy.

XI. THIS was done every Day: but Cuſtom by degrees relaxing their Diligence, as frequently happens in things of long continuance; the *Bellovaci*, who had obſerved the daily Stations of our Horſe, placed a choſen Body of Foot in ambuſh in a Wood, and ſent their Cavalry thither next Day, to draw our Men into the Snare, and then attack them ſurrounded on every ſide. This ill Fortune fell upon the Cavalry of *Rheims*, whoſe turn it was that Day to guard the Foragers: for theſe, ſuddenly diſcovering the Enemy's Cavalry, and deſpiſing their ſmall numbers, purſued with ſuch Eagerneſs, that they were at length ſurpriſed and ſurrounded by the Foot. This threw them into Confuſion, and obliged them to retreat haſtily, with the loſs of *Vertiſcus* their General, and the chief Man of their State; who tho' ſo far advanced in years, that he could hardly

hardly ſit on Horſeback, yet according to the cuſtom of the *Gauls*, would neither decline the Command on account of his Age, nor ſuffer them to fight without him. The Enemy were animated and encouraged by this Succeſs, and the death of the Chief and General of the *Rhemi:* our Men, on the other hand, were cautioned by their Loſs, carefully to examine the Ground before they took their Poſts, and purſue a retreating Enemy with more reſerve.

XII. MEAN-WHILE the daily Skirmiſhes between the two Camps, at the Fords and Paſſes of the Moraſs, ſtill continued. In one of theſe, the *Germans*, whom *Cæſar* had brought from beyond the *Rhine*, that they might fight intermingled with the Cavalry; boldly paſſing the Moraſs in a Body, put all that made reſiſtance to the Sword, and purſued the reſt with great Vigor. Fear not only ſeized thoſe who fought hand to hand, or were wounded at a diſtance; but even the more remote Parties, who were poſted to ſuſtain the others, ſhamefully betook themſelves to flight; and being driven from height to height, ceaſed not to continue the Rout, until they had reached their very Camp: nay ſome, quite confounded by their Fear, fled a great way beyond it. Their Danger ſpread ſo univerſal a Terror among the Troops, that it appeared hard to ſay, whether they were more apt to be elated by a trifling Advantage, or depreſſed by an inconſiderable Loſs.

XIII. AFTER a ſtay of many Days in this Camp: upon Information that *C. Trebonius* was approaching with the Legions; the Generals of the *Bellovaci*, fearing a Siege like that of *Aleſia*, ſent away by night all whom Age or Infirmities rendered unfit for Service; and along with them the Baggage of the whole Army. But before this confuſed and numerous Train could be put in order, (for the *Gauls*, even in their ſudden Expeditions, are always attended with a vaſt number of Carriages,) Day-light appeared; and the Enemy were obliged to draw up before their Camp, to hinder the *Romans* from diſturbing the march of their Baggage. *Cæſar* did not think proper to attack them in ſo advantageous a Poſt, nor was willing to remove his Legions to ſuch a diſtance, as might give them an Opportunity of retreating without Danger. Obſerving therefore that the two Camps were divided by a very dangerous Moraſs, the difficulty of paſſing which might greatly retard the Purſuit; and that beyond the Moraſs there was an Eminence, which in a manner commanded the Enemy's Camp, and was ſeparated from it only by a ſmall Valley; he laid Bridges over the Moraſs, paſſed his Legions, and quickly gained the ſummit of the Hill, which was ſecured on each ſide by the ſteepneſs of the aſcent. Thence he marched his Legions in order of Battle to the extremeſt Ridge, and poſted them in a place, where his Engines could play upon the Enemy's Battalions.

XIV. THE *Gauls* confiding in the ſtrength of their Poſt, reſolved not to decline a Battle, if the *Romans* ſhould attack them on the Hill; and not daring to make their Troops file off, for fear of being charged when ſeparated and in diſorder, continued in the ſame poſture. *Cæſar* perceiving their Obſtinacy, kept twenty Cohorts ready drawn up; and marking out a Camp in the place where he then ſtood, ordered it to be fortified immediately. The Works being finiſhed, he drew up his Legions before the Rampart, and aſſigned the Cavalry their ſeveral Poſts, where they were to wait with their Horſes ready bridled. The *Bellovaci* ſeeing the *Romans* prepared for the Purſuit; and finding

A. *Cæsar's Camp*. B. *The Moraſs between the two Camps*. C C. *The two Ditches fifteen foot deep*. D. *Camp beyond the Moraſs*. F. *The Hill were the Gauls were encamped*. G. *The Gauls placing all the Fa*

N°. 58.

ep. **D.** *Cæsar's Troops drawn up in Order of Battle before the Rampart.* **E.** *Cæsars second*
ll the Facines in their Camp at ye Head of their Line, set fire to them, & by that means secure their Retreat.

finding it impoſſible to paſs the Night, or continue longer in that Place without Proviſions, fell upon the following Stratagem to ſecure their Retreat. They collected and placed at the head of their Line all the Faſcines in the Camp, of which the number was very great, (for, as has been already obſerved, the *Gauls* commonly ſit upon theſe, when drawn up in order of Battle,) and towards Night, upon a Signal given, ſet fire to them all at once. The Flame blazing out on a ſudden, with great violence, covered their Forces from the view of the *Romans*; and the *Gauls* laying hold of that Opportunity, retreated with the utmoſt Diligence.

XV. THO' *Cæſar* could not perceive the Enemy's departure, becauſe of the Flames; yet ſuſpecting that this was only a Contrivance to cover their Flight, he made the Legions advance, and detached the Cavalry to purſue them. Mean-while apprehending an Ambuſcade, and that the Enemy might perhaps continue in the ſame Poſt, to draw our Men into a place of Diſadvantage, he took care to follow ſlowly with the Foot. The Cavalry not daring to enter that thick Column of Flame and Smoke; or if any had the Courage to adventure it, being unable to diſcern the very Heads of their Horſes, thought proper to retire for fear of a Surpriſe, and left the *Bellovaci* at full liberty to eſcape. Thus by a Flight, which equally ſpoke their Fear and Addreſs, they retreated ten Miles without loſs, and encamped in a place of great Advantage. Thence, by frequent Ambuſcades of Horſe and Foot, they often attacked and cut to pieces the *Roman* Foragers.

XVI. *CÆSAR* having received many Loſſes of this kind, underſtood at laſt by a certain Priſoner, that *Correus* General of the *Bellovaci*, had choſen ſix thouſand of his beſt Foot, and a thouſand Horſe, to form an Ambuſcade in a Place abounding in Corn and Graſs, and where it was therefore preſumed the *Romans* would come to forage. Upon this Intelligence, he drew out a greater number of Legionaries than uſual; ſent the Cavalry, who formed the ordinary Guard of the Foragers, before; intermixed them with Platoons of light-armed Foot; and advanced himſelf as near as poſſible with the Legions. The Enemy, who lay in ambuſh, having choſen for the place of Action a Plain of about a Mile every way, and environed on all ſides with thick Woods, or a very deep River, which incloſed it as in a Toil, diſpoſed their Forces all around. Our Men, who knew their Deſign, and advanced armed and reſolved for Battle, becauſe the Legions were behind to ſuſtain them, entered the Plain troop by troop. Upon their arrival, *Correus* thinking that now was the proper time for Action, appeared firſt with a few of his Men, and fell upon the neareſt Squadrons. Our Men reſolutely ſuſtained the Attack, nor flocked together in Crowds, as frequently happens among the Cavalry on Occaſions of ſudden Surpriſe, when the very number of Combatants throws all into Confuſion. The Squadrons fighting thus in good Order, and preſerving a proper diſtance, to prevent their being taken in flank; ſuddenly the reſt of the *Gauls* broke from the Woods, and advanced to the aid of thoſe who fought under *Correus*. The Conteſt was carried on with great Heat, and continued for a long time with equal Advantage on both ſides; when at laſt the Foot advancing ſlowly in order of Battle from the Woods, obliged our Men to give way. Upon this the light-armed Infantry, who, as we have obſerved, had been ſent before the Legions, marched up ſpeedily to their Aſſiſtance; and placing themſelves in the intervals of the Squadrons, continued the Fight. The Conteſt again became equal. At length, as was natural in an Encounter of

that kind, thoſe who had ſuſtained the firſt Charge of the Ambuſcade, began for this very Reaſon to have the Superiority, becauſe the Enemy had gained no Advantage over them. Mean-while the Legions approached, and both ſides had notice at the ſame time that *Cæſar* was advancing with his Forces in order of Battle. Our Troops, animated by this Hope, redoubled their Efforts; leſt by puſhing the Enemy too ſlowly, the Legions ſhould have time to come in for a ſhare of the Victory. The Enemy, on the contrary, loſt Courage, and fled different ways. But in vain: for the very Difficulties of the Ground, by which they hoped to have enſnared the *Romans*, ſerved now to entangle themſelves. Being at laſt vanquiſhed and repulſed, with the loſs of the beſt part of their Men, they fled in great terror whither Chance directed; ſome towards the Woods, ſome towards the River. The *Romans* urged the Purſuit with great keenneſs, and put many to the Sword. Mean-while *Correus*, whoſe Reſolution no Misfortune could abate, would neither quit the Fight, and retire to the Woods; nor accept of any offers of Quarter from our Men: but fighting on to the laſt with invincible Courage, and wounding many of the victorious Troops, conſtrained them at length to transfix him with their Javelins.

XVII. AFTER this Action; *Cæſar* coming up juſt as the Battle was ended; and naturally ſuppoſing, that the Enemy, upon Intelligence of ſo conſiderable a Defeat, would immediately abandon their Camp, which was not above eight Miles diſtant from the place of Slaughter: tho' he ſaw his march obſtructed by the River, he paſſed it notwithſtanding, and advanced with his Forces againſt them. But the *Bellovaci*, and the other States in their Alliance, hearing of the Diſaſter by ſome of the Runaways, who, tho' wounded, found means to eſcape under cover of the Woods; and finding that every thing was againſt them, their General ſlain, their Cavalry and the flower of their Infantry deſtroyed, and the *Romans* doubtleſs upon the march to attack them: ſpeedily aſſembling a Council by ſound of Trumpet, demanded with great Cries, that Ambaſſadors and Hoſtages might be ſent to *Cæſar*.

XVIII. THIS Propoſal being approved by all, *Comius* the *Atrebatian* fled to the *Germans*, whoſe Aſſiſtance he had obtained in the War. The reſt immediately diſpatched Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar*, and requeſted: "That he would "regard their preſent Sufferings as a ſufficient Puniſhment for their Revolt, "ſince they were ſuch, as his Humanity and Clemency would never have ſuf"fered him to inflict upon them, had he compelled them to ſubmit entire "and without fighting: That their Power was utterly broken by the late de"feat of their Cavalry: That ſeveral thouſands of their beſt Infantry were "deſtroyed, ſcarce enough being left to bring them news of the Diſaſter: "That yet in ſo great a Calamity, it was no ſmall Advantage to the *Bellovaci*, "that *Correus*, the Author of the War, who had ſtirred up the Multitude to "revolt, was killed; becauſe while he lived, the headſtrong Populace would "always have had more Authority in the State than the Senate." The Ambaſſadors having ended their Speech, *Cæſar* put them in mind: "That the "Year before, the *Bellovaci* had, in conjunction with the other States of *Gaul*, "taken up Arms againſt the *Romans*: That of all the Confederates they had "perſiſted with the greateſt Obſtinacy in their Revolt, nor been induced by "the Submiſſion of the reſt to hearken to Reaſon: That nothing was eaſier "than to lay the blame of their Miſconduct upon the dead; but they would "find it difficult to make him believe, that a ſingle Man could have ſo much

Influence,

" Influence, as in ſpite of the oppoſition of the Nobility and Senate, and the " Efforts of all good Men, to ſtir up and ſupport a War, by the mere Au- " thority of the Multitude: that however, he would be ſatisfied for the preſent " with the Puniſhment they had brought upon themſelves."

XIX. NEXT Night the Deputies returned with *Cæſar*'s Anſwer, and Hoſtages were immediately ſent to the *Roman* Camp. The Deputies of the other States, who only waited the Event of this Treaty, immediately flocked to *Cæſar*, gave Hoſtages, and ſubmitted to his Commands. *Comius* alone would not hear of treating, from a particular Diſtruſt of the *Romans*. For the Year before, while *Cæſar* was employed in the Affairs of *Ciſalpine Gaul*, *Labienus* underſtanding that *Comius* was ſoliciting ſeveral States to rebel, and join in a Confederacy againſt the *Romans*; thought it might be allowed him to uſe Perfidy toward the Perfidious. And becauſe he expected to be refuſed, ſhould he ſend for him to the Camp; that he might not by an unſucceſsful Attempt put him upon his Guard, he employed *C. Voluſenus Quadratus*, to kill him under pretence of an Interview; furniſhing him with ſome choſen Centurions for that purpoſe. When the Interview began; and *Voluſenus*, by way of ſignal, had taken *Comius* by the Hand; one of the Centurions, as if ſurpriſed at a Step ſo unuſual, attempted to kill him; but *Comius*'s Friends haſtily interpoſing, he was prevented: however, the firſt Blow wounded him ſeverely on the Head. Both ſides immediately drew, not ſo much with a deſign to engage, as to retire: our Men, becauſe they believed *Comius* mortally wounded: the *Gauls*, becauſe diſcovering the intended Treachery, they apprehended the Danger to be greater than as yet appeared. From that time *Comius* determined never to be in the ſame place with any *Roman*.

XX. *CÆSAR* having thus ſubdued the moſt warlike Nations of *Gaul*, and finding no State diſpoſed to take up Arms, or make Reſiſtance; but that only ſome few had left their Towns and Poſſeſſions, to avoid preſent Subjection; reſolved to divide his Army into ſeveral Bodies. *M. Antony* the Quæſtor, with the eleventh Legion, had orders to continue with him. *C. Fabius* was ſent at the head of twenty-five Cohorts, into the remoteſt Parts of *Gaul*; becauſe he underſtood ſome States were in Arms on that ſide, whom *C. Caninius Rebilus*, his Lieutenant, who commanded in thoſe Provinces, was ſcarcely ſtrong enough to oppoſe with only two Legions. He then ſent for *T. Labienus*, and ordered the twelfth Legion, which he commanded, into *Gallia Togata*, to protect the *Roman* Colonies there, that they might not ſuffer by the Incurſions of the *Barbarians*, as had happened the Year before to the *Tergeſtini*, whoſe Territories had been plundered by a ſudden and unexpected Invaſion. He himſelf marched to ravage and lay waſte the Territories of *Ambiorix*: for finding it impoſſible to lay hold on that perfidious *Gaul*, whoſe Fear prompted him to fly continually before him; he thought it behoved him, in regard to his own Dignity, ſo effectually to ruin the Country, by deſtroying his Towns, Cattle, and Subjects, as might render him odious to his Followers, if any ſtill remained, and deprive him of all hope of being reſtored to his Poſſeſſions. Having ſpread his Legions and Auxiliaries over the whole Country of *Ambiorix*, deſtroyed all with Fire and Sword, and either killed or made Priſoners an infinite number of People; he diſpatched *Labienus*, with two Legions againſt the *Treviri*; whoſe Country, bordering upon *Germany*, and exerciſed in continual Wars, differed little from the Temper and Fierceneſs of that Nation; nor ever ſubmitted to his Commands, unleſs inforced by the preſence of an Army.

XXI.

XXI. MEAN-TIME *C. Caninius*, Lieutenant-General, underſtanding by Letters and Meſſengers from *Duracius*, who had always continued faithful to the *Romans*, even in the Defection of many of his own State; that great Numbers of the Enemy were aſſembled in the Territories of the *Pictones*; marched towards the Town of *Limo*. Upon his Arrival there, having certain Information from ſome Priſoners, that *Duracius* was ſhut up and beſieged in *Limo*, by a great Army of *Gauls*, under the Conduct of *Dumnacus*, General of the *Andes*; as he was not ſtrong enough to attack the Enemy, he encamped in a Place of great advantage. *Dumnacus* hearing of his Approach, turned all his Forces againſt the Legions, and reſolved to inveſt the *Roman* Camp. But after many Days ſpent in the Attack, and the loſs of a great Number of Men, without any Impreſſion made upon the Intrenchments, he returned again to the Siege of *Limo*.

XXII. AT the ſame time *C. Fabius*, having brought over many States to their Duty, and confirmed their Submiſſion by receiving Hoſtages; upon Intelligence ſent him by *Caninius*, of the Poſture of Affairs among the *Pictones*, marched immediately to the Aſſiſtance of *Duracius*. *Dumnacus* hearing of his Arrival, and concluding himſelf loſt, ſhould he at the ſame time be obliged to make head againſt an Enemy without, and ſuſtain the Efforts of the Townſmen within; ſuddenly decamped with all his Forces, reſolving not to ſtop till he had got on the other ſide of the *Loire*, which, by reaſon of its largeneſs, could not be paſſed without a Bridge. *Fabius*, tho' he had neither as yet come within ſight of the Enemy, nor joined Forces with *Caninius*; yet inſtructed by thoſe who were well acquainted with the Country, eaſily conjectured the Rout the *Gauls* would take. Wherefore directing his march towards the ſame Bridge, he ordered the Cavalry to keep before the Legions; yet ſo, that without too much fatiguing their Horſes, they might return and encamp with them again at Night. The Cavalry followed the Enemy as directed; came up with their Rear; and attacking them flying, diſmayed, and incumbred with their Baggage; killed great Numbers, gained a conſiderable Booty, and returned in triumph to the Camp.

XXIII. THE Night following *Fabius* ſent the Cavalry before, with Orders to engage the Enemy, and keep their whole Army employed, till he himſelf ſhould come up with the Legions. *Q. Atius Varus*, a prudent and experienced Officer, who had the charge of the Detachment, deſirous to execute the Commands of his General with ſucceſs, exhorted his Men; and coming up with the Enemy, diſpoſed ſome Squadrons in the moſt convenient Places, and engaged the *Gauls* with the reſt. The Enemy's Cavalry made a reſolute Stand, being ſupported by their Foot, who halting in a Body, advanced to the Aſſiſtance of their own Men. The Conflict was ſharp on both ſides. For the *Romans*, deſpiſing Enemies whom they had overcome the Day before, and remembring that the Legions were coming up to join them; partly aſhamed to give way, partly eager to bring the Battle to a ſpeedy Iſſue by their own Valour alone, fought with great Bravery againſt the Enemy's Foot. And the *Gauls*, who had no Apprehenſion of the Approach of more Forces, becauſe none other had appeared the Day before, fancied they had now a favourable Opportunity of cutting off our Cavalry. As the fight continued with great Obſtinacy for a conſiderable time; *Dumnacus* advanced with the Foot in Battle-array, to ſuſtain the Horſe: when ſuddenly the Legions, marching in cloſe order, appeared within view of the Enemy. This Sight diſcompoſed the

Gallick

Gallick Squadrons, and producing an univerſal Confuſion through their whole Army, which ſpread even to the Baggage and Carriages; they with great Uproar and Tumult betook themſelves to a precipitate Flight. But our Horſe, who a little before had fought againſt an Enemy that vigorouſly oppoſed them; now elated with the Joy of Victory, ſurrounded them with great Cries, and urged the Slaughter as far as the Strength of their Horſes to purſue, and the Vigour of their right Hands to deſtroy, were able to bear them out. Upwards of twelve thouſand periſhed on this occaſion, partly in the Battle, partly in the Purſuit; and the whole Baggage was taken.

XXIV. AFTER this Rout, *Drapes*, of the Nation of the *Senones* (who upon the firſt Revolt of *Gaul* had drawn together a Band of deſperate Men, invited Slaves to join him by the hopes of Liberty, aſſembled all the Fugitives he could find, received even publick Robbers into his Service, and with that profligate Crew intercepted the *Roman* Convoys and Baggage) having rallied about five thouſand of the Runaways, directed his march towards the Province; being joined by *Luterius* of *Quercy*, who, as we have ſeen in the foregoing Book, had attempted an Invaſion on that ſide at the firſt breaking out of the War. *Caninius* having notice of this Deſign, marched in purſuit of them with two Legions, to prevent any Alarm in thoſe Parts, and hinder the Province from falling a Prey to the Ravages of a deſperate and needy Crew.

XXV. *FABIUS*, with the reſt of the Army, marched againſt the *Carnutes*, and other States, whoſe Forces had ſerved under *Dumnacus* in the late Action: for he made no doubt of finding them humbled by ſo great a Blow; and was unwilling, by any delay, to give *Dumnacus* an opportunity of rouſing them to a continuance of the War. In this Expedition *Fabius* had all the Succeſs he could deſire, the ſeveral States ſubmitting immediately upon his Approach. For the *Carnutes*, who though often haraſſed, had never yet made mention of Peace, now ſurrendred and gave Hoſtages: and the other States, inhabiting the more remote Parts of *Gaul*, bordering upon the Ocean, and known by the name of *Armorica*, influenced by their Authority, and the Arrival of *Fabius* and his Legions, readily accepted the Terms he offered them. *Dumnacus*, expelled his Territories, and forced to wander and hide himſelf in lurking Holes, at length eſcaped into the fartheſt Parts of *Gaul*.

XXVI. BUT *Drapes* and *Luterius*, underſtanding that *Caninius* was in purſuit of them with the Legions; and ſenſible, that having an Army at their heels, they could not without certain Deſtruction make an Irruption into the Province, nor ſafely indulge themſelves in the liberty of plundering and ravaging the Country; halted in the Territories of the *Cadurci*. As *Luterius*, during his Proſperity, had bore a conſiderable Sway in the State, and been always in great Reputation with the Multitude, as the Author of new and enterpriſing Counſels; he ſeized upon *Uxellodunum*, a Town ſtrongly fortify'd by Nature, which had formerly been under his Patronage; and prevailed with the Inhabitants to join his and *Drapes*'s Forces.

XXVII. *CANINIUS* ſoon arrived before the Place, which he found ſurrounded on every ſide with ſteep Rocks, ſo very difficult of Acceſs, that it was hardly poſſible for armed Troops to aſcend them, even where there were no Oppoſers. But knowing that there was a vaſt Quantity of Baggage in the Town, which could not be conveyed away ſo privately as to eſcape the

The whole Army were deſirous to deprive the Beſieged of this Reſource; but *Cæſar* alone diſcovered the means of effecting it. He brought forward his Galleries, and began a Terraſs over-againſt the Mountain, with much danger to the Soldiers, incredible Fatigue, and a continued ſeries of fighting. For the Garriſon ruſhing furiouſly upon us from the higher Ground, charged without danger, and wounded great numbers of our Men, as they advanced obſtinately to the Combat; yet without deterring them from bringing forward their Machines, and by their Works and Aſſiduity ſurmounting the Difficulties of the Ground. At the ſame time they carried on their Mines, from the Terraſs and Galleries, quite to the Fountain; a kind of Work in which they proceeded without Danger or Suſpicion. A Terraſs was raiſed ſixty Foot high, and a Tower of ten Stories placed upon it; not indeed to equal the height of the Walls, for which no Works were ſufficient; but to command the top of the Spring. From this Tower we were continually playing our Engines upon all the acceſſes to the Fountain, which made it extremely dangerous to water at the Place; inſomuch that not only Cattle and Beaſts of Carriage, but great numbers of People periſhed by Thirſt.

XXXIV. THE Enemy, terrified at this Diſaſter, filled ſeveral Barrels with Tallow, Pitch, and dry Wood; and having ſet them on fire, rolled them down upon the Works. At the ſame time they charged the *Romans* with great Fury, that the Anxiety and Danger of the Battle might hinder them from extinguiſhing the Flames. The Conflagration ſoon became general: for whatever was rolled down from above, being ſtopped by the Machines and Terraſs, communicated the Flame to that part. But our Soldiers, tho' engaged in a dangerous kind of Fight, becauſe of the inequality of the Ground, yet bore all with great Firmneſs and Reſolution. For the Action was in a conſpicuous Place, within view of our Army, and great Shouts were raiſed on both ſides. Thus every one was the more ardent to ſignalize himſelf, and brave the Flames and Darts of the Enemy, as his Bravery would be better known, and have the Teſtimony of many Witneſſes.

XXXV. *CÆSAR* ſeeing many of his Soldiers wounded, ordered the Cohorts to aſcend the Mountain on all ſides, and as if preparing to ſcale the Walls, raiſe a mighty Shout. This alarmed the Inhabitants, who not knowing what paſſed in other Parts, recalled their Troops from the Attack, and diſpoſed them along the Walls. Thus our Men, being relieved from the Battle, ſoon found means to extinguiſh or put a ſtop to the Flames. But as the Beſieged ſtill continued to defend themſelves with great obſtinacy, and notwithſtanding the loſs of the greateſt part of their number by Thirſt, perſiſted in their firſt Reſolution; *Cæſar* at laſt contrived to drain or avert the Spring by Mines. Upon this the Fountain ſuddenly becoming dry, ſo effectually deprived the Beſieged of all hopes of Safety, that they imagined it an Event brought about, not by human counſel, but by the will of the Gods; and therefore, compelled by Neceſſity, immediately ſurrendered themſelves.

XXXVI. *CÆSAR* conſcious that his Clemency was known to all, and no way fearing that his Severity on this Occaſion would be imputed to any Cruelty of Nature; as he perceived there would be no end of the War, if other States in different parts of *Gaul*, ſhould in like manner form the Deſign of a Revolt; reſolved, by a ſignal Example of Puniſhment, to deter them from all ſuch Projects. He therefore cut off the Hands of all whom he found in Arms;

Arms; granting them their Lives, that their Puniſhment might be the more conſpicuous. *Drapes*, who, as we have ſaid, had been made Priſoner by *Caninius*; either out of indignation at finding himſelf a Captive, or dreading a ſeverer Fate, put an end to his Life by abſtaining from Food. At the ſame time *Luterius*, who had eſcaped out of the Battle, falling into the hands of *Epaſnactus* of *Auvergne*, (for by continually removing from place to place, he was obliged to confide in many, becauſe he could ſtay no where long without danger, and knew the little reaſon he had to expect Favour from *Cæſar*;) was by him, a great favourer of the *Roman* People, delivered without heſitation bound to *Cæſar*.

XXXVII. IN the mean time *Labienus* engaged the Cavalry of the *Treviri* with Succeſs: and having killed a conſiderable number on the ſpot, as likewiſe many *Germans*, who were always ready to join againſt the *Romans*; made the greateſt part of their Chiefs Priſoners; and among the reſt *Surus* the *Æduan*, a Nobleman of diſtinguiſhed Birth and Valour, and the only one of that Nation, who had continued until then in Arms. Upon notice of this Victory, *Cæſar*, who ſaw his Affairs in a flouriſhing Condition in *Gaul*, and that his laſt Campaigns had compleated the ſubjection of the whole Country; reſolved upon a Journey to *Aquitain*, where he had never yet been in perſon, though *P. Craſſus* had in part reduced it to his Obedience. He therefore ſet out for that Country with two Legions, deſigning to ſpend there the reſt of the Campaign. This Expedition was attended with the deſired Succeſs; for all the States of *Aquitain* ſent Ambaſſadors to him, and delivered Hoſtages. He then went with a Guard of Cavalry to *Narbonne*, and diſtributed his Army into Winter-Quarters under the care of his Lieutenants. *M. Antony*, *C. Trebonius*, *P. Vatinius*, and *Q. Tullius*, were quartered in *Belgium* with four Legions. Two were ſent into the Country of the *Æduans*, whom he knew to be the moſt powerful People in *Gaul*: two into that of the *Turones*, bordering upon the *Carnutes*, to hold the maritime States in awe: and the remaining two were ſtationed among the *Lemovices*, not far from *Auvergne*, that none of the Provinces of *Gaul* might be deſtitute of Troops. He remained ſome Days at *Narbonne*, held all the uſual Aſſemblies of the Province, decided the differences ſubſiſting among the People, recompenſed thoſe who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their faithful Services; (for he had a wonderful Faculty of diſcerning how Men ſtood affected in the general Revolt of *Gaul*, which he had been enabled to ſuſtain, merely by the Fidelity and Aſſiſtance of the Province;) and having diſpatched all theſe Affairs, repaired to the Legions in *Belgium*, and took up his Winter-Quarters at *Nemetocenna*.

XXXVIII. HERE he was informed that *Comius* of *Arras* had had an Engagement with his Cavalry. For after the arrival of *Antony* in his Winter-Quarters; as the *Atrebatians*, awed by his preſence, continued in their Duty to *Cæſar*: *Comius*, who ever ſince the Wound above-mentioned had kept a watchful Eye upon all the Motions of his Countrymen, that in caſe of a War, he might be ready to offer them his Counſel and Aſſiſtance; finding that the State now ſubmitted quietly to the *Romans*, applied his Troops to ſupport himſelf and his Followers by Plunder; and often carried off the Convoys that were going to the *Roman* Winter-Quarters.

XXXIX. AMONG thoſe who commanded under *Antony* in his Winter-Quarters was *C. Voluſenus Quadratus*, an Officer of the firſt Rank among the

Horſe. Him *Antony* ſent in purſuit of the Enemy's Cavalry. *Voluſenus*, to his natural Bravery, which he poſſeſſed in an eminent degree, added a particular hatred of *Comius*, which induced him the more readily to accept of this Commiſſion. Accordingly, having planted his Ambuſcades, he found means frequently to engage the Enemy, and always came off victorious. At laſt, a very warm Diſpute enſuing: and *Voluſenus*, thro' an eager deſire of making *Comius* Priſoner, urging the Chace with only a few Attendants; while *Comius*, by a haſty Retreat, drew him a conſiderable way from his Party: ſuddenly the latter, invoking the Aſſiſtance of his Followers, called upon them to revenge the Wound he had treacherouſly received from the *Romans*; and turning ſhort upon our Detachment, advanced without Precaution towards *Voluſenus*. All his Cavalry did the ſame, and ſoon put our ſmall Party to flight. *Comius* clapping ſpurs to his Horſe, ran furiouſly againſt *Quadratus*, and drove his Lance thro' his Thigh. Our Men ſeeing their Commander wounded, inſtantly faced about, and forced the Enemy to give ground. In this laſt Attack, the *Gauls*, after a conſiderable Slaughter, were entirely routed by the vigorous Charge of our Cavalry. Some were troden to death in the Purſuit, others made Priſoners; but *Comius* eſcaped by the ſwiftneſs of his Horſe. *Voluſenus* being dangerouſly wounded, almoſt beyond hope of recovery, was carried back to the Camp. *Comius*, either ſatisfied with the Revenge he had taken, or apprehenſive he muſt at laſt be ruined, as he continually loſt ſome of his Men; ſent a Deputation to *Antony*, offering to retire wherever he ſhould order him, to ſubmit to whatever ſhould be impoſed on him, and to give Hoſtages for the performance of theſe Conditions: he only requeſted, that ſo much regard might be ſhewn to his juſt Fears, as not to have it inſiſted on that he ſhould appear before any *Roman*. *Antony*, conſcious that his Apprehenſions were but too well grounded, excuſed him, took Hoſtages, and granted him Peace.

CÆSAR, I know, aſſigns a diſtinct Book to each of his ſeveral Campaigns. But I have not judged it neceſſary to purſue this Method; becauſe the enſuing Year, under the Conſulſhip of *L. Paulus*, and *C. Marcellus*, furniſhes nothing memorable tranſacted in *Gaul*. However, that none may be ignorant where *Cæſar* and his Army were during this time, I have ſubjoined a ſhort Account to the preſent Commentary.

XL. *CÆSAR*, during the time of his Winter-Quarters in *Belgium*, made it his whole ſtudy to ingratiate himſelf with the *Gauls*, and deprive them of all Pretence or Colour for a Revolt. For there was nothing he more earneſtly deſired, than to leave *Gaul* peaceably diſpoſed at his departure; leſt, when he was about to withdraw his Army, any ſparks of Rebellion ſhould remain, which would infallibly rekindle into a War, were the *Roman* Troops once removed. Wherefore, by treating the ſeveral States with reſpect, liberally rewarding their Chiefs, and abſtaining from the Impoſition of new Burdens, he eaſily prevailed with the *Gauls*, wearied and exhauſted by long unſucceſsful Wars, to embrace the eaſe and quiet attendant on their preſent Submiſſion.

XLI. THE Winter being over, contrary to his Cuſtom, he poſted by great Journeys into *Italy*, to viſit the municipal Towns and Colonies of *Ciſalpine Gaul*, and engage their Intereſt in favour of *M. Antony* his Queſtor, who was then a Candidate for the Prieſthood. He the more warmly intereſted himſelf in

in this Affair, not only as it was in behalf of a Man united to him by the ſtricteſt ties of Friendſhip, but as it likewiſe gave him an Opportunity of oppoſing a ſmall Faction, who aimed to diminiſh *Cæſar*'s Credit by repulſing *Antony*. Altho' he heard upon the Road, before he reached *Italy*, that *Antony* had been made Augur; he ſtill thought it incumbent upon him to viſit the municipal Towns and Colonies of the Province, in order to thank them for the Zeal they had ſhown in behalf of his Friend, and to recommend to them his own Petition for the Conſulſhip of the enſuing Year. For his Enemies every where boaſted, that *L. Lentulus* and *C. Marcellus* had been choſen Conſuls, in the view of deſpoiling him of all his Honours and Dignities; and that *Sergius Galba* had been excluded, tho' much the ſtrongeſt in the number of Votes, becauſe of his known Intimacy with *Cæſar*, and having ſerved under him as Lieutenant.

XLII. HE was received every where with incredible Honours, and the warmeſt Teſtimonies of the People's Affection. For this was the firſt time he had appeared among them ſince the total reduction of *Gaul*. Nothing was omitted that could contribute to the ornament of the Gates, Ways, and Places thro' which he was to paſs. The People with their Children came out to meet him: Sacrifices were offered in all Parts: Tables richly ſpread were placed in the publick Squares and Temples: and ſo great was the Magnificence diſplayed by the rich, ſuch the Eagerneſs of the poor to expreſs their Satisfaction, that every thing wore the face of a moſt ſplendid Triumph.

XLIII. *CÆSAR* having viſited the ſeveral Provinces of *Ciſalpine Gaul*, returned in all haſte to the Army at *Nemetocenna*; and ordering the Legions to quit their Winter-Quarters, and rendezvous in the Territories of the *Treviri*, went thither and reviewed them in perſon. He gave the Goverment of *Ciſalpine Gaul* to *Labienus*, the better to reconcile him to his demand of the Conſulſhip; and marched the Army from place to place, that by the motion and change of Air, he might prevent any Sickneſs getting among the Troops. Altho' he often heard, that *Labienus* was ſtrongly ſolicited by his Enemies; and was for certain informed, that ſome were labouring, by means of the Senate's Authority, to deprive him of part of his Army: yet neither did he credit any Reports to *Labienus*'s diſadvantage, nor could be induced to ſet himſelf in oppoſition to the Authority of the Senate. For he made no doubt of obtaining his demand by the free Suffrages of the Fathers: and the rather, becauſe *C. Curio*, Tribune of the People, having undertaken the defence of *Cæſar*'s Cauſe and Dignity, had often propoſed in the Senate: "That if *Cæſar*'s "Army gave umbrage to any, as *Pompey* was no leſs formidable to the true "Friends of Liberty, both ſhould be ordered to diſmiſs their Troops, and "return to a private Condition, which would entirely free the Common-"wealth from all apprehenſions of Danger." Nor did he only propoſe this, but even began to put it to the Vote. But the Conſuls and *Pompey*'s Friends interpoſed, which hindered the Senate from coming to any Reſolution.

XLIV. THIS was an authentick Teſtimony from the whole Senate, and agreeable to what had paſſed on a former Occaſion. For when *Marcellus*, who ſtrove to render himſelf conſiderable by oppoſing *Cæſar*, had propoſed the Year before, contrary to the Law of *Pompey* and *Craſſus*, to recal *Cæſar* before his Commiſſion was expired, the Overture was rejected by a very full Houſe.

Houſe. But this, inſtead of diſcouraging *Cæſar*'s Enemies, only puſhed them on to new Attempts, that they might at length bring the Senate into their Meaſures.

XLV. A *Senatuſconſultum* ſoon after paſſed, that one Legion from *Pompey*, and another from *Cæſar*, ſhould be ſent to the *Parthian* War. But it was viſibly their Deſign to take both Legions from *Cæſar* alone. For *Pompey* offered the firſt Legion for that ſervice, which he had lent ſome time before to *Cæſar*, having raiſed it in his Province. But *Cæſar*, though now fully ſatisfied of the ill Deſigns of his Enemies, readily ſent back *Pompey*'s Legion; and in compliance with the Decree of the Senate, ordered the fifteenth, one of his own Number, which was then in hither *Gaul*, to be delivered to their Commiſſioners; and ſent the thirteenth into *Italy* to replace it, and ſupply the Garriſons whence it had been drawn. He then put his Army into Winter-Quarters. *C. Trebonius*, with four Legions, was ordered into the Country of the *Belgians*; and *C. Fabius*, with the like number, was placed among the *Æduans*. For thus he thought *Gaul* was moſt likely to be kept in ſubjection; if the *Belgæ*, the moſt renowned for their Valour, and the *Æduans*, the moſt conſiderable for their Authority, were awed by the preſence of two Armies.

XLVI. AFTER this he returned into *Italy*, where he underſtood, that the two Legions he had ſent, in conformity to the Decree of the Senate, to be employed in the *Parthian* War, had been delivered by the Conſul *Marcellus* to *Pompey*, and were by him ſtill detained in *Italy*. Although by this it was abundantly evident, that they were preparing to take up Arms againſt him; he yet reſolved to ſuffer every thing, while any hope remained of adjuſting their Differences by the methods of Peace, rather than thoſe of Violence and War.

CÆSAR's COMMENTARIES

OF THE

CIVIL WAR.

BOOK I

THE ARGUMENT.

I. *Different Opinions in the Senate in relation to* Cæſar's *Letter.* III. *The Origin and Cauſes of the Oppoſition formed againſt him.* IV. *The Senate's ſevere Decree, and Flight of* Cæſar's *Friends.* V. *War againſt* Cæſar *reſolved on.* VI. Cæſar *harangues his Troops.* VII. Pompey *ſends Propoſals of Peace.* VIII. Cæſar's *Anſwer.* IX. Pompey *ſends Propoſals a ſecond time.* X. *Which not pleaſing* Cæſar, *he prepares for War.* XI. Cæſar *makes himſelf maſter of* Iguvium *and* Auximum. XII. *Which ſo alarms his Enemies at* Rome, *that they haſtily quit the City, and retire to* Capua. XIII. Cæſar, *by his Expedition, obliges many of the Towns of* Italy *to ſubmit.* XXIII. Pompey, *after the Reduction of* Corfinium *by* Cæſar, *withdraws with his Troops to* Brunduſium. XXIV. Cæſar *beſieges him there.* XXVI. *He eſcapes by Sea, after which the Town ſurrenders.* XXVIII. Cæſar *cannot purſue him for want of a Fleet.* XXIX. Valerius *and* Curio, *Partizans of* Cæſar, *drive* Cotta *from* Sardinia, *and* Cato *from* Sicily. Varus *compels* Tubero *to deſiſt from his Deſign upon* Africa. XXX. Cæſar's *Speech to the Senate.* XXXI. *Which producing no Effect, he ſets out for* Tranſalpine Gaul. XXXII. *The People of* Marſeilles *ſhut their Gates againſt* Cæſar. XXXIV. *Who commands* Brutus *and* Trebonius *to beſiege the Place.* XXXV. Fabius *ſent before into* Spain. XXXIX. Cæſar *follows, and comes up with* Afranius *and* Petreius *at* Lerida. XLI. *A Skirmiſh with almoſt equal Advantage on both ſides.* XLVI. *A ſudden ſtorm having broke down his Bridges,* Cæſar *is ſhut up between two Rivers.* XLVIII. *And reduced to great ſtraits for want of Proviſions.* LI. *He extricates himſelf at length, and ſurpriſes the Enemies Foragers.* LII. Brutus *defeats the People of* Marſeilles *in a Sea-Fight.* LIII. Cæſar *obtains the Superiority near* Lerida. LIV. *Many States declare for him.* LV. Afranius *and* Petreius *remove towards* Celtiberia. LVI. Cæſar *purſues them with his Cavalry.* LVII. *Then drawing out the Legions, continues to urge them in their Retreat.* LXIV. *He cuts off their Proviſions.* LXVI. Afranius *and* Petreius's *Men talk with* Cæſar's *about a Surrender.* LXVII. Petreius *interrupts the Conference.* LXVIII. *And obliges the Soldiers to take an Oath of Fidelity to their Generals.* LXX. *Who finding both their Proviſions and Forage intercepted, reſolve to return to* Lerida. LXXI. Cæſar *follows and greatly moleſts them in their march.* LXXIII. *At length Water, Forage, and every thing failing them, they are forced to ſue for Peace, and accept of* Cæſar's *Terms.*

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Genava
Lamanus lacus
Eborodunum
Sedunum
Rhodanus fl.
Seduni
Alpes montes
Lipontii
Caturiges
Augusta Prætoria
Oscella
Verbanus lacus
Axima
Isara fl.
Graiæ Alpes
Eporedia
Segusi
Segusium
Brigantium
Vercellæ
Novaria
Laus Pompeia
Ticinum
Laumellum
Rhætia
Tridentum
Tridente
Adua fl.
Vamia
Bretinum
Carrae
Vicentia
Vicenta
Vicenza
Fuga
Verona
Aponus Vicus
Ateste
Patavium
Meduacus portus
Brondulus por
Carbonaria ostium
Mantua
Ostilia
Cenomani
Veji
Forum Alieni
Regium
Cremona
Gremonia
Brixellum
Brixellum
Fidentia
Parma
Tanetum
Acara
Mutina
Ravenna
Bononia
Bellunum
Fertum
Taurisium
Altinum
Concordia
Aquileia
Tilavemptum
Ruscium
Opitergium
Epitergium
Sontius fl.
Athesis fl.
Philistina
Padus fl.
Fossa Clodia
Ferraria
Spina
Sestinum
Pitinum
Clusium novum
Arretium
Cortona
Perusia
Volaterræ
Populonium
Populonium
Vetulonium
Populonium pr.
Columbaria
Ilva
Argos pr.
Planasia
Latium
Oglasa
Ostia
Tiberis fl.
Portus Augusti
Portus Trajani
Portus Claudii
Portus Herculis Monoci
Portus Delphini
Genua
Sabata
Carrea
Ceba
Cema mons
Maßilienses
Augusti trophæa
Forum Julium
Antipolis
Vada Sabatia
Gallingria
Album Ingaunum
Albingaunum
Veneris pr.
Vigo seu Gorgonis
Capraria Ægilos
Mare Ligusticum
Heraclea Cacabaria
Pechades I.
Mare Gallicum
Sacrum pr.
Centurinum
Cenelatum
Tilox promont.
Actium pro
Mantini
Martanum
Casalus Sinus
Ropicum
Cersinum
Palanta
Viriballum
Aluce
Charax
Venicium
Rhætius m.
Sermidia
Osmeum
Talcinum
Urcinium
Cenestum
Rhium pro.
Locra fl.
Mora
Opinum
Tiberis fl.
Matisba
Titanis portus
Tysena
Rubra
Marianum pr.
Marianum
Palla
Taphros
Canicularia I.
Errebantium pr.
Plubium
Nymphæum
Phintonis
Inuliola
Herculis Insul.
Itya
Tibula
Hermæa
Arcti prom.
Valentium
Bubonis Libisonis
turris
Tullium
Diabate
Nymphæus portus
Ericinum
Hermæum pr.
Gurullis Vetus
Olbianus portus
Colum prom.
Coracodes por.
Cornus
Gurullis nova
Olbia
Tarras
Bosa
Macopsisa
Heræum
Menomeni mons
Saralapis
Feronia
Usellis
Cedrus fl.
Tiberis fl.
Osæa
Valeria
Sardopatoris fanum
Lisa
Supicius por.
Neapolis
Sepras fl.
Pachia prom.
Aqua Neapolitana
Bloca por.
Hieracum Accipitrum
Pupulium
Usalei villa
MARE SARDOUM
GALLIÆ PARS
REGIO
GALLIA CISPADANA
GALLIA TOGATA
LIGURIA
REGIO OCTAVA
REGIO SEPTIMA
REGIO
ITALIA
Orobii
Mediolanum
Mediolanum
Forum Licini
Comum
Lambrus fl.
Addua fl.
Bergamum
Briccia
Anas Anisium
Forum Diuentani
Forum Intuntiæ
Biberiacum
Ollius fl.
Laus Pompeia
Ticinum
Vercellæ
Bodincomagus
Padus fl.
Eporedia
Duria minor
Augusta Taurinorum
Augusta Vagiennorum
Forum Fulvii Valentiæ
Forum Vibii
Asta
Derona
Iria
Lipubium
Vellepedum
Frisinum
Corcidium
Trebia fl.
Statyellæ
Aquæ Statyellæ
Frinium
Tanarus fl.
Varus fl.
Alba Pompeia
Pollentia
Carrea Potentia
Sabata
Genua
Portus Delphini
M. Apœninus
Segesta Tigullorum
Tigullia
Eryicis portus
Pisæ
Pisatorium
Fossa Papyriana
Fossa
Luca
Arnus fl.
Arni lanus
Arretium
Cortona
Perusia
Volaterræ
Manlianum
Clusium vetus
Comerscolum
Clusium
Bitervia
Arna
Arunus
Herbanum
Russellæ
Amiata
Telamon
Vulci
Saturnia
Suana
Vesentium
Vetulonium
Populonium
Populonium
Trajani portus
Ilva
Ostia
Tiberis fl.
Portus Augusti
Portus Trajani
Portus Claudii
Sabina
Tuscania
Forum Cassii
Blera
Sutrium
Nepe
Falisci
Veii
Coſſæ
Graviscæ
Agylla
Pisæ
Diana Artemisia
Sibra Candida
Roma
Tiberis fl.
Ager Veientanus
Fidenæ
Crustumium
Nomentum
Ager Crustuminus
Ager Nomentanus
Tibur
Ager Tiburtinus
Anio fl.
Anio fl.
Ager Sabinus
Ager Latinus
Ager Hernicus
Ager Volscus
Ager Pomptinus
Ager Falernus
Ager Campanus
Ager Sidicinus
Ager Stellatinus
Ager Calenus
Ager Samnitium
Ager Frentanus
Ager Apulus
Ager Daunius
Ager Peucetius
Ager Salentinus
Ager Brutius
Ager Lucanus
Ager Bruttius
Ager Lucanus
Ager Picentinus
Ager Hirpin

ITALIÆ ANTIQUÆ Delineatio

Auctore

PHILIPPO CLUVERIO.

ILLYRIS seu ILLYRICUM

LIBURNI

Adria seu Sinus Adriaticus vel Atrianus quod et Mare Adriaticum & Superum.

Hetruscum, Tyrrhenum item Tyrsenum, Notium, et Inferum.

MARE IONIUM

MARE AUSONIUM

LATIA

Sinus Tarentinus

Diomedeæ inſ.

Insulæ Æoliæ, quæ et Hiphæstiades, Vulcaniæ et Liparеæ.

SICILIAE PARS

Taurisci

REGIO SEXTA

REGIO QUINTA

REGIO PRIMA

REGIO SECUNDA

Picentes

Picentini

Marucini

Ferentani

Peligni

Samnites

Campani

Apuli

Pediculi

Pucetii

Salentini

Meßenii

Brutii

Istri seu Iapides

Liburni

Iapides

Morlachi

Dalmatæ

Liburnia

Dalmatia

Croatia

Histria

Forum Iulii

Tergeste

Pacinum

Pietas Iulia

Parentium

Nauportus

Flanona

Tarsatica

Velcera

Senia

Lopsica

Argyruntum

Iader et Iadera

Scardona

Tariona

Sicum

Salona

Tragurium

Brattia Ins.

Pharos an Paros

Rhizonicus sinus

Epidaurus

Rhizæi

Onæum Pleræi

Corcyra nigra Melæna

Melitia Melitine

Diomedeæ inſ.

Matrinum

Aternum

Teate

Anxanum

Corfinium

Sulmo

Alba

Fabianum

Samnium

Aufidena

Venafrum

Teanum

Sidicinum

Capua

Calatia

Abella

Nola

Suessula

Neapolis

Puteoli

Cumæ

Misenum

Baiæ

Lucrinus lacus

Avernus lacus

Caieta

Formiæ

Fundi

Terracina

Circeii

Ostia

Antium

Lanuvium

Aricia

Alba

Tibur

Roma

Tusculum

Tarquinii

Caere

Pyrgi

Graviscæ

Cosa

Heraclea

Thurii

Sybaris

Croton

Locri

Rhegium

Messana

Tauromenium

Catana

Syracusæ

Agrigentum

Lilybæum

Panormus

Drepanum et Arganium prom.

Cephaloedium

Halesa

Halæsa

Alæsa

Agathyrnum

Tyndaris

Abarana

Chyta

Calacta

Ericusa

Phœnicusa

Didyme

Euonymos

Lipara

Hiera sacra

Strongyle

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THE

SUPPLEMENT

OF

DIONYSIUS VOSSIUS,

TO

CÆSAR's First Book of the CIVIL WAR.

I Think it needleſs to ſay any thing here, in oppoſition to thoſe who pretend, that the following Commentaries concerning the *Civil War*, were not penned by *Cæſar* himſelf. We have not only the expreſs Teſtimony of *Suetonius* to the contrary, but the very Stile ſufficiently declares, that *Cæſar* alone could be the Author of the Work. There is room however to ſuſpect, from the abrupt manner in which the Subject is introduced, that the beginning of this firſt Book is wanting: for Hiſtory takes notice of ſeveral previous Facts, of which no mention is made here. I have therefore collected out of *Plutarch*, *Appian*, and *Dion*, as much as was neceſſary to connect this and the former Commentary, and fancy it will not be diſagreeable to the Reader, to offer it here by way of Preface.

GAUL being wholly reduced, *Cæſar*, upon his arrival in *Lombardy*, thought proper for many Reaſons to ſend Deputies to *Rome*, to demand the Conſulſhip, and a prolongation of his Command. *Pompey*, who tho' averſe to *Cæſar*'s Intereſt, had not yet openly declared againſt him, neither furthered nor oppoſed this requeſt. But the Conſuls *Marcellus* and *Lentulus*, who had already joined the Party of his Enemies, reſolved by every Method in their power to fruſtrate the Deſign. *Marcellus* ſcrupled not to add other Injuries to that of which we ſpeak. For *Cæſar* had lately planted a Colony at *Novocomum* in *Ciſalpine Gaul*; and *Marcellus*, not ſatisfied with ſtripping the Inhabitants of the Privilege of *Roman* Citizens, ſeized one of their chief Magiſtrates at *Rome*, ordered him to be ſcourged, and then diſmiſſed him to carry his Complaints to *Cæſar*: an Ignominy from which all free Citizens were expreſly exempted by the Laws. While Affairs were in this train, *C. Curio*, Tribune of the People, came to *Cæſar* in *Gaul*. This Nobleman, after many Attempts in behalf of the Commonwealth, and to promote *Cæſar*'s Intereſt; finding at length all his Endeavours without effect, fled from *Rome* to avoid the Malice of his Enemies, and informed *Cæſar* of all that was tranſacting againſt him. *Cæſar* received him with great marks of Reſpect, as well on account

account of his Rank in the Commonwealth, as the many Services he had done himſelf and the State; and thanked him for the ſignal Zeal he had ſhown in his Cauſe. But *Curio* adviſed him, ſince his Enemies were now openly preparing for War, to draw his Army together without delay, and reſcue the Commonwealth from the tyranny of an aſpiring Faction. *Cæſar*, tho' fully ſatisfied of the truth of *Curio*'s Report, reſolved to ſacrifice all other Conſiderations to the publick Tranquillity, that no Man might juſtly charge him with being the Author of a civil War. He therefore only petitioned by his Friends, that the Government of *Ciſalpine Gaul* and *Illyricum*, with the command of two Legions, might be continued to him: In all which his principal Aim was, by the equity of his Demands, to induce his Enemies to grant Peace to the Commonwealth. Theſe Offers appeared ſo reaſonable, that even *Pompey* himſelf knew not how to oppoſe them. But the Conſuls ſtill continuing inflexible, *Cæſar* wrote a Letter to the Senate; wherein, after briefly enumerating his Exploits and Services, he requeſted them not to deprive him of the Benefit of the People's Favour, who had permitted him to ſue for the Conſulſhip in his abſence. He proteſted his readineſs, if ſuch was the Reſolution of the Senate and People of *Rome*, to diſmiſs his Army, provided *Pompey* did the ſame: but could by no means reſolve, ſo long as he continued in Command and Authority, to diveſt himſelf of Troops, and lay himſelf open to the Injuries of his Enemies. *Curio* was commiſſioned to carry this Letter; who travelling with incredible diſpatch, reached *Rome* in three Days, (a diſtance of an hundred and ſixty Miles,) before the beginning of *January*, and ere the Conſuls could get any thing determined relating to *Cæſar*'s Command. *Curio*, upon his Arrival, refuſed to part with the Letter, reſolving not to deliver it but in full Senate, and when the Tribunes of the People were preſent: for he was apprehenſive, ſhould he do otherwiſe, that the Conſuls would ſuppreſs it.

CÆSAR's

CÆSAR's COMMENTARIES

OF THE

CIVIL WAR.

BOOK I.

I. *CÆSAR*'s Letter being delivered to the Conſuls, the Tribunes with much difficulty procured it a reading in the Senate, but could by no means prevail to have his Demands brought under deliberation. The Conſuls propoſed to debate upon the ſtate of the Republick. "*Lentulus* pro- "miſed to ſtand by the Senate and People, if they would deliver their Senti- "ments with Freedom and Courage: but if they regarded *Cæſar*, and affected "to court his Friendſhip, as had been the practice for ſome time paſt, he "knew, he told them, what he had to do, and was determined to diſclaim "their Authority; not doubting but he would find a ready Admittance to the "Favour and Protection of *Cæſar*." *Scipio* ſpoke much to the ſame purpoſe: "That *Pompey* was firmly bent not to abandon the Republick, if he found "the Senators ready to ſupport him: but if they cooled, or were remiſs in "their Reſolves, it would be in vain for them to expect his Aid, if they ſaw "cauſe afterwards to apply for it." This Speech of *Scipio*, as the Senate was held in the City, and *Pompey* reſided in the Suburbs, was conſidered as coming from *Pompey*'s own Mouth. Some were for following milder Counſels, of which number was *M. Marcellus*, who gave it as his Opinion: "That it was not "proper to enter upon the preſent Deliberation, 'till Troops were raiſed over "all *Italy*, and an Army got ready, under whoſe Protection the Senate might "proceed with freedom and ſafety in their Debates. *Callidius* was for ſend- "ing *Pompey* to his Government, to take away all occaſion of Diſcord; be- "cauſe *Cæſar* had reaſon to fear, as two of his Legions had been taken from "him, that *Pompey* retained them in the neighbourhood of *Rome*, with a "view to employ them againſt him." *M. Rufus* nearly agreed in opinion with *Callidius*. But they were all ſeverely reprimanded by the Conſul *Lentulus*, who expreſly refuſed to put *Callidius*'s Motion to the vote. *Marcellus* awed by the Conſul's Reprimand, retracted what he had ſaid. Thus the Clamours of *Lentulus*, the dread of an Army at the Gates of *Rome*, and the Menaces of *Pompey*'s Friends, forced the greater part of the Senate, tho' with the utmoſt Reluctance and Diſlike, into a Compliance with *Scipio*'s Motion: "That *Cæſar* ſhould be ordered to disband his Army before a certain Day "then fixed; and that, in caſe of Diſobedience, he ſhould be declared an

" Enemy to the Republick." *M. Antonius* and *Q. Caſſius*, Tribunes of the People, oppoſed their Negative to this Decree. Immediately a Debate aroſe upon the validity of their Interpoſition. Many ſevere Speeches were made againſt them; and the more warm and paſſionate any one appeared, the more was he applauded by *Cæſar*'s Enemies.

II. IN the Evening the Senate roſe; and *Pompey* ſending for all thoſe of his Party, commended the forward; confirmed them in their Reſolutions; reproved and animated the more moderate. Multitudes of Veterans, who had formerly ſerved under him, flocked to him from all parts, allured by the expectation of Rewards and Dignities. A great number of Officers belonging to the two Legions lately returned by *Cæſar*, had likewiſe Orders to attend him. *Rome* was filled with Troops. *Curio* aſſembled the Tribunes to ſupport the Decree of the People. On the other hand, all the Friends of the Conſuls, all the Partizans of *Pompey*, and of ſuch as bore any ancient grudge to *Cæſar*, repaired to the Senate: by whoſe Concourſe and Votes the weaker ſort were terrified, the irreſolute confirmed, and the greater part deprived of the liberty of ſpeaking their mind freely. *L. Piſo* the Cenſor, and *L. Roſcius* the Prætor, offered to go and acquaint *Cæſar* with the ſtate of Affairs, demanding only ſix Days for that purpoſe. Some were for ſending Deputies to him, to inform him of the Senate's Diſpoſition.

III. BUT all theſe Propoſals were rejected, becauſe the Conſul, *Scipio*, and *Cato*, declared againſt them. *Cato* was incited by the remembrance of an old Quarrel, and the diſappointment he had ſuſtained in ſtanding Candidate for the Prætorſhip with *Cæſar*. *Lentulus* was oppreſſed with Debt, and flattered himſelf with the Command of Armies, the Government of Provinces, and the Largeſſes of the Kings for whom he ſhould procure the title of Allies and Friends of the *Roman* People. He was beſides wont to boaſt among thoſe of his own Party, that he doubted not of becoming a ſecond *Sylla*, in whom the whole Authority of the Commonwealth ſhould center. *Scipio* entertained the ſame hope of Commands and Governments, which he expected to ſhare with his Son-in-law *Pompey:* add to this his dread of a Proſecution; his Vanity and Self-Conceit; and the Flatteries and Applauſes of his Friends, who at that time bore a conſiderable ſway in the Commonwealth and Courts of Juſtice. *Pompey* himſelf, inſtigated by *Cæſar*'s Enemies, and not able to endure an Equal in dignity, was now entirely alienated from him, and had joined with their common Adverſaries, moſt of whom *Cæſar* had contracted during his Affinity with *Pompey*. Beſides, the fraudulent Step he had taken, in detaining for the Purpoſes of his own Ambition, the two Legions deſtined to ſerve in *Aſia* and *Syria*, determined him to uſe all his Endeavours to bring on a civil War.

IV. THUS nothing but Tumult and Violence was to be ſeen in the publick Debates. *Cæſar*'s Friends had no time given them to inform him of what paſſed. Even the Tribunes themſelves were not exempt from Danger, nor durſt they have recourſe to that right of Interceſſion, which *Sylla* had left them as the laſt Bulwark of Liberty: inſomuch that the ſeventh Day after entering upon their Office, they ſaw themſelves obliged to provide for their Safety; whereas in former times, the moſt turbulent and ſeditious Tribunes never began to apprehend themſelves in Danger, 'till towards the eighth Month of their Adminiſtration. Recourſe was had to that rigid and ultimate Decree, which

was

was never uſed but in the greateſt Extremities, when the City was threatned with Ruin and Conflagration: " That the Conſuls, the Prætors, the Tribunes " of the People, and the Proconſuls that were near *Rome*, ſhould take care " that the Commonwealth received no Detriment." This Decree paſſed the ſeventh of *January*; ſo that during the five firſt Days in which it was permitted the Senate to aſſemble, after *Lentulus*'s entrance upon the Conſulſhip (for two Days are always appropriated to the holding of the Comitia) the moſt ſevere and rigorous Reſolutions were taken, both in relation to *Cæſar*'s Government, and the Tribunes of the People, Men of eminent Worth and Dignity. The Tribunes immediately quitted the City, and fled to *Cæſar*, who was then at *Ravenna*, waiting an Anſwer to his late Demands, whoſe Equity he hoped would diſpoſe all Parties to entertain thoughts of Peace.

V. THE following Days the Senate aſſembled without the City, where *Pompey* confirmed every thing he had before intimated by the Mouth of *Scipio*. He applauded the Reſolution and Courage of the Senators, acquainted them with the ſtate of his Forces, that he had ten Legions already in Arms, and was beſides well informed, that *Cæſar*'s Troops were by no means ſatisfied with their General, nay had even refuſed to ſupport and follow him. It was then propoſed in the Senate; that Troops ſhould be raiſed over all *Italy*; that *Fauſtus Sylla* ſhould be ſent Proprætor into *Mauritania*; that *Pompey* ſhould be ſupplied with Money out of the publick Treaſury; and that King *Juba* ſhould be declared Friend and Ally of the People of *Rome*: but *Marcellus* oppoſed the laſt of theſe; and *Philippus*, Tribune of the People, would not agree to the Proprætorſhip of *Sylla*. The other Motions were approved by the Senate. The Affair of the Provinces was next decided; two of which were Conſular, the reſt Prætorian. *Syria* fell to the ſhare of *Scipio*; and *Gaul* fell to *L. Domitius*. *Philippus* and *Marcellus* were ſet aſide, through the private views of the prevailing Party. The reſt of the Provinces were aſſigned to Men of Prætorian Rank; who waited not to have their Nomination confirmed by the People, as had been the Cuſtom in former Years; but after taking the uſual Oath, departed for their ſeveral Commands in a military Habit. The Conſuls left the City, a thing unheard of 'till that time; and Lictors were ſeen walking before private Men in the Forum and Capitol, contrary to the expreſs Practice of former Ages. Troops were levied over all *Italy*; Arms enjoined; Money demanded of the Colonies and free Towns, and even taken from the very Temples: in fine, neither divine nor human Rights were regarded.

VI. *CÆSAR* having Intelligence of theſe Proceedings, addreſſed himſelf to his Troops: " He took notice of the many Injuries he had received on all " Occaſions from his Enemies, who had alienated *Pompey* from him, by filling " him with an Envy and Jealouſy of his Reputation, tho' he had done every " thing in his power to promote his Glory, and favour his Advancement to " the higheſt Dignities. He complained of the new Precedent introduced " into the Commonwealth, in checking and hindering by Arms the oppoſition " of the Tribunes, which of late Years had been reſtored to its wonted Force. " That *Sylla*, who had almoſt annihilated the Tribuneſhip, had yet left it the " liberty of Oppoſition; whereas *Pompey*, who valued himſelf upon the re- " eſtabliſhment of that Office, deprived it now of a Privilege it had always " enjoyed. That the Decree enjoining the Magiſtrates to provide for the " ſafety of the Commonwealth, which implied an Order to the *Roman* People " to repair to Arms, was never wont to be uſed but on occaſion of dangerous

" Laws,

" Laws, ſeditious Meaſures purſued by the Tribunes, or a general ſeceſſion of " the People, when they poſſeſſed themſelves of the Temples and Places of " Strength: Crimes, which in former Ages had been expiated by the Fate of " *Saturninus* and the *Gracchi*. That at preſent nothing of this kind had been " attempted, nor ſo much as thought of; no Law promulged, no Endeavours " uſed to ſeduce the People, no Appearance of Revolt or Diſaffection. He " therefore conjured them to defend againſt the Malice of his Enemies, the " Honour and Reputation of a General, under whom they had ſerved nine " Years with ſo much Advantage to the Commonwealth, gained ſo many " Battles, and ſubdued all *Gaul* and *Germany*." The Soldiers of the thirteenth Legion, who were preſent, and whom he had ſent for in the beginning of the Troubles, (the reſt not being yet arrived,) cried out, that they were determined to maintain the Honour of their General, and to revenge the Wrongs done to the Tribunes.

VII. BEING aſſured of the Good-will of the Soldiers, he marched with that Legion to *Rimini*, where he was met by the Tribunes of the People, who had fled to him for Protection. He ordered the other Legions to quit their Winter-Quarters, and follow him with all expedition. While he was at *Rimini*, young *L. Cæſar*, whoſe Father was one of his Lieutenants, came to him; and after acquainting him with the occaſion of his Journey, added, that he had a private Meſſage to him from *Pompey*, " who was deſirous of clearing himſelf " to *Cæſar*, that he might not interpret thoſe Actions as deſigned to affront him, " which had no other Aim but the good of the Commonwealth: That it had " been his conſtant Maxim, to prefer the intereſt of the Republick to any " private Engagement: That it was worthy of *Cæſar*, to ſacrifice his Paſſion " and Reſentment to the ſame noble Motive; and not prejudice the Common- " wealth, by puſhing too far his Revenge againſt his private Enemies." He added ſomething more to the ſame purpoſe, mingled with Excuſes for *Pompey*. The Prætor *Roſcius* joined likewiſe in the Negotiation, declaring he was commiſſioned ſo to do.

VIII. THO' all this tended little to redreſs the Injuries of which *Cæſar* complained: yet conſidering theſe as proper Perſons by whom to tranſmit his Thoughts; he begged of them, that as they had not ſcrupled to bring *Pompey*'s Demands to him, they would likewiſe carry back his Propoſals to *Pompey*; that, if poſſible, ſo ſmall a Labour might put an end to mighty Differences, and deliver all *Italy* from the fear of a civil War. He told them: " That the " intereſt of the Commonwealth had always been dearer to him than Life; but " he could not help grieving at the Malice of his Enemies, who had fruſtrated " the good Intentions of the *Roman* People in his favour, by cutting off ſix " Months from his Command, and obliging him to return to *Rome* to ſue for " the Conſulſhip, tho' a Law had been made diſpenſing with his perſonal At- " tendance: That he had yet, for the ſake of the Commonwealth, patiently " ſubmitted to this Aſſault upon his Honour: That even his Propoſal of diſ- " banding the Armies on both ſides, which he had made by a Letter to the " Senate, had been rejected: That new Levies were making over all *Italy*: " That two Legions, which had been taken from him under pretence of the " *Parthian* War, were ſtill retained in the ſervice of his Enemies: That the " whole State was in Arms. What could all this aim at but his Deſtruction? " That nevertheleſs he was ready to agree to any Propoſal, and expoſe himſelf " to any Danger, for the ſake of his Country. Let *Pompey* go to his Govern-

" ment:

" ment: let all the Armies be disbanded: let every body throughout *Italy* lay " down their Arms: let every thing that participates of Terror and Force be " removed: let the Elections of Magistrates be made with perfect Freedom; " and let the Republick be administred by the Authority of the Senate and " People. And the better to settle all these Articles, and corroborate them " with the sanction of an Oath, let either *Pompey* himself draw nearer, or " suffer *Cæsar* to approach him; as all their Differences may be most easily " terminated by a Conference."

IX. *ROSCIUS* and *L. Cæsar*, having received this Answer, departed for *Capua*, where they found *Pompey* and the Consuls, and laid before them *Cæsar*'s Proposals. After deliberating upon the Affair, they sent a Reply in writing by the same Messengers, the Purport of which was: " That *Cæsar* " should quit *Rimini*, return to *Gaul*, and disband his Army; which Condi- " tions performed, *Pompey* would go into *Spain*. In the mean time, 'till " *Cæsar* gave security for the performance of what he had promised, neither " *Pompey* nor the Consuls would discontinue the Levies."

X. IT was by no means a fair Proposal, that *Cæsar* should be obliged to quit *Rimini*, and return to *Gaul*; while *Pompey* held Provinces and Legions that were none of his: that he should dismiss his Army; whilst the other was levying Troops: and that only a general Promise of going into *Spain* should be given, without fixing a Day for his departure; by which Evasion, was he to be found in *Italy*, even at the expiration of *Cæsar*'s Consulship, he could not yet be charged with breach of Faith. His forbearing too to appoint a time for a Conference, and declining to approach nearer, gave little reason to hope for a Peace. He therefore sent *Antony* to *Arretium* with five Cohorts; remained himself at *Rimini* with two, where he resolved to levy Troops; and seizing *Pisaurum*, *Fanum*, and *Ancona*, left a Cohort in each for a Garrison.

XI. MEAN-TIME being informed, that *Thermus* the Prætor had entered *Iguvium* with five Cohorts, and was endeavouring to fortify the Town; as he knew the Inhabitants to be well inclined to his Interest, he detached *Curio* thither with three Cohorts, drawn from *Pisaurum* and *Rimini*. Upon this *Thermus*, who could not confide in the Townsmen, retired with his Cohorts, and quitted the Place: but his Troops abandoning him in their march, returned severally to their own Homes. *Curio* was received into the Place with great demonstrations of Joy: which being reported to *Cæsar*, as he found he had the Good-will of the Colonies and free Towns, he drew the Cohorts of the thirteenth Legion out of Garrison, and marched to *Auximum*, which *Attius* held with a Body of Troops, and whence he had dispatched Senators to levy Forces over all *Picenum*. *Cæsar*'s arrival being known, the chief Citizens of *Auximum* went in a Body to *Attius Varus*, and told him: " That it did not " belong to them to determine on which side Justice lay; but that neither " they, nor the other municipal Towns could endure to see their Gates shut " against *Cæsar*, who by his great Actions had deserved so well of the Com- " monwealth: That therefore he would do well to consult his own Safety " and Reputation." *Attius*, moved by this Speech, drew off his Garrison and fled. But some of *Cæsar*'s first Ranks pursuing him, obliged him to stop; and a Battle ensuing, he was deserted by his Men. Some of the Troops returned home; the rest went over to *Cæsar*, and brought along with

them *L. Pupius*, firſt Centurion of the Legion, who had formerly held the ſame rank in *Pompey*'s Army. *Cæſar* commended *Attius*'s Soldiers; diſmiſſed *Pupius*; returned thanks to the Inhabitants of *Auximum*; and promiſed to retain always a grateful remembrance of their Attachment.

XII. THESE things being reported at *Rome*, the Conſternation was ſo great over the whole City, that when the Conſul *Lentulus* came to the Treaſury to deliver out the Money to *Pompey*, in conſequence of the Decree of the Senate, he ſcarce waited the opening of the inner Door, but precipitately left the Place, upon a falſe Rumour that *Cæſar* was approaching, and ſome of his Cavalry already in view. He was ſoon followed by his Collegue *Marcellus*, and the greater part of the Magiſtrates. *Pompey* had left the Town the Day before, and was upon his way to *Apulia*, where he had quartered the Legions he had received from *Cæſar*. The Levies were diſcontinued within the City, and no place appeared ſecure on this ſide *Capua*. Here at laſt they took Courage and rallied, and began to renew their Levies in the Colonies round about, which had been ſent thither by the *Julian* Law. *Lentulus* ſummoned into the Forum the Gladiators whom *Cæſar* had ordered to be trained up there, gave them their liberty, furniſhed them with Horſes, and commanded them to follow him. But being afterwards admoniſhed by his Friends that this Step was univerſally condemned, he diſperſed them into the neighbouring Towns of *Campania*, to keep garriſon there.

XIII. *CÆSAR* mean-while leaving *Auximum*, traverſed the whole Country of *Picenum*; where he was joyfully received in all parts by the Inhabitants, who furniſhed his Army with every thing neceſſary. Even *Cingulum* itſelf, a Town founded by *Labienus*, and built at his own expence, ſent Deputies to him with an offer of their Submiſſion and Services. He demanded a certain number of Soldiers, which were ſent immediately. Meantime the twelfth Legion joined him; and with theſe two he marched to *Aſculum*, a Town of *Picenum*. Here *Lentulus Spinther* commanded with ten Cohorts; who hearing of *Cæſar*'s Approach, quitted the Place with his Troops, who almoſt all deſerted him upon the march. Being left with only a few, he fell in with *Vibullius Rufus*, whom *Pompey* had ſent into *Picenum*, to encourage his Followers in thoſe parts. *Vibullius* underſtanding from him the ſtate of Affairs in *Picenum*, diſmiſſed *Lentulus*, and took the Soldiers under his Command. He likewiſe drew together from the neighbouring Provinces as many as he could meet with of *Pompey*'s Levies; among the reſt *Ulcilles Hirus*, who was flying with ſix Cohorts from *Camerinum*, where they had been quartered. Out of all theſe he formed thirteen Cohorts, with which he poſted by great Journeys to *Corfinium*, where *Domitius Ahenobarbus* commanded; whom he informed that *Cæſar* was approaching with two Legions. *Domitius* had already got together with great expedition twenty Cohorts from *Alba*, the Country of the *Marſi*, *Peligni*, and the neighbouring Provinces.

XIV. *CÆSAR* having made himſelf maſter of *Aſculum*, and obliged *Lentulus* to retire, ordered the Soldiers who had deſerted him to be ſought after, and new Levies to be made. He remained only one Day there, to ſettle what related to Proviſions, and then purſued his march to *Corfinium*. Upon his arrival there, he found five Cohorts, whom *Domitius* had detached from the Garriſon, employed in breaking down a Bridge about three Miles diſtant from

from the Town. But *Cæſar*'s advanced Parties attacking them, they quickly abandoned the Bridge, and retired to *Corfinium*. *Cæſar* having paſſed with his Legions, halted before the Town, and encamped under the Walls.

XV. UPON this *Domitius* engaged by great Rewards Perſons well acquainted with the Country, to carry Letters into *Apulia* to *Pompey*, wherein he earneſty requeſted him to come to his Aid. He told him, "That it would "be eaſy, in that cloſe Country, to ſhut up *Cæſar* between two Armies, and "cut off his Proviſions: that unleſs this Courſe was followed, he himſelf, "with above thirty Cohorts, and a great Number of Senators and *Roman* "Knights, would be expoſed to imminent danger." Mean-while having encouraged his Men, he diſpoſed Engines along the Walls, appointed every one his particular Poſt, and the more to animate them, promiſed each Soldier four Acres of Land out of his own Eſtate, and in proportion to every Centurion and Volunteer.

XVI. MEAN-TIME *Cæſar* was informed that the People of *Sulmona*, a Town ſeven Miles diſtant from *Corfinium*, deſired to put themſelves under his Protection, but were reſtrained by *Q. Lucretius* a Senator, and *Attius* a *Pelignian*, who held them in ſubjection with a Garriſon of ſeven Cohorts. He therefore diſpatched *M. Antony* thither, with five Cohorts of the ſeventh Legion, whoſe Enſigns were no ſooner deſcried from the Walls of *Sulmona*, than the Gates were thrown open, and the whole People in a Body, both Soldiers and Townſmen, came out to congratulate *Antony* on his Arrival. *Lucretius* and *Attius* endeavoured to eſcape over the Wall: but *Attius* being taken, and brought to *Antony*, requeſted that he might be ſent to *Cæſar*. *Antony* returned the ſame Day, bringing along with him the Cohorts and *Attius*. *Cæſar* joined theſe Cohorts to his Army, and ſet *Attius* at liberty.

XVII. *CÆSAR* reſolved to employ the three firſt Days in ſtrongly fortifying his Camp, in procuring Corn from the neigbouring Towns, and waiting the arrival of the reſt of his Forces. During this ſpace the eighth Legion joined him, with two and twenty Cohorts of new Levies from *Gaul*, and about three hundred Horſe from the King of *Noricum*. This obliged him to form a ſecond Camp on the other ſide of the Town, under the Command of *Curio*. The remaining Days were ſpent in drawing a Line with Redoubts round the Place, which Work was nearly compleated when the Meſſengers that had been ſent to *Pompey* returned.

XVIII. *DOMITIUS* peruſing the Diſpatches, thought proper to diſſemble the Contents, and declared in Council, that *Pompey* would ſpeedily come to their Aſſiſtance. Mean-time he exhorted them to behave with Courage, and provide every thing neceſſary for a vigorous Defence. He conferred however privately with a few of his moſt intimate Friends, and in concert with them determined upon Flight. But as his Looks and Speech were found to diſagree; as he behaved not with his uſual Compoſure and Firmneſs; and was obſerved, contrary to Cuſtom, to be much in ſecret Conference with his Friends; avoiding publick Appearances, and Councils of War: it was not poſſible for the Truth to remain any longer concealed. For *Pompey* had wrote back; "That he could not put all to hazard for his ſake; that he had "neither adviſed nor conſented to his ſhutting himſelf up in *Corfinium*; that "he muſt therefore endeavour to extricate himſelf as well as he could, and

"come

" come and join him with all his Forces." But as *Cæſar* had inveſted and carried his Lines round the Place, this Retreat was now become impracticable.

XIX. *DOMITIUS*'s Deſign being diſcovered, the Soldiers, who were at *Corfinium*, began to aſſemble in the Evening, and by means of their Tribunes, Centurions, and other Officers, made known their Thoughts to one another: " That they were beſieged by *Cæſar*, who had already in a manner " compleated his Works: that their General *Domitius*, in whoſe Promiſes of " Aſſiſtance they had placed their chief Hope, abandoning all Concern for " their Safety, was contriving to eſcape privately by flight: that it was there- " fore incumbent upon them to look alſo to their own Preſervation." The *Marſi* at firſt oppoſed this Reſolution, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the ſtrongeſt part of the Town; nay the Diſpute was ſo warm, that it almoſt came to be decided by the Sword. But ſhortly after, being made acquainted with *Domitius*'s intended Flight, of which before they had no knowledge; they all in a Body ſurrounded *Domitius*, ſecured his Perſon, and ſent Deputies to *Cæſar*; " That they were ready to open their Gates, receive his Orders, and deliver up " *Domitius* alive."

XX. THOUGH *Cæſar* was fully ſenſible of how great importance it was to get poſſeſſion of the Town immediately, and join the Garriſon to his own Army; leſt by Largeſſes, Promiſes of ſpeedy Relief, or falſe Reports, any Change ſhould be produced; as in War great Revolutions often ariſe from very trifling Cauſes: yet fearing that if he introduced his Soldiers in the dark, they would take that Opportunity to plunder the Town, he ſent back the Deputies with thanks for their proffer, reſolving to have the Walls and Gates watched with great care. To that end he diſpoſed his Men along the Works, not at certain diſtances as uſual, but in one continued Rank, ſo as to touch each other, and compleatly inveſt the Town. He ordered the military Tribunes, and Officers of the Cavalry, to patrol about the Works, and not only be on their Guard againſt Sallies, but even take care to prevent the eſcape of particular Perſons. And indeed ſo alert and vigilant were the Soldiers, that not a Man cloſed his Eyes that Night; each expecting the Event with impatience, and carrying his Thoughts from one thing to another; what would be the Fate of the *Corfinians*, what of *Domitius*, what of *Lentulus* and the other illuſtrious Perſons in the Place: in fine, what was like to be the iſſue of ſo complicated a Scene.

XXI. ABOUT the fourth Watch of the Night, *Lentulus Spinther* called from the Wall to the Guard, and deſired to be conducted to *Cæſar*. His Requeſt being granted, he came out of the Town, attended by ſome of *Domitius*'s Soldiers, who never left him till they had conducted him into *Cæſar*'s preſence. " He begged him to ſpare his Life, and pardon the Injuries he had " done him, in conſideration of their former Friendſhip. He owned the " many Obligations he had laid him under, in procuring him an Admiſſion " into the College of Prieſts, obtaining for him the Government of *Spain* " after the expiration of the Prætorſhip, and ſupporting him in the demand " of the Conſulſhip." *Cæſar* interrupted him by ſaying, " That he was not " come out of the Bounds of his Province with an intent to injure any body; " but to repel the Injuries done him by his Enemies; to revenge the Wrongs " of the Tribunes; and to reſtore to the *Roman* People, who were oppreſſed " by

" by a ſmall Faction of the Nobles, their Liberty and Privileges." *Lentulus* encouraged by this Speech, asked leave to return into the Town, " where, he " ſaid, the Aſſurances he had obtained of his own Safety, would contribute " not a little to the conſolation of others, ſome of whom were ſo terrified, that " they were ready to take deſperate Reſolutions." Leave being granted, he departed for the Town.

XXII. AS ſoon as it was light, *Cæſar* ordered before him all the Senators, Senators' Sons, military Tribunes, and *Roman* Knights. There were of Senatorian Rank, *L. Domitius*, *P. Lentulus Spinther*, *L. Vibullius Rufus*, *Sextus Quintilius Varus* Queſtor, *L. Rubrius*; alſo *Domitius*'s Son, and many young Men of Quality, with a great number of *Roman* Knights, and ſome Decurions, or Senators of the neighbouring municipal Towns, who had been ſent for by *Domitius*. As ſoon as they appeared, he gave Orders to ſecure them from the Inſults of the Soldiery; and addreſſing them in few Words, remonſtrated: " That they had made a very ill Requital for the many ſignal Services received " at his hands:" after which he ſet them all at liberty. He likewiſe reſtored to *Domitius* ſix millions of Seſterces, which that General had brought with him to *Corfinium*, and depoſited in the hands of the two Treaſurers of the Town, who ſurrendered it to *Cæſar*. As this was publick Money, aſſigned by *Pompey* to pay the Forces with, *Cæſar* might juſtly have ſeized it; but he was willing to ſhew himſelf generous, as well as merciful. He ordered *Domitius*'s Soldiers to take the uſual Oath to him, decamped that very Day, made the ordinary march; and after ſtaying in all ſeven Days before *Corfinium*, arrived in *Apulia*, through the Territories of the *Marrucini*, *Frentani*, and *Larinates*.

XXIII. *POMPEY* having Intelligence of what paſſed at *Corfinium*, retreated from *Luceria* to *Canuſium*, and thence to *Brunduſium*. He ordered all the new Levies to join him, armed the Shepherds and Slaves, furniſhed them with Horſes, and formed a Body of about three hundred Cavalry. Meanwhile the Prætor *L. Manlius*, flying from *Alba* with ſix Cohorts; and the Prætor *Rutilus Lupus*, from *Tarracina* with three; ſaw *Cæſar*'s Cavalry at a diſtance, commanded by *Bivius Curius*: upon which the Soldiers immediately abandoned the two Prætors, and joined the Troops under the conduct of *Curius*. Several other Parties, flying different ways, fell in, ſome with the Foot, others with the Horſe. *Cn. Magius* of *Cremona*, *Pompey*'s chief Engineer, being taken on his way to *Brunduſium*, was brought to *Cæſar*, who ſent him back to *Pompey* with this Meſſage: " That as he had not yet obtained " an Interview, his Deſign was to come to *Brunduſium*, there to confer with " him in relation to the common Safety, becauſe they would ſoon be able " to diſpatch in a perſonal Treaty, what, if managed by the Interven- " tion of others, could not be hindered from running into a tedious Ne- " gotiation."

XXIV. HAVING diſmiſſed him with theſe Inſtructions, he arrived before *Brunduſium* with ſix Legions, three of which were compoſed of veteran Soldiers, and the reſt of new Levies drawn together upon his march: for as to *Domitius*'s Troops, he had ſent them directly from *Corfinium* to *Sicily*. He found the Conſuls were gone to *Dyrrachium* with great part of the Army, and that *Pompey* remained in *Brunduſium* with twenty Cohorts. Nor was it certainly known, whether he continued there with deſign to keep poſſeſſion of

Brunduſium, that he might be maſter of the whole *Adriatick* Sea, the extreme parts of *Italy*, and the Country of *Greece*, in order to make War on both ſides the Gulph; or for want of Shipping to tranſport his Men. Fearing therefore that it was ſtill his Intention to keep footing in *Italy*, he reſolved to deprive him of the Advantages he might reap from the Port of *Brunduſium*. The Works he contrived for this purpoſe were as follows. He carried on a Mole on either ſide the mouth of the Haven where the entrance was narroweſt, and the Water ſhallow. But as this Work could not be carried quite acroſs the Port, by reaſon of the great depth of the Sea, he prepared double Floats of Timber, thirty Foot ſquare, which were each ſecured by four Anchors from the four Corners, to enable them to reſiſt the fury of the Waves. Theſe extending all the way between the two Moles, were covered over with Earth and Faſcines, that the Soldiers might paſs and repaſs with eaſe, and have firm footing to defend them. The front and ſides were armed with a Parapet of Hurdles; and every fourth Float had a Tower of two Stories, the better to guard the Work from Fire, and the ſhocks of Veſſels.

XXV. AGAINST theſe Preparations *Pompey* made uſe of ſeveral large Ships which he found in the Port of *Brunduſium*: and having fitted them with Towers of three Stories, which he filled with a great number of Engines and Darts, let them looſe upon *Cæſar*'s Floats, to break through the Staccado, and interrupt the Works. Thus daily Skirmiſhes happened with Darts, Arrows, and Slings at a diſtance. Amidſt theſe Hoſtilities, *Cæſar*'s Thoughts were ſtill bent upon Peace: and tho' he could not but wonder that *Magius*, whom he had ſent with Propoſals to *Pompey*, was not yet returned with an Anſwer; and even ſaw his Deſigns and Undertakings retarded by his frequent Offers of this kind; he nevertheleſs ſtill perſevered in theſe peaceable Reſolutions. Accordingly he diſpatched *Caninius Rebilus*, one of his Lieutenants, a Relation and intimate Friend of *Scribonius Libo*, to confer with him on this Subject. He charged him, to exhort that Nobleman to think ſeriouſly of Peace, and if poſſible procure an Interview between him and *Pompey*. Could this be effected, he ſhewed there was the greateſt Ground to believe, that Peace would ſoon be concluded on reaſonable Terms; the Honour and Reputation of which would in a manner wholly redound to *Libo*, if by his Mediation both Parties ſhould be prevailed with to lay down their Arms. *Libo*, after conferring with *Caninius*, waited on *Pompey*. Soon after he returned with this Anſwer; that the Conſuls were abſent, without whom *Pompey* had no power to treat of an Accommodation. Thus *Cæſar* having often tried in vain to bring about a Peace, thought it now time to drop that Deſign, and bend all his thoughts to War.

XXVI. *CÆSAR* having ſpent nine Days about his Works, had now half finiſhed the Staccado, when the Ships employed in the firſt Embarkation, being ſent back by the Conſuls from *Dyrrachium*, returned to *Brunduſium*. *Pompey*, either alarmed at *Cæſar*'s Works, or becauſe from the firſt he had determined to relinquiſh *Italy*, no ſooner ſaw the Tranſports arrive, than he prepared to carry over the reſt of his Forces. And the better to ſecure himſelf againſt *Cæſar*, and prevent his Troops from breaking into the Town during the Embarkation, he walled up the Gates; barricaded the Streets; or cut Ditches acroſs them, filled with pointed Stakes, and covered with Hurdles and Earth. The two Streets which led to the Port, and which he left open for the paſſage of his Men, were fortified with a double Paliſado of very ſtrong well ſharpened Stakes.



A. *Brundusium.* B. *The Haven.* C. *Cæsar's two Moles.* D. *The Works by which they were defended*
Mouth of the Haven. G. *The square Floats covered with Earth and Facines, and defended by To*
I. *An Island facing the Mouth of the Port.* K. *Six Quadriremes stationed at the Entrance of th*

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

lefended on the Side of the Town. **E.** *The Works defending them towards the Sea.* **F.** *The*
d by Towers of two Stories. **H.** *The Place where the Paſsage to the Port was narrowest*
ce of the Port.

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Stakes. Theſe Preparations being made, he ordered the Soldiers to embark with great Silence, having placed on the Walls and Towers ſome ſelect Archers and Slingers, who were to wait 'till all the Troops had got aboard, and then retire, upon a Signal given, to ſome ſmall Ships that waited them at a convenient diſtance.

XXVII. THE People of *Brunduſium*, provoked by the Affronts they had received from *Pompey*, and the Inſults of his Soldiers, wiſhed well to *Cæſar*'s Cauſe: and having notice of *Pompey*'s intended departure; while the Soldiers were buſied with the care of embarking, found means to ſignify it from the tops of their Houſes. *Cæſar*, upon this Intelligence, ordered ſcaling Ladders to be prepared, and the Soldiers to repair to their Arms, that he might not loſe any opportunity of acting. *Pompey* weighed Anchor a little before Night, and gave the Signal for recalling the Soldiers that were upon the Walls, who repaired with all expedition to the Ships prepared for them. Mean time the ſcaling Ladders are applied to the Walls, and *Cæſar*'s Troops enter the Town. But being informed by the *Brunduſians* of the Snares and Ditches provided for them by the Enemy, they were obliged to take a great Circuit, which gave *Pompey* time enough to put to ſea. Two Tranſports only, impeded by *Cæſar*'s Mole, were taken with the Troops on board.

XXVIII. THO' *Cæſar* was fully ſenſible, that to finiſh the War at a blow, he muſt paſs the Sea immediately, and endeavour to come up with *Pompey*, before he could draw his tranſmarine Forces together; yet he dreaded the delay and length of time that ſuch a Project might require: becauſe *Pompey* having carried with him all the Ships on that Coaſt, rendered the preſent execution of the Deſign impracticable. He muſt therefore wait the arrival of Ships from *Picenum*, *Sicily*, and the remoter Coaſts of *Gaul*; which was a tedious Buſineſs, and, at that ſeaſon of the Year, ſubject to great Uncertainty. It appeared likewiſe of dangerous Conſequence, to ſuffer a veteran Army, and the two *Spains*, one of which was wholly devoted to *Pompey*, to ſtrengthen themſelves in his Rival's Intereſt; to let them grow powerful by levies of Horſe and Foot; and leave *Gaul* and *Italy* open to their Attacks in his abſence. He determined, therefore, to lay aſide, for the preſent, the deſign of purſuing *Pompey*, and turn all his thoughts towards *Spain*. He ordered the Magiſtrates of the municipal Towns to aſſemble all the Veſſels they could, and ſend them to *Brunduſium*. He ſent *Valerius*, one of his Lieutenants, into *Sardinia*, with one Legion; and the Proprætor *Curio* into *Sicily* with three: ordering him, as ſoon as he had maſtered *Sicily*, to paſs over with his Army into *Africa*.

XXIX. *M. COTTA* commanded in *Sardinia*; *M. Cato* in *Sicily*; and *Africa* had fallen by lot to *Tubero*. The Inhabitants of *Cagliari*, hearing of *Valerius*'s Commiſſion, of their own accord, before he had left *Italy*, drove *Cotta* out of their City; who terrified by the unanimous Oppoſition he met with from the Province, fled into *Africa*. In *Sicily*, *Cato* applied himſelf with great diligence to the refitting of old Ships, and building of new. He ſent his Lieutenants to raiſe Forces in *Lucania* and the Country of the *Brutians*, and ordered the States of *Sicily* to furniſh him with a certain number of Horſe and Foot. When theſe Preparations were almoſt compleated, being informed of *Curio*'s arrival, he called his chief Officers together, and com-
" plained, that he was betrayed and abandoned by *Pompey*, who without
" any

" any previous Preparation had involved the Commonwealth in an unneceſ-
" ſary War; and upon being queſtioned by himſelf and others in the Senate,
" had aſſured them, that he was abundantly able to ſuſtain it." Having thus declared his Mind, he quitted the Province, which by this means ſubmitted without trouble to *Curio*, as *Sardinia* had before done to *Valerius*. *Tubero* arriving in *Africa*, found *Attius Varus* in poſſeſſion of that Province; who after the loſs of his Cohorts at *Auximum*, as we have ſhewn above, had fled into thoſe parts, and, with the conſent of the Natives, taken upon him the Command. Here he had found means to levy two Legions, by his knowledge of the People and Country, where he had been Governor ſome Years before, after the expiration of his Prætorſhip. *Tubero* coming before *Utica* with his Fleet, was forbid the Harbour and Town; nor could he even obtain leave for his Son to land, though he had a fit of Sickneſs upon him, but was obliged to weigh Anchor and be gone.

XXX. THESE Affairs diſpatched, *Cæſar*, that his Troops might enjoy ſome Repoſe, cantoned them in the neareſt Towns, and ſet out himſelf for *Rome*. There he aſſembled the Senate, and after complaining of the Injuries of his Enemies, told them, " that he had never affected extraordinary Ho-
" nours, but waited patiently the time preſcribed by the Laws, to ſolicit for a
" ſecond Conſulſhip, to which every *Roman* Citizen had a right to aſpire:
" That the People, with the concurrence of their Tribunes, (in ſpite of the
" Attempts of his Enemies, and the vigorous Oppoſition of *Cato*, who en-
" deavoured, according to Cuſtom, to ſpin out the time in ſpeaking,) had
" permitted him to ſtand Candidate though abſent, and that even in the Con-
" ſulſhip of *Pompey*: who, if he diſapproved of the Decree, why did he let it
" paſs? but if he allowed it, why now oppoſe the execution? He ſet before
" them his Moderation, in voluntarily propoſing that both Parties ſhould lay
" down their Arms, by which he muſt have been himſelf diveſted of his
" Government and Command. He diſplayed the Malice of his Enemies,
" who ſought to impoſe Terms upon him, to which they would not ſubmit
" themſelves; and choſe rather to involve the State in a civil War, than part
" with their Armies and Provinces. He enlarged upon the Injury they had
" done him, in taking away two of his Legions, and their Cruelty and Inſolence,
" in violating the Authority of the Tribunes. He ſpoke of his many offers
" of Peace, his frequent deſire of an Interview, and the continual Refuſals he
" had received. For all theſe Reaſons, he requeſted and conjured them to un-
" dertake the Adminiſtration of the Republick, jointly with him. But if
" they declined it through Fear, he had no Intention to force ſo great a Bur-
" den upon them, and would take the whole Charge alone. That in the
" mean time it would be proper to ſend a Deputation to *Pompey*, to treat
" of an Accommodation: Nor was he frighted at the Difficulty *Pompey* had
" ſtarted ſome time before in the Senate; that to ſend Deputies was to acknow-
" ledge the Superiority of him to whom they were ſent, and a ſign of Timi-
" dity in the ſender. That this was a little low way of thinking; and that,
" in the ſame manner as he had endeavoured at a ſuperiority in Action, he
" would alſo ſtrive to be ſuperior in Juſtice and Equity."

XXXI. THE Senate liked the Propoſal of a Deputation to *Pompey*: but the great Difficulty was, to find Deputies; every one, out of fear, refuſing to charge himſelf with that Commiſſion. For *Pompey*, at his departure from *Rome*, had declared in the Senate: " That he would eſteem thoſe who ſtayed
" behind,



A. *The River Sicoris*. B. *Fabius's two Bridges over the Sicoris four Miles distant from each other.*
and Petreius. G. *Two of Fabius's Legions*. H. *Four Legions of Afranius and Petreius*. I. *Two Legions wh*
head of all his Forces drawn up in three Lines. L. *Afranius with his Forces*. M. *A Rising Ground whi*

other. C. *Fabius's Camp.* D. *Afranius's Bridge near Lerida.* E. *Lerida.* F. *The Camp of Afranius*
ions which Fabius sent by the further Bridge to sustain his Party. K. *Cæsar marching to Lerida at y*
nd which Afranius disputes with Cæsar & at last gets Posſeſsion of. N. *Cæsar's Camp.* O. *The River*
Cinga

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" behind, as no leſs guilty than thoſe in *Cæſar*'s Camp." Thus three Days were ſpent in Debates and Excuſes. The Tribune *L. Metellus* had likewiſe been ſuborned by *Cæſar*'s Enemies to traverſe this Deſign, and hinder whatever he ſhould propoſe. Which *Cæſar* coming to underſtand, and that he only waſted his time to no purpoſe; he ſet out from *Rome*, without effecting what he had intended, and arrived in further *Gaul*.

XXXII. HERE he was informed, that *Pompey* had ſent into *Spain Vibullius Rufus*; the ſame who a few Days before had been made Priſoner at *Corfinium*, and ſet at liberty by *Cæſar*: that *Domitius* was gone to take poſſeſſion of *Marſeilles*, with ſeven Gallies, which he had fitted out at *Igilium* and *Coſanum*, and manned with his Slaves, Freedmen, and Labourers: That the Deputies of the above-mentioned State, young Men of the firſt Quality, (whom *Pompey*, at his departure from *Rome*, had exhorted not to ſuffer the memory of his paſt Services to their Country to be blotted out by thoſe lately received from *Cæſar*,) had been ſent before, to prepare the way for his Reception. In conſequence of their Remonſtrances, the Inhabitants of *Marſeilles* ſhut their Gates againſt *Cæſar*, and ſummoned to their Aſſiſtance the *Albici*, a barbarous People, who had long been under their Protection, and inhabited the adjoining Mountains. They brought Proviſions from the neighbouring Country and Caſtles, appointed Work-ſhops for the making of Arms, refitted their Navy, and repaired their Walls and Gates.

XXXIII. *CÆSAR* ſending for fifteen of the principal Men of the City, exhorted them not to be the firſt to begin the War, but to be ſwayed rather by the Authority of all *Italy*, than the will of one particular Perſon. He forgot not ſuch other Conſiderations as ſeemed moſt likely to bring them to reaſon. The Deputies returning into the Town, brought back this Anſwer from their Senate: " That they ſaw the *Romans* divided into two Parties; and it did not " belong to them to decide ſuch a Quarrel: That at the head of theſe Parties " were *Pompey* and *Cæſar*, both Patrons of their City; the one having added " to it the Country of the *Volcæ Arecomici* and *Helvians*; the other, after " the reduction of *Gaul*, conſiderably augmented its Territories and Revenues: " That as they were therefore equally indebted to both, it became them not to " aid the one againſt the other; but to remain neuter, and grant neither an " admittance into their City or Port."

XXXIV. WHILST theſe things were in agitation, *Domitius* arrived at *Marſeilles* with his Fleet; and being received into the Town, was appointed Governor, and charged with the whole Adminiſtration of the War. By his Order, they ſent out their Fleet to cruiſe round the Coaſts; ſeized and brought in all the Merchant Veſſels they could find; and made uſe of the Nails, Rigging, and Timber of ſuch as were unfit for Service, to repair the reſt. They depoſited in publick Granaries all the Corn that was to be found in the City, and ſecured whatever elſe they thought might be ſerviceable to them in caſe of a Siege. *Cæſar* provoked at theſe Preparations, brought three Legions before the Town; began to erect Towers and Galleries; and gave Orders for building twelve Gallies at *Arles*: which being finiſhed, lanched, and brought to *Marſeilles*, within thirty Days from the cutting of the Wood they were compoſed of, he put them under the Command of *D. Brutus*; and having directed the manner of the Siege, left the care of it to *C. Trebonius* his Lieutenant.

XXXV. DURING theſe Orders and Preparations, he ſent *C. Fabius* before him into *Spain*, with three Legions that had wintered about *Narbonne*; charging him to ſecure with all diligence the paſſage of the *Pyrenæan* Mountains, which was at that time guarded by a Party of *Afranius*'s Army. His other Legions, whoſe Quarters were more remote, had orders to follow as faſt as they could. *Fabius*, according to his Inſtructions, having made great diſpatch, forced the Paſſes of the *Pyrenees*; and by long marches came up with *Afranius*'s Army.

XXXVI. *POMPEY* had then three Lieutenants in *Spain*; *Afranius*, *Petreius*, and *Varro*. The firſt of theſe was at the head of three Legions, and governed the nearer *Spain*. The other two had each two Legions, and commanded; the one from the *Caſtilian* Foreſt to the *Anas*; the other from the *Anas*, quite through *Luſitania*, and the Territories of the *Vettones*. Theſe three Lieutenants, upon the arrival of *Vibullius Rufus*, whom *Pompey* had ſent into *Spain*, as we have ſeen above; conſulted together, and agreed; that *Petreius* ſhould join *Afranius* with his two Legions; and that *Varro* ſhould ſtay and ſecure further *Spain*. Theſe Reſolutions being taken; *Petreius* levied Horſe and Foot in *Luſitania*; and *Afranius* in *Celtiberia*, *Cantabria*, and the barbarous Nations bordering upon the Ocean. When the Levies were compleated, *Petreius* ſpeedily joined *Afranius* through the Territories of the *Vettones*; and both reſolved to make *Lerida* the ſeat of the War, becauſe the Country lay convenient for their purpoſe.

XXXVII. WE have already obſerved that *Afranius* had three Legions, and *Petreius* two. Beſides theſe, there were about eighty Cohorts, ſome light, ſome heavy-armed; and five thouſand Horſe, raiſed in both Provinces. *Cæſar* had ſent his Legions before him into *Spain*, with ſix thouſand auxiliary Foot, and three thouſand Horſe, who had ſerved under him in all his former Wars; and he was furniſhed with the like number from *Gaul*, all choſen Troops. For hearing that *Pompey* was coming with his whole Force through *Mauritania* into *Spain*, he ſent circular Letters to all the *Gallick* States, inviting by name thoſe of the moſt known and approved Valour, and in particular a ſelect Body of Mountaineers from *Aquitain*, where it borders upon the *Roman* Province. At the ſame time he borrowed Money from the military Tribunes and Centurions, which he diſtributed among the Soldiers. This Policy was attended with two great Advantages: it bound the Officers to him by the Obligation of Intereſt, and the Soldiers by the tie of Gratitude.

XXXVIII. *FABIUS*, by Letters and Meſſengers, endeavoured to ſound the diſpoſition of the neighbouring States. He had laid two Bridges over the *Sicoris*, four miles diſtant from each other, for the convenience of foraging, having conſumed all the Paſture on this ſide the River. *Pompey*'s Generals did the ſame, with much the like view, which occaſioned frequent Skirmiſhes between the Horſe. Two of *Fabius*'s Legions, which was the ordinary Guard of the Foragers, paſſing one Day according to cuſtom, and the Cavalry and Carriages following; the Bridge broke down on a ſudden, by the violence of the Winds and Floods, and ſeparated them from the reſt of the Army. *Afranius* and *Petreius* perceiving it, by the Faſcines and Hurdles that came down with the Stream; detached immediately four Legions, with all their Cavalry, over the Bridge that lay between the Town and their Camp; and marched to attack *Fabius*'s Legions. Upon this, *L. Plancus*, who commanded the Eſcort, finding himſelf

himſelf hard preſſed; ſeized a riſing Ground; and forming his Men in two Diviſions, poſted them back to back, that he might not be ſurrounded by the Enemies Horſe. By this diſpoſition, tho' inferior in number, he was enabled to ſuſtain the furious Charge of their Legions and Cavalry. During the courſe of the Battle, the Enſigns of two Legions were perceived at a diſtance, which *Fabius* had ſent by the further Bridge to ſuſtain his Party, ſuſpecting what might happen, and that *Pompey*'s Generals would ſeize the Opportunity offered them by Fortune, to fall upon our Men. Their arrival put an end to the Engagement, and both Parties returned to their reſpective Camps.

XXXIX. TWO Days after, *Cæſar* arrived in the Camp with nine hundred Horſe, which he had kept for a Body-guard. He began by re-eſtabliſhing in the night the Bridge which had been broken down, and was not yet quite repaired. Next Day he took a view of the Country, and leaving ſix Cohorts to guard the Bridge, the Camp, and the Baggage, marched with all his Forces in three Lines to *Lerida*, and ſtopped near *Afranius*'s Camp, where he remained ſome time under Arms, and offered him Battle on an even Ground. *Afranius* drew out his Troops, and formed them before his Camp half way down the Hill. *Cæſar* finding that he declined an Engagement, reſolved to encamp within four hundred Paces of the foot of the Mountain; and to hinder his Troops from being alarmed or interrupted in their Works, by ſudden Incurſions from the Enemy; ordered them not to throw up a Rampart, which muſt have appeared and betrayed them at a diſtance; but to cut a Ditch in front, fifteen Foot broad. The firſt and ſecond Lines continued in order of Battle, as had been reſolved from the beginning; and the third carried on the Work behind them unperceived. Thus the whole was compleated, before *Afranius* had the leaſt ſuſpicion of his deſign to encamp there.

XL. IN the evening *Cæſar* retreated with his Legions behind the Ditch, and paſſed the whole Night under Arms. Next Day he carried the Intrenchment quite round his Camp: and becauſe Materials for a Rampart muſt have been fetched from a great diſtance, he contented himſelf for the preſent with a naked Ditch, as the Day before; allotting a Legion to each ſide of the Camp; and keeping the reſt of the Troops under Arms, to cover thoſe who worked. *Afranius* and *Petreius*, to alarm our Men, and diſturb the Works, advanced with their Troops to the foot of the Mountain, and threatned to give Battle. But *Cæſar* truſting to the three Legions under Arms, and the defence of his Ditch, ſtill perſiſted in his Deſign. At laſt, after a ſhort ſtay, and without daring to come forward into the Plain, they retreated again to their Camp. The third Day, *Cæſar* added a Rampart to his Camp, and brought into it the ſix Cohorts, with the Baggage which he had left in his former Camp.

XLI. BETWEEN the City of *Lerida*, and the Hill where *Petreius* and *Afranius* were encamped, was a Plain of about three hundred Paces; in the midſt of which was a riſing Ground, which *Cæſar* wanted to take poſſeſſion of; becauſe, by that means, he could cut off the Enemy's communication with the Town and Bridge, and render the Magazines they had in the Town uſeleſs. In this Hope, he drew out three Legions; and having formed them in order of Battle, commanded the firſt Ranks of one of them to run before, and gain the Place. *Afranius* perceiving his deſign, diſpatched the Cohorts that were upon guard before the Camp, a nearer way to the ſame Eminence. The

Conteſt

Conteſt was ſharply maintained on both ſides: but *Afranius*'s Party, who had firſt got poſſeſſion of the Poſt, obliged our Men to give ground; and being reinforced by freſh Supplies, put them at laſt to rout, and forced them to fly for ſhelter to the Legions.

XLII. THE manner of fighting of *Afranius*'s Soldiers was, to come forward briskly againſt an Enemy, and boldly take poſſeſſion of ſome Poſt; neither taking care to keep their Ranks, nor holding it neceſſary to fight in a cloſe compact Body. If they found themſelves hard puſhed, they thought it no diſhonour to retire and quit their Poſt; following in this the Cuſtom of the *Luſitanians*, and other barbarous Nations; as it almoſt always happens, that Soldiers give into the Manners of the Country where they have long been uſed to make War. This manner of fighting however, as it was new and unexpected, diſordered our Men, who ſeeing the Enemy come forward, without regard to their Ranks, were apprehenſive of being ſurrounded; and yet did not think themſelves at liberty to break their Ranks, or abandon their Enſigns, or quit their Poſt, without ſome very urgent Cauſe. The firſt Ranks therefore being put into diſorder, the Legion in that Wing gave ground, and retired to a neighbouring Hill.

XLIII. *CÆSAR*, contrary to his Expectation, finding the Conſternation like to ſpread through the whole Army, encouraged his Men, and led the ninth Legion to their aſſiſtance. He ſoon put a ſtop to the vigorous and inſulting purſuit of the Enemy, obliged them to turn their Backs, and puſhed them to the very Walls of *Lerida*. But the Soldiers of the ninth Legion, elated with ſucceſs, and eager to repair the Loſs we had ſuſtained, followed the Runaways with ſo much heat, that they were drawn into a Place of diſadvantage, and found themſelves directly under the Hill where the Town ſtood: whence when they endeavoured to retire, the Enemy again facing about, charged vigorouſly from the higher Ground. The Hill was rough, and ſteep on each ſide, extending only ſo far in Breadth, as was ſufficient for drawing up three Cohorts: but they could neither be reinforced in Flank, nor ſuſtained by the Cavalry. The Deſcent from the Town was indeed ſomething eaſier, for about four hundred Paces; which furniſhed our Men with the means of extricating themſelves from the danger into which their Raſhneſs had brought them. Here they bravely maintained the Fight, though with great diſadvantage to themſelves, as well on account of the narrowneſs of the Place, as becauſe being poſted at the foot of the Hill, none of the Enemies Darts fell in vain. Still however they ſupported themſelves by their Courage and Patience, and were not diſheartned by the many Wounds they received. The Enemies Forces increaſed every Moment, freſh Cohorts being ſent from the Camp through the Town, who ſucceeded in the place of thoſe that were fatigued. *Cæſar* was likewiſe obliged to detach ſmall Parties to maintain the Battle, and bring off ſuch as were wounded.

XLIV. THE Fight had now laſted five Hours without intermiſſion, when our Men, oppreſſed by the Multitude of the Enemy, and having ſpent all their Darts, attack'd the Mountain Sword in hand; and overthrowing ſuch as oppoſed them, obliged the reſt to betake themſelves to flight. The Purſuit was continued to the very Walls of *Lerida*, and ſome out of fear took ſhelter in the Town; which gave our Men an opportunity of making good their Retreat. At the ſame time the Cavalry though poſted diſadvantageouſly in a

bottom,

bottom, found means by their Valour to gain the ſummit of the Mountain; and riding between both Armies, hindered the Enemy from harraſſing our Rear. Thus the Engagement was attended with various Turns of Fortune. *Cæſar* loſt about ſeventy Men in the firſt Encounter; among whom was *Q. Fulginius*, firſt Centurion of the *Haſtati* of the fourteenth Legion, who had raiſed himſelf by his Valour to that Rank, through all the inferior Orders. Upwards of ſix hundred were wounded. On *Afranius*'s ſide was ſlain *T. Cæcilius*, firſt Centurion of a Legion; alſo four Centurions of inferior degree, and above two hundred private Men.

XLV. YET ſuch were the Circumſtances of this Day's Action, that both ſides laid claim to the Victory: the *Afranians*, becauſe though allowed to be inferior in Number, they had long ſuſtained our Attack, kept poſſeſſion of the Eminence which occaſioned the Diſpute, and obliged our Men at firſt to give ground: *Cæſar*'s Troops, becauſe they had maintained a fight of five Hours, with a handful of Men, and in a very diſadvantageous Poſt; becauſe they had attacked the Mountain Sword in hand; becauſe they had driven their Adverſaries from the higher Ground, and compelled them to take ſhelter in the Town. Mean-time *Afranius* fortified the Hillock which had been the ſubject of diſpute, with a great Number of Works, and poſted there a large Body of Troops.

XLVI. TWO Days after, a very unfortunate Accident happened. For ſo great a Storm aroſe, that the Water was never known to be higher in thoſe Parts; and the Snow came down in ſuch Quantities from all the Mountains round about, that the River overflowed its Banks, and in one Day broke down both the Bridges *Fabius* had built over it. *Cæſar*'s Army was reduced to great Extremities on this occaſion. For his Camp, as we have before obſerved, was between the *Sicoris* and *Cinga*, two Rivers that were neither of them fordable, and neceſſarily ſhut him up within a ſpace of no more than thirty miles. By this means, neither could the States that had declared for him ſupply him with Proviſions, nor the Troops that had been ſent beyond the Rivers to forage return, nor the large Convoys he expected from *Gaul* and *Italy* get to his Camp. Add to all this, that it being near the time of Harveſt, Corn was extremely ſcarce: and the more, as before *Cæſar*'s arrival, *Afranius* had carried great Quantities of it to *Lerida*; and the reſt had been ſince conſumed by *Cæſar*'s Troops. The Cattle, which was the next Reſource in the preſent ſcarcity, had been removed to Places of Security, on the breaking out of the War. The Parties ſent out to forage and bring in Corn, were perpetually harraſſed by the *Spaniſh* Infantry, who being well acquainted with the Country, purſued them every where. The Rivers themſelves did not impede them, becauſe they were accuſtomed to paſs them on blown-up Skins, which they always brought with them into the Field. *Afranius*, on the contrary, abounded in all things. He had large Magazines of Corn already laid up, was continually receiving freſh Supplies from the Province, and had plenty of Forage. The Bridge of *Lerida* furniſhed all theſe Conveniencies without danger, and opened a free communication with the Country beyond the River, from which *Cæſar* was wholly excluded.

XLVII. THE Waters continued ſeveral Days. *Cæſar* endeavoured to reeſtabliſh his Bridges, but could not get the better of the Obſtacles occaſioned by the ſwelling of the River, and the Enemy's Forces ſtationed on the oppoſite

Bank. They found it the eaſier to prevent his Deſign, as the River was deep and rapid, and they could diſcharge their Darts all along the Bank, on that particular Spot where our Men were at work: whereas it was extremely difficult on our ſide to ſtruggle with the force of the Stream, and at the ſame time guard ourſelves againſt the Aſſaults of the Enemy.

XLVIII. MEAN-WHILE *Afranius* was informed, that a large Convoy, which was on its way to join *Cæſar*, had been obliged to halt at the River ſide. It conſiſted of Archers from *Rovergue*, *Gauliſh* Horſe, with many Carts and much Baggage, according to the cuſtom of the *Gauls*, and about ſix thouſand Men of all ſorts, with their Domeſticks and Slaves; but withont Diſcipline or Commander, every one following his own Choice, and all marching in perfect Security, as if they had nothing more to apprehend than in former times. There were likewiſe many young Gentlemen of Quality, Senators' Sons, and *Roman* Knights, with the Deputies of the States of *Gaul*, and ſome of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants; who were all ſtopped ſhort by the River. *Afranius* ſet out in the night with three Legions, and all his Cavalry; and ſending the Horſe before, attacked them, when they leaſt expected it. The *Gauliſh* Squadrons forming with great expedition, began the Fight. While the Conteſt was upon equal terms, the *Gauls*, though few in number, bore up againſt the vaſt multitude of the Enemy; but ſeeing the Legions advance, and having loſt ſome of their Men, they retreated to the neighbouring Mountains. This delay ſaved the Convoy; for during the Skirmiſh, the reſt of the Troops gained the higher Ground. We loſt that Day about two hundred Archers, a few Troopers, and ſome Servants and Baggage.

XLIX. ALL this ſerved to enhance the price of Proviſions, a Calamity inſeparable from preſent Scarcity, and the proſpect of future Want. Corn was already at fifty Denarii a Buſhel, the Soldiers began to loſe their Strength, and the Evil increaſed every moment. Nay ſo great was the change produced in a few Days, and ſuch the alteration of Fortune, that while our Men were in the utmoſt want of all kind of Neceſſaries, the Enemy had plenty of every thing, and were accounted victorious. *Cæſar* left nothing untried to remove the preſent Scarcity: he diſmiſſed all the uſeleſs Mouths, and applied to the States that had declared for him, deſiring them to ſend him Cattle where they wanted Corn.

L. THESE things were greatly exaggerated by *Afranius*, *Petreius*, and their Friends, in the Letters they ſent upon this Occaſion to *Rome*. Nor was Fame backward in adding to the Account; inſomuch that the War appeared to be almoſt at an end. Theſe Couriers and Letters having reached *Rome*, there was a great concourſe of People at *Afranius*'s Houſe, many Congratulations paſſed, and multitudes of the Nobility flocked out of *Italy* to *Pompey*; ſome to carry the firſt accounts of this grateful News; others that they might not be ſo late as to ſubject them to the Reproach of having waited for the event of things.

LI. AFFAIRS being in this extremity, and all the Paſſes guarded by *Afranius*'s Parties, without a poſſibility of repairing the Bridges; *Cæſar* ordered the Soldiers to build ſome light Boats, in imitatation of thoſe he had formerly ſeen in *Britain*, whoſe Keel and Ribs were of Wood, and the reſt of Wicker, covered with Leather. When he had got a ſufficient number, he ſent them

them by night in Waggons, twenty-two Miles off his Camp. In theſe he embarked a good number of Soldiers, and ſent them over the River; took poſſeſſion unexpectedly of a Hill adjoining to the Bank on the other ſide; threw up a Fortification before the Enemy thought of hindering him; poſted a Legion in this Fortification; and then threw a Bridge over the *Sicoris* in two Days. By this means he recovered his Foragers, ſecured the Convoy, and opened a Paſſage for future Supplies. The ſame Day he detached a great part of his Cavalry over the River; who falling unexpectedly upon the Enemy's Foragers, diſperſed up and down without ſuſpicion of Danger, made a conſiderable capture of Men and Horſes; and obſerving ſome *Spaniſh* Cohorts on the march to their Aſſiſtance, skilfully divided themſelves into two Bodies; one to ſecure the Booty; the other, to receive, and return the Enemy's Charge. One of their Cohorts, which had raſhly ſeparated from the reſt, and advanced too far before the main Body, was ſurrounded and cut to pieces by our Men, who returned over the ſame Bridge to the Camp, without loſs, and enriched with a conſiderable Booty.

LII. WHILST theſe things paſſed at *Lerida*, the People of *Marſeilles*, by the advice of *L. Domitius*, equipped ſeventeen Gallies, eleven of which were covered. To theſe they added a multitude of ſmaller Veſſels, that they might ſtrike a Terror into our Fleet by their very number; and manned them with Archers, and the Mountaineers we have already mentioned, whom they encouraged to perform their Part by great Rewards and Promiſes. *Domitius* deſired ſome of theſe Ships, and filled them with the Shepherds and Labourers he had brought thither with him. Thus furniſhed and equipped, they ſailed with great Confidence in queſt of our Fleet, which was commanded by *Decimus Brutus*, and rid at Anchor at an Iſland over-againſt *Marſeilles*. *Brutus* was much inferior to the Enemy in number of Ships; but *Cæſar* had manned them with his beſt Soldiers, choſen out of all the Legions, and headed by Centurions of diſtinguiſhed Bravery, who had petitioned him for this Service. Theſe had provided themſelves with Hooks and Grappling-Irons, and a great number of Darts, Javelins, and offenſive Weapons of all ſorts. Thus prepared, upon notice of the Enemy's arrival, they ſtood out to Sea, and attacked their Fleet. The Conflict was ſharp and vigorous. For the Mountaineers, a hardy Race, habituated to Arms, and trained up in War, ſcarce yielded to the *Romans* in Bravery; and having but juſt parted from *Marſeilles*, ſtill retained a lively ſenſe of the Promiſes ſo lately made them. The Shepherds too, animated by the hopes of Liberty, and fighting under the Eye of their Maſter, did Wonders to merit his Approbation. The Townſmen themſelves confiding in the nimbleneſs of their Ships, and the skill of their Pilots, eluded the ſhock of our Veſſels, and baffled all their Attempts. As they had abundance of Sea-room, they extended their Line of Battle, in order to ſurround our Fleet, or attack our Ships ſingly with a number of theirs, or in running along-ſide, ſweep away a range of Oars. If they were compelled to come to a cloſer Engagement, ſetting aſide the Skill and Addreſs of their Pilots, they relied wholly on the Bravery of their Mountaineers. Our Men were but indifferently provided with Rowers and Pilots, who had been haſtily taken out of ſome Merchants Ships, and knew not ſo much as the names of the Tackle. They were incommoded too by the weight and lumpiſhneſs of their Veſſels, which being built in haſte of unſeaſoned Timber, were not ſo ready at tacking about. But when an Opportunity offered of coming to cloſe Fight, they would boldly get between two of the Enemy's Ships; and grappling them with their Hooks, charge

charge them on each ſide, board them, and cut to pieces the Mountaineers and Shepherds that defended them. In this manner they ſunk part of their Veſſels, took ſome with all the Men on board, and drove the reſt into the Haven. In this Engagement the Enemy had nine Galleys ſunk or taken.

LIII. THE report of this Battle reaching *Lerida*, and *Cæſar* having finiſhed his Bridge over the *Sicoris*, Affairs ſoon began to put on a new Face. The Enemy dreading the Courage of our Horſe, durſt not diſperſe about the Country as formerly; but either foraged in the neighbourhood of the Camp, that they might the ſooner make good their Retreat; or by a long Circuit, endeavoured to avoid our Parties: and upon receiving any Check, or even deſcrying our Cavalry at a diſtance, they would throw down their Truſſes, and fly. At laſt, they were reduced to omit foraging ſeveral Days together, and reſolved to purſue it only by night, contrary to the general Cuſtom of War.

LIV. IN the mean time the *Oſcenſes* and *Calagurritani*, jointly ſent Deputies to *Cæſar*, with an Offer of their Submiſſion and Services. The *Tarraconenſes*, *Jacitani*, and *Auſetani*, and not many Days after, the *Illurgavonenſes*, who inhabit along the Banks of the *Iberus*, followed their Example. He only required them to ſupply him with Corn, to which they readily agreed; and having got together a great number of Carriage-Horſes, brought it to his Camp. A Cohort of the *Illurgavonenſes*, hearing of the Reſolution taken by their State, deſerted from the Enemy, and came over to *Cæſar*'s Camp. The Change was ſudden and great: for the Bridge being finiſhed, Proviſions ſecured, the rumor of *Pompey*'s march through *Mauritania* extinguiſhed, and five conſiderable States having declared in his favour; a great number of diſtant Provinces renounced their Engagements with *Afranius*, and entered into new ones with *Cæſar*.

LV. THESE things having ſtruck a Terror into the Enemy; that he might not be always obliged to ſend his Cavalry ſo far about to forage, the Bridge lying above ſeven Miles from his Camp, he bethought himſelf of draining the River, by turning ſome of its Water into Canals thirty Foot deep, ſo as to make it fordable. The Work being almoſt compleated, *Petreius* and *Afranius* grew extremely apprehenſive of being entirely cut off from their Proviſions and Forage, becauſe *Cæſar* was very ſtrong in Cavalry. They therefore thought proper to quit a Poſt that was no longer tenable, and to carry the War into *Celtiberia*. What contributed ſtill further to confirm them in this Reſolution was, that of the two contrary Parties, concerned in the late War; thoſe who had declared for *Sertorius*, ſtill trembled at the name of the Conqueror, and dreaded his Power though abſent; and thoſe who had attached themſelves to *Pompey*, continued to love him for the many Services he had done them: but *Cæſar*'s name was hardly known among theſe Barbarians. Here they expected conſiderable Reinforcements of Horſe and Foot; and doubted not, by taking the advantage of Places, to be able to protract the War 'till Winter. In order to execute this Plan, they collected all the Boats to be found on the *Iberus*, and ordered them to be brought to *Octogeſa*, a City on that River, about twenty miles from their Camp. Here they commanded a Bridge of Boats to be built; and having ſent two Legions over the *Sicoris*, fortified their Camp with a Rampart of twelve Foot.

LVI.

LVI. *CÆSAR* having notice of this by his Scouts, laboured day and night at his Drains with the utmoſt diligence; and had already ſo far diminiſhed the Water of the *Sicoris*, that the Cavalry could, with ſome difficulty, paſs over: but it took the Infantry as high as the Shoulders, who had therefore both the depth of the River, and the rapidity of the Stream to ſtruggle with. Mean-while it was known, that the Bridge over the *Iberus* was almoſt finiſhed, and *Cæſar*'s Ford in great forwardneſs. This was a freſh Motive to the Enemy to quicken their march: wherefore leaving two auxiliary Cohorts for a Garriſon at *Lerida*, they croſſed the *Sicoris* with all their Forces, and joined the two Legions they had ſent over before. *Cæſar* had now no other Remedy left but to harraſs and fatigue them with his Cavalry: for if he went with his whole Army over his Bridge, he lengthened his march prodigiouſly, and gave *Afranius* time enough to get to the *Iberus*. Accordingly the Horſe having forded the River, came up with *Petreius* and *Afranius*'s rear, who had decamped about midnight; and making a motion to ſurround them, began to ſtop and retard their march.

LVII. AT Day-break we diſcovered from the Hills near the Camp, that the Enemy's rear was greatly harraſſed by our Cavalry. Sometimes they obliged them to halt, and diſordered their Ranks: at other times the Enemy facing about, charged with all their Cohorts at once, and forced our Men to give ground; who wheeling again as ſoon as they began to march, failed not to renew the Attack. At this ſight the legionary Soldiers running up and down the Camp, complained that the Enemy would eſcape out of their Hands, and the War neceſſarily be prolonged. They addreſſed themſelves to the Centurions and military Tribunes, and deſired them to beg of *Cæſar* not to ſpare them; that they feared neither Danger nor Fatigue, and were ready to paſs the River as the Horſe had done. *Cæſar* moved by their Alacrity and Intreaties, though he ſaw ſome Danger in expoſing his Army to the rapidity of a deep River, judged it yet proper to attempt and make trial of the Paſſage. Having therefore withdrawn from every Company ſuch as were weak of Body, or of leſs Courage than the reſt; he left them in the Camp with a Legion and all the Baggage. The reſt of the Army happily paſſed the River, by the aſſiſtance of a double line of Cavalry, placed above and below them. Some of the Infantry were carried away by the violence of the Current, but they were picked up and ſaved by the Horſe below them; ſo that not one Man was loſt. Having paſſed the River without loſs, he drew up his Army in order of Battle, and began to purſue the Enemy in three Lines: and ſuch was the Ardor of the Soldiers, that notwithſtanding the Army was obliged to make a Circuit of ſix miles, notwithſtanding the time neceſſarily loſt in croſſing the River, they got up at the ninth hour of the Day to the Enemy, who had ſet out at midnight.

LVIII. WHEN *Afranius* and *Petreius* perceived them at ſome diſtance, being with reaſon intimidated, they ſuſpended their march, halted on an Eminence, and formed in order of Battle. *Cæſar* would not hazard an Action with his Troops thus fatigued, and halted likewiſe in the Plain. On this, the Enemy reſumed their march, and he the purſuit; which obliged them to encamp earlier than they deſigned. Hard by was a range of Mountains, and about five miles farther, the ways were difficult and narrow. The Enemy retired among theſe Mountains, to avoid the purſuit of the Cavalry; and having placed Parties in all the Paſſes, to ſtop *Cæſar*'s Army; hoped by this means to

continue their march to the *Iberus*, without Fear or Danger. This was their great Affair, and what before all things they ſhould have endeavoured to effect: but being fatigued by a long march, and their continual Skirmiſhes with *Cæſar*'s Cavalry, they deferred it 'till next Day. *Cæſar* likewiſe encamped on a Hill that lay near him.

LIX. ABOUT midnight the Cavalry having ſurpriſed ſome of the Enemy, who had adventured a little too far from their Camp in queſt of Water; *Cæſar* was informed by them, that *Pompey*'s Lieutenants were decamping without noiſe. Immediately he ordered the Alarm to be ſounded, and gave his Army the ſignal to march. The Enemy, finding they ſhould be purſued, kept ſtill; being afraid of a nocturnal Flight, wherein they would have had greatly the diſadvantage, on account of their heavy Baggage, which they had with them, and the ſuperiority of *Cæſar*'s Cavalry. Next Day *Petreius* went privately out with a Party of Horſe, to take a view of the Country. *Cæſar* likewiſe detached a Squadron for the ſame purpoſe, under the command of *Decidius Saxa*. Both made the like Report in their ſeveral Camps; that for five miles together, the Country was level and open, but after that rough and mountainous; and that whoever ſhould firſt get poſſeſſion of the Defiles, might eaſily prevent the other Army from approaching them.

LX. UPON this a Council of War was held by *Petreius* and *Afranius*, to deliberate about the time of beginning their march. The greater number were for ſetting out by night, in hopes of reaching the Defiles before *Cæſar* could have notice of their departure. Others argued againſt the poſſibility of decamping privately, by the Alarm given in *Cæſar*'s Camp the Night before: "That the "Enemies Cavalry were continually patrolling in the night, and had beſet "all the Ways and Paſſes: That a nocturnal Engagement was to be avoided, "becauſe in a civil War, the Soldiers were more apt to liſten to their Fears, "than the Obligations of the military Oath: That Shame, and the preſence "of the Centurions and Tribunes, the great Inſtruments of Obedience and "military Duty, could have their proper Effect only in the Light, which ren-"dered it of infinite importance to wait the approach of Day: That in caſe of "a Diſaſter, yet the bulk of the Army would eſcape, and be able to poſſeſs "themſelves of the Poſt in queſtion." This Opinion prevailed in the Council, and they reſolved to ſet out the next Morning by break of Day.

LXI. *CÆSAR* having taken a view of the Country, decamped as ſoon as it was light, taking a conſiderable Circuit, and obſerving no particular Rout: for the direct way to the *Iberus* and *Octogeſa*, lay in the rear of the Enemy's Camp. He was therefore obliged to march thro' Valleys and Precipices, and over ſteep Rocks, which the Soldiers could not climb, but by diſencumbring themſelves of their Arms, and returning them afterwards to one another. But not a Man murmured at theſe Difficulties, in hopes of ſeeing a ſpeedy end of all their Labours, if they could but gain the *Iberus* before the Enemy, and intercept their Proviſions. As in this march we purſued at firſt an oppoſite courſe, and ſeemed to turn our Backs upon the Enemy, *Afranius*'s Soldiers, who obſerved us from their Camp, came forth with joyful Looks, and inſulted us on our ſuppoſed Flight, imagining the want of Proviſions obliged us to return to *Lerida*. Their Generals applauded themſelves upon their Reſolution of not decamping, and were confirmed in the notion of our Retreat, as they ſaw

we

we had neither Horſes nor Carriages, whence they concluded the ſcarcity muſt be exceeding great. But when they ſaw us, after ſome time, turn to the right, and that our advanced Guard had already gained the Ground beyond their Camp, there was not a Man ſo tardy or indolent, as not to perceive the neceſſity of decamping and oppoſing our march. Immediately they ran to Arms, and leaving a few Cohorts to guard the Camp, ſallied in a Body, purſuing their way directly to the *Iberus*.

LXII. ALL depended upon diſpatch, and getting the firſt poſſeſſion of the Defiles and Mountains. Our Troops were retarded by the difficulties of the Way, and *Afranius*'s by the continual Attacks of *Cæſar*'s Cavalry. But ſuch was the ſituation of the *Afranians*, that even ſuppoſing them to gain the Hills firſt, they could only ſecure their own Retreat, without a poſſibility of preſerving their Baggage, and the Cohorts left to guard the Camp; becauſe *Cæſar*'s Army getting between, cut them off from all Communication with their own Men. *Cæſar* arrived firſt at the Place in queſtion; and having found a Plain beyond the Rocks, formed his Men in order of Battle againſt the Enemy. *Afranius*, who now ſaw our Army in his Front, at the ſame time that his Rear was continually harraſſed by the Cavalry, halted on an Eminence, from whence he detached four *Spaniſh* Cohorts, to take poſſeſſion of the higheſt Mountain thereabouts; ordering them to make all the diſpatch they could to ſeize it, that he might get thither himſelf with the reſt of his Forces, and changing his rout, march them over the Hills to *Octogeſa*. The *Spaniards* wheeling obliquely to take poſſeſſion of the Place, were perceived by *Cæſar*'s Cavalry; who charged them furiouſly, broke them at the firſt Onſet, ſurrounded, and cut them to pieces in ſight of both Armies.

LXIII. *CÆSAR* had now an opportunity of giving the Enemy an effectual Blow; whoſe Army, in the preſent Conſternation it was under, would, he was ſenſible, make but a faint Reſiſtance; more eſpecially as it was ſurrounded on all ſides by the Cavalry, and would be obliged to fight on equal Ground. He was preſſed on all hands to give the Signal. The Lieutenants, Centurions, and military Tribunes, got round him, urging him not to delay the Engagement: "That the Soldiers were all eager for a Battle; whereas, on the con-
"trary, the *Afranians* had given many marks of Fear: That they had neither
"dared to ſupport their own Detachment, nor offered to deſcend from the
"Hill, nor been able to withſtand the very firſt Charge of our Cavalry: That
"they had brought their Enſigns all into one place, where they crouded con-
"fuſedly round them, without obſerving Ranks or Order: That if he was
"afraid to attack them on the Eminence, he would ſoon have an opportunity
"of more equal Ground, as *Afranius* would be obliged to remove for want
"of Water."

LXIV. *CÆSAR* was in hopes of terminating the Affair, without Bloodſhed, or a Battle; becauſe he had intercepted the Enemy's Proviſions. Why therefore, even ſuppoſing the Event to be proſperous, ſhould he unneceſſarily loſe any of his Men? Why ſhould he expoſe to Wounds Soldiers who had deſerved ſo well of him? Why, in fine, ſhould he tempt Fortune? Eſpecially as it redounded no leſs to the Honour of a good General, to gain the Victory by his Conduct, than by the force of his Arms. He was alſo touched with Compaſſion for *Afranius*'s Soldiers; who, after all, were Fellow-Citizens, and whom he muſt have ſlaughtered, when he could equally ſucceed without touching

touching their Lives. This Reſolution was not at all reliſhed by the Army; who, in their diſcontent, openly declared, that ſince *Cæſar* did not lay hold of ſo favourable an Opportunity, nor let them fight when they had a mind, they would not fight when he had a mind. But nothing could ſhake him. Nay he even retreated a little, to give *Afranius* and *Petreius* liberty to regain their Camp, which they did. He then poſted Troops on the Mountains to guard the Defiles, and came and encamped as near the Enemy as poſſible.

LXV. THE Day after, *Pompey*'s Lieutenants diſturbed at finding their Proviſions cut off, and all the Ways to the *Iberus* intercepted, conſulted what was proper to be done. They had it ſtill in their power to return to *Lerida*, or march to *Tarraco*. But while they were debating this matter, notice was brought them, that our Cavalry had fallen upon their Parties ſent out in queſt of Water. Upon this Intelligence, they formed ſeveral Poſts of Horſe and Foot, intermixed with Legionary Cohorts; and began to throw up a Rampart from the Camp to the Place where they watered, that the Soldiers might paſs and repaſs under cover, without fear, and without a Guard. *Afranius* and *Petreius* divided this Work between them, and went to give Directions about it in perſon.

LXVI. IN their Abſence, their Soldiers found frequent opportunities of converſing with our Men, and ſought out every one his Fellow-Citizen and Acquaintance. They began by thanking them for having ſpared them the Day before, owning they were indebted to them for their Lives. Afterwards they asked them, if they might truſt to *Cæſar*'s Honour; teſtifying much Grief at being obliged to fight with their Countrymen and Relations, with whom they were united by the ſtricteſt Ties. At laſt they ſtipulated even for their Generals, whom they would not ſeem to betray; and promiſed, if the Lives of *Petreius* and *Afranius* were granted them, to change ſides. At the ſame time they ſent ſome of their principal Officers to negotiate with *Cæſar*; and, theſe Preliminaries to an Accommodation being ſettled, the Soldiers of both Armies went into one another's Tents, ſo that the two Camps were now in a manner one. A great Number of Centurions and military Tribunes came to pay their court to *Cæſar*, and beg his Protection. The *Spaniſh* Chiefs, who had been ſummoned to attend *Afranius*, and were detained in the Camp as Hoſtages, followed their Example. Every Man ſought out his Acquaintance and Friend, who might recommend and procure him a favourable Reception from *Cæſar*. Things were carried to ſuch a length, that *Afranius*'s Son, a young Gentleman, treated with *Cæſar* by the Mediation of *Sulpicius*, to deſire he would give his Word for his Life, and that of his Father. The Joy was general, they mutually congratulated each other; the one, in that they had eſcaped ſo imminent a danger; and the other, in that they had brought to a happy Concluſion ſo important an Enterpriſe, without ſtriking a Blow. *Cæſar*, in the judgment of all, was upon the point of amply reaping the fruits of his wonted Clemency, and every body applauded his late Conduct.

LXVII. *AFRANIUS* having notice of what paſſed, quitted the Work he was engaged in, and returned to the Camp; prepared, as it would ſeem, to bear with an equal mind whatever ſhould happen. But *Petreius* was not wanting to himſelf. He armed his Slaves; and joining them to a Prætorian Cohort of Target-bearers, and ſome *Spaniſh* Horſe, his Dependents, whom he always

always kept about him to guard his Perſon; he inſtantly flew to the Rampart, broke off the Conferences of the Soldiers, drove our Men from the Camp, and put all of them he could find to the Sword. The reſt flocked together: where, alarmed at the danger to which they ſaw themſelves expoſed, they wrapped their Clokes round their left Arms, drew their Swords; and truſting to the nearneſs of their Camp, defended themſelves againſt the *Spaniſh* Target-bearers and Cavalry, till they had retreated to our advanced Guard, who ſcreen'd them from any farther Aſſault.

LXVIII. AFTER this he went through the whole Camp, begging his Troops with Tears, to have pity on him, and *Pompey* their General; and that they would not deliver them both up to the cruel Vengeance of their Enemies. Every one upon this flocks to the Head-quarters. There *Petreius* propoſes to the Army to bind themſelves by a new Oath, not to abandon nor betray their Commanders, nor to act ſeparately, but all in concert, for the common good. He himſelf took this Oath firſt, and then exacted it of *Afranius*, afterwards of the military Tribunes and Centurions, and laſtly of all the Companies man by man. At the ſame time an Order was iſſued, that all who had any of *Cæſar*'s Soldiers in their Tents ſhould ſignify it, that they might be put to Death in the ſight of the whole Army. But the majority deteſting this bloody Order, carefully hid thoſe who were under their Protection, and procured them means to eſcape in the night. However the Terror they had been thrown into by their Generals, the Severity ſhewn in puniſhing, and the new Oath they had been obliged to take, defeated, for the preſent, all hopes of a Surrender, changed the Soldiers Minds, and reduced the War to its former State.

LXIX. *CÆSAR* ordered diligent Search to be made after ſuch of the Enemies Soldiers, as had come to his Camp during the time of Conference, and carefully ſent them back. Some military Tribunes and Centurions voluntarily choſe to ſtay with him; whom he afterwards treated with great Diſtinction, promoting the Centurions to higher Ranks, and honouring the *Roman* Knights with the Office of military Tribune.

LXX. THE *Afranian* Troops were deſtitute of Forage, and could not water without much difficulty. The Legionary Soldiers had indeed ſome Proviſions, becauſe they had been ordered to bring two and twenty Days Corn with them from *Lerida:* but the *Spaniſh* Infantry and Auxiliaries had none; for they neither had Opportunities of ſupplying themſelves, nor were their Bodies inured to carry heavy Burdens. Accordingly they every Day deſerted in ſhoals to *Cæſar*. In this Extremity, of the two Expedients propoſed, that of returning to *Lerida* appeared the ſafeſt, as they had ſtill ſome Proviſions in that City, and might there concert what further meaſures to purſue. *Tarraco* was at a greater diſtance, and they would of courſe be expoſed to more Accidents by the Way. This Reſolution being taken, they decamped. *Cæſar* ſent the Cavalry before, to harraſs and retard them in their march; and followed himſelf with the reſt of the Army. The Cavalry gave the Enemy no reſpite, being continually engaged with their Rear.

LXXI. THE manner of fighting was thus. Some light-armed Cohorts formed the Rear-guard, which, in a Plain, halted from time to time, and made head againſt our Cavalry. When they fell in with an Eminence, the

very nature of the Ground furniſhed them with the means of defending themſelves; becauſe thoſe who were firſt could cover them behind. But when a Valley or Deſcent came in the Way, the Van could give no Aſſiſtance to the Rear, and our Cavalry annoyed them with their Darts from the higher Ground, which put them in imminent danger. In this caſe the Legions were obliged to halt, and endeavour to drive back the Cavalry a good way, after which they ran down the Valley precipitately, until they came to the oppoſite Eminence. For their Cavalry, of which they had a conſiderable Number, was ſo terrify'd by their ill Succeſs in former Skirmiſhes, that, far from being of any ſervice, they were forced to place it in the Center to ſecure it; and if any of them chanced to ſtraggle from the main Body, they were immediately taken by *Cæſar*'s Horſe.

LXXII. DURING theſe continual Skirmiſhes, in which the Enemy were often obliged to halt, in order to diſengage their Rear, it is eaſy to perceive, that their march could not be very expeditious. This was in fact the caſe; ſo that after advancing four miles, finding themſelves greatly incommoded by the Cavalry, they halted on an Eminence, and drew a Line before them, as it were to encamp; but did not unload their Beaſts of Burden. When they ſaw that *Cæſar* had marked out his Camp, pitched his Tents, and ſent his Cavalry to forage; ſuddenly, towards noon, they reſumed their march briskly, hoping to be rid of the Cavalry which had ſo much incommoded them. But *Cæſar* ſet out immediately with his Legions, leaving a few Cohorts to guard the Baggage, and ſent Orders to his Cavalry to return with all diligence. The Cavalry returned accordingly; and having overtaken the Enemy before the cloſe of Day, attacked their Rear ſo vigorouſly, that they were almoſt routed; a great Number of Soldiers, and even ſome Centurions being ſlain. *Cæſar*'s whole Army came up, and threatned them with an immediate Attack.

LXXIII. AS they could then neither chooſe a proper Place for a Camp, nor continue their march, they were forced to halt where they were, far from any Water, and on very diſadvantageous Ground. *Cæſar* did not offer to attack them, for the Reaſons mentioned before: he would not even permit any Tents to be pitched that Day, that he might be the readier to purſue with all his Forces, ſhould they attempt to eſcape either by night or by day. The *Afranians* perceiving the diſadvantage of their Situation, employed the whole Night in throwing up Intrenchments, and diſpoſed their Camp directly fronting ours. The ſame they did the following Day, from Sun-riſe till the Evening. But the farther they extended their Camp, and produced their Lines, in order to better their poſition, the farther they went from Water; and to avoid one inconvenience, fell into another. The firſt Night no-body went out of the Camp for Water, and the next Day the whole Army was obliged to do it in order of Battle, ſo that they could not forage that Day. *Cæſar* wanted to humble them by theſe Misfortunes, and reduce them by Want and Neceſſity rather than Force. He began however to draw Lines round their Camp, the better to check their ſudden Sallies and Eruptions, to which he foreſaw they would be obliged to have recourſe at laſt. Want, and the deſire of marching with leſs difficulty, ſoon conſtrained them to kill all the Beaſts of Burden.

LXXIV. TWO Days were ſpent in forming and executing theſe Reſolutions: on the third *Cæſar* had conſiderably advanced his Works. *Afranius* and

Petreius



A. *The Camp of Afranius and Petreius*. B. *Cæsar's Camp*. C. *The Rampart thrown up by Ca*
facilitate their Access to the River. E. *Afranius's Army in Order of Battle*. F. *The fifth Legion*
Wing. H. *The Enemys Cavalry*. I. *The right and left Wing of Cæsar's Army*. K. *The Archers a*

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

o by Cæsar to exclude the Enemy from Water. D. *The Rampart thrown up by the Enemy to*
Legion placed as a Body of Reserve. G. *The third Legion forming a Reserve on the other*
rchers and Slingers forming the main Battle. L. *The Cavalry on the two Wings.*

Petreius, ſenſible of the Conſequences, drew all their Forces out of the Camp, and formed them in order of Battle. *Cæſar* preſently called in his Workmen, aſſembled his Cavalry, and put his Army in a condition to receive them: for he was aware of the hurt his Reputation might ſuſtain, if, contrary to the opinion of the Troops, and the earneſt expectations of all, he ſhould ſtill ſeem to decline an Engagement. However, for the Reaſons already mentioned, he reſolved to keep only upon the defenſive; and the rather, becauſe the diſtance between the two Camps was ſo ſmall, that ſhould he even put his Adverſaries to rout, he could not flatter himſelf with the hopes of a compleat Victory. In fact, from Camp to Camp was not above two thouſand Foot: the Armies were poſted on each ſide of this Space, which was left void for the mutual Charge and Aſſault of the Soldiers. On ſuppoſition therefore of a Battle, the nearneſs of their Camp furniſhed an eaſy Retreat to the vanquiſhed. For this Reaſon he reſolved to wait the Enemy's Charge, and not enter the firſt into Action.

LXXV. *AFRANIUS*'s Troops were ranged in two Lines, conſiſting of five Legions; and the Cohorts wont to be ſtationed in the Wings, formed a Body of Reſerve. *Cæſar*'s Army was upon three Lines; in the firſt of which were poſted four Cohorts, detached out of each of the five Legions; in the ſecond three; and in the third the like number, all from their reſpective Legions: the Archers and Slingers were diſpoſed in the midſt, and the Cavalry on the two Wings. The Armies being drawn up in this manner, each General kept firm to his Reſolution: *Cæſar*, not to engage, unleſs forced to it: and *Afranius*, to prevent the progreſs of our Works. In this Poſture they continued 'till Sun-ſet, when both Armies returned to their ſeveral Camps. The next Day, *Cæſar* prepared to finiſh his Lines; and *Pompey*'s Lieutenants, as their laſt Reſource, endeavoured to find a fordable place in the *Sicoris*. But *Cæſar* penetrating their Deſign, ſent his light-armed *Germans*, with part of his Cavalry over the River; and poſted many good Bodies of Troops along the Banks, at a ſmall diſtance from one another.

LXXVI. AT laſt, having no hope left, and being in want of every thing, Wood, Water, Forage, Corn, they demanded an Interview: and that it might be, if poſſible, in ſome place out of the ſight of the Soldiers. *Cæſar* denied the laſt part of their Requeſt, but offered to grant them a publick Interview: whereupon *Afranius*, having given his Son for a Hoſtage, went to the place appointed by *Cæſar*; where, in the preſence of both Armies, he addreſſed him to this effect: "That it was no juſt matter of Blame, either in him or his "Soldiers, to have preſerved their Fidelity to their General *Pompey*; but that "they had now ſufficiently acquitted themſelves of their Duty, and ſuffered "enough in his Cauſe, by the want of all kind of Neceſſaries: That like "wild Beaſts caught in a Toil, they were deprived of the moſt common En-"joyments; having their Bodies oppreſſed by Want, and their Minds over-"whelmed with Ignominy: That they therefore acknowledged themſelves "vanquiſhed, and beſought and conjured him, not to make a rigorous uſe "of his Victory, but to ſpare the Lives of his unhappy Countrymen." This Speech was delivered with all poſſible marks of Humility and Submiſſion.

LXXVII. *CÆSAR* replied: "That he, of all Mankind, had leaſt Reaſon "to complain, or implore Compaſſion: That all the reſt had fully done their "Duty:

" Duty: himſelf, in forbearing to attack him, with all the Advantages of time " and place, that the way to an Accommodation might be the more open: his " Army, in returning untouched the Men that were in their power, after Injuries " received, and the maſſacre of their Comrades: in fine, even his own Troops, " in endeavouring to conclude a Peace, whereon they thought their Safety de- " pended. Thus all Orders had ſhewn an Inclination to treat, while *Afranius* " and *Petreius* alone oppoſed an Accommodation; refuſing both Interview and " Truce, and barbarouſly murdering thoſe, whom the faith of a Conference " had enticed to their Camp: That it had therefore happened to them, as " frequently happens to Men of Obſtinacy and Arrogance; and they were " forced to have recourſe to thoſe Conditions, and earneſtly ſolicit the very " ſame Terms, which not long before they had deſpiſed. However, he would " not take advantage of their preſent Submiſſion, or the favourable Circum- " ſtances in which he found himſelf, to demand any thing tending to the " increaſe of his own Power; but only that they would disband thoſe Troops, " which they had now for ſo many Years kept on foot againſt him. For with " what other view had ſix Legions been ſent into *Spain*; a ſeventh levied " there; ſo many powerful Navies equipped; ſo many able and experienced " Officers ſent over. Theſe mighty Preparations could not be meant againſt " *Spain*, or to ſupply the wants of the Province, which having enjoyed a long " run of Peace, had no occaſion for ſuch extraordinary Forces. Their real " Aim was to pave the way to his Deſtruction; to effect which, a new ſpecies of " Power had been introduced into the Commonwealth; and the ſame Man " appointed to command in *Italy* at the Gates of *Rome*, and hold for ſo many " Years, tho' abſent, the Government of the two moſt potent Provinces of the " Republick. For this Reaſon the Magiſtrates were ſtript of their Prerogatives, " and not ſuffered to take poſſeſſion of their Provinces, at the expiration of the " Prætorſhip or Conſulſhip, as had always been the Cuſtom; but particular " Governors were ſent, by the Choice and Management of a Faction. For " this Reaſon even the Excuſe of old Age was diſallowed; and thoſe who had " merited a Diſcharge by their paſt Services, were compelled to take Arms " again, to compleat the number of their Troops. In fine, for this Reaſon he " alone had been denied that Juſtice, which was never refuſed to any General " before him; that after having ſucceſsfully ſerved the Commonwealth, he " ſhould be allowed to return home, and disband his own Army, with ſome " marks of Honour, or at leaſt without Ignominy. All which, nevertheleſs, " he had hitherto born, and ſtill reſolved to bear with Patience: nor was it " now his Deſign, to take from them their Soldiers, and enliſt them, as it " would be eaſy for him to do; but to prevent their employing them againſt " him. Therefore, as he had already intimated, they muſt reſolve to quit " *Spain*, and disband their Forces: in which caſe he would injure no Man. " This was his final Reſolution, and the only Condition of Peace they were " to expect."

LXXVIII. THESE Conditions were very agreeable to *Afranius*'s Soldiers; who, inſtead of being puniſhed, as they feared, were in ſome ſort rewarded by the Diſcharge procured them. They plainly ſhewed their Satisfaction. For, while the place and time of their diſmiſſion were debating, they ſignified by their Geſtures and Cries from the Rampart, where they ſtood, that they deſired to be disbanded immediately: becauſe no ſufficient Security could be given for the performance of what was put off 'till another time. After ſome diſcuſſion of that Article by *Cæſar* and *Afranius*, it was regulated, that thoſe

thoſe who had Houſes or Poſſeſſions in *Spain*, ſhould be diſcharged on the ſpot; and the reſt near the *Var*, a River between *Gaul* and *Italy*. *Cæſar* on his ſide declared, that he would hurt no-body, nor force any one to take on in his Service.

LXXIX. *CÆSAR* undertook to find them in Corn until they got to the *Var*. He even promiſed to reſtore to them all they had loſt in the War, that could be known again; himſelf indemnifying his own Soldiers, who hereby loſt part of their Booty. By this Conduct he acquired their Confidence to ſuch a degree, that he was Arbiter of all the Diſputes they had, either among themſelves, or with their Commanders. The Soldiers being ready to mutiny about their Pay, becauſe *Petreius* and *Afranius* affirmed it was not yet due, the matter was referred to *Cæſar*, who determined it to the ſatisfaction of both Parties. About a third of the Army was disbanded during the two Days they continued here; after which the reſt ſet out for the *Var* in this order. Two of *Cæſar*'s Legions marched at the head, the others in the rear, and the vanquiſhed Troops in the middle. *Q. Fufius Calenus*, one of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants, preſided over the march. In this manner they continued their Rout to the *Var*, where the remainder of the Troops were disbanded.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF THE

CIVIL WAR.

BOOK II.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. Trebonius *continues the Siege of* Marſeilles. III. Naſidius *arrives with a Fleet to the relief of the Town.* IV. *The Inhabitants repair their Fleet, and join it to that of* Naſidius. V. *A Sea-fight between* Brutus *and the People of* Marſeilles. VI. *In which the latter are defeated.* VIII. Trebonius *raiſes a prodigious Tower againſt the Town.* IX. *Likewiſe a Muſculus of uncommon ſize.* X. *By which a Tower belonging to the Enemy is overthrown.* XI. *Upon this the Beſieged demand a Truce.* XIII. *Which they afterwards break, and in a ſudden Sally, burn* Trebonius's *Works.* XIV. Trebonius, *with wonderful expedition, raiſes a new and amazing Terraſs.* XV. *Upon which the Beſieged again treat of a Surrender.* XVI. *Mean-while* M. Varro *in farther* Spain *prepares to oppoſe* Cæſar. XVII. Cæſar *ſummons a general Aſſembly of the States at* Corduba. XVIII. Varro, *deſerted by his Troops, goes over to* Cæſar. XIX. Cæſar *having reduced* Spain, *arrives before* Marſeilles. XX. *The* Marſeillians *ſurrender.* L. Domitius *eſcapes by Sea.* XXI. *About the ſame time* C. Curio *ſets out for* Africa. XXII. *Where, at firſt, he wars ſucceſsfully againſt* Varus. XXXIV. *But afterwards,* Varus *having received Supplies from King* Juba, *he raſhly ventures a Battle; where, after ſome Advantages in the beginning, by means of his Cavalry, he is at laſt cut off with his whole Army.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF THE
CIVIL WAR.

BOOK II.

I. WHILE theſe things paſſed in *Spain*, *Trebonius*, *Cæſar*'s Lieutenant, who had been left to carry on the Siege of *Marſeilles*, raiſed Terraſſes for two different Attacks, and approached with his Towers and Galleries. One of the Attacks was on the ſide of the Port; the other towards the mouth of the *Rhone*, which empties itſelf into the Sea bordering upon *Spain* and *Gaul*. For *Marſeilles* is waſhed by the Sea on three ſides, and can be approached by Land only on the fourth; of which that part where the Citadel ſtands, being very ſtrong by Nature, becauſe of a deep Valley that runs before it, requires a long and difficult Siege. For the compleating of theſe Works, *Trebonius* drew together, from all parts of the Province, a great number of Workmen and Beaſts of Carriage; ordered Wood and Oſiers to be brought; and having prepared all things neceſſary, raiſed a Terraſs eighty Foot high.

II. BUT ſo well was the Town provided with all requiſites of War, and ſo great was the multitude of Machines to annoy the Beſiegers, that no Mantles were ſufficient to withſtand their violence. For they had wooden Bars twelve Foot in length, armed at the point with Iron, which were ſhot with ſuch force from their Baliſtæ, that they pierced four rows of Hurdles, and entered a conſiderable way into the Ground. To reſiſt the violence of theſe Batteries, the Beſiegers made uſe of Galleries, whoſe Roofs conſiſted of pieces of Wood of about a Foot in thickneſs, ſtrongly compacted together. Under this cover, the Materials neceſſary for raiſing the Terraſs were conveyed: and a Tortoiſe ſixty Foot long, compoſed of ſtrong Beams, and armed with every thing neceſſary to defend it againſt Fire and Stones, went before to level the Ground. But in ſpite of all endeavours; the greatneſs of the Works, the height of the Wall and Towers, and the multitude of Machines made uſe of by the Beſieged, greatly retarded the Approaches. Beſides, the Mountaineers made frequent Sallies, and ſet fire to the Towers and Mount: which tho' our Men eaſily ſuſtained, driving them back with great loſs into the Town, yet failed not very much to incommode the Works.

III. IN the mean time *L. Naſidius*, ſent by *Pompey* to the Aſſiſtance of *Domitius* and the *Maſſilians*, with a Fleet of ſixteen Ships, ſome of which were ſtrengthened with Beaks of Braſs; paſſed the Straits of *Sicily* unknown to *Curio*, landed at *Meſſana*, and raiſed ſo great a Terror in the Place, that being abandoned by the Senate and principal Inhabitants, he found Means to carry off one of their Gallies: and joining it to his own Fleet, ſteered directly for *Marſeilles*; having diſpatched a Frigate before, to apprize *Domitius* and the Inhabitants of his coming, and preſs them to hazard a ſecond Engagement with *Brutus*, when they ſhould be reinforced by his Fleet.

IV. THE *Maſſilians*, after their late Defeat, had drawn as many old Ships out of the Docks as they had loſt in the Engagement; and repaired and rigged them with wondrous expedition. They were likewiſe well provided with Rowers and Pilots; and had prepared a number of fiſhing Barks, which they filled with Archers and Engines, and ſtrengthened with Roofs, to ſhelter the Rowers from the Enemies Darts. The Fleet being equipped in this manner; the *Maſſilians*, animated by the Prayers and Tears of their old Men, Matrons, and Virgins, to exert themſelves in defence of their Country in ſo preſſing a Conjuncture; embarked with no leſs Confidence and Aſſurance, than they had done before their late Defeat. For ſuch is the weakneſs of the human Mind, that things dark, hidden, and unknown, always produce in us a greater degree of Confidence or Terror; as happened in the preſent Caſe: for the arrival of *Naſidius* had filled all Men with an uncommon ſhare of Hope and Eagerneſs. The Wind ſpringing up fair, they ſet ſail, and rendezvouſed at *Tauroenta*, a Caſtle belonging to the Town, where *Naſidius* lay with his Fleet. Here they put their Ships in order, armed themſelves with Courage for a ſecond Encounter, and entering readily into all the Meaſures propoſed by *Naſidius*, left to him the command of the left Wing, and ſtationed themſelves upon the right.

V. *BRUTUS* ſailed to meet them with his Fleet conſiderably increaſed; for beſides the Ships which *Cæſar* had cauſed to be built at *Arles*, he had alſo joined to it ſix more taken from the *Maſſilians*, which he had refitted and rigged ſince the late Action. Wherefore exhorting his Men to deſpiſe an Enemy, who had not been able to reſiſt them when entire and unvanquiſhed, he advanced againſt them full of Reſolution and Confidence. It was eaſy to diſcern from *Trebonius*'s Camp, and the Eminences around it, what paſſed in the Town. All the Youth that were left, the old Men, the Women, Children, and even the Guards upon the Walls, extending their Hands to Heaven, or repairing to the Temples, and proſtrating themſelves at the Altars, beſought the Gods to grant them Victory. Nor was there a Man among them who did not believe, that their Safety depended wholly on the iſſue of that Day's Action. For the choice of their Youth, and the moſt conſiderable Men of their City, were all on board the Fleet: inſomuch, that in caſe of any Diſaſter, they had no Reſource left: but ſhould they obtain the Victory, they were in hopes of preſerving their City, either by their own Forces, or the Reinforcements they expected from without.

VI. ACCORDINGLY in the Engagement, they behaved with the moſt determined Courage. The remembrance of what their Wives and Children had repreſented to them at their departure ſerved to exalt their Bravery, in a full Perſuaſion, that this was the laſt Opportunity they ſhould have of exerting themſelves

themſelves in defence of their Country; and that if they fell in the Engagement, their Fellow-Citizens could not long ſurvive them, as their Fate muſt be the ſame upon the taking of the Town. Our Ships being at ſome diſtance from each other, both gave the Enemy's Pilots an opportunity of ſhewing their Addreſs in working their Veſſels, and flying to the aſſiſtance of their Friends, when they were laid hold on by our grappling Hooks. And indeed, when it came to a cloſe Fight, they ſeconded the Mountaineers with wonderful Reſolution, and in Bravery ſeemed to yield but little to our Men. At the ſame time, a great quantity of Darts poured inceſſantly from their ſmaller Frigates, wounded a great many of our Rowers, and ſuch of the Soldiers as were without ſhelter. Two of their Gallies fell upon that of *Brutus*, which was eaſily diſtinguiſhed by its Flag: but tho' they attacked him on both ſides, he extricated himſelf with ſuch Agility and Addreſs, as in a ſhort time to get a little before; which made them run foul of each other ſo violently, that they were both conſiderably ſhattered: one in particular had its Beak broken, and was in a manner totally cruſhed; which being obſerved by thoſe of our Fleet that lay neareſt, they ſuddenly fell upon and ſunk them, before they could recover out of their Diſorder.

VII. IN this Encounter, the Ships under *Naſidius* were of no manner of ſervice to the *Maſſilians*, but quickly retired out of the Fight. For as they were neither animated by the ſight of their Country, nor the Intreaties of their Relations, they were not very forward to expoſe their Lives to hazard, but eſcaped without hurt from the Combat. The *Maſſilians* had five Ships ſunk, and four taken. One eſcaped to the Coaſt of hither *Spain* with thoſe of *Naſidius*. Of the reſt that remained, one was immediately diſpatched to *Marſeilles*, to carry thither the news of the Defeat. As ſoon as it drew near the Town, all the Inhabitants flocked out, to know what had paſſed; and being informed of it, appeared no leſs dejected, than if the City had been taken by Storm. However, they ſtill continued their Preparations for the Defence of the Place with as much diligence as ever.

VIII. THE Legionaries who had the charge of the Works on the right perceived, that a Tower of Brick built at a little diſtance from the Walls, would be of great ſervice to ſhelter them from the frequent Sallies of the Enemy. At firſt they made it very low and ſmall, to guard againſt ſudden Incurſions. Hither they retired in caſe of Danger: here they defended themſelves againſt the moſt obſtinate Attacks of the Enemy; nay, even aſſaulted them in their turn, repulſed and purſued them. This Tower was of a ſquare form, thirty Foot every way, allowing for the thickneſs of the Walls, which might be about five Foot. Afterwards, (being inſtructed by Experience, which is the beſt of Teachers,) they plainly perceived, that the higher it was carried, the more ſerviceable it would prove. The manner of effecting it was thus. When the Work was raiſed to the height of one Story, they laid a Floor over it, the extremities of whoſe Beams were concealed in the thickneſs of the Wall; that they might not, by appearing on the outſide, be liable to be ſet on fire. Thence they continued the Wall directly upwards, as far as their Galleries and Mantles would allow. Here they laid two Beams croſs-wiſe, whoſe extremities almoſt reached to the Angles of the Wall, for ſupporting the Floor, which was to ſerve as a Roof to the whole. Over theſe Beams they laid the Joiſts of the Roof, and boarded them with Planks. The Roof was ſo contrived as to project a little beyond the Wall, in order to ſuſpend from it what might be neceſſary

neceſſary to ſhelter the Workmen, while employed in compleating the Story. This Floor was paved with Tiles and Clay, to render it proof againſt Fire; and had beſides a covering of ſtrong Mattreſſes, to break the force of Stones and Darts. At the ſame time they ſuſpended from the Beams of the Roof, that projected beyond the Wall, Curtains made of ſtrong Cables, wove to the depth of four Feet, and which went round the three ſides of the Tower that were expoſed to the Engines of the Enemy; having experienced on former Occaſions, that this kind of Cover was impenetrable to any Dart or Engine whatever. When this part of the Tower was finiſhed, rooſed, and ſheltered from the Enemy's Blows, they removed their Mantles to another; and by means of Engines elevated the Roof entire from the firſt Story, as far as the Curtains would allow. There, ſecure from all Inſult, they laboured at the Wall; elevating the Roof a ſecond time, and thereby enabling themſelves both to continue the Work, and lay the interjacent Floors. In this manner they proceeded from Story to Story, mounting them one upon another, 'till without Danger or Wounds, they had compleated the number of ſix; leaving Loop-Holes in convenient Places, for the Engines to play through.

IX. WHEN by means of this Tower, they thought they had ſufficiently provided for the ſecurity of the Works around it; they reſolved to build a Gallery ſixty Foot long, of Wood two Feet in thickneſs, to extend from the brick Tower to the Tower of the Enemy, and the very Walls of the Town. The form of the Gallery was this: Firſt, two Beams of equal length were laid upon the Ground, at the diſtance of four Feet from one another; and in theſe were fixed little Pillars five Foot high, joined at the top by Beams deſigned to ſupport the Roof of the Gallery. Over theſe were laid Rafters two Foot ſquare, faſtened ſtrongly with Nails and Plates of Iron. The upper part of the Roof was compoſed of ſquare Laths, four Inches thick, which were placed at a ſmall diſtance one from another, to bear the Tiles that were to be laid upon them. Thus was the whole finiſhed with a ſloping Roof, which being partly compoſed of Tiles and Mortar, was proof againſt Fire; and had beſides a covering of Hides, to hinder the Mortar from being waſhed away by Spouts of Water. Over all we threw ſtrong Mattreſſes, to ſcreen the Hides from Fire and Stones. This Work was finiſhed cloſe by the brick Tower, under cover of four Mantles; and immediately carried forward upon Rollers, in the manner Ships are lanched, 'till it unexpectedly reached the very Tower of the Enemy.

X. THE *Maſſilians* aſtoniſhed at ſo threatning and unlooked for a Machine, puſhed forward with Leavers the largeſt Stones they could find, and tumbled them from the top of the Wall upon the Gallery. But the ſtrength of the Wood reſiſted the violence of the Blows, ſo that they fell to the Ground without doing any hurt. Obſerving this, they changed their Deſign, and poured down upon us burning Barrels of Pitch and Tallow. But theſe likewiſe rolled along the Roof without Damage, and falling upon the Ground, were afterwards thruſt away with Forks and long Poles. Mean-while our Soldiers, under protection of the Gallery, were endeavouring with their Leavers to undermine the Enemy's Tower. The Gallery itſelf was defended by the Tower of Brick, whence our Engines played without intermiſſion; inſomuch that the Enemy, driven from their Tower and Walls, were at laſt obliged to abandon their Defence. By degrees the Tower being undermined, part of it fell down, and the reſt was ſo ſhaken that it could not ſtand long.

XI.



The Brick Tower and Muſculus at the Siege of Marſeilles.

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XI. UPON this the Enemy, alarmed at ſo unexpected a Misfortune, diſcouraged by the downfal of the Tower, awed by ſuch a Teſtimony of the wrath of the Gods, and dreading the plunder and devaſtation of their City; came forth in the Habit of Suppliants: and with out-ſtretched Hands, beſought the Compaſſion of the Army and Generals. At this new and unexpected ſight, all Acts of Hoſtility ceaſed; and the Soldiers laying aſide their Ardor for the Fight, were eager to hear and get acquainted with the Propoſals of the Enemy: who arriving in preſence of the Army and Generals, threw themſelves at their Feet, requeſting them to ſuſpend all further Operations 'till *Cæſar*'s arrival. They told them: "That as the Works were now compleated, and "the Tower deſtroyed, they were ſenſible the City could no longer hold out; "and therefore meant not to defend it: That in the mean time, no Prejudice "could ariſe to the Beſiegers from this Reſpite; becauſe, if they refuſed to "ſubmit upon *Cæſar*'s coming, he would have it in his power to treat them as "he pleaſed. They added, that if the whole Tower ſhould be brought down, "it would be impoſſible to hinder the Soldiers from yielding to the deſire of "Plunder, by breaking into and pillaging the Town." This, and much more of the ſame nature (for the *Maſſilians* are a learned People,) they urged in a very moving and pathetick Strain.

XII. THE Generals moved by theſe Remonſtrances, drew off the Soldiers from the Works, diſcontinued the Attack, and contented themſelves with poſting Guards in convenient Places. Compaſſion occaſioned a kind of Truce 'till *Cæſar*'s arrival; ſo that on neither ſide were any Acts of Hoſtility committed, but every thing was quiet and ſecure, as if the Siege had been at an end. For *Cæſar* had earneſtly recommended it to *Trebonius* by Letter, to prevent, if poſſible, the City's being taken by Storm; leſt the Soldiers, irritated by their Revolt, and the Reſiſtance they had found, ſhould put all the Youth to the Sword, as they threatned to do. Nay they were even then hardly reſtrained from breaking into the Town, and loudly murmured againſt *Trebonius*, for delaying a Conqueſt, which they looked upon as certain.

XIII. BUT the *Maſſilians*, a Nation without Faith, aimed at nothing farther in all this, than to find a Time and Opportunity to deceive us, and put in practice the treacherous Purpoſe they had formed. For after ſome Days, our Men ſuſpecting no Danger, but relying upon the good Faith of the Enemy; while ſome were retired to their Tents, others laid down to reſt in the Trenches, overpowered by the long Fatigue they had undergone; and all the Arms laid up and removed out of ſight; ſuddenly they ſallied from the Town: and the Wind being high, and favourable to their Deſign, ſet fire to the Works. The Flame in a moment ſpread itſelf on all ſides, inſomuch that the Battery, the Mantles, the Tortoiſe, the Tower, the Machines, and the Gallery were entirely deſtroyed, before it was poſſible to diſcover whence the Diſaſter aroſe. The ſuddenneſs of the Accident made our Men immediately run to their Arms, where every one took what came firſt to hand. Some ſallied out upon the Enemy, but were checked by the Arrows and Darts poured upon them from the Town; inſomuch that the *Maſſilians*, ſheltered by their Walls, burnt without any difficulty the Tower of Brick and the Gallery. Thus the Labour of many Months was deſtroyed in an Inſtant, by the treachery of the Enemy, and the violence of the Wind. Next Day they made the ſame Attempt, favoured by the ſame Wind, and with yet greater Aſſurance, againſt the Tower and Terraſs of the other Attack. They approached them boldly, and

threw plenty of Fire upon them: but our Men, grown wiſe by their late Misfortune, had made all neceſſary Preparations for their Defence; ſo that after loſing many Men, they were obliged to retreat into the City, without effecting their Purpoſe.

XIV. *TREBONIUS* immediately reſolved to repair his Loſs, in which he found himſelf warmly ſeconded by the Zeal of the Soldiers. They ſaw the Works which had coſt ſo much Labour and Toil, deſtroyed by the Perfidy of a People, who made no ſcruple of violating the moſt ſacred Engagements: they ſaw that their Credulity had been abuſed, and that they were become the Jeſt of their Enemies, which grieved and provoked them at the ſame time. But it was ſtill difficult to determine, whence they might be ſupplied with Wood, to repair all theſe Works. There was none in the neighbourhood of *Marſeilles*, the Trees having been all cut down for a great way round. They reſolved therefore to raiſe a Terraſs of a new kind, and ſuch as Hiſtory no where mentions before that time. They raiſed two Walls of Brick, each ſix Foot thick, and diſtant from one another nearly the breadth of the former Mount. Over theſe they laid a Floor; and to render it firm, beſides its being ſupported on either ſide, placed Pillars underneath between the Walls, to bear it up where it was weakeſt, or had a greater ſtreſs of weight to ſupport. There were moreover Croſs-beams, which reſted upon Nitches in the Wall; and to render the ſeveral Floors proof againſt Fire, Hurdles were laid over them, which were afterwards covered with Clay. The Soldiers thus ſheltered over head by the Roof, on the right and left by Walls, and before by a Breaſt-work, brought the neceſſary Materials without danger; and by the eagerneſs with which they laboured, ſoon compleated the whole; leaving Ouvertures in convenient Places, to ſally out upon occaſion.

XV. THE Enemy ſeeing we had repaired in ſo ſhort a time, what they imagined muſt have coſt us the labour of many Days; that there was now no hope left, either of deceiving us, or ſallying out upon us with ſucceſs; that all the approaches to the City by Land, might in like manner be ſhut up by a Wall and Towers, ſo as to render it impoſſible for them to appear upon their Works, our Walls over-topping and commanding theirs, that they could neither diſcharge their Javelins, nor make any uſe of their Engines, in which their principal Hope lay; and that they were now reduced to the neceſſity of fighting us upon equal Terms, tho' conſcious of their great inferiority in point of Valour: they were forced to have recourſe again to the ſame Conditions of Truce they had ſo ill obſerved before.

XVI. *M. VARRO* in farther *Spain*, having early notice of what paſſed in *Italy*, and beginning to diſtruſt the ſucceſs of *Pompey*'s Affairs, ſpoke in a very friendly manner of *Cæſar*. He ſaid: "That he was indeed under par-
"ticular Obligations to *Pompey*, who had made him his Lieutenant-General;
"but at the ſame time was no leſs indebted to *Cæſar*: That he was not igno-
"rant of the duty of a Lieutenant, employed by his General in an Office of
"Truſt; but that he likewiſe knew his own Strength, and the Attachment of
"the whole Province to *Cæſar*." After this manner he talked in all Companies, nor declared expreſly for either ſide. But when he afterwards underſtood, that *Cæſar* was detained by the Siege of *Marſeilles*; that the Armies of *Petreius* and *Afranius* had joined, and daily grew ſtronger by the arrival of new Succours; that there was room to hope for every thing; that the hither

Province

Province had unanimouſly declared in their Favour; that *Cæſar* himſelf was reduced to great Straits at *Lerida*: of all which *Afranius* wrote largely, magnifying his own Advantages: he began to alter with Fortune. He raiſed Troops over the whole Province; added thirty auxiliary Cohorts to the two Legions he had already under his Command; formed great Magazines of Corn to ſupply *Marſeilles*, and the Armies under *Afranius* and *Petreius*; ordered the *Gaditani* to furniſh him with ten Ships of War; cauſed a conſiderable Number to be built at *Hiſpalis*; ſent all the Money and Ornaments he found in the Temple of *Hercules* to *Cales*; left there a Garriſon of ſix Cohorts, under the Command of *Caius Gallonius*, a *Roman* Knight, the Friend of *Domitius*, who had ſent him thither to look after an Inheritance of his; conveyed all the Arms, public and private, to *Gallonius*'s Houſe; ſpoke every where diſadvantageouſly of *Cæſar*; declared ſeveral times from his Tribunal, that *Cæſar* had been worſted, and that many of his Soldiers had gone over to *Afranius*, as he was well aſſured by undoubted Teſtimonies: by all which, having ſtruck a Terror into the *Roman* Citizens of that Province, he obliged them to promiſe him one hundred and ninety thouſand Seſterces, twenty thouſand weight of Silver, and one hundred and twenty thouſand Buſhels of Wheat. The States well affected to *Cæſar* he loaded with heavy Contributions; confiſcated the Effects of ſuch as had ſpoken againſt the Commonwealth; quartered Soldiers upon them; harraſſed them with arbitrary Judgments; and in fine obliged the whole Province to take an Oath of Fidelity to himſelf and *Pompey*. Hearing of what had paſſed in hither *Spain*, he prepared for War. His Deſign was, to ſhut himſelf up with his two Legions in *Cales*, where all the Proviſions and Shipping lay; becauſe he very well underſtood, that the whole Province was in *Cæſar*'s Intereſt: for he judged it would be eaſy in that Iſland, with the Ships and Proviſions he had, to draw out the War into length.

XVII. *CÆSAR*, though called upon by many and neceſſary Affairs to return to *Italy*, reſolved however not to leave *Spain*, till he had entirely quelled the War in that Province: for he knew that hither *Spain* had many Obligations to *Pompey*, and that moſt of the Inhabitants were ſtrongly in his Intereſt. Having therefore detached two Legions into farther *Spain*, under the Command of *Q. Caſſius*, Tribune of the People, he himſelf advanced by great Journeys at the head of ſix hundred Horſe. He ſent Orders before to the Magiſtrates, and the principal Men of every State, to meet him by a certain Day at *Cordova*. All obeyed: every State ſent its Deputies: nor was there a ſingle *Roman* Citizen of any Conſideration, who did not repair thither on this occaſion. The very Senate of *Cordova*, of their own proper motion, ſhut their Gates againſt *Varro*, ſtationed Guards and Sentinels along the Walls, and detained two Cohorts called *Calonicæ*, which chanced to march that way, that they might ſerve to protect the Town. At the ſame time thoſe of *Carmona*, the moſt conſiderable State in the Province, drove out of their City three Cohorts, which *Varro* had left to garriſon the Citadel, and ſhut their Gates againſt them.

XVIII. THIS determined *Varro* to make all poſſible Diſpatch, that he might reach *Cales* as ſoon as poſſible, leſt his march ſhould be intercepted; ſo great and apparent was the Affection of the Province to *Cæſar*. When he was advanced a little way, he received Letters from *Cales*, which informed him, " That as ſoon as *Cæſar*'s Edict was known, the principal Men of *Cales*, with " the Tribunes of the Cohorts he had left in Garriſon, had conſpired to drive

" *Gallonius*

" *Gallonius* from the City, and preſerve the Town and Iſland for *Cæſar*: " that this Project being formed, they had warned *Gallonius* to retire of his " own accord, while he yet might with ſafety; threatning, if he did not, " to come to ſome immediate Reſolution againſt him: that *Gallonius*, terrified " by ſo general a Revolt, had accordingly left *Cales*." Upon this Intelligence, one of the two Legions known by the Name of *Vernacula*, took up their Enſigns in *Varro*'s preſence, quitted the Camp, and marched directly to *Hiſpalis*, where they ſat down in the Market-place and Cloiſters, without committing the leaſt Act of Violence: which ſo wrought upon the *Roman* Citizens reſiding in the Town, that every one was deſirous of accommodating them in their Houſes. *Varro* aſtoniſhed at theſe Proceedings, turned back with deſign to reach *Italica*, but was informed that the Gates were ſhut. At laſt, finding himſelf ſurrounded on all ſides, and the Ways every where beſet; he wrote to *Cæſar*, that he was ready to reſign the Legion under his Command, to whomſoever he ſhould order to receive it. *Cæſar* ſent *Sextus Cæſar* to take the Command; and *Varro* having reſigned the Legion accordingly, came to him at *Cordova*. After giving him an Account of the State of the Province, he faithfully reſigned all the publick Money he had in his hands, and informed him of the Quantity of Corn and Shipping he had prepared.

XIX. *CÆSAR* aſſembling the States at *Cordova*, returned thanks ſeverally to all who had declared in his Favour: to the *Roman* Citizens, for having made themſelves Maſters of the Town in his Name: to the *Spaniards*, for driving out *Pompey*'s Garriſons: to the People of *Cales*, for having fruſtrated the Deſigns of his Enemies, and aſſerted their own Liberty: to the military Tribunes and Centurions ſent thither to guard the Place, for having confirmed them in their Reſolutions by their Example. He remitted the Tribute impoſed by *Varro* upon the *Roman* Citizens; reſtored their Eſtates to thoſe who had been deprived of them for ſpeaking their Thoughts freely; diſtributed Rewards to a great many both in publick and private; and gave all room to hope for like Favours in the iſſue. After a ſtay of two Days at *Cordova*, he went to *Cales*; where he reſtored to the Temple of *Hercules* all the Treaſures and Ornaments which had been carried off, and lodged in private Houſes. He committed the Government of the Province to *Q. Caſſius*, aſſigned him four Legions for that purpoſe; and embarking for *Tarraco* on board the Fleet which *Varro* had obliged the *Gaditani* to furniſh, arrived there in a few Days. There he found Deputies from almoſt all the States of the Province: and having, in like manner as at *Cordova*, both publickly and privately rewarded ſome States; he left *Tarraco*, came by Land to *Narbonne*, and thence to *Marſeilles*. There he was informed of the Law touching the Dictatorſhip, and that *M. Lepidus* the Prætor had named him to that Office.

XX. THE *Maſſilians* overwhelmed with a Profuſion of Calamities; reduced to the utmoſt Diſtreſs by Famine; worſted in two different Engagements by Sea; weakened by continual Sallies; aſſaulted by a heavy Peſtilence, occaſioned by the length of the Siege, and their conſtant change of Diet; (for they were obliged to feed upon old Meal and muſty Barley, which had been long treaſured up in their Magazines againſt an Accident of this kind:) their Tower being overthrown; a great Part of their Walls undermined; and no Proſpect of Relief from Armies or the Provinces, which were now all reduced under *Cæſar*'s Power: they reſolved to ſurrender in good earneſt. But ſome Days before, *Domitius*, who was appriſed of their Intentions, having prepared three

three Ships (two of which he aſſigned to his Followers, and embarked in perſon on board the third) took occaſion during a Storm to make his Eſcape. Some of *Brutus*'s Gallies, which he had ordered to keep conſtantly cruiſing before the Port, chancing to get ſight of him, prepared to give chace. That in which *Domitius* was eſcaped under favour of the Tempeſt; but the two others, alarmed at ſeeing our Gallies ſo near them, re-entered the Port. *Cæſar* ſpared the Town, more in regard to its Antiquity and Reputation, than any real Merit it could plead. He obliged the Citizens however to deliver up their Arms, Machines, and Ships of War, whether in the Port or Arſenal: to ſurrender all the Money in their Treaſury: and to receive a Garriſon of two Legions. Then ſending the reſt of the Army into *Italy*, he himſelf ſet out for *Rome*.

XXI. ABOUT the ſame time, *C. Curio* ſailed from *Sicily* into *Africa*, with two of the four Legions which had been put under his Command by *Cæſar*, and five hundred Horſe; having conceived the higheſt Contempt of the Troops headed by *P. Attius Varus*. After two Days and three Nights ſailing, he landed at a Place called *Aquilaria*. This Place is about twenty-two Miles diſtant from *Clupea*, and has a very convenient Harbour for Ships in the Summer-time, ſheltered on each ſide by a Promontory. *L. Cæſar* the Son waited for him at *Clupea* with ten Gallies, which *P. Attius* had taken in the War againſt the Pirates, and repaired at *Utica*, for the ſervice of the preſent War. But terrified at the number of Ships *Curio* brought with him, he ſtood in for the Coaſt; where running his Galley on ſhore, he left her, and went by Land to *Adrumetum*. *C. Conſidius Longus* commanded in that Town with one Legion: and here alſo the reſt of the Fleet repaired after *Cæſar*'s Flight. *M. Rufus* the Quæſtor purſuing them with twelve Gallies, which *Curio* had brought with him from *Africa* to guard the Tranſports; when he ſaw *Cæſar*'s own Galley upon the Strand, he towed her off, and returned with the Fleet to *Curio*.

XXII. *CURIO* ordered him to ſail directly for *Utica*, and followed himſelf with the Land-Army. After a march of two Days, he arrived at the River *Bagradas*, where he left *C. Caninius Rebilus* with the Legions, and advanced before with the Cavalry, to take a view of the *Cornelian* Camp, which was judged to be a Situation extremely advantageous. It is a high Rock, jutting out into the Sea, ſteep and rough on both ſides, but with an eaſier Deſcent where it fronts *Utica*. It lies little more than a Mile from *Utica* in a direct Line: but as there is a Fountain about half way, which runs towards the Sea, and overflowing the Plain, forms a Moraſs; to avoid this, in marching to *Utica*, it is neceſſary to take a compaſs of ſix Miles. When he had taken a view of this Poſt, he went next and examined *Varus*'s Camp, which was under the Walls of the Town, towards the Gate named the *Gate of War*. The Situation of it was extremely advantageous; for on the one ſide it was covered by the City of *Utica* itſelf, and on the other by a kind of Theatre which ſtood without the Walls, the Works round which took up ſo much room, that they rendred the Approach to the Camp extremely difficult. At the ſame time he ſaw all the Ways crouded with People, who out of fear of being pillaged, were carrying their moſt valuable Effects into the City. He detached the Cavalry againſt them to diſperſe them, and likewiſe have an Opportunity of making ſome Booty. Upon which *Varus* ordered ſix hundred *Numidian* Horſe to advance to their Aſſiſtance, which he farther ſtrengthned with four hundred Foot, ſent by *Juba* a few Days before,

to reinforce the Garriſon of *Utica*. This King inherited from his Father an Affection for *Pompey*, and beſides perſonally hated *Curio*, who, during his Tribuneſhip, had publiſhed a Law to deprive him of his Kingdom. The *Numidian* Cavalry ſoon came to Blows with ours; but were not able to ſtand their firſt Charge, retreating to their Camp with the loſs of an hundred and twenty Men. Mean-time, upon the arrival of *Curio*'s Fleet, he ordered Proclamation to be made among the Merchant Ships which were at *Utica*, to the number of two hundred, that he would treat them as Enemies, if they did not immediately repair to the *Cornelian* Camp. Upon this Proclamation they inſtantly weighed Anchor, and leaving *Utica*, ſailed whither they were ordered; by which means the Army was plentifully ſupplied with every thing they ſtood in need of.

XXIII. THESE things diſpatched, *Curio* repaired to his Camp at *Bagrada*, where with the joint Acclamations of the whole Army, he was ſaluted by the Name of *Imperator*. Next Day he led his Army towards *Utica*, and encamped not far from the Town. But before he had finiſhed his Intrenchments, he was informed by ſome Parties of Horſe, who were upon the ſcout, that a powerful Body of Horſe and Foot had been ſent by the King to *Utica*: at the ſame time a great Cloud of Duſt began to appear, and ſoon after the Enemy's Van was in view. *Curio* aſtoniſhed at a Motion ſo unexpected, ſent the Cavalry before to ſuſtain their firſt Charge, and keep them in play: he, mean-while, drawing off the Legions from the Works with all poſſible expedition, formed them in order of Battle. The Horſe engaged according to Orders; and with ſuch Succeſs, that before the Legions could be duly drawn up, the whole Reinforcement ſent by the King, who marched without Order or apprehenſion of Danger, falling into Confuſion, at laſt betook themſelves to flight. The Cavalry, wheeling nimbly along the Shore, eſcaped with little Loſs into the Town: but great numbers of the Infantry were cut to pieces.

XXIV. NEXT Night two Centurions of the Nation of the *Marſi*, with twenty-two private Soldiers, deſerted from *Curio*, and went over to *Attius Varus*. Theſe, either believing the thing themſelves, or deſirous to carry grateful Tidings to *Varus*, (for we eaſily believe what we wiſh, and readily hope that others will fall into our way of thinking,) aſſured him, that the whole Army was extremely averſe to *Curio*, and would infallibly revolt, if he would but advance, and come to a Conference with them. Accordingly *Varus* drew out his Legions next Day. *Curio* did the ſame: and the two Armies ſtood facing one another in order of Battle, with a ſmall Valley between them.

XXV. *SEXTUS QUINTILIUS VARUS*, who, as we have related above, had been made Priſoner at *Corfinium*, was now in the Enemy's Army: for *Cæſar* having granted him his liberty, he had retired into *Africa*. *Curio* had brought over with him from *Sicily* the very ſame Legions, who had revolted ſome time before to *Cæſar* at the Siege of *Corfinium*: ſo that excepting a few Centurions who had been changed, the Officers and Companies were the ſame as had formerly ſerved with this very *Quintilius*. He made uſe of this Handle to debauch the Army of *Curio*, " and began with putting the Soldiers " in mind of their former Oath to *Domitius*, and to himſelf that General's " Quæſtor; he exhorted them not to carry Arms againſt the old Companions of " their Fortune, who had ſhared with them in all the Hazards of that Siege;

" nor

" nor fight in defence of that Party, who treated them ignominiouſly, and as " Deſerters." To theſe Conſiderations he added offers of a liberal Recompence, if they would follow his Fortune and that of *Attius*. But his Speech made no impreſſion upon *Curio*'s Troops, ſo that both Armies retired to their reſpective Camps.

XXVI. BUT an uncommon Panick ſoon ſpread itſelf over *Curio*'s Camp, which the various Diſcourſes of the Soldiers ſerved only to increaſe. For every one had his Opinion, and added the Suggeſtions of his own Fear to that which he heard from others. Theſe Reports ſpreading from one to many, and receiving Additions in every new Relation, there appeared to be ſeveral Authors of the ſame Notions: " That in a civil War it was lawful for every Soldier to " chooſe what ſide he pleaſed: That the ſame Legions who a little before had " fought on the ſide of the Enemy, might without ſcruple return again to the " ſame Cauſe, ſince *Cæſar*'s conferring Favours upon his Enemies, ought not " to render them unmindful of prior and greater Obligations: That even the " municipal Towns were divided in their Affection, and ſided ſome with one " Party, ſome with another." Theſe Diſcourſes proceeded not from the *Marſi* and *Peligni* alone, but ran like a Torrent through the whole Camp. However, ſome of the Soldiers blamed their Companions for this ſo great freedom of Talk; and others, who affected to appear more diligent than the reſt, enlarged in their Accounts of it to the Officers.

XXVII. FOR theſe Reaſons *Curio* ſummoning a Council of War, began to deliberate about the proper Remedies for this Evil. Some were for attacking at all hazards the Camp of *Varus*, in order to find employment for the Soldiers, whoſe Idleneſs they conſidered as the cauſe of all the preſent Alarms. Beſides, it was better, they ſaid, to truſt to Valour, and try the fortune of a Battle, than ſee themſelves abandoned by their Men, and delivered up to the barbarity of the Enemy. Others were for retiring during the night to the *Cornelian* Camp, where they would have more time to cure the Infatuation of the Soldiers; and whence, in caſe of a Diſaſter, they could with more ſafety and eaſe make good their Retreat into *Sicily*, by means of the great number of Ships they were there provided with. *Curio* reliſhed neither of theſe Motions: the one, he thought, argued Cowardiſe; the other, a raſh Boldneſs: to retreat, would have all the appearance of a ſhameful Flight; to attack, they muſt reſolve to fight in a place of Diſadvantage. " With what hope, ſaid he, can " we attack a Camp fortified by Nature and Art? And what Advantage can " we draw from an Attempt, whence we ſhall be obliged to retire with Loſs? " Does not Succeſs always ſecure to a General the Affection of his Troops, whereas " ill Fortune is evermore followed with Contempt? And what would a De- " campment imply but an ignominious Flight, an abſolute deſpair of all " Things, and an unavoidable Alienation of the whole Army? That we ought " not to let the modeſt think we diſtruſt them, nor the inſolent that we fear " them; becauſe the Knowledge of our Fear only augments the Preſumption of " the one, and an Apprehenſion of being ſuſpected abates the Zeal of the other. " But if what is reported of the diſcontent of the Army be true, which I am " yet unwilling to believe, at leaſt to the degree ſome pretend; we ought for " that Reaſon rather to hide and diſſemble our Fears, than by an unreaſonable " diſcovery of them add ſtrength to the Evil: That as in ſome Caſes it was " neceſſary to conceal the Wounds of the Body, that an Enemy might not " conceive hope from our Misfortunes; ſo alſo ought we to hide the Indiſ-

" poſition

" poſition of an Army: That by retreating in the night, as ſome propoſed, " they would only furniſh a fairer occaſion to the ill-affected to execute their " Purpoſe: for Fear and Shame are powerful Reſtraints by Day, but Night " intirely diveſts them of their Force: That he was neither ſo raſh, as to at- " tack a Camp without hopes of Succeſs; nor ſo blinded by Fear, as to be " at a loſs what Meaſures to purſue: That he thought it his Duty to examine " things to the bottom; and as he had called them together to deliberate " upon the preſent ſtate of Affairs, doubted not, with their Aſſiſtance, to take " ſuch Meaſures as would be attended with Succeſs."

XXVIII. HE then diſmiſſed the Council: and aſſembling the Soldiers, put them in mind of what advantage their Steddineſs and Zeal had been to *Cæſar* at *Corfinium*, and how ſerviceable towards the conqueſt of the greateſt part of *Italy*. " It was you, ſaid he, that gave the Example, and all the mu- " nicipal Towns ſoon followed: their ſubmiſſion to *Cæſar* was your Work: and " therefore it is not without reaſon, that he is ſo particularly attached to you, " and that *Pompey* hates you ſo ſincerely. It was you that obliged him to quit " *Italy*, without being forced to it by the loſs of a Battle. *Cæſar*, who ranks " me in the number of his deareſt Friends, has committed my Safety to your " Care, with *Sicily* and *Africa*, without which it would be impoſſible to de- " fend either *Rome* or *Italy*. You are now in the preſence of thoſe who ex- " hort you to abandon us: and indeed what could be more deſirable to " them, than at the ſame time to enſnare us, and fix upon you the ſtain of an " infamous Crime? What worſe Opinion could an enraged Enemy teſtify of " you, than to ſuppoſe you capable of betraying thoſe, who own themſelves " indebted to you for all; and of throwing yourſelves into the power of a " Party, who conſider you as the Authors of all their Misfortunes? Are you " Strangers to *Cæſar*'s Exploits in *Spain?* Two Armies defeated? Two Gene- " rals overcome? Two Provinces brought under ſubjection? And all this in " the ſpace of forty Days, after *Cæſar* came within ſight of the Enemy. Is " it likely that thoſe, who with Forces unbroken could not ſtand their Ground, " will be able to reſiſt, now they are vanquiſhed? And will you, who followed " *Cæſar* before Fortune declared in his favour, now return to the vanquiſhed, " when Fortune has already decided the Quarrel, and you are upon the point of " obtaining the Reward of your Services? They charge you with having aban- " doned and betrayed them, contrary to the faith of Oaths. But is it indeed true " that you abandoned *Domitius?* Or did not he rather meanly abandon you, " at a time when you were ready to ſuffer every thing for his ſake? Did " he not, unknown to you, reſolve to ſeek his Safety in flight? And were " you not, after being thus baſely betrayed by him, indebted to *Cæſar*'s Good- " neſs for your Preſervation? How could your Oath bind you to one, who " after throwing away the Enſigns of his Authority, and diveſting himſelf of " his Office, ſurrendered himſelf a private Man and a Captive into the power " of another? The new Engagement you were then brought under alone ſub- " ſiſts at preſent, and ought quite to obliterate that, which the ſurrender of " your General, and his loſs of Liberty, have made void. But tho' I doubt " not of your being ſatisfied with *Cæſar*, you may perhaps have taken offence " at me. And, indeed, I have no thought of mentioning any Services I may " have done you; which, as yet, come far ſhort of my Intentions, and your " Expectations: but you are not ignorant, that the Rewards of military Service " come not 'till after the concluſion of the War; and I believe you little " doubt what the iſſue of this will be. Nor need I on this occaſion decline

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" taking notice of the Diligence I have uſed, the Progreſs already made, and " the good Fortune that has hitherto attended me. Are you diſſatisfied that " I have landed my Army ſafe in *Africa*, without the loſs of a ſingle Ship? " That I diſperſed the Enemies Fleet at the firſt Onſet? That within the " ſpace of two Days I have twice defeated their Cavalry? That I forced two " hundred of their Merchant-men to quit the Port of *Utica* and join me? " and that I have reduced them to a ſituation where it is impoſſible for them " to receive any Supplies either by Land or Sea? Can you think of abandoning " a Cauſe conducted by ſuch Leaders, and attended with ſuch Succeſs; to " follow the Fortune of thoſe who ſo ignominiouſly delivered up *Corfinium*, " relinquiſhed *Italy*, ſurrendred *Spain*, and have already ſuſtained conſiderable " Loſſes in the *African* War? I never pretended to more than being a Fol- " lower of *Cæſar*: it was you that honoured me with the Title of *Imperator*; " which I am this moment ready to reſign, if you think me unworthy of the " Favour. Reſtore me my former Name, that it may not be ſaid I was ho- " noured, to be covered afterwards with the greater Ignominy."

XXIX. THESE Remonſtrances made ſuch an Impreſſion upon the Soldiers, that they frequently interrupted him while he was ſpeaking, and appeared deeply touched at his ſuſpecting their Fidelity. As he retired, they all gathered round him, exhorting him not to be diſcouraged, or ſcruple to hazard a Battle, and make Trial of their Fidelity and Bravery. This Behaviour of the Troops wrought ſo great a Change in the Minds of the Officers, that *Curio*, with the joint Concurrence of them all, reſolved to give Battle the firſt Opportunity that offered. Accordingly drawing out his Men next day, in the ſame Place he had done for ſome time paſt, he ranged them in Order of Battle. *Attius Varus* did the ſame; that if an Opportunity offered, either of corrupting the Soldiers, or fighting to advantage, he might be in readineſs to lay hold of it.

XXX. BETWEEN the two Armies lay a Valley, as we have obſerved above; not indeed conſiderable for its Breadth, but ſteep and difficult of Aſcent. Both ſides waited till the other ſhould paſs it, that they might engage to more Advantage. *Curio* obſerving that all the Horſe on *Varus*'s right Wing, together with the light-armed Foot, had ventured down into this Valley; detached his Cavalry againſt them, with two Cohorts of *Marrucinians*; whoſe firſt Shock the Enemy were not able to ſuſtain, but returned full ſpeed to their own Men, leaving the light-armed Foot behind, who were ſurrounded and cut to Pieces in ſight of *Varus*'s Army; which fronting that way, was witneſs to the Flight of the one, and Slaughter of the other. Upon this *Rebilus*, one of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants, whom *Curio* had brought with him from *Sicily*, on account of his conſummate Knowledge in the Art of War; " Why, " ſays he, do you delay ſeizing the favourable Moment? You ſee the Enemy " ſtruck with Terror." *Curio* made no Anſwer, only deſired his Soldiers to remember what they had promiſed the Day before; and marching the firſt, commanded them to follow him. The Valley was ſo ſteep and difficult, that the firſt Ranks could not aſcend, but with the aſſiſtance of thoſe that came after. But the *Attinian* Army was ſo diſpirited with Fear, and the Flight and Slaughter of their Troops, that they never thought of making Reſiſtance; fancying themſelves already ſurrounded by our Cavalry: ſo that before we could arrive within reach of Dart, the whole Army of *Varus* fled, and retreated to their Camp.

XXXI. IN this Flight, one *Fabius Pelignus*, a Centurion of the loweſt Rank in *Curio*'s Army, as he was purſuing the Fugitives, called with a loud Voice to *Varus*, as if he had been one of his own Men, who wanted to admoniſh him of ſomething. *Varus* hearing himſelf named ſeveral times, turned and ſtood ſtill, demanding who he was, and what he wanted. *Fabius* aimed a Blow at his Breaſt with his Sword, and would certainly have killed him, had not *Varus* warded it off with his Shield. *Fabius* himſelf was ſoon after ſurrounded and ſlain. Mean-while the Multitude of Fugitives ſo cloſed up the Gates of the Camp, and preſſed upon one another in ſuch manner, that more were crouded to Death, than fell either in the Battle or Purſuit. Nay the Camp itſelf was very near being taken; becauſe great Numbers inſtead of ſtopping there to defend it, made directly for the Town. But both the Nature of the Ground, and the Fortifications themſelves, prevented the Aſſault; and the rather, as *Curio*'s Soldiers being armed only for Battle, had brought with them none of the neceſſary Tools to force a Camp. *Curio* brought back his Army without the loſs of a Man, *Fabius* excepted: of the Enemy about ſix hundred were killed, and a thouſand wounded. After *Curio* had drawn off his Men, all the wounded quitted the Camp, and retired into the City, as did a great many others, who overcome by Fear, ſheltered themſelves there alſo under the ſame pretence. *Varus* obſerving this, and that an univerſal dread had ſeized the Army; left only a Trumpet in the Camp, with a few Tents for ſhew; and about midnight, ſilently entered the Town with all his Forces.

XXXII. NEXT Day *Curio* reſolved to beſiege *Utica*, and draw a Line of Circumvallation round it. There was in the Town a Multitude of Men unfit for the Fatigues of War, through a long Enjoyment of Peace. The Inhabitants themſelves were ſtrongly attached to *Cæſar*, for ancient Favours received from him. The Senate was compoſed of People greatly differing in their Tempers: and the Loſſes already ſuſtained ſpread Terror through all Ranks. A Surrender was publickly talked of; and all concurred in ſoliciting *Varus* not to ruin them by his Obſtinacy and Perverſeneſs. While theſe things were in agitation, Meſſengers ſent by King *Juba* arrived, who informed them of the approach of his Army, and exhorted them to defend the City; which contributed not a little to confirm their wavering Minds.

XXXIII. *CURIO* received the ſame News; but for ſome time would not believe it, ſo greatly did he confide in his good Fortune. Beſides, *Cæſar*'s Succeſs in *Spain* was already known in *Africa*; whence he concluded it improbable that *Juba* would attempt any thing againſt him. But when he was for certain informed of his being within twenty-five Miles of *Utica* with his whole Army, he retired from before the Town to the Cornelian Camp, laid in great Quantities of Corn and Wood, began to fortify himſelf, and ſent directly to *Sicily* for the Cavalry, and the two Legions he had left there. The Camp itſelf was very advantageous for protracting the War; being ſtrong both by Nature and Art, near the Sea, and abounding in Water and Salt, great Quantities of which had been carried thither from the neighbouring Salt-pits. Neither ran he any hazard of being ſtraitned for Wood and Corn, as the Country abounded in Trees and Grain. He reſolved therefore, with the conſent of the whole Army, to wait here the arrival of the reſt of the Troops, and make Preparation for continuing the War.

XXXIV.

XXXIV. THIS Reſolution being taken, and meeting with a general Approbation; ſome of the Townſmen, who had deſerted to *Curio*, informed him, that the War in which *Juba* was engaged with the *Leptitani*, having obliged him to return into his own Kingdom, he had only ſent his Lieutenant *Sabura*, with a ſmall Body of Forces, to the Aſſiſtance of the *Uticans*. Upon this Intelligence, to which he too haſtily gave Credit, he changed his Deſign, and reſolved to give Battle. The Fire of Youth, his Courage, good Succeſs, and Self-confidence, contributed greatly to confirm him in this Reſolution. Urged by theſe Conſiderations, about the beginning of the Night, he ſent all his Cavalry towards the Enemy's Camp, which was upon the River *Bagradas*, and where *Sabura*, of whom we have ſpoken before, commanded in chief. But the King followed with all his Forces, and was not above ſix Miles behind him. The Cavalry which *Curio* had detached, marched all night, and coming unexpectedly upon the Enemy, attacked them before they were ready to receive the Charge: for the *Numidians*, according to the Cuſtom of that barbarous Country, were encamped without Order or Rule. Falling upon them, therefore, in this Confuſion, and oppreſſed with Sleep, they ſlew great Numbers, and obliged the reſt to fly in the utmoſt Conſternation: after which they returned to *Curio*, with the Priſoners they had taken.

XXXV. *CURIO* had ſet out with all his Forces about the fourth Watch of the Night, leaving only five Cohorts to guard his Camp. After a march of ſix Miles he was met by his Cavalry, who informed him of all that had paſſed. He asked the Priſoners, who commanded at *Bagradas?* they anſwered, *Sabura*. Upon this, without making any farther Enquiries, for fear of being detained too long, he turned to the Troops next him, and ſaid: "Do you not ſee, Fellow-ſoldiers, that the Report of the Priſoners correſponds "exactly with the Intelligence given by the Deſerters? *Juba* is not with the "Army. It muſt conſiſt of but a few Troops, ſince they were not able to "withſtand the Charge of a ſmall Body of Horſe. Haſte, therefore, in the "Purſuit of Glory, Booty, and Victory." What the Cavalry had done was indeed conſiderable, becauſe they were but few in number in compariſon of the *Numidians:* but as Vanity always makes us believe our Merit to be greater than it is, they themſelves boaſted immoderately of the Action, and endeavoured to enhance the Value of it. They made a mighty Parade of the Booty. The Priſoners too, as well Infantry as Cavalry, marched in Proceſſion before them. And indeed the whole Army imagined, that to delay the Battle was no other than to delay the Victory: ſo that the Ardor of the Troops perfectly ſeconded *Curio*'s Hopes. He therefore haſtened his march, ordering the Horſe to follow, that he might as ſoon as poſſible come up with the frighted Enemy. But as they were fatigued with their late march, they found themſelves unable to keep pace with the Army; but ſtopped, ſome in one Place, ſome in another: which, however, retarded not *Curio*'s Hopes.

XXXVI. *JUBA* having notice from *Sabura* of the Action in the Night, detached to his Aſſiſtance two thouſand *Spaniſh* and *Gallick* Horſe, of his ordinary Guard, with that part of the Infantry in which he put the greateſt Confidence. Himſelf followed leiſurely with the reſt of the Troops, and about forty Elephants; ſuſpecting that *Curio*, who had ſent the Cavalry before, could not be far off with his Army. *Sabura* drew up his Horſe and Foot, ordering them to give ground upon the Enemy's Attack; and, as through Fear, counterfeit a Flight. Mean-while he told them, that he would give the Signal of

of Battle when he ſaw proper, and direct their Motions as the Caſe might require.

XXXVII. *CURIO* flattered with new Hopes, and imagining by the Enemy's Motions, that they were preparing for Flight, made his Troops come down from the Mountain into the Plain; and advancing ſtill farther, tho' his Army was already very much fatigued, having marched upwards of ſixteen miles, halted at laſt to give the Men breath. That Moment *Sabura* ſounded the Charge, led on his Men in order of Battle, and went from Rank to Rank to animate the Troops: but he ſuffered only the Cavalry to come to Blows, keeping the Infantry at a diſtance within ſight. *Curio* was not wanting on his ſide, but exhorted his Men to place all their hopes in their Valour. And indeed neither the Infantry, tho' fatigued with their march; nor the Cavalry, tho' few in number, and ſpent with Toil; ſhewed any want of Valour, or backwardneſs to fight: tho' the laſt, in particular, did not exceed two hundred; the reſt having ſtopt by the way. Theſe, wherever they attacked the Enemy, obliged them to give ground: but they could neither purſue far, nor drive their Horſes on with Impetuoſity. On the other hand, the *Numidian* Cavalry began to ſurround our Men, and charge them in the Rear. When the Cohorts advanced againſt them, they fell back, and by the quickneſs of their Retreat, eluded the Charge: but immediately returning, they got behind our Men, and cut them off from the reſt of the Army. Thus it was equally dangerous for them to maintain their Ranks, or advance to Battle. The Enemy's Forces increaſed continually, by the Reinforcements ſent from the King: ours, on the contrary, were diſabled by Fatigue. Neither could our wounded Men retire, or be ſent to any place of Safety, the whole Army being inveſted by the Enemy's Horſe. Theſe deſpairing of ſafety; as is uſual for Men in the laſt moments of Life, either lamented their own Fate, or recommended their Relations to their Fellow-Soldiers, if any ſhould be ſo fortunate as to eſcape that Danger. The whole Army was filled with Conſternation and Grief.

XXXVIII. *CURIO* perceiving the general Alarm, and that neither his Exhortations nor Prayers were regarded, ordered the Troops to retire with the Standards to the neareſt Mountains, as the only Reſource in the preſent Exigence. But the Cavalry detached by *Sabura* had already ſeized them. All hope being now loſt, ſome were ſlain endeavouring to fly: others threw themſelves upon the Ground, partly in deſpair, partly unable to make any Efforts for their own Safety. At this moment *Cn. Domitius*, who commanded the Horſe, addreſſing *Curio*, intreated him to endeavour to regain his Camp with the few Cavalry that remained, promiſing not to abandon him. "Can I, "ſays *Curio*, look *Cæſar* in the Face, after having loſt an Army he had "committed to my Charge?" So ſaying, he continued fighting 'till he was ſlain. Very few of the Cavalry eſcaped, thoſe only excepted who had ſtopt to refreſh their Horſes: for perceiving at a diſtance the rout of the whole Army, they returned to their Camp. All the Infantry were ſlain to a Man.

XXXIX. WHEN this Diſaſter was known, *M. Rufus* the Quæſtor, whom *Curio* had left to guard the Camp, intreated his Men not to loſe Courage. They begged and requeſted him to reconduct them into *Sicily*: which he promiſed; and ordered the Maſters of the Tranſports to have their Ships

Ships in readineſs at night along the Shore. But Fear had ſo univerſally ſeized the Minds of the Soldiers, that ſome cried out *Juba* was arrived with his Troops; ſome that *Varus* approached with the Legions, the Duſt of whoſe march they pretended to diſcern; and others, that the Enemy's Fleet would be upon them in an inſtant: though there was not the leaſt ground for theſe Reports. The Conſternation thus becoming general, each Man thought only of his own Safety. Thoſe who were already embarked ſailed immediately: and their Flight drew after it that of the Tranſports; ſo that only a very few ſmall Frigates obeyed the Summons, and came to the general Rendezvous. The Diſorder was ſo great upon the Shore, every one ſtriving who ſhould firſt embark, that many Boats ſunk under the Croud, and others were afraid to come near the Land.

XL. THUS only a few Soldiers and aged Men, who either through Intereſt or Compaſſion were received on board, or had Strength enough to ſwim to the Tranſports, got ſafe to *Sicily*. The reſt deputing their Centurions to *Varus* by night, ſurrendered to him. *Juba* coming up next Day, claimed them as his Property, put the greater Number to the Sword, and ſent a few of the moſt conſiderable, whom he had ſelected for that purpoſe, into *Numidia*. *Varus* complained of this Violation of his Faith; but durſt not make any Reſiſtance. The King made his Entrance into the City on horſeback, followed by a great Number of Senators, among whom was *Servius Sulpicius*, and *Licinius Damaſippus*. Here he ſtayed a few Days, to give what Orders he thought neceſſary; and then returned with all his Forces into his own Kingdom.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's

COMMENTARIES

OF THE

CIVIL WAR.

BOOK III.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. Cæſar *reverſes ſome Judgments given upon Perſons for Bribery at Elections.* II. *He ſets out for* Brunduſium. III. Pompey's *mighty Preparations for War.* IV. Cæſar *embarks, and arrives at the Promontory of* Ceraunium. VI. *His Fleet returning to* Brunduſium *is intercepted by the Enemy.* VII. M. Octavius, *one of* Pompey's *Adherents, laying ſiege to* Salona, *is obliged, by a ſudden Sally of the Inhabitants, to abandon his Lines.* VIII. Cæſar's *Embaſſy to* Pompey *with Propoſals of Peace.* IX. Cæſar *makes himſelf maſter of* Oricum. X. *Alſo of* Apollonia, *and the whole Country round about.* XI. Cæſar *and* Pompey *incamp over-againſt each other on the Banks of the River* Apſus. XII. Cæſar's *Tranſports ſailing from* Brunduſium, *put back immediately for fear of the Enemy.* XIII. Pompey's *Fleet reduced to great Straits.* XIV. *Conferences ſet on foot about a Peace, which come to nothing.* XV. Bibulus, *Admiral of* Pompey's *Fleet, dies.* XVI. Pompey's *Anſwer to* Cæſar's *Propoſals of Peace.* XVII. *The Conferences about a Peace renewed, but without effect.* XVIII. *A Commotion in* Rome. XXI. Libo, *one of* Pompey's *Followers, blocks up the Port of* Brunduſium *with a Fleet.* XXII. *But by the Valour and Conduct of* Antony *is forced to quit his Project.* XXIII. Antony *and* Kalenus *tranſport* Cæſar's *Troops to* Greece *with wonderful good Succeſs.* XXVII. Pompey, *to avoid being ſhut up between two Armies, retires to* Aſparagium. XXVIII. Scipio, *a Partizan of* Pompey, *behaves very tyrannically in* Aſia. XXIX. *The Motions of* Cæſar's *Lieutenants in* Theſſaly, Ætolia, *and* Macedonia. XXXIV. *Young* Pompey *burns* Cæſar's *Fleet in the Port of* Oricum. XXXV. Cæſar *cuts off* Pompey's *Communication with* Dyrrhachium. XXXVI. *And beſieges him in his Camp.* XXXIX. *Many Attempts and Diſpoſitions on both ſides, with various turns of Fortune.* XL. Cæſar's *Troops, diſtreſſed for want of Corn, make Bread of a certain Root.* XLIII. Pompey *repulſed in a Sally.* XLVII. Kalenus, *one of* Cæſar's *Lieutenants, poſſeſſes himſelf of ſeveral Towns in* Achaia. XLVIII. Cæſar *offers* Pompey *Battle.* XLIX. *Another Embaſſy with Propoſals of Peace, which are rejected.* L. Pompey, *diſtreſſed for want of Forage, reſolves to break thro'* Cæſar's *Lines.* LI. Roſcillus *and* Ægus *diſguſted at ſome Check they had received from* Cæſar, *revolt to* Pompey. LII. Pompey *breaks thro'* Cæſar's *Lines, after making great Slaughter of his Troops.* LXI. Cæſar *deſiſts from the Deſign of incloſing* Pompey, *and makes a Speech to his Men.* LXII. Cæſar *retires to* Aſparagium, *and is followed by* Pompey. LXV. *Thence to* Apollonia. LXVII. *And then to* Gomphi, *a Town of* Theſſaly; *which refuſing to open its Gates, is taken by Aſſault the firſt Day.* LXVIII. Metropolis *ſubmits, and their Example is followed by other* Theſſalian *States.* LXIX. Pompey *arrives in* Theſſaly, *elated with his Succeſs, and confident of Victory.* LXX. Cæſar *reſolves to give battle. His Reſolution with reſpect to his Cavalry.* LXXII. Pompey *likewiſe reſolves to give battle, and boaſts of an aſſured Victory.* LXXIII. *The diſpoſition of* Pompey's *Army.* LXXIV. *The diſpoſition of* Cæſar's. LXXV. Cæſar's *Speech to his Soldiers.* LXXVI. *The Battle of* Pharſalia, *in which* Cæſar *obtains a compleat Victory.* LXXVII. Cæſar *makes himſelf maſter of* Pompey's *Camp.* LXXVIII. *Where he finds great Riches.* LXXIX. Pompey's *Flight.* LXXX. Cæſar *purſues* Pompey's *Troops, and obliges them to ſurrender.* LXXXI. *The number of Men killed on each ſide.* LXXXII. *Mean-while* Lælius, *a Follower of* Pompey, *blocks up the Port of* Brunduſium *with a Fleet.* LXXXIII. *And* Caſſius *burns ſome Ships in* Sicily *belonging to* Cæſar. LXXXIV. Cæſar *purſues* Pompey. LXXXV. Pompey *flying to* Peluſium, *is murdered there by ſome of King* Ptolemy's *Court.* LXXXVI. *Some Prodigies that happened on the Day of* Cæſar's *Victory.* LXXXVII. Cæſar *purſuing* Pompey *to* Alexandria, *hears there the News of his Death.* LXXXVIII. *And is unexpectedly entangled in a new War.*

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF THE
CIVIL WAR.

BOOK III.

I. CÆSAR, as Dictator, holding the Comitia, *Julius Cæſar*, and *P. Servilius*, were choſen Conſuls: for this was the Year in which he could be elected to that Magiſtracy, conſiſtent with the Laws. This Affair being diſpatched; as *Cæſar* ſaw publick Credit at a ſtand over all *Italy*, becauſe no body paid their Debts; he ordered that Arbiters ſhould be choſe, who ſhould make an eſtimate of the Poſſeſſions of all Debtors, and ſhould convey them in payment to their Creditors, at the price they bore before the War. This Regulation he thought beſt calculated to reſtore publick Credit, and prevent the Apprehenſion of a general Abolition of Debts, which is but too common a Conſequence of Wars and civil Diſſenſions. At the ſame time, in conſequence of an Addreſs to the People, he re-eſtabliſhed the Prætors and Tribunes, who had been deprived upon a Charge of Bribery, at a time when *Pompey* awed the City by his Legions. Theſe Deciſions were ſo little conformable to Law, that Sentence was often pronounced by a Party of Judges, different from thoſe who attended the Pleadings. As theſe had made him an offer of their Service in the beginning of the War, he accounted the Obligation the ſame as if he had actually accepted of their Friendſhip: but thought it better their Reſtoration ſhould ſeem to flow from the People, than appear a mere act of Bounty in him; that he might neither be charged with Ingratitude to his Followers, nor accuſed of invading the Prerogatives of the People.

II. ALL this Buſineſs, with the Celebration of the *Latin* Feſtivals, and the holding the Comitia for Elections, took him up only eleven Days, at the end of which he abdicated the Dictatorſhip; and immediately ſet out from *Rome*, in order to reach *Brunduſium*, where he had ordered twelve Legions, with all the Cavalry, to rendezvous. But he had ſcarce Ships to carry over twenty thouſand legionary Soldiers, and ſix hundred Horſe; which alone hindered him from putting a ſpeedy end to the War. Beſides, the Legions were conſiderably weakened by their many Loſſes in the *Gallick* War, and the long and painful march from *Spain*: and an unhealthful Autumn in *Apulia*, and about *Brunduſium*, with the change of ſo fine a Climate as that of *Gaul* and *Spain*, had brought a general ſickneſs among the Troops.

III. *POMPEY* having had a whole Year to compleat his Preparations, undiſturbed by Wars, and free from the Interruption of an Enemy; had collected a mighty Fleet from *Aſia*, the *Cyclades*, *Corcyra*, *Athens*, *Pontus*, *Bithynia*, *Syria*, *Cilicia*, *Phœnicia*, and *Egypt*; and had given Orders for the building of Ships in all Parts. He had exacted great Sums from the People of *Aſia* and *Syria*; from the Kings, Tetrarchs, and Dynaſties of thoſe Parts; from the free States of *Achaia*; and from the Corporations of the Provinces ſubject to his Command. He had raiſed nine Legions of *Roman* Citizens: five he had brought with him from *Italy*; one had been ſent him from *Sicily*, conſiſting wholly of Veterans, and called *Gemella*, becauſe compoſed of two; another from *Crete* and *Macedonia*, of veteran Soldiers likewiſe, who having been disbanded by former Generals, had ſettled in thoſe Parts; and two more from *Aſia*, levied by the care of *Lentulus*. Beſides all theſe, he had great Numbers from *Theſſaly*, *Bœotia*, *Achaia*, and *Epirus*; whom, together with *Antony*'s Soldiers, he diſtributed among the Legions by way of Recruits. He expected alſo two Legions that *Metellus Scipio* was to bring out of *Syria*. He had three thouſand Archers drawn together from *Crete*, *Lacedemon*, *Pontus*, *Syria*, and other Provinces; ſix Cohorts of Slingers; and two of Mercenaries. His Cavalry amounted to ſeven thouſand; ſix hundred of which came from *Galatia* under *Dejotarus*; five hundred from *Cappadocia* under *Ariobarzanes*; and the like Number had been ſent him out of *Thrace* by *Cotus*, with his Son *Sadalis* at their head. Two hundred were from *Macedonia*, commanded by *Raſcipolis*, an Officer of great Diſtinction: five hundred from *Alexandria*, conſiſting of *Gauls* and *Germans*, left there by *A. Gabinius* to ſerve as a Guard to King *Ptolemy*; and now brought over by young *Pompey* in his Fleet, together with eight hundred of his own Domeſticks. *Tarcundarius Caſtor* and *Donilaus* furniſhed three hundred *Gallogræcians:* the firſt of theſe came himſelf in perſon, the latter ſent his Son. Two hundred, moſt of them Archers, were ſent from *Syria* by *Comagenus* of *Antioch*, who lay under the greateſt Obligations to *Pompey*. There were likewiſe a great Number of *Dardanians* and *Beſſians*, partly Volunteers, partly Mercenaries; with others from *Macedonia*, *Theſſaly*, and the adjoining States and Provinces, who altogether made up the Number mentioned above. To ſubſiſt this mighty Army, he had taken care to amaſs vaſt Quantities of Corn from *Theſſaly*, *Aſia*, *Egypt*, *Crete*, *Cyrene*, and other Countries; reſolving to quarter his Troops during the Winter at *Dyrrhachium*, *Apollonia*, and the other maritime Towns, to prevent *Cæſar*'s paſſing the Sea; for which purpoſe he ordered his Fleet to cruiſe perpetually about the Coaſts. Young *Pompey* commanded the *Egyptian* Squadron; *D. Lælius* and *C. Triarius* the *Aſiatic*; *C. Caſſius* the *Syrian*; *C. Marcellus* and *C. Coponius* the *Rhodian*; *Scribonius Libo* and *M. Octavius* the *Liburnian* and *Achaian:* but the chief Authority was veſted in *M. Bibulus*, who was Admiral of the whole, and gave his Orders accordingly.

IV. *CÆSAR*, upon his Arrival at *Brunduſium*, harangued his Troops, and told them: "That as they were now upon the point of ſeeing an end of all "their Toils and Dangers, they ought not to ſcruple at leaving their Servants "and Baggage behind them in *Italy*, that they might embark with leſs Con-"fuſion, and in greater Numbers; putting all their Hopes in Victory, and "the Generoſity of their General." The whole Army teſtified their Approbation of what was propoſed, and called out that they were ready to ſubmit to his Orders. Accordingly, having put ſeven Legions on board, as we have before obſerved, he ſet ſail the fourth of *January*, and arrived next Day at

at the *Ceraunian* Mountains: where having found among the Rocks and Shelves, with which that Coaſt abounds, a tolerable Road; and not daring to go to any Port, as he apprehended they were all in the Enemy's Poſſeſſion; he landed his Troops at a Place called *Pharſalus*, whither he brought his Fleet without the loſs of a ſingle Ship.

V. *LUCRETIUS VESPILLO* and *Minucius Rufus* were at *Oricum*, with eighteen *Aſiatic* Ships; and *Bibulus* had an hundred and ten at *Corcyra*. But the firſt durſt not hazard an Engagement, though *Cæſar* was eſcorted by no more than twelve Gallies, only four of which had Decks: and *Bibulus* had not time to re-aſſemble his Sailors and Soldiers, who were diſperſed in full Security: for no news of *Cæſar*'s Approach had reached thoſe Parts, till his Fleet was ſeen from the Continent.

VI. *CÆSAR* having landed his Troops, ſent the Fleet back the ſame Night to *Brunduſium*, to bring over his other Legions and Cavalry. *Fuſius Kalenus*, Lieutenant-General, had the Charge of this Expedition, with Orders to uſe the utmoſt Diſpatch. But ſetting ſail too late, he loſt the benefit of the Wind, which offered fair all Night, and fell in with the Enemy. For *Bibulus* hearing at *Corcyra* of *Cæſar*'s Arrival, forthwith put to Sea, in hopes of incercepting ſome of the Tranſports; and meeting the Fleet as it returned empty, took about thirty Ships, which he immediately burnt, with all that were on board; partly to ſatisfy his own Vengeance for the diſappointment he had received; partly to deter the reſt of the Troops from attempting the Paſſage. He then ſtationed his Fleet along the Coaſt from *Salona* to *Oricum*, guarded all Places with extraordinary care, and even lay himſelf aboard, notwithſtanding the rigour of the Winter; declining no Danger nor Fatigue, and ſolely intent upon intercepting *Cæſar*'s Supplies.

VII. AFTER the departure of the *Liburnian* Gallies, *M. Octavius*, with the Squadron under his Command, ſailed from *Illyricum*, and came before *Salona*. Having ſpirited up the *Dalmatians*, and other barbarous Nations in thoſe Parts, he drew *Iſſa* to revolt from *Cæſar*. But finding that the Council of *Salona* was neither to be moved by Promiſes nor Threats, he reſolved to inveſt the Town. *Salona* is built upon a Hill, and advantageouſly ſituated for Defence: but as the Fortifications were very inconſiderable, the *Roman* Citizens reſiding there, immediately ſurrounded the Place with wooden Towers; and finding themſelves too few to reſiſt the Attacks of the Enemy, who ſoon overwhelmed them with Wounds, betook themſelves to their laſt Refuge, by granting Liberty to all Slaves capable of bearing Arms, and cutting off the Womens Hair to make Cords for their Engines. *Octavius* perceiving their Obſtinacy, formed five different Camps round the Town, that they might at once ſuffer all the Inconveniences of a Siege, and be expoſed to frequent Attacks. The *Salonians*, determined to endure every thing, found themſelves moſt preſſed for want of Corn; and therefore ſent Deputies to *Cæſar* to ſolicit a Supply, patiently ſubmitting to all the other Hardſhips they laboured under. When the Siege had now continued a conſiderable time, and the *Octavians* began to be off their Guard: the *Salonians* finding the Opportunity favourable, about noon, when the Enemy were diſperſed, diſpoſed their Wives and Children upon the Walls, that every thing might have its wonted Appearance; and ſallying in a Body with their enfranchiſed Slaves, attacked the neareſt Quarters of *Octavius*. Having ſoon forced theſe, they advanced to the next; thence

to

to a third, a fourth, and ſo on through the reſt; till having driven the Enemy from every Poſt, and made great Slaughter of their Men, they at length compelled them, and *Octavius* their Leader, to betake themſelves to their Ships. Such was the iſſue of the Siege. As Winter now approached, and the loſs had been very conſiderable; *Octavius*, deſpairing to reduce the Place, retired to *Dyrrhachium*, and joined *Pompey*.

VIII. WE have ſeen that *L. Vibullius Rufus*, *Pompey*'s chief Engineer, had fallen twice into *Cæſar*'s hands, and been as often ſet at liberty; the firſt time at *Corfinium*, the next in *Spain*. Having been therefore twice indebted to him for his Life, and being alſo much in *Pompey*'s Eſteem, *Cæſar* thought him a proper Perſon to negotiate between them. His Inſtructions were; "That "it was now time for both to deſiſt from their Obſtinacy, and lay down "their Arms, without expoſing themſelves any more to the precarious Events "of Fortune. That the Loſſes they had already ſuſtained ought to ſerve as "Leſſons and Cautions, and fill them with juſt Apprehenſions with regard "to the future. That *Pompey* had been forced to abandon *Italy*, had loſt "*Sicily* and *Sardinia*, the two *Spains*, with about an hundred and thirty "Cohorts of *Roman* Citizens, who had periſhed in theſe Countries. That "himſelf too had been a conſiderable Sufferer by the Death of *Curio*, the "Deſtruction of the *African* Army, and the Surrender of his Forces at *Cor-* "*cyra*. That it was therefore incumbent on them to ſhow ſome regard to "the ſinking State of the Commonwealth, having ſufficiently experienced by "their own Misfortunes, how prevalent Fortune was in War. That the pre- "ſent Moment was the moſt favourable in this reſpect; becauſe, not having "yet tried one another's Strength, and conſidering themſelves as Equals, there "would be more likelihood of agreeing on terms: whereas, if one of them "once got the ſuperiority, he would exact every thing from the other, and "give up nothing. That as hitherto they had been unable to ſettle the Con- "ditions of Peace, they ought to refer them to the Deciſion of the Senate "and People of *Rome*; and in the mean time, to obtain a free and unbiaſſed "Judgment, both ſwear to disband their Armies in three Days time. That "when they were once diveſted of their national and auxiliary Forces, in "which their whole Confidence lay, they would find themſelves under a ne- "ceſſity of ſubmitting to the Decree of the Senate and People. In fine, that to "give *Pompey* a proof of his readineſs to perform theſe Propoſals, he would "give immediate Orders for the Diſcharge of all his Forces, both in Garriſon "and in the Field."

IX. *VIBULLIUS* having received theſe Inſtructions, thought it neceſſary to give *Pompey* ſpeedy notice of *Cæſar*'s Arrival, that he might be provided againſt that event, before he laid open the Commiſſion he was charged with. Accordingly journeying Day and Night, and frequently changing Horſes for the greater Expedition, he at length got to *Pompey*, and informed him that *Cæſar* was approaching with all his Forces. *Pompey* was at that time in *Candavia*, from whence he was marching through *Macedonia*, to his Winter-Quarters at *Apollonia* and *Dyrrhachium*. Concerned at this unexpected News, he haſtened his march to *Apollonia*, to prevent *Cæſar*'s making himſelf maſter of the Sea-coaſts. Mean-while *Cæſar* having landed his Forces, marched the ſame Day to *Oricum*. Upon his Arrival there, *L. Torquatus*, who commanded in the Town for *Pompey*, with a Garriſon of *Parthinians*, ordered the Gates to be ſhut, and the *Greeks* to repair to their Arms, and man the Walls. But they

they refuſing to fight againſt the Authority of the People of *Rome*; and the Inhabitants, of their own accord, endeavouring to admit *Cæſar*; *Torquatus*, deſpairing of Relief, opened the Gates, and ſurrendered both himſelf and the Town to *Cæſar*, who readily granted him his Life.

X. *CÆSAR* having made himſelf maſter of *Oricum*, marched directly to *Apollonia*. Upon the report of his arrival, *L. Staberius*, who commanded in the Place, ordered Water to be carried into the Caſtle, fortified it with great care, and demanded Hoſtages of the Townſmen. They refuſed to comply; declaring they would not ſhut their Gates againſt the Conſul of the *Roman* People, nor preſume to act in contradiction to the Judgment of the Senate, and of all *Italy*. *Staberius* finding it in vain to reſiſt, privately left the Place; upon which the *Apollonians* ſent Deputies to *Cæſar*, and received him into the Town. The *Bullidenſes*, *Amantiani*, with the reſt of the neighbouring Countries, and all *Epirus*, followed their Example; acquainting *Cæſar* by their Ambaſſadors, that they were ready to execute his Commands.

XI. MEAN-WHILE *Pompey*, having notice of what paſſed at *Oricum* and *Apollonia*, and being apprehenſive for *Dyrrhachium*, marched day and night to reach the Place. At the ſame time it was reported that *Cæſar* was not far off; which meeting with the more credit, becauſe of their haſty march, put the whole Army into ſuch Conſternation, that many abandoning their Colours in *Epirus* and the neighbouring States, and others throwing down their Arms, every thing had the appearance of a precipitate Flight. But upon *Pompey*'s halting near *Dyrrhachium*, and ordering a Camp to be formed; as the Army had not even then recovered its Fright, *Labienus* advanced before the reſt, and ſwore never to abandon his General, but to ſhare in whatever Lot Fortune ſhould aſſign him. The other Lieutenants did the ſame, as likewiſe the military Tribunes and Centurions, whoſe Example was followed by the whole Army. *Cæſar* finding that he was prevented in his Deſign upon *Dyrrhachium*, purſued his march more leiſurely, and encamped on the River *Apſus*, in the Territories of the *Apollonians*, that he might protect the Poſſeſſions of a State which had ſo warmly declared in his favour. Here he reſolved to paſs the Winter in Tents, and wait the arrival of the reſt of his Legions out of *Italy*. *Pompey* did the like, and having encamped on the other ſide of the *Apſus*, aſſembled there all his Legions and Auxiliaries.

XII. *KALENUS* having embarked the Legions and Cavalry at *Brunduſium*, according to the Inſtructions he had received, put to Sea with his whole Fleet; but had not ſailed very far, 'till he was met by Letters from *Cæſar*, informing him, that all the *Grecian* Coaſts were guarded by the Enemy's Fleet. Upon this he recalled his Ships, and returned again into the Harbour. Only one continued its Rout, which carried no Soldiers, nor was ſubject to the Orders of *Kalenus*, but belonged to a private Commander. This Veſſel arriving before *Oricum*, fell into the hands of *Bibulus*, who not ſparing the very Children, put all on board to death, both Freemen and Slaves. So much did the ſafety of the whole Army depend upon a ſingle Moment.

XIII. *BIBULUS*, as we have related above, lay at *Oricum* with his Fleet; and as he deprived *Cæſar* of all Supplies by ſea, ſo was he in like manner greatly incommoded by *Cæſar* at land: who having diſpoſed Parties along the Coaſt, hindered him from getting Water or Wood, or coming near

the Shore. This was attended with many Inconveniences, and threw him into great Straits; inſomuch that he was obliged to fetch all his other Neceſſaries, as well as Wood and Water, from the Iſland of *Corcyra*: and once, when foul Weather prevented his receiving Refreſhments from thence, the Soldiers were neceſſitated, for want of Water, to collect the Dew which in the night fell on the Hides that covered their Ships. Yet he bore all theſe Difficulties with ſurpriſing Firmneſs, and continued reſolute in his Deſign of not unguarding the Coaſt. But at laſt, being reduced to the above-mentioned Extremity, and *Libo* having joined him, they called from on board to *M. Acilius* and *Statius Murcus*, two of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants, one of whom guarded the Walls of *Oricum*, and the other the Sea-Coaſts; that they wanted to confer with *Cæſar*, about Affairs of the greateſt Conſequence, if they could but have an Opportunity. To gain the more Credit, they let fall ſome Expreſſions that ſeemed to promiſe an Accommodation; and in the mean while demanded and obtained a Truce: for *Murcus* and *Acilius* believing their Propoſals to be ſerious, knew how extremely grateful they would be to *Cæſar*, and doubted not but *Vibullius* had ſucceeded in his Negotiation.

XIV. *CÆSAR* was then at *Buthrotum*, a Town over-againſt *Corcyra*, whither he was gone with one Legion, to reduce ſome of the more diſtant States, and ſupply himſelf with Corn, which then began to be ſcarce. Here receiving Letters from *Acilius* and *Murcus*, with an account of *Libo* and *Bibulus*'s Demands, he left the Legion, and returned to *Oricum*. Upon his arrival, he invited them to a Conference. *Libo* appeared, and made an Apology for *Bibulus*: "That being naturally haſty, and bearing a perſonal Grudge to "*Cæſar*, contracted during the time of his Ædileſhip and Quæſtorſhip, he had "for that Reaſon declined the Interview; to prevent any Obſtructions from his "preſence to the ſucceſs of ſo deſirable and diſadvantageous a Deſign: That "*Pompey* was, and ever had been inclined to lay down his Arms, and ter"minate their Differences by an Accommodation: but as yet had not ſent him "ſufficient Powers to treat, which however he doubted not ſoon to receive, as "the Council had intruſted him with the whole Adminiſtration of the War: "That if he would therefore make known his Demands, they would ſend "them to *Pompey*, who would ſoon come to a Reſolution upon their Repre"ſentations. In the mean time the Truce might continue, and both Parties "abſtain from acts of Hoſtility, 'till an Anſwer could be obtained." He added ſomething about the Juſtice of their Cauſe, and their Forces both natural and auxiliary; to which *Cæſar* neither at that time returned any Anſwer, nor do we now think it of importance enough to be tranſmitted to Poſterity. *Cæſar*'s Demands were: "That he might have leave to ſend Ambaſſadors to "*Pompey*; and that they would either ſtipulate for their return, or under"take themſelves to convey them in ſafety: That with regard to the Truce; "ſuch were the preſent Circumſtances of the War, that their Fleet kept back "his Supplies and Tranſports, and his Forces deprived them of Water and "acceſs to the Shore. If they expected any Abatement on his ſide, they muſt "likewiſe abate in guarding the Coaſt; but if they ſtill perſiſted in their for"mer Vigilance, neither would he yield in what depended on him: That "notwithſtanding, the Accommodation might go forward, without any Ob"ſtruction from this mutual Denial." *Libo* declined receiving *Cæſar*'s Ambaſſadors, or undertaking for their ſafe return, and choſe to refer the whole matter to *Pompey*; yet inſiſted mightily on the Truce. *Cæſar* perceiving, that the only Aim of the Enemy was, to extricate themſelves out of their preſent

Straits

Straits and Danger; and that it was in vain to entertain any hopes of Peace; turned all his thoughts to the vigorous proſecution of the War.

XV. *BIBULUS* having kept at Sea for many Days, and contracted a dangerous Illneſs by the Cold and perpetual Fatigue; as he could neither have proper Aſſiſtance on board, nor would be prevailed upon to quit his Poſt; he at laſt ſunk under the weight of his Diſtemper. After his death, no body ſucceeded in the command of the whole Fleet; but each Squadron was governed, independently of the reſt, by its particular Commander.

XVI. WHEN the Surpriſe occaſioned by *Cæſar*'s ſudden arrival was over; *Vibullius*, in preſence of *Libo*, *L. Lucceius*, and *Theophanes*, who were among *Pompey*'s moſt intimate Counſellors, reſolved to deliver the Commiſſion he had received from *Cæſar*. But ſcarce had he begun to ſpeak, when *Pompey* interrupted him, and ordered him to proceed no farther. "What, ſays he, is "my Life or Country to me, if I ſhall ſeem to be beholden to *Cæſar* for "them? And will it be believed that I am not indebted to him for them, "if he, by an Accommodation, reſtores me to *Italy*?" *Cæſar* was informed of this Speech, after the concluſion of the War, by thoſe who were preſent when it was delivered: he ſtill continued however, by other Methods, to try to bring about an Accommodation.

XVII. AS the two Camps were only ſeparated by the River *Apſus*, the Soldiers had frequent Diſcourſe among themſelves; and it was ſettled by mutual Conſent, that no act of Hoſtility ſhould paſs during the Conferences. *Cæſar* taking advantage of this Opportunity, ſent *P. Vatinius*, one of his Lieutenants, to forward to the utmoſt an Accommodation; and to demand frequently with a loud Voice, "Whether it might not be permitted to Citizens, "to ſend Deputies to their Fellow-Citizens about Peace: That this had never "been denied even to Fugitives and Robbers, and could much leſs be op-"poſed, when the only deſign was, to prevent the effuſion of civil Blood." This and much more he ſaid, with a ſubmiſſive Air, as became one employed to treat for his own and the common Safety. He was heard with great ſilence by both Parties, and received this Anſwer from the Enemy: "That *A. Varro* "had declared he would next day appear at an Interview, whither the De-"puties of both Parties might come in perfect Security, and mutually make "known their Demands." The hour of meeting was likewiſe ſettled; which being come, multitudes on both ſides flocked to the Place, the greateſt Expectations were formed, and the Minds of all ſeemed intent upon Peace. *T. Labienus* advancing from the Croud, began in a low Voice to confer with *Vatinius*, as if to ſettle the Articles of the Treaty. But their Diſcourſe was ſoon interrupted by a multitude of Darts that came pouring in on all ſides. *Vatinius* eſcaped the Danger by means of the Soldiers, who protected him with their Shields; but *Cornelius Balbus*, *M. Plotius*, *L. Tiburtus*, Centurions, and ſome private Men were wounded. *Labienus* then lifted up his Voice, and cried: "Leave off prating of an Accommodation: for you muſt not expect "Peace, 'till you bring us *Cæſar*'s Head.

XVIII. ABOUT the ſame time *M. Cœlius Rufus*, Prætor at *Rome* for foreign Affairs, having undertaken the cauſe of the Debtors; on his entrance into his Office, ordered his Tribunal to be fixed near that of the City Prætor *C. Trebonius*; and promiſed to receive the Complaints of ſuch as ſhould appeal

to

to him, in regard to the Eſtimation and Payments, made in conſequence of *Cæſar*'s late Regulation. But ſuch was the equity of the Decree, and the humanity of *Trebonius*, who in ſo nice and critical an Affair, thought it neceſſary to conduct himſelf with the utmoſt Clemency and Moderation, that no pretence of Appeal could be found. For to plead Poverty, perſonal Loſſes, the hardneſs of the Times, and the difficulty of bringing their Effects to ſale, is uſual enough even with reaſonable Minds: but to own themſelves indebted, and yet aim at keeping their Poſſeſſions entire, would have argued a total want both of Honeſty and Shame. Accordingly not a Man was found who made any ſuch Demand. *Cælius*'s whole Severity, therefore, was pointed againſt thoſe, to whom the Inheritance of the Debtor was adjudged: and having once embarked in the Affair, that he might not ſeem to have engaged himſelf to no purpoſe in an unjuſtifiable Cauſe, he publiſhed a Law, by which he allowed the Debtors ſix Years for the diſcharge of their Debts, which they were to clear at equal Payments, without Intereſt.

XIX. BUT the Conſul *Servilius*, and the reſt of the Magiſtrates oppoſing the Law; when he found it had not the effect he expected, he thought proper to drop that Deſign; and in the view of inflaming the People, propoſed two new Laws; the one, to exempt all the Tenants in *Rome* from paying Rents; the other, for a general abolition of Debts. This Bait took with the Multitude; and *Cælius* at their head, came and attacked *Trebonius* on his Tribunal, drove him thence, and wounded ſome about him. The Conſul *Servilius* reported theſe things to the Senate, who interdicted to *Cælius* the functions of his Office. In conſequence of this Decree, the Conſul refuſed him admittance into the Senate, and drove him out of his Tribunal, when he was going to harangue the People. Overwhelmed with Shame and Reſentment, he openly threatned to carry his Complaints to *Cæſar*; but privately gave notice to *Milo*, who had been baniſhed for the murder of *Clodius*, to come into *Italy*, and join him with the remains of the Gladiators, which he bought formerly to entertain the People with, in the Shows he gave them. With this view he ſent him before to *Turinum*, to ſolicit the Shepherds to take Arms, and went himſelf to *Caſilinum*; where hearing that his Arms and Enſigns had been ſeized at *Capua*, his Partizans at *Naples*, and their deſign of betraying the City diſcovered: finding all his Projects defeated, the Gates of *Capua* ſhut againſt him, and the Danger increaſing every Moment, becauſe the Citizens had taken Arms, and began to conſider him as a publick Enemy; he deſiſted from the Project he had formed, and thought proper to change his Rout.

XX. IN the mean time *Milo*, having diſpatched Letters to all the Colonies and free Towns, intimating that what he did was in virtue of *Pompey*'s Authority, who had ſent him his Orders by *Bibulus*, endeavoured to draw over the Debtors to his Party. But not ſucceeding in his Deſign, he contented himſelf with ſetting ſome Slaves at liberty, and with them marched to beſiege *Coſa*, in the Territory of *Turinum*. *Q. Pædius* the Prætor, with a Garriſon of one Legion, commanded in the Town; and here *Milo* was ſlain by a Stone from a Machine on the Walls. *Cælius* giving out that he was gone to *Cæſar*, came to *Thurium*; where endeavouring to debauch the Inhabitants, and corrupt by promiſes of Money the *Spaniſh* and *Gauliſh* Horſe, whom *Cæſar* had ſent thither to garriſon the Place, they ſlew him. Thus theſe dangerous Beginnings, that by reaſon of the multiplicity of Affairs wherewith the

the Magiſtrates were diſtracted, and the tickliſh ſituation of the Time, threatned great Revolutions, and alarmed all *Italy*, were brought to a ſafe and ſpeedy iſſue.

XXI. *LIBO* leaving *Oricum*, with the Fleet under his Command, conſiſting of fifty Sail, came to *Brunduſium*, and poſſeſſed himſelf of an Iſland directly facing the Harbour; judging it of more conſequence to ſecure a Poſt, by which our Tranſports muſt neceſſarily paſs, than guard all the Coaſts and Havens on the other ſide. As his Arrival was unexpected, he ſurpriſed and burnt ſome Trranſports, and carried off a Veſſel loaden with Corn. The Conſternation was great among our Men; inſomuch that having landed ſome Foot, with a party of Archers, in the night, he defeated our Guard of Cavalry; and had ſo far the Advantage by the commodiouſneſs of his Poſt, that he writ *Pompey* word, he might draw the reſt of the Navy on Shore, and order them to be careen'd; for he alone, with his Squadron, would undertake to cut off *Cæſar*'s Supplies.

XXII. *ANTONY* was then at *Brunduſium*; who confiding in the Valour of the Troops, ordered ſome Boats belonging to the Fleet to be armed with Hurdles and Galleries; and having filled them with choſen Troops, diſpoſed them in ſeveral Places along the Shore. At the ſame time he ſent two three-bench'd Gallies, which he had cauſed to be built at *Brunduſium*, to the mouth of the Harbour, as if with deſign to exerciſe the Rowers. *Libo* perceiving them advance boldly, and hoping he might be able to intercept them, detached five Quadriremes for that purpoſe. At their Approach, our Men rowed towards the Harbour; whither the Enemy, eager of the purſuit, inconſiderately followed them: for now *Antony*'s armed Boats, upon a Signal given, came pouring upon them from all Parts; and at the very firſt Onſet took a Quadrireme, with all the Soldiers and Sailors on board, and forced the reſt to an ignominious Flight. To add to this Diſgrace, the Cavalry, which *Antony* had poſted all along the Coaſt, hindered the Enemy from watering; which reduced them to ſuch Straits, that *Libo* was forced to quit the Blockade of *Brunduſium*, and retire with his Fleet.

XXIII. SEVERAL Months had now paſſed, the Winter was almoſt over; mean-time neither the Ships nor Legions were yet arrived, which *Cæſar* expected from *Brunduſium*. He could not help thinking that ſome Opportunities had been loſt, as it was certain the Wind had many times offered fair, and there was a neceſſity of truſting to it at laſt. The longer the delay in ſending over the Troops, the more vigilant and alert were the Enemy in guarding the Coaſt, and the greater their Confidence to hinder the paſſage; nay *Pompey*, in his Letters, frequently reproached them, that as they had not prevented the firſt Embarkation, they ought at leaſt to take care that no more of the Troops got over; and the Seaſon itſelf was becoming leſs favourable, by the Approach of milder Weather, when the Enemy's Fleet would be able to act and extend itſelf. For theſe reaſons *Cæſar* writ ſharply to his Lieutenants at *Brunduſium*, charging them not to omit the firſt Opportunity of ſailing, as ſoon as the Wind offered fair; and to ſteer for the Coaſt of *Apollonia*, which they could approach with leſs danger, as it was not ſo ſtrictly guarded by the Enemy, who were afraid of venturing on a Coaſt ſo ill provided with Havens.

XXIV. THE Lieutenants rouſed and emboldened by theſe Letters, and encouraged by the Exhortations of the Troops themſelves, who profeſſed they were ready to face any danger for *Cæſar*'s ſake, embarked under the Direction of *M. Antony*, and *Fuſius Kalenus*; and ſetting ſail with the Wind at South, paſſed *Apollonia* and *Dyrrhachium* next Day. Being deſcried from the Continent, *C. Caponius*, who commanded the *Rhodian* Squadron at *Dyrrhachium*, put out to ſea; and the Wind ſlackening upon our Fleet, it was near falling into the hands of the Enemy; but a freſh Gale ſpringing up at South, ſaved us from that danger. *Caponius* however deſiſted not from the purſuit, hoping by the Labour and Perſeverance of the Mariners, to ſurmount the violence of the Tempeſt; and though we had paſſed *Dyrrhachium* with a very hard Gale, ſtill continued to follow us. Our Men apprehenſive of an Attack, ſhould the Wind again chance to ſlacken, ſeized an Advantage Fortune threw in their way, and put into the Port of *Nymphæum*, about three Miles beyond *Liſſus*. This Port is ſheltered from the South-weſt Wind, but lies open to the South: but they preferred the hazard they might be expoſed to by the Tempeſt, to that of fighting. At that inſtant, by an unuſual piece of good Fortune, the Wind, which for two Days had blown from the South, changed to the South-weſt. This was a ſudden and favourable turn: for the Fleet ſo lately in danger from the Enemy, was ſheltered in a ſafe commodious Port: and that which threatned ours with Deſtruction, was in its turn expoſed to the utmoſt Peril. By this unexpected change, the Storm, which protected our Fleet, beat ſo furiouſly on the *Rhodian* Gallies, that they were all, to the Number of ſixteen, broke to pieces againſt the Shore. Moſt of the Soldiers and Mariners periſhed among the Rocks; the reſt were taken up by our Men, and ſent by *Cæſar*'s Orders to their ſeveral Homes.

XXV. TWO of our Tranſports, unable to keep up with the reſt, were overtaken by the Night; and not knowing where the Fleet had put in, caſt Anchor over-againſt *Liſſus*. *Otacilius Craſſus*, who commanded in the Place, ſent out ſome Boats and ſmall Veſſels to attack them: at the ſame time he urged them to a ſurrender, promiſing Quarter to ſuch as would ſubmit. One of theſe Veſſels carried two hundred and twenty new raiſed Soldiers; the other leſs than two hundred Veterans. On this Occaſion appeared, how great a defence againſt Danger reſults from firmneſs of Mind. The new Levies, frighted at the Number of their Adverſaries, and fatigued with Sea-ſickneſs, ſurrendred on promiſe of their Lives. But when they were brought to *Otacilius*, regardleſs of the Oath he had taken, he ordered them all to be cruelly ſlain in his preſence. The Veterans, on the contrary, though they had both the Storm and a leaky Veſſel to ſtruggle with, abated nothing of their wonted Bravery; but having ſpun out the time till Night, under pretence of treating, obliged the Pilot to run the Veſſel aſhore; where finding an advantageous Poſt, they continued the remainder of the Night. At day-break *Otacilius* detached againſt them about four hundred Horſe, who guarded that Part of the Coaſt, and purſued them Sword in hand: but they defended themſelves with great Bravery, and having ſlain ſome of the Enemy, rejoined, without loſs, the reſt of the Troops.

XXVI. UPON this the *Roman* Citizens inhabiting *Liſſus*, to whom *Cæſar* had before made a grant of the Town, after fortifying it with great care, opened their Gates to *Antony*, and furniſhed him with every thing he ſtood in need of. *Otacilius*, dreading the Conſequences of this Revolution, quitted the

the Place, and fled to *Pompey*, *Antony* having landed his Troops, which conſiſted of three veteran Legions, one new raiſed, and eight hundred Horſe, ſent moſt of the Tranſports back again to *Brunduſium*, to bring over the reſt of the Foot and Cavalry; retaining nevertheleſs ſome Ships of *Gauliſh* Structure, that if *Pompey*, imagining *Italy* deſtitute of Troops, ſhould attempt to return thither, as was commonly rumoured, *Cæſar* might be able to follow him. At the ſame time he gave *Cæſar* ſpeedy Notice of the number of Forces he had brought over with him, and the Place where he had landed.

XXVII. THIS Intelligence reached *Cæſar* and *Pompey* much about the ſame time; for both had ſeen the Fleet paſs *Apollonia* and *Dyrrhachium*, and had in conſequence directed their march that way; but neither knew, for ſome Days, into what Harbour it had put. On the firſt news of *Antony*'s landing, the two Generals took different Reſolutions; *Cæſar*, to join him as ſoon as poſſible; *Pompey*, to oppoſe his march, and, if poſſible, draw him into an Ambuſcade. Both quitted their Camps on the *Apſus* about the ſame time; *Pompey*, privately during the night; *Cæſar*, publickly by day. But *Cæſar*, who had the River to croſs, was obliged to fetch a compaſs, that he might come at a Ford. *Pompey*, on the other hand, having nothing to obſtruct his march, advanced by great Journeys againſt *Antony*; and underſtanding that he was not far off, poſted his Troops on an advantageous Ground, ordering them to keep within their Camp, and light no Fires, that his approach might not be perceived. But *Antony* being informed of it by the *Greeks*, would not ſtir out of his Lines; and ſending immediate notice to *Cæſar*, was joined by him next Day. On advice of *Cæſar*'s arrival, *Pompey*, that he might not be ſhut up between two Armies, quitted the Place; and coming with all his Forces to *Aſparagium*, a Town belonging to the *Dyrrhachians*, encamped there on an advantageous Ground.

XXVIII. ABOUT the ſame time *Scipio*, notwithſtanding ſome Checks he had received near Mount *Amanus*, aſſumed the Title of Emperor; after which he exacted great ſums of Money from the neighbouring States and Princes; obliged the Farmers of the Revenue to pay the two Years' Taxes, which lay in their hands, and advance a third by way of Loan; and ſent Orders to the whole Province for levying Cavalry. Having got a ſufficient number together, he quitted the *Parthians*, his neareſt Enemies, who not long before had ſlain *M. Craſſus*, and held *Bibulus* inveſted; and marched out of *Syria* with his Legions and Cavalry. When he arrived in *Aſia minor*, he found the whole Country filled with Terror on account of the *Parthian* War; and the Soldiers themſelves declared, that they were ready to march againſt an Enemy, but would never bear Arms againſt a Conſul, and their Fellow-Citizens. To ſtifle theſe Diſcontents, he made conſiderable Preſents to the Troops, quartered them in *Pergamus* and other rich Towns, and gave up the whole Country to their diſcretion. Mean-while the Money demanded of the Province was levied with great Rigor; and various Pretences were deviſed, to ſerve as a Ground to new Exactions. Slaves and Freemen were ſubjected to a Capitation-Tax. Impoſts were laid upon Pillars and Doors of Houſes. Corn, Soldiers, Mariners, Arms, Engines, Carriages, in a word, every thing that had a Name, furniſhed a ſufficient Handle for extorting Money. Governors were appointed not only over Towns, but over Villages and Caſtles; and he that acted with the greateſt rigor and cruelty, was accounted the worthieſt Man, and beſt Citizen. The Province ſwarmed with Lictors, Overſeers, and Collectors, who beſides the Sums

Sums impoſed by publick Authority, exacted Money likewiſe on their own account; colouring their iniquitous Demands with a Pretence, that they had been expelled their Country and native Homes, and were in extreme want of every thing. Add to all theſe Calamities, immoderate Uſury, an Evil almoſt inſeparable from War: for as great Sums are then exacted, beyond what a Country is able to furniſh, they are obliged to apply for a Delay, which at any Price is ſtill accounted a Favour. Thus the Debts of the Province increaſed conſiderably during theſe two Years. Nor were the *Roman* Citizens the only ſufferers on this Occaſion; for certain Sums were demanded of every State and Corporation, as a Loan upon the Senate's Decree; and the Farmers of the Revenue were ordered to advance the next Year's Tribute, in like manner as when they firſt enter'd upon Office. Beſides all this, *Scipio* gave Orders for ſeizing the Treaſures of the Temple of *Diana* at *Epheſus*, with all the Statues of that Goddeſs. But when he came to the Temple attended by many Perſons of ſenatorian Rank, he received Letters from *Pompey*, deſiring him to lay aſide all other Concerns, and make what haſte he could to join him, becauſe *Cæſar* had paſſed into *Greece* with his whole Army. In conſequence of this Order, he ſent back the Senators who had been ſummoned to attend him at *Epheſus*, made Preparations for paſſing into *Macedonia*, and began his march a few Days after. Thus the *Epheſian* Treaſures eſcaped being plundered.

XXIX. *CÆSAR* having joined *Antony*'s Army, and recalled the Legion he had left at *Oricum*, to guard the Sea-Coaſt, judged it neceſſary to advance farther into the Country, and poſſeſs himſelf of the more diſtant Provinces. At the ſame time Deputies arrived from *Theſſaly* and *Ætolia*, with aſſurances of Submiſſion from all the States in thoſe Parts, provided he would ſend Troops to defend them. Accordingly he diſpatched *L. Caſſius Longinus*, with a Legion of new Levies, called the twenty-ſeventh, and two hundred Horſe into *Theſſaly*; and *C. Calviſius Sabinus*, with five Cohorts, and ſome Cavalry, into *Ætolia*; charging them in a particular manner, as thoſe Provinces lay the neareſt to his Camp, that they would take care to furniſh him with Corn. He likewiſe ordered *Cn. Domitius Calvinus*, with the eleventh and twelfth Legions, and five hundred Horſe, to march into *Macedonia:* for *Menedemus*, the principal Man of that Conntry, having come Ambaſſador to *Cæſar*, had aſſured him of the Affection of the Province.

XXX. *CALVISIUS* was well received by the *Ætolians*; and having driven the Enemies Garriſons from *Calydon* and *Naupactum*, poſſeſſed himſelf of the whole Country. *Caſſius* arriving in *Theſſaly* with his Legion, found the State divided into two Factions. *Egeſaretus*, a Man in Years, and of eſtabliſhed Credit, favoured *Pompey: Petreius*, a young Nobleman of the firſt Rank, exerted his whole Intereſt in behalf of *Cæſar*.

XXXI. ABOUT the ſame time *Domitius* arrived in *Macedonia:* and whilſt Deputies were attending him from all parts, news came that *Scipio* approached with his Legions, which ſpread a great Alarm thro' the Country; as Fame, for the moſt part, magnifies the firſt appearances of Things. *Scipio*, without ſtopping any where in *Macedonia*, advanced by great marches towards *Domitius*; but being come within twenty miles of him, ſuddenly changed his Rout, and turned off to *Theſſaly*, in queſt of *Caſſius Longinus*. This was done ſo expeditiouſly, that he was actually arrived with his Troops, when *Caſſius* received the firſt notice of his march: for to make the more diſpatch, he had left

M. Favonius

M. Favonius at the River *Haliacmon*, which ſeparates *Macedonia* from *Theſſaly*, with eight Cohorts to guard the Baggage of the Legions, and ordered him to erect a Fort there. At the ſame time King *Cotus*'s Cavalry, which had been accuſtomed to make Inroads into *Theſſaly*, came pouring upon *Caſſius*'s Camp; who knowing that *Scipio* was upon his march, and believing the Cavalry to be his, retired in a Fright to the Mountains that begirt *Theſſaly*, and thence directed his courſe towards *Ambracia*. *Scipio* preparing to follow him, received Letters from *M. Favonius*; that *Domitius* was coming up with his Legions, nor would it be poſſible for him to maintain the Poſt he was in, without his Aſſiſtance. *Scipio*, upon this Intelligence, changed his reſolution, gave over the purſuit of *Caſſius*, and advanced to the relief of *Favonius*. As he marched Day and Night without intermiſſion, he arrived ſo opportunely, that the Duſt of *Domitius*'s Army, and his advanced Parties, were deſcried at the ſame time. Thus *Domitius*'s Care preſerved *Caſſius*, and *Scipio*'s Diligence *Favonius*.

XXXII. *SCIPIO* continuing two Days in his Camp upon the *Haliacmon*, which ran between him and the Army of *Domitius*, put his Troops in motion on the third, and by Day-break forded the River. Early next Morning he drew up his Troops in order of Battle at the head of his Camp. *Domitius* was not averſe to an Engagement; but as between the two Camps there was a Plain of ſix miles, he thought that the fitteſt place for a Field of Battle, and drew up his Men at ſome diſtance from *Scipio*'s Camp. *Scipio* would not ſtir from his Poſt; yet hardly could *Domitius* reſtrain his Men from advancing to attack him; tho' a Rivulet with ſteep Banks, that ran in the front of the Enemy's Camp, oppoſed their Paſſage. *Scipio* obſerving the keenneſs and alacrity of our Troops, and fearing that next Day he ſhould either be forced to fight againſt his Will, or ignominiouſly keep within his Camp; after great Expectations raiſed, by too haſtily croſſing the River, he ſaw all his Projects defeated; and decamping in great ſilence during the night, returned to his former Station beyond the *Haliacmon*, and poſted himſelf on a riſing Ground, near the River. A few Days after, he formed an Ambuſcade of Cavalry by night, in a place where our Men were wont to forage: and when *Q. Varus*, who commanded the Horſe under *Domitius*, came next Day according to cuſtom; ſuddenly the Enemy roſe from their lurking Holes: but our Men bravely ſuſtaining the Attack, ſoon recovered their Ranks, and in their turn vigorouſly charged the Enemy. About fourſcore fell on this Occaſion; the reſt betook themſelves to flight, and our Men returned to their Camp with the loſs of only two of their Number.

XXXIII. AFTER this Rencounter, *Domitius* hoping to draw *Scipio* to a Battle, feigned to decamp for want of Proviſions; and having made the uſual Signal for retreating, after a march of three miles, drew up his Cavalry and Legions in a convenient Plain, ſhrouded from the Enemy's view. *Scipio* preparing to follow, ſent the Horſe and light-armed Infantry before, to explore his Rout, and examine the ſituation of the Country. When they were advanced a little way, and their firſt Squadrons had come within reach of our Ambuſh; beginning to ſuſpect ſomething from the neighing of the Horſes, they wheeled about in order to retreat; which the Troops that followed obſerving, ſuddenly halted. Our Men finding that the Ambuſh was diſcovered, and knowing it would be in vain to wait for the reſt of the Army, fell upon the two Squadrons that were moſt advanced. *M. Opimius*, General of the

Horſe to *Domitius*, was amongſt theſe, but ſome how found means to eſcape. All the reſt were either ſlain, or made Priſoners.

XXXIV. *CÆSAR* having drawn off his Garriſons from the Sea-Coaſt, as we have related above; left three Cohorts at *Oricum* to defend the Town, and committed to their charge the Gallies he had brought out of *Italy*. *Acilius*, one of his Lieutenants, had the command of theſe Troops; who, for the greater Security, cauſed the Ships to be drawn up into the Harbour behind the Town, and made them faſt to the Shore. He likewiſe ſunk a Tranſport in the mouth of the Haven, behind which another rode at Anchor, on whoſe Deck a Tower was erected facing the entrance of the Port, and filled with Troops, to be ready in caſe of ſurpriſe. Young *Pompey*, who commanded the *Ægyptian* Fleet, having notice of this, came to *Oricum*; weighed up the Veſſel that had been ſunk in the mouth of the Harbour; and, after an obſtinate Reſiſtance, took the other, which had been placed there by *Acilius* to guard the Haven. He then brought forward his Fleet, on which he had raiſed Towers to fight with the greater advantage; and having ſurrounded the Town on all ſides, attacked it by Land with ſcaling Ladders, and by Sea from the Towers, ſending freſh Men continually in the place of thoſe that were fatigued, and thereby obliging us to yield thro' Wearineſs and Wounds. At the ſame time he ſeized an Eminence on the other ſide of the Town, which ſeemed a kind of natural Mole, and almoſt formed a Peninſula over-againſt *Oricum*; and by means of this neck of Land, carried four ſmall Gallies upon Rollers into the inner part of the Haven. Thus the Gallies, that were made faſt to the Land, and deſtitute of Troops, being attacked on all ſides; four were carried off, and the reſt burnt. This Affair diſpatched, he left *D. Lælius*, whom he had taken from the command of the *Aſiatic* Fleet, to prevent the importation of Proviſions from *Biblis* and *Amantia*; and ſailing for *Liſſus*, attacked and burnt the thirty Tranſports which *Antony* had left in that Haven. He endeavoured likewiſe to take the Town: but the *Roman* Citizens of that Diſtrict, aided by the Garriſon *Cæſar* had left, defended it ſo well, that at the end of three Days, he retired without effecting his Purpoſe, having loſt ſome Men in the Attempt.

XXXV. *CÆSAR* being informed that *Pompey* was at *Aſparagium*, marched thither with his Army; and having taken the Capital of the *Parthinians* by the way, where *Pompey* had a Garriſon; arrived the third Day in *Macedonia*, and encamped at a ſmall diſtance from the Enemy. The next Day he drew out all his Forces, formed them before his Camp, and offered *Pompey* battle. Finding that he kept within his Lines, he led back his Troops, and began to think of purſuing other Meaſures. Accordingly, on the morrow, by a long Circuit, and thro' very narrow and difficult ways, he marched with all his Forces to *Dyrrhachium*; hoping either to oblige *Pompey* to follow him thither, or cut off his Communication with the Town, where he had laid up all his Proviſions, and Magazines of War: which happened accordingly. For *Pompey*, at firſt, not penetrating his Deſign, becauſe he counterfeited a Rout different from what he really intended, imagined he had been obliged to decamp for want of Proviſions: but being afterwards informed of the truth by his Scouts, he quitted his Camp next Day, in hopes to prevent him by taking a nearer way. *Cæſar* ſuſpecting what might happen, exhorted his Soldiers to bear the Fatigue patiently; and allowing them to repoſe during only a ſmall part of the

the Night, arrived next Morning at *Dyrrhachium*, where he immediately formed a Camp, juſt as *Pompey*'s Van began to appear at a diſtance.

XXXVI. *POMPEY* thus excluded from *Dyrrhachium*, and unable to execute his firſt Deſign, came to a reſolution of encamping on an Eminence called *Petra*, where was a tolerable Harbour, ſheltered from ſome Winds. Here he ordered part of his Fleet to attend him, and Corn and Proviſions to be brought him from *Aſia*, and the other Provinces ſubject to his Command. *Cæſar* apprehending the War would run into length, and deſpairing of Supplies from *Italy*, becauſe the Coaſts were ſo ſtrictly guarded by *Pompey*'s Fleet; and his own Gallies, built the Winter before in *Sicily*, *Gaul*, and *Italy*, were not yet arrived, diſpatched *L. Canuleius*, one of his Lieutenants, to *Epirus* for Corn. And becauſe that Country lay at a great diſtance from his Camp, he built Granaries in ſeveral Places, and wrote to the neighbouring States to carry their Corn thither. He likewiſe ordered ſearch to be made for what Corn could be found in *Liſſus*, the Country of the *Parthinians*, and the other Principalities in thoſe Parts. This amounted to very little; partly occaſioned by the Soil, which is rough and mountainous, and obliges the Inhabitants often to import Grain; partly becauſe *Pompey* foreſeeing *Cæſar*'s Wants, had ſome Days before ravaged the Country of the *Parthinians*, plundered their Houſes, and by means of his Cavalry carried off all their Corn.

XXXVII. FOR theſe Reaſons *Cæſar* formed a Project, which the very nature of the Country ſuggeſted. All round *Pompey*'s Camp, at a ſmall diſtance, were high and ſteep Hills. *Cæſar* took poſſeſſion of thoſe Hills, and built Forts upon them; reſolving, as the nature of the Ground would allow, to draw Lines of Communication from one Fort to another, and incloſe *Pompey* within his Works. His views herein were; firſt, to facilitate the paſſage of his Convoys, which the Enemy's Cavalry, which was very ſtrong and fine, would no longer cut off; next, to diſtreſs this very Cavalry, for want of Forage; and laſtly, to leſſen the great Reputation and high Idea entertained of *Pompey*, when it ſhould be reported all over the World, that he had ſuffered himſelf to be blockaded, and as it were impriſoned by *Cæſar*'s Works; and durſt not hazard a Battle to ſet himſelf at liberty.

XXXVIII. *POMPEY* would neither leave the Sea and *Dyrrhachium*, where he had all his Magazines and Engines of War, and whence he was ſupplied with Proviſions by means of his Fleet; nor could he prevent the progreſs of *Cæſar*'s Works without fighting, which at that time he was determined againſt. He could do nothing therefore but extend himſelf, by taking in as many Hills, and as large a Circuit of Country as poſſible, to give his Adverſary the more Trouble, and divide his Forces. This he did, by raiſing twenty-four Forts, which took in a Circumference of fifteen miles, wherein were arable and paſture Lands, to feed his Horſes and Beaſts of Burden. And as our Men had carried their Circumvallation quite round, by drawing Lines of Communication from Fort to Fort, to prevent the Sallies of the Enemy, and guard againſt Attacks in their Rear; in like manner *Pompey*'s Men had ſurrounded themſelves with Lines, to hinder us from breaking in upon them, and charging them behind. They even perfected their Works firſt, becauſe they had more Hands, and a leſs Circuit to incloſe. When *Cæſar* endeavoured to gain any Place, *Pompey*, tho' determined not to oppoſe him with all his Forces, nor hazard a general Action, failed not however to detach Parties of

Archers

Archers and Slingers, who wounded great Numbers of our Men, and occaſioned ſuch a dread of their Arrows, that almoſt all the Soldiers furniſhed themſelves with Coats of Mail, or of thick Leather, to guard againſt that danger.

XXXIX. BOTH Parties diſputed every Poſt with great obſtinacy: *Cæſar*, that he might incloſe *Pompey* within as narrow a ſpace as poſſible; and *Pompey*, that he might have liberty to extend himſelf: which occaſioned many ſharp Skirmiſhes. In one of theſe, *Cæſar*'s ninth Legion having poſſeſſed themſelves of an Eminence, which they began to fortify, *Pompey* ſeized the oppoſite Mount, with a Reſolution to hinder their Works. As the Acceſs on one ſide was very eaſy; he ſent firſt ſome Archers and Slingers, and afterwards a ſtrong Detachment of light-armed Foot, plying us at the ſame time with his military Engines; which obliged our Men to deſiſt, as they found it impoſſible at once to ſuſtain the Enemy's Charge, and go forward with their Works. *Cæſar* perceiving his Men were wounded from all ſides, reſolved to quit the Place and retire. But as the Deſcent by which he muſt retreat was pretty ſteep, the *Pompeians* charged him briskly in drawing off, imagining he gave way through fear. *Pompey* went ſo far as to ſay, "That he conſented to be accounted a "General of no Merit, if *Cæſar*'s Men got off without conſiderable loſs." *Cæſar* concerned about the Retreat of his Men, ordered Hurdles to be fixed on the Ridge of the Hill fronting the Enemy; behind which he dug a moderate Ditch, and rendred the Place as inacceſſible as he could on all ſides. When this was done, he began to file off the Legionary Soldiers, ſupporting them by ſome light-armed Troops poſted on their Flanks, who with Arrows and Stones might repulſe the Enemy. *Pompey*'s Troops failed not to purſue them with great Outcries and fierce Menaces, overturned the Hurdles, and uſed them as Bridges to get over the Ditch. Which *Cæſar* obſerving; and fearing ſome Diſaſter might enſue, ſhould he ſeem to be driven from a Poſt, which he quitted voluntarily; when his Forces were got half down the Hill, encouraging them by *Antony*, who had the Command of that Legion, he gave the Signal to face about and fall on the Enemy. Immediately the Soldiers of the ninth Legion, forming themſelves into cloſe Order, lanched their Darts; and advancing briskly up the Hill againſt the Enemy, forced them to give ground, and at laſt betake themſelves to Flight; which was not a little incommoded by the Hurdles, Paliſades, and Ditch, *Cæſar* had thrown up to ſtop their Purſuit. But our Men, who ſought only to ſecure their Retreat, having killed ſeveral of the Enemy, and loſt only five of their own Number, retired without the leaſt diſturbance, and incloſing ſome other Hills within their Lines, compleated the Circumvallation.

XL. THIS method of making War was new and extraordinay; as well in regard to the Number of Forts, the Extent of the Circumvallation, the Greatneſs of the Works, and the manner of Attack and Defence; as on other Accounts. For whoever undertakes to inveſt another, is for the moſt part moved thereto, either by ſome previous Defeat he has ſuſtained, the knowledge of his Weakneſs, to take advantage of his Diſtreſſes, to profit by a ſuperiority of Forces; or, in fine, to cut off his Proviſions, which is the moſt ordinary Cauſe of theſe Attempts. But *Cæſar*, with an inferior Force, beſieged *Pompey*, whoſe Troops were entire, in good order, and abounded in all things. For Ships arrived every Day from all Parts with Proviſions; nor could the Wind blow from any Quarter, that was not favourable to ſome of them;

them; whereas *Cæſar*'s Army, having conſumed all the Corn round about, was reduced to the laſt Neceſſities. Nevertheleſs the Soldiers bore all with ſingular Patience; remembring, that though reduced to the like Extremity the Year before in *Spain*, they had yet, by their Aſſiduity and Perſeverance, put an end to a very formidable War. They called to mind too their Sufferings at *Aleſia*, and their ſtill greater Diſtreſſes before *Avaricum*, by which however they triumphed over mighty Nations. When Barley or Pulſe was given them inſtead of Corn, they took it chearfully; and thought themſelves regaled when they got any Cattle, which *Epirus* furniſhed them with in great abundance. They diſcovered in the Country a Root called *Chara*, which they pounded and kneaded with Milk, ſo as to make a ſort of Bread of it. This furniſhed a plentiful Supply: and when their Adverſaries reproached them with their want, by way of anſwer to their Inſults, they threw theſe Loaves at them.

XLI. BY this time the Corn began to ripen, and the hopes of a ſpeedy Supply ſupported the Soldiers under their preſent wants. Nay they were often heard to ſay one to another, that they would ſooner live on the Bark of Trees, than let *Pompey* eſcape. For they were informed from time to time by Deſerters, that their Horſes were almoſt ſtarved, and the reſt of their Cattle actually dead: that the Troops themſelves were very ſickly; partly occaſioned by the narrow ſpace in which they were incloſed, the Number and noiſom Smell of dead Carcaſes, and the daily Fatigue to which they were unaccuſtomed; partly by their extreme want of Water. For *Cæſar* had either turned the Courſe of all the Rivers and Brooks that ran into the Sea, or dammed up their Currents. And as the Country was mountainous, intermixed with deep Valleys, by driving Piles into the Earth, and covering them with Mold, he ſtopped up the Courſe of the Waters. This obliged the Enemy to ſearch for low and marſhy Places, and to dig Wells, which added to their daily Labour. The Wells too, when diſcovered, lay at a conſiderable diſtance from ſome Parts of the Army, and were ſoon dried up by the heat. *Cæſar*'s Army, on the contrary, was very healthy, abounded in Water, and had plenty of all kinds of Proviſion, Corn excepted, which they hoped to be ſoon ſupplied with, as the Seaſon was now pretty far advanced, and Harveſt approached.

XLII. IN this new method of making War, new Stratagems were every Day put in practice by both Generals. *Pompey*'s Soldiers, obſerving by the Fires the Place where our Cohorts were upon guard, ſtole thither privately by night, and pouring upon them a flight of Arrows, retired inſtantly to their Camp; which obliged our Men to have Fires in one Place, and keep guard in another.

XLIII. MEAN-WHILE *P. Sylla*, whom *Cæſar*, at his departure, had left to command the Camp, being informed of what paſſed, came to the aſſiſtance of the Cohort with two Legions. His arrival ſoon put the *Pompeians* to flight, who could not ſtand the very Sight and Shock of his Troops; but ſeeing their firſt Ranks broken, took to their heels, and quitted the Place. *Sylla* checked the Ardour of his Men, whom he would not ſuffer to continue the Purſuit too far; and it was the general Belief, that had he purſued the Enemy warmly, that Day might have put an end to the War. His Conduct however cannot be juſtly cenſured; for the difference is great between a

Lieutenant and a General: the one is tied up to act according to Inſtructions; the other, free from reſtraint, is at liberty to lay hold of all Advantages. *Sylla*, who was left by *Cæſar* to take care of the Camp, was ſatisfied with having diſengaged his own Men; and had no intention to hazard a general Action, which might have been attended with ill Conſequences, and would have looked like arrogating the part of a General. The *Pompeians* found it no eaſy matter to make good their Retreat: for having advanced from a very diſadvantageous Poſt to the ſummit of the Hill, they had reaſon to fear our Men would charge them in deſcending; and the rather, as it was very near Sun-ſet; for they had protracted the Affair almoſt 'till night, in hopes of accompliſhing their Deſign. Thus *Pompey*, compelled by Neceſſity, immediately took poſſeſſion of an Eminence, at ſuch a diſtance from our Fort, as to be ſecure from Darts and military Engines. Here he encamped, threw up an Intrenchment, and drew his Forces together to defend the Place.

XLIV. AT the ſame time we were engaged in two other Places; for *Pompey* attacked ſeveral Caſtles together, to divide our Forces, and hinder the Forts from mutually ſuccouring one another. In one of theſe, *Volcatius Tullus*, with three Cohorts, ſuſtained the Charge of a whole Legion, and forced them to retire. In the other, the *Germans*, ſallying out of their Intrenchments, ſlew ſeveral of the Enemy, and returned again without loſs.

XLV. THUS there happened no leſs than ſix Actions in one Day; three near *Dyrrhachium*, and three about the Lines. In computing the number of the ſlain, it appeared, that *Pompey* loſt about two thouſand Men, with ſeveral Volunteers and Centurions, among whom was *Valerius Flaccus*, the Son of *Lucius*, who had formerly been Prætor of *Aſia*. We gained ſix Standards, with the loſs of no more than twenty Men in all the Attacks: but in the Fort, not a Soldier eſcaped being wounded; and four Centurions belonging to one Cohort, loſt their Eyes. As a proof of the danger they had been expoſed to, and the Efforts they had ſuſtained, they brought and counted to *Cæſar* about thirty thouſand Arrows that had been ſhot into the Fort; and ſhewed him the Centurion *Scæva*'s Buckler, which was pierced in two hundred and thirty places. *Cæſar*, as a reward for his Services both to himſelf and the Republick, preſented him with two hundred thouſand Aſſes, and advanced him directly from the eighth rank of Captains to the firſt; it appearing, that the preſervation of the Fort was chiefly owing to his Valour. He alſo diſtributed military Rewards among the other Officers and Soldiers of that Cohort; and aſſigned them double Pay, and a double allowance of Corn.

XLVI. *POMPEY* laboured all night at his Fortifications, raiſed Redoubts the following Days, and having carried his Works fifteen Foot high, covered that part of his Camp with Mantelets. Five Days after, taking advantage of a very dark Night, he walled up the Gates of his Camp, rendered all the Avenues impracticable; and drawing out his Troops in great ſilence about midnight, returned to his former Works.

XLVII. *ÆTOLIA*, *Acarnania*, and *Amphilochis*, having been reduced by *Caſſius Longinus*, and *Calviſius Sabinus*, as we have related above; *Cæſar* thought it expedient to purſue his Conqueſts, and attempt to gain *Achaia*. Accordingly he diſpatched *Fufius Kalenus* thither, ordering *Sabinus* and *Caſſius* to join him, with the Cohorts under their command. *Rutilius Lupus*, *Pom-*

pey's

pey's Lieutenant in *Achaia*, hearing of their approach, reſolved to fortify the Iſthmus, and thereby hinder *Fufius* from entering the Province. *Delphos*, *Thebes*, and *Orchomenus*, voluntarily ſubmitted to *Kalenus*: ſome States he obtained by force; and ſending Deputies to the reſt, endeavoured to make them declare for *Cæſar*. Theſe Negotiations found ſufficient Employment for *Fufius*.

XLVIII. *CÆSAR*, mean-while, drew up his Army every Day, offering *Pompey* battle upon equal Ground; and, to provoke him to accept it, advanced ſo near his Camp, that his Van was within Engine-ſhot of the Rampart. *Pompey*, to preſerve his Reputation, drew out his Legions too; but poſted them in ſuch a manner, that his third Line touched the Rampart, and the whole Army lay under cover of the Weapons diſcharged from thence.

XLIX. WHILST theſe things paſſed in *Achaia* and at *Dyrrhachium*, and it was now known that *Scipio* was arrived in *Macedonia*; *Cæſar* ſtill adhering to his former views of Peace, diſpatched *Clodius* to him, an intimate Friend of both, whom he had taken into his Service upon *Scipio*'s Recommendation. At his departure, he charged him with Letters and Inſtructions to this effect: "That he had tried all ways to bring about a Peace, but believed he had hi-"therto miſcarried, thro' the fault of thoſe to whom his Propoſals were ad-"dreſſed, becauſe they dreaded preſenting them to *Pompey* at an improper "time: That he knew *Scipio*'s Authority to be ſuch, as not only privileged "him to adviſe freely, but even to inforce his Counſels, and compel the ob-"ſtinate to hearken to Reaſon: That he was poſſeſſed of an independent "Command, and had an Army at his diſpoſal to give weight to his Interpoſi-"tion: That in employing it for ſo deſirable an end, he would gain the in-"diſputable Praiſe of having reſtored Quiet to *Italy*, Peace to the Provinces, "and ſaved the Empire." *Clodius* reported this Commiſſion to *Scipio*, and at firſt met with a favourable Reception, but afterwards was denied audience: for *Favonius* having ſharply reprimanded *Scipio*, as we learnt after the concluſion of the War, the Negotiation was diſcontinued, and *Clodius* returned to *Cæſar* without ſucceſs.

L. *CÆSAR*, the more effectually to ſhut up *Pompey*'s Horſe at *Dyrrhachium*, and hinder them from foraging, blocked up the two narrow Paſſes, of which we have ſpoken, with ſtrong Works, and raiſed Forts to defend them. *Pompey* finding his Cavalry rendered by this means unſerviceable, conveyed them ſome Days after by ſea to his Camp again. Forage was ſo ſcarce, that they were forced to have recourſe to the Leaves of Trees, and the Roots of green Reeds bruiſed: for the Corn ſown within their Lines was all conſumed; nor had they had any Supplies, but what came a long way about by ſea, from *Corcyra* and *Acarnania*; and even this was ſo inconſiderable, that to increaſe the Quantity, they were forced to mix it with Barley, and by theſe Contrivances ſupport their Horſes. At laſt, all Expedients being exhauſted, and the Horſes dying daily, *Pompey* thought it time to attempt to force the Barricade, and ſet himſelf at liberty.

LI. AMONG the Cavalry in *Cæſar*'s Camp, were two Brothers, *Allobrogians* by birth, named *Roſcillus* and *Ægus*, the Sons of *Adbucillus*, who had long held the chief ſway in his own State; Men of ſingular Bravery, and who had been of ſignal ſervice to *Cæſar* in all his *Gallick* Wars. For theſe Reaſons he

he had raiſed them to the higheſt Offices in their own Country, got them choſen into the Senate before they were of age, given them Lands in *Gaul* taken from the Enemy, beſides pecuniary Rewards to a great value; inſomuch that from very moderate beginnings they had riſen to vaſt Wealth. Theſe Men were not only highly honoured by *Cæſar* on account of their Bravery, but in great eſteem with the whole Army. But preſuming on *Cæſar*'s Friendſhip, and fooliſhly elated with their Proſperity, they uſed the Troopers ill, defrauded them of their Pay, and ſecreted all the Plunder to their own uſe. The *Gauliſh* Cavalry, offended at theſe Proceedings, went in a body to *Cæſar*, and openly complained of the two Brothers; adding, among other Accuſations, that by giving in falſe Muſters they received Pay for more Men than they had. *Cæſar* not thinking it a proper time for Animadverſion, and regarding them greatly on account of their Valour, declined all publick notice of the Affair, and contented himſelf with reprimanding them in private; admoniſhing them to expect every thing from his Friendſhip, and to meaſure their future Hopes by the experience of what he had already done for them. This Rebuke, however, diſguſted them greatly, and very much leſſened their Credit with the whole Army; which they eaſily perceived, as well from the Raillery they were often forced to bear, as in conſequence of the ſecret Reproaches and ſenſe of their own Minds. Thus prompted by Shame, and perhaps imagining they were not cleared, but reſerved to a more favourable Opportunity; they reſolved to deſert, try their Fortune elſewhere, and ſearch for new Friendſhips. Having imparted their Deſign to a few of their Clients, whom they judged fit Inſtruments for ſo black a Treaſon; they firſt attempted to murder *C. Voluſenus*, General of the Cavalry, (as was afterwards known, when the War was over,) that by ſo ſignal a piece of Service they might the more effectually recommend themſelves to *Pompey*'s Favour. But finding that Deſign attended with great hazard, and that no favourable Opportunity offered for putting it in execution; they borrowed all the Money they could, under pretence of reimburſing the Troops, and making reſtitution; and having bought up a great number of Horſes, went over to *Pompey*, with thoſe whom they had made acquainted with their Deſign. As they were Perſons of noble Birth, liberally educated, came with a great train of Horſes and Servants, had been highly honoured by *Cæſar*, and were univerſally eſteemed on account of their Valour; *Pompey* carried them oſtentatiouſly over all the Camp, triumphing in this new and unuſual Acquiſition: for 'till then, neither Horſe nor Foot-Soldier had deſerted from *Cæſar* to *Pompey*; whereas ſcarce a Day paſſed without ſome deſertion from *Pompey*'s Army, eſpecially among the new Levies in *Epirus*, *Ætolia*, and thoſe Countries that had declared for *Cæſar*. The Brothers being well acquainted with the condition of *Cæſar*'s Camp, what was wanting to compleat the Fortifications, where the foible of the Lines lay, the particular times, diſtance of Places, ſtrength and vigilance of the Guards, with the temper and character of the Officers who commanded in every Poſt, made an exact report of all to *Pompey*.

LII. UPON this Intelligence, having already formed the Deſign of forcing *Cæſar*'s Lines, he ordered the Soldiers to make coverings of Oſier for their Helmets, and provide themſelves with Faſcines. This done, he embarked by night, in Boats and ſmall Barks, a great number of light-armed Troops and Archers, with the Faſcines for filling up *Cæſar*'s Trenches; and having drawn together ſixty Cohorts from the greater Camp and Forts, led them about midnight towards that part of the Enemy's Lines neareſt the Sea, a good diſtance from



A. *Dyrrachium*. B. *Cæsar's Camp near Dyrrachium*. C. *Pompey excluded from Dyrrachium, encamps on*
Lines of Communication, endeavours to enclose Pompey within his Works. E. *Pompey unable to hinder*
ence of Forage. F. *Cæsar offers Pompey Battle*. G. *Pompey draws up before his Camp*. H. *Pompey lea*
of an Eminence and fortifies it. K. *A Line carried from the left Angle of the Camp to the River*. L.
Legion to sustain his Men in the leſser Camp. N. *The Harbour of Petra*. O. *The River*.

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mps on an Eminence called Petra. D. Cæsar raising Redoubts from Space to Space, and joining them by hinder Cæsar's Works, builds twenty four Redoubts, and takes in a Circumference of fifteen Miles, for the Conveni- pey leads sixty Cohorts towards that Part of the Enemy's Lines nearest the Sea. I. Pompey takes Posseſsion ver. L. Cæsar's Camp between the Sea and the River fronting Pompey's. M. Pompey marches with his fifth

from the main Camp. Thither likewiſe he diſpatched the Barks, on board of which were the light-armed Troops and Faſcines, together with all the Gallies that lay at *Dyrrhachium*, giving each their particular Inſtructions. *Lentulus Marcellinus* the Quæſtor, with the ninth Legion, had charge of this part of the Fortifications; and as his Health was but infirm, *Cæſar* had joined *Fulvius Poſthumus* with him in the Command.

LIII. THIS Place was guarded by a Ditch fifteen Foot broad, with a Rampart towards the Enemy ten Foot high, and of equal thickneſs. Behind this, at the diſtance of ſix hundred Feet, was another Rampart ſomewhat lower than the former, and fronting the contrary way. *Cæſar* apprehending an Attack from the Sea, had raiſed this double Rampart ſome Days before, that he might be able to defend himſelf againſt the Enemy, ſhould they charge him on both ſides at once. But the extent of the Circumvallation, and the continued labour of ſo many Days, in incloſing a ſpace of eighteen miles, had not allowed us time to finiſh the Work. Accordingly the Line of Communication, which ran along the Sea-ſide, and was to have joined theſe two Ramparts, was not yet compleated. This *Pompey* was informed of by the *Allobrogian* Brothers, which proved of fatal conſequence to us. For while ſome Cohorts of the ninth Legion were upon guard near the Sea, ſuddenly the *Pompeians* arrived about Day-break, and ſurpriſed them with their unexpected appearance. At the ſame time the Troops that came by ſea, lanched their Darts againſt the outward Rampart, and began to fill up the Ditch with Faſcines; while the legionary Soldiers, planting their Scaling-ladders againſt the inner Works, and plying thoſe that defended them with Darts and Engines, ſpread a general Terror over that part of the Camp, which was ſtill increaſed by the multitude of Archers that came pouring upon them from all ſides. The Oſiers they had bound round their Helmets, contributed greatly to defend them from the Stones thrown down from the Rampart, which were the only Weapons we had. At laſt, all things going againſt us, and our Reſiſtance becoming every moment more languid, the Enemy diſcovered the Defect before ſpoken of in our Lines; and landing their Men between the two Ramparts, where the Line of Communication towards the Sea remained unfiniſhed, they attacked our Soldiers in the rear, and obliged them to abandon both ſides of the Works.

LIV. *MARCELLINUS* hearing of this Diſorder, detached ſome Cohorts to ſuſtain the flying Troops: but as the Rout was become general, they could neither perſuade them to rally, nor were able themſelves to withſtand the Enemy's Charge. The like happened to a ſecond Detachment; inſomuch that the ſeveral Supplies ſent, by catching the general Terror, ſerved only to add to the Confuſion and Danger: for the multitude of Runaways rendered the Retreat the more difficult. In this Action the Eagle-bearer of the ninth Legion, finding himſelf dangerouſly wounded, and that his Strength began to fail, called to ſome Troopers who paſſed by, and ſaid: "I have "preſerved, to the laſt moment of my Life, with the greateſt care, this "Eagle, with which I have been intruſted; and now I am dying, I return "it to *Cæſar*, with the ſame Fidelity. Carry it to him, I beſeech you; "nor ſuffer *Cæſar*'s Arms to experience, in loſing it, an Ignominy with which "they have been hitherto unacquainted." Thus the Eagle was preſerved; but all the Centurions of the firſt Cohort were ſlain, except the firſt Captain of the Principes.

LV. AND now the *Pompeians*, having made great ſlaughter of our Men, approached the Quarters of *Marcellinus*, to the no ſmall terror of the reſt of the Cohorts; when *Mark Antony*, who commanded in the neareſt Redoubts, upon notice of what paſſed, was ſeen deſcending from the higher Ground at the head of twelve Cohorts. His arrival put a ſtop to the Enemy's progreſs, and by enabling our Men to recover from their extreme Terror, reſtored them to their wonted Courage. Soon after *Cæſar* arrived in perſon with ſome Troops, being appriſed of the Attack by the ſmoke of the Forts, the uſual Signal on theſe Occaſions: and perceiving the loſs he had ſuſtained, and that *Pompey* had forced the Lines, being able to forage, and having an eaſy communication with the Sea; he quitted his former Project, which had proved unſucceſsful, and encamped as near *Pompey* as he could.

LVI. WHEN the Intrenchments were finiſhed, *Cæſar* had notice from his Scouts, that a certain number of the Enemy's Cohorts, which to them appeared a compleat Legion, were retired behind a Wood, and ſeemed to be on their march to the old Camp. The ſituation of the two Armies was this: Some Days before, when *Cæſar*'s ninth Legion was ſent to oppoſe a Body of *Pompey*'s Troops, they thought proper to intrench themſelves upon an oppoſite Hill, and form a Camp there. This Camp bordered upon a Wood, and was not above four hundred Paces from the Sea. But afterwards, for certain Reaſons, *Cæſar* removed a little beyond that Poſt; and *Pompey*, a few Days after, took poſſeſſion of it. But as his deſign was to place ſeveral Legions there; leaving the inner Rampart ſtanding, he ſurrounded it with greater Works. Thus the ſmaller Camp, incloſed within one of larger circumference, ſerved by way of a Caſtle or Citadel. He likewiſe carried an Intrenchment from the left Angle of the Camp to the River, thro' a ſpace of about four hundred Paces, which enabled him to water freely and without danger. But he too, ſoon after, changed his Mind, for Reaſons which it is not needful to repeat here; and abandoned the Place, which thereby was left ſeveral Days without Troops, tho' the Fortifications remained entire. Hither the Scouts reported they ſaw the Standard of a Legion carried; which was likewiſe confirmed by thoſe who were ſtationed in the higher Forts. The Place was about five hundred Paces diſtant from *Pompey*'s new Camp. *Cæſar* deſirous to repair the loſs he had ſuſtained, and hoping he might be able to ſurpriſe this Legion, left two Cohorts in his Intrenchments, to prevent any ſuſpicion of his Deſign; and with thirty-three more, amongſt which number was the ninth Legion, which had loſt many Centurions and Soldiers, marched by a different Rout, as privately as he could, againſt the Legion which *Pompey* had lodged in the leſſer Camp. Neither was he deceived in his firſt Conjecture: for he arrived before *Pompey* could have notice of his Deſign; and tho' the Intrenchments were ſtrong, yet charging the Enemy briskly with his left Wing, where he himſelf commanded in perſon, he quickly drove them from the Rampart. But as the Gates were ſecured by a Barricade, they ſtill maintained the Fight here for ſome time, our Men endeavouring to break in, and the Enemy to defend the Camp. *T. Pulcio*, who betrayed the Army of *C. Antony*, as we have related above, gave ſignal proofs of his Valour on this Occaſion. But our Men at laſt prevailed; and having cut down the Barricade, broke firſt into the greater Camp, and afterwards into the Fort within it, whither the Legion had retired, ſome of whom were ſlain endeavouring to defend themſelves.

LVII.

LVII. BUT Fortune, whoſe Influence is very great, as in other things, ſo particularly in War; often effects mighty Changes from the moſt trifling Cauſes; as happened upon this occaſion. For the Cohorts of *Cæſar*'s right Wing being unacquainted with the Situation of the Camp, and miſtaking the Rampart which led to the River for one of its ſides, marched on that way in queſt of a Gate: but perceiving at length their Error, and that no-body defended the Intrenchment, they immediately mounted the Rampart, and were followed by the whole Cavalry. This delay ſaved the Enemy: for *Pompey* having notice of what paſſed, brought up the fifth Legion to ſuſtain his Party; ſo that at one and the ſame inſtant, his Cavalry approached ours, and his Troops were ſeen advancing in order of Battle, by thoſe who had taken poſſeſſion of the Camp: which quickly changed the face of Affairs. For *Pompey*'s Legion, encouraged by the hope of ſpeedy Succours, ſallied by the *Decuman* Port, and briskly charged our Cohorts. On the other hand, *Cæſar*'s Cavalry, who had entered by a narrow Breach in the Rampart, foreſeeing that a Retreat would be extremely difficult, began betimes to think of flying. The right Wing, which had no communication with the left, obſerving the Conſternation of the Cavalry, and fearing they ſhould be overpowered within the Camp, retired the ſame way they had entered. Many, to avoid being engaged in the narrow Paſſes, threw themſelves from the Rampart, which was ten foot high, into the Ditch; where the firſt Ranks being troden to death, their Bodies afforded a ſafe Paſſage to thoſe that followed. The left Wing, who from the Rampart whence they had driven the Enemy, ſaw *Pompey* advancing againſt them, and their own Men flying; fearing to be intangled in the Defiles, as they had the Enemy upon them both within and without the Camp, retreated the ſame way they came. Nothing was to be ſeen but Conſternation, Flying, and Diſorder; inſomuch that all *Cæſar*'s Efforts to rally his Troops were fruitleſs. If he ſeized any by the Arm, they ſtruggled till they got away. If he laid hold of the Colours, they left them in his Hands. Not a Man could be prevailed on to face about.

LVIII. IN this Calamity, what ſaved the Army from entire Deſtruction was, that *Pompey* apprehending an *Ambuſcade* (probably becauſe the Succeſs was beyond his hopes, as a little before he had ſeen his Men worſted and put to flight) durſt not for ſome time approach the Intrenchments; and his Cavalry were retarded in the purſuit by *Cæſar*'s Troops, who were poſſeſſed of all the Gates and Defiles. Be that as it will, a ſmall matter proved of very great conſequence to both Parties: for the Intrenchment between the Camp and the River, ſtopped the courſe of *Cæſar*'s Victory, when he had already forced *Pompey*'s Lines: and the ſame, by retarding the purſuit of the Enemy, ſaved his Army from Deſtruction.

LIX. IN theſe two Actions, *Cæſar* loſt nine hundred and ſixty private Men, thirty Officers, and ſeveral *Roman* Knights of note, as *Flavius Tuticanus Gallus*, a Senator's Son; *C. Felginus* of *Placentia*; *A. Gravius* of *Puteoli*; and *M. Sacrativir* of *Capua*. But the greateſt part of thoſe died without Wounds, being troden to death in the Ditch, about the Works, and on the Banks of the River, occaſioned by the Flight and Terror of their own Men. He loſt alſo thirty-two Colours. *Pompey* was ſaluted Emperor on this occaſion; a Title which he bore ever after, and ſuffered himſelf to be accoſted by: but neither in the Letters which he wrote, nor in his Conſular Enſigns did he think proper to aſſume the Laurel. The Priſoners were delivered up to *Labienus* at his

his own Requeſt; and this Deſerter, brutal and cruel as uſual, diverted himſelf with inſulting them in their Calamity; and asked them ſarcaſtically, if it was uſual for Veterans to run away; after which he cauſed them all to be put to death.

LX. THIS Succeſs gave ſuch Confidence and Spirit to the *Pompeian* Party, that they now no longer took any Concern about the Conduct of the War, but began to conſider themſelves as already victorious. They never reflected on the inconſiderable Number of our Troops, the diſadvantage of the Ground, the narrow Paſſes we were engaged in by their having firſt poſſeſſion of the Camp, the double danger both within and without the Fortifications, and the ſeparation of the two Wings of the Army, which hindered them from mutually ſuccouring one another. They forgot that the Advantage they had gained, was not the effect of a brisk and vigorous Attack; and that our Men had ſuffered more by crouding upon one another in the narrow Paſſes, than by the Sword of the Enemy. In fine, they never called to mind the uncertain Chance of War, and upon what minute Cauſes good or bad Succeſs often depend; how a groundleſs Suſpicion, a panick Terror, or a religious Scruple, have frequently been productive of the moſt fatal Events; when either by the miſconduct of a General, or the Error of a Tribune, ſome falſe Perſuaſion has been ſuffered to take root in an Army. But as if the Victory had been purely the Effect of their Valour, and no Change of Fortune was to be apprehended, they every where proclaimed and made publick the Succeſs of this Day.

LXI. *CÆSAR* ſeeing all his former Projects diſconcerted, reſolved to ſubmit to Fortune, and entirely change the manner of the War. He therefore called in all his Forces from the Forts, gave up the Deſign of incloſing *Pompey*, and having aſſembled his Army, addreſſed them as follows: " That " they ought not to be diſcouraged, or give way to Conſternation upon what " had lately happened, but oppoſe their many ſucceſsful Engagements to one " ſlight and inconſiderable Check. That Fortune had already befriended them " greatly, in the Reduction of *Italy* without Bloodſhed; in the Conqueſt of " the two *Spains*, though defended by warlike Troops, under the Conduct of " skilful and experienced Leaders; and in the Subjection of the neighbouring " Provinces, whence they could be plentifully ſupplied with Corn. In fine, " they ought to call to mind, how happily they had paſſed into *Greece*, " through the midſt of the Enemy's Fleets, though poſſeſſed of all the Coaſts " and Havens. If they were not ſucceſsful in every thing, they muſt endeavour by Prudence to overcome the diſappointments of Fortune; and attribute " their late Diſaſter to the Caprice of that Goddeſs, rather than to any Fault " on their ſide. That he had led them to an advantageous Ground, and put " them in poſſeſſion of the Enemy's Camp, after driving them from all their " Works. If either ſome ſudden Conſternation, the miſtaking their way, or " any other Miſhap, had ſnatched an apparent and almoſt certain Victory out " of their hands, they ought to exert their utmoſt Endeavours to repair that " Diſgrace; which would turn their Misfortune to a Benefit, as happened at " *Gergovia*; where thoſe who at firſt dreaded to encounter the Enemy, demanded earneſtly in the end to be led to Battle." Having made this Speech, he contented himſelf with ſtigmatiſing, and reducing to private Men, ſome of the Standard-bearers: for the whole Army were ſo grieved at their loſs, and ſo deſirous of expunging the Stain their Glory had received, that there was no occaſion either

for the Tribunes or Centurions to remind them of their Duty: nay they even undertook to puniſh themſelves by the ſevereſt Impoſitions, and demanded with great Outcries to be led againſt the Enemy; being ſeconded by ſome Centurions of the firſt Rank, who touched with their Remonſtrances, were for continuing in the Poſt they then poſſeſſed, and putting all to the hazard of a Battle. But *Cæſar* did not think it prudent to expoſe to an Action Troops that had been juſt worſted, and in whom might remain too deep Impreſſions of their late Fright. He was for allowing them time to recover themſelves; and having quitted his Works, thought it needful to provide for the ſecurity of his Convoys.

LXII. ACCORDINGLY, after proper care taken of the ſick and wounded, as ſoon as Night approached, he ſent all the Baggage privately towards *Apollonia*, under a Guard of one Legion, with Orders not to halt 'till they had reached the Place. This Affair diſpatched, he made two Legions remain in the Camp, and marching out all the reſt about three in the Morning at ſeveral Gates, ordered them to follow the ſame Rout the Baggage had taken. Soon after, that his departure might not have the appearance of a Flight, and yet be known to the Enemy as late as poſſible, he ordered the uſual Signal to be given; and ſetting out with the reſt of his Forces, loſt ſight of the Camp in a moment. *Pompey* hearing of his Retreat, prepared to follow him without delay, and hoping to ſurpriſe the Army in its march, whilſt incumbered with Baggage, and not yet recovered from its Conſternation, drew out all his Troops, and ſent his Cavalry before to retard our Rear: which however he could not overtake, becauſe *Cæſar* marching without Baggage, had got a great way before him. But when we came to the River *Genuſus*, we found the Banks ſo ſteep and difficult, that before all the Men could get over, *Pompey*'s Cavalry came up, and fell upon our hindmoſt Battalions. *Cæſar* ſent his Horſe to oppoſe them, intermixed with ſome light-armed Troops; who charged with that Vigour and Succeſs, as to put them all to rout, leave a conſiderable number dead upon the Field, and return without loſs to the main Body of their Army.

LXIII. HAVING compleated the intended march of that Day, and brought his Army over the *Genuſus*, he took up his Quarters in his old Camp at *Aſparagium*, ſuffering none of the Soldiers to ſtroll without the Rampart, and charging the Cavalry, who had been ſent out under pretence of foraging, to return immediately by the *Decuman* Port. *Pompey* likewiſe, having compleated that Day's march, encamped in his old Poſt at *Aſparagium*; where the Troops having nothing to do, becauſe the Works were ſtill entire; ſome made long Excurſions in queſt of Wood and Forage; others, who had come almoſt without any Baggage, by reaſon the march was undertaken on a ſudden, enticed by the nearneſs of their former Camp, laid down their Arms in their Tents, quitted the Intrenchments, and went to fetch what they had left behind them. This rendering them unable to purſue, as *Cæſar* had foreſeen; about noon, he gave the Signal for decamping, led forth his Troops, and doubling that Day's march, gained eight miles upon *Pompey*, who could not follow him by reaſon his Troops were diſperſed.

LXIV. NEXT Day *Cæſar* decamped again at three in the Morning, having ſent away his Baggage over night, that if he ſhould find himſelf under a neceſſity of fighting, he might have his Army clear of all Incumbrance.

The ſame he did the following Days: by which means, tho' he had very difficult ways to paſs, and ſome great Rivers to croſs, he ſuffered no loſs during the whole march. For *Pompey*, after the firſt Day's hindrance, endeavouring in vain by long and forced marches to overtake *Cæſar*, gave over the Purſuit on the fourth, and began to think of taking other Meaſures.

LXV. *CÆSAR* was under a neceſſity of going to *Apollonia*, to leave his wounded there, to pay his Army, confirm his Friends in their Duty, and garriſon the Towns that had ſubmitted. But he took no longer time to theſe Affairs, than the importance of his other Engagements would allow. For fearing that *Pompey* might ſurpriſe *Domitius Calvinus*, he put himſelf in full march to join him. The Scheme he proceeded on was this: that if *Pompey* took the ſame Rout, he muſt leave the Sea, the Forces he had at *Dyrrhachium*, with all his Ammunition and Proviſion, which would bring them upon equal terms: if he paſſed into *Italy*, *Cæſar* purpoſed to join *Domitius*, and march to its defence by the Coaſt of *Illyricum:* in fine, ſhould he fall upon *Apollonia* and *Oricum*, and endeavour to exclude him from the Sea-Coaſt; in that caſe he reckoned to oblige him, by attacking *Metellus Scipio*, to leave every thing to ſuccour him. *Cæſar* therefore diſpatched Couriers to *Domitius*, to acquaint him with his Deſign; and leaving four Cohorts at *Apollonia*, one at *Liſſus*, and three at *Oricum*, with the ſick and wounded, began his march thro' *Epirus* and *Acarnania*. *Pompey*, on his ſide, gueſſing *Cæſar*'s deſign, made what haſte he could to join *Scipio*; that if *Cæſar* ſhould march that way, he might prevent his being overpower'd: but ſhould he ſtill keep near *Corcyra*, and the Sea, becauſe of the Legions and Cavalry he expected from *Italy*; in that caſe, he purpoſed to fall upon *Domitius* with all his Forces.

LXVI. FOR theſe Reaſons both Generals ſtudied diſpatch, as well to afford timely ſuccour to their Friends, as not to miſs an Opportunity of diſtreſſing their Enemies. But *Cæſar* had turned off to *Apollonia*; whereas *Pompey* took the neareſt way thro' *Candavia* for *Macedonia*. It happened too very unfortunately, that *Domitius*, who for ſeveral Days had been encamped near *Scipio*, quitted that Station for the convenience of Proviſions, and was upon his march to *Heraclea Sentica*, a City of the *Candavians*; ſo that Chance ſeemed to throw him directly in *Pompey*'s way, which *Cæſar* had not then the leaſt knowledge of. *Pompey* too having ſent Letters thro' all the States and Provinces, relating to the Action at *Dyrrhachium*, with repreſentations that far exceeded the truth; a rumour began to prevail, that *Cæſar* had been defeated with the loſs of almoſt all his Forces, and was forced to fly before *Pompey*. Theſe Reports raiſed him many Enemies on his march, and induced ſome States to throw off their Allegiance; whence it happened, that the Couriers mutually ſent by *Cæſar* and *Domitius*, were all intercepted. But the *Allobrogians* in the train of *Ægus* and *Roſcillus*, who, as we have ſeen before, had deſerted from *Cæſar* to *Pompey*, meeting ſome of *Domitius*'s Scouts; either out of ancient Cuſtom, becauſe they had ſerved together in the *Gallick* Wars; or from a motive of Vain-glory; informed them of all that had paſſed; of *Pompey*'s Victory, and *Cæſar*'s Retreat. Advice being given of this to *Calvinus*, who was not above four Hours march from the Enemy, he avoided the Danger by a timely Retreat, and joined *Cæſar* near *Æginium*, a Town on the Borders of *Theſſaly*.

LXVII.

LXVII. AFTER the junction of the two Armies, *Cæsar* arrived at *Gomphi*, the first Town of *Thessaly*, as you come from *Epirus*. A few Months before, the Inhabitants had of their own accord sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, to make an offer of what their Country afforded, and petition for a Garrison. But the report of the Action at *Dyrrhachium*, with many groundless Additions, had by this time reached their Ears. And therefore *Androsthenes* Prætor of *Thessaly*, choosing rather to be the Companion of *Pompey*'s good Fortune, than associate with *Cæsar* in his Adversity; ordered all the People, whether Slaves or free, to assemble in the Town; and having shut the Gates against *Cæsar*, sent Letters to *Scipio* and *Pompey* to come to his Assistance, intimating: "That the Town was strong enough to hold out if they used dispatch, but "by no means in condition to sustain a long Siege." *Scipio*, on advice of the departure of the Armies from *Dyrrhachium*, was come to *Larissa* with his Legions; and *Pompey* was yet far enough distant from *Thessaly*. *Cæsar* having fortified his Camp, ordered Mantelets, Hurdles, and Scaling-Ladders to be prepared for a sudden Attack; and then exhorting his Men, represented; "Of how great consequence it was to render themselves Masters of an opu-"lent City, abounding in all things needful for the supply of their Wants, "and by the terror of whose Punishment other States would be awed into "Submission: and this, he told them, must be done quickly, before any Succours "could arrive." Accordingly, seizing the Opportunity offered by the uncommon Ardor of the Troops, he attacked the Town the same Day about three in the Afternoon; and having made himself master of it before Sun-set, gave it up to be plundered. From *Gomphi Cæsar* marched directly to *Metropolis*, and arrived before they were acquainted with the Misfortune of their Neighbours.

LXVIII. THE *Metropolitans* at first following the example of *Gomphi*, to which they were moved by the same Reports, shut their Gates, and manned the Walls. But no sooner came they to understand the fate of their neighbour City, by some Prisoners whom *Cæsar* produced for that end, than immediately they admitted him into the Town. He suffered no Hostilities to be committed, nor any harm to be done them; and so powerful was the Example, from the different treatment of these two Cities, that not a single State in *Thessaly* refused to submit to *Cæsar*, and receive his Orders, except *Larissa*, which was awed by the numerous Army of *Metellus Scipio*. As the Country was good, and covered with Corn, which was near ripe, *Cæsar* took up his Quarters there, judging it a proper Place to wait for *Pompey* in, and render the Theatre of the War.

LXIX. A Few Days after *Pompey* arrived in *Thessaly*; and joining *Metellus Scipio*, harangued both Armies. He first thanked his own for their late Services; and then turning to *Scipio*'s Troops, exhorted them to put in for their share of the Booty, which the Victory already obtained gave them the fairest prospect of. Both Armies being received into one Camp, he shared all the Honours of Command with *Scipio*, ordered a Pavilion to be erected for him, and the Trumpets to sound before it. This increase of *Pompey*'s Forces, by the conjunction of two mighty Armies, raised the Confidence of his Followers, and their assurance of Victory to such a degree, that all delays were considered as a hindrance of their return to *Italy*; insomuch that if *Pompey* on any Occasion acted with slowness and circumspection, they failed not to cry out: "That he industriously protracted an Affair, for the dispatch of which one

Day

" Day was ſufficient, in the view of gratifying his Ambition for Command, " and having conſular and prætorian Senators amongſt the number of his " Servants." Already they began to diſpute about Rewards and Dignities, and fixed upon the Perſons who were annually to ſucceed to the Conſulſhip. Others ſued for the Houſes and Eſtates of thoſe who had followed *Cæſar*'s Party. A warm Debate aroſe in Council in relation to *L. Hirrus*, whom *Pompey* had ſent againſt the *Parthians*, whether in the next Election of Prætors, he ſhould be allowed to ſtand Candidate for that Office in his abſence; his Friends imploring *Pompey* to make good the Promiſe he had made him at his departure, and not ſuffer him to be deceived by depending on the General's Honour; while ſuch as aſpired at this Office complained publickly, that a Promiſe ſhould be made to any one Candidate, when all were embarked in the ſame Cauſe, and ſhared the like Dangers. Already *Domitius*, *Scipio*, and *Lentulus Spinther*, were openly quarrelling about the High-prieſthood, which *Cæſar* was in poſſeſſion of. They even deſcended to perſonal Abuſe, and pleaded their ſeveral Pretenſions; *Lentulus* urging the Reſpect due to his Age; *Domitius*, his Dignity, and the Intereſt he had in the City; and *Scipio* his Alliance with *Pompey*. *Attius Rufus* impeached *L. Afranius* before *Pompey*, charging him with having occaſioned the loſs of the Army in *Spain*. And *L. Domitius* moved in Council, that after the Victory, all the Senators in *Pompey*'s Army and Camps, ſhould be appointed Judges, and impowered to proceed againſt thoſe who had ſtay'd in *Italy*, or who had appeared cool, or ſhewn any indifference to the Cauſe; and that three Billets ſhould be given to theſe Judges, one for Acquittance, another for Condemnation, and a third for a pecuniary Fine. In a word, nothing was thought on but Honours, or Profit, or Vengeance; nor did they conſider by what methods they were to conquer, but what Advantage they ſhould make of Victory.

LXX. *CÆSAR* having provided for the Subſiſtence of his Troops, who were now no longer fatigued, and had ſufficiently recovered from the Conſternation the different Actions at *Dyrrhachium* had thrown them into; thought it high time to make trial how *Pompey* ſtood affected to an Engagement. Accordingly he drew out his Men, and formed them in order of Battle; at firſt near his own Camp, and ſomewhat diſtant from the Enemy: but perceiving this had no effect on *Pompey*, who ſtill maintained his Poſt on the Eminences, he each Day drew nearer, and by that Conduct animated and gave freſh Courage to his Soldiers. His Cavalry being much inferior to the Enemy's in number, he followed the method already mentioned; of ſingling out the ſtrongeſt and nimbleſt of his Foot-Soldiers, and accuſtoming them to fight intermixed with the Horſe; in which way of Combat they were become very expert by daily practice. This Diſpoſition, joined to conſtant Exerciſe, ſo emboldened his Cavalry, that though but a thouſand in Number, they would upon occaſion ſuſtain the Charge of *Pompey*'s ſeven thouſand, even in an open Plain, and appear not greatly diſmayed at their Multitude: nay they actually got the better in a skirmiſh that happened between them, and killed *Ægus* the *Allobrogian*, one of the two Brothers who deſerted to *Pompey*, with ſeveral others of his Party.

LXXI. *POMPEY*, whoſe Camp was on an Eminence, drew up his Army at the foot of the Mountain, expecting, as may be preſumed, that *Cæſar* would attack him in that advantageous Situation. But *Cæſar* deſpairing to draw *Pompey* to a Battle on equal terms, thought it would be his beſt courſe to

to decamp, and be always upon the march; in hopes, that by frequently ſhifting his ground, he might the better be ſupplied with Proviſions; and that as the Enemy would not fail following him, in the frequent marches he ſhould make, he might perhaps find an Opportunity of attacking them, and forcing them to fight: at leaſt he was ſure of harraſſing *Pompey*'s Army, little accuſtomed to theſe continued Fatigues. Accordingly the Order for marching was given, and the Tents ſtruck, when *Cæſar* perceived that *Pompey*'s Army, which had quitted their Intrenchments, had advanced further towards the Plain than uſual, ſo that he might engage them at a leſs diſadvantage: whereupon addreſſing himſelf to his Soldiers, who were juſt ready to march out of their Trenches; "Let us no longer think, ſays he, of marching; now is the "time for fighting, ſo long wiſh'd for; let us therefore arm ourſelves with "Courage, and not miſs ſo favourable an Opportunity." This ſaid, he immediately drew out his Forces.

LXXII. *POMPEY* likewiſe, as was afterwards known, had reſolved to offer Battle, in compliance with the repeated Importunities of his Friends. He even ſaid in a Council of War, held ſome Days before, that *Cæſar*'s Army would be defeated before the Infantry came to engage. And when ſome expreſs'd their ſurpriſe at this Speech; "I know, ſays he, that what I promiſe "appears almoſt incredible: but hear the reaſons on which I ground my Con-"fidence, that you may advance to Battle with the greater aſſurance. I have "perſuaded the Cavalry, and obtained their promiſe for the performance, that "as ſoon as the Armies are formed, they ſhall fall upon *Cæſar*'s right Wing, "which they will eaſily be able to out-flank and ſurround. This muſt in-"fallibly occaſion the immediate Rout of that Wing, and conſequently of the "reſt of *Cæſar*'s Troops, without danger or loſs on our ſide. Nor will the "Execution be attended with any difficulty, as we are ſo much ſuperior to "them in Horſe. Be ready therefore for Battle; and ſince the ſo much de-"ſired Opportunity of fighting is come, take care not to fall ſhort of the good "Opinion the World entertains of your Valour and Experience." *Labienus* ſpoke next; highly applauding this Scheme of *Pompey*, and expreſſing the greateſt Contempt of *Cæſar*'s Army: "Think not, ſays he, addreſſing himſelf "to *Pompey*, that theſe are the Legions which conquered *Gaul* and *Germany*. "I was preſent in all thoſe Battles, and can of my own knowledge affirm, "that but a very ſmall Part of that Army now remains: great Numbers have "been killed, as muſt of neceſſity happen, in ſuch a Variety of Conflicts: "many periſhed during the autumnal Peſtilence in *Apulia*: many are returned "to their own Habitations: and not a few were left behind to guard *Italy*. "Have you not heard, that the Cohorts in Garriſon at *Brunduſium* are made "up of Invalids? The Forces which you now behold, are compoſed of new "Levies raiſed in *Lombardy*, and the Colonies beyond the *Po*: for the Vete-"rans, in whom conſiſted the main ſtrength of the Army, periſhed all in the "two Defeats at *Dyrrhachium*." Having finiſhed this Speech, he took an Oath, which he profered to all that were preſent, never to return to Camp otherwiſe than victorious. *Pompey* commended his Zeal, took the Oath himſelf, and the reſt followed his Example without heſitation. After theſe Engagements taken publickly in Council, they all departed full of Joy and Expectation; conſidering themſelves as already victorious, and relying entirely on the Ability of their General; who, in an Affair of that Importance, they were confident would promiſe nothing without aſſurance of Succeſs.

LXXIII. WHEN *Cæſar* approached *Pompey*'s Camp, he found his Army drawn up in this manner. In the left Wing were the two Legions delivered by *Cæſar* at the beginning of the Quarrel, in conſequence of a Decree of the Senate; one of which was called the firſt, the other the third Legion: and here *Pompey* commanded in perſon. *Scipio* was in the Center, with the Legions he had brought out of *Syria*. The *Cilician* Legion, joined to the *Spaniſh* Cohorts brought over by *Afranius*, formed the right Wing. Theſe *Pompey* eſteemed his beſt Troops, diſtributing the leſs expert between the Wings and the main Body. He had in all an hundred and ten Cohorts, amounting to five and forty thouſand; beſides two Cohorts of Volunteers, who had ſerved under him in former Wars; and who, out of Affection to their old General, though their legal time was expired, flocked to his Standard on this occaſion, and were diſperſed amongſt the whole Army. His other ſeven Cohorts were left to guard the Camp and the adjoining Forts. As the *Enipeus*, a River with very ſteep Banks, covered his right Wing, he placed all his Horſe, Slingers, and Archers in the left.

LXXIV. *CÆSAR* obſerving his ancient Cuſtom, placed the tenth Legion in the right, and the ninth in the left Wing. As this laſt had been conſiderably weakened by the ſeveral Actions at *Dyrrhachium*, he joined the eighth to it in ſuch manner, that they formed as it were but one Legion, and had Orders mutually to relieve each other. His whole Army amounted to fourſcore Cohorts, making in all twenty-two thouſand Men; beſides two Cohorts left to guard the Camp. *Domitius Calvinus* was in the Center, *Mark Antony* on the left, and *P. Sylla* on the right. *Cæſar* took his poſt oppoſite to *Pompey*, at the head of the tenth Legion. And as he had obſerv'd the diſpoſition of the Enemy contrived to out-flank his right Wing: to obviate that inconvenience, he made a draught of ſix Cohorts from his Rear-line, formed them into a ſeparate Body, and oppoſed them to *Pompey*'s Horſe; inſtructing them in the Part they were to act; and admoniſhing them, that the Succeſs of that Day would depend chiefly on their Courage. At the ſame time he charged the whole Army, and in particular the third Line, not to advance to Battle without Orders; which, when he ſaw it proper, he would give by making the uſual Signal.

LXXV. WHEN he was exhorting them to Battle, as military Cuſtom required, and reminding them of the many Favours they had on all occaſions received at his hands, he chiefly took care to obſerve; " That they had " themſelves been Witneſſes of his earneſt Endeavours after Peace; that he " had employed *Vatinius* to ſolicit a Conference with *Labienus*, and ſent " *A. Clodius* to treat with *Scipio*; that he had preſſed *Libo* in the warmeſt " manner at *Oricum*, to grant him a ſafe Conduct for his Ambaſſadors: in a " word, that he had left nothing unattempted to avoid waſting the Blood of " his Soldiers, and to ſpare the Commonwealth the loſs of one of her Armies." After this Speech, obſerving his Soldiers ardent for the Fight, he ordered the Trumpets to ſound a Charge. Among the Volunteers in *Cæſar*'s Army was one *Craſtinus*, a Man of diſtinguiſhed Courage, who the Year before had been firſt Centurion of the tenth Legion. This brave Officer, as ſoon as the Signal was given, calling to thoſe next him: " Follow me, ſaid he, you that " were formerly under my Command, and acquit yourſelves of the Duty you " owe to your General. This one Battle more will crown the Work, by re- " ſtoring him to his proper Dignity, and us to the Enjoyment of our Freedom.

" At



A. *Cæsar's Camp*. B. *Pompey's Camp situated on a Hill*. C. *The first and third Legions, which formed R*
D. *The Syrian Legions*. E. *The right Wing, consisting of the Cilician Legion, joined to the Spanis*
right Wing covered by the Enipeus. H. *The Cavalry on the left supported by the Archers and Slinge*
in Cæsar's right Wing. L. *The ninth Legion strengthned with the eighth in the left Wing*. M. *Cæsar's*

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

formed Pompey's left Wing, and had been delivered over to him at the Beginning of the Quarrel.
the Spanish Cohorts. F. *The Cohorts between the right Wing and the main Body.* G. *Pompey's*
and Slingers. I. *The Cohorts between the left Wing and the main Body.* K. *The tenth Legion placed*
M. *Cæsar's Cavalry.* N. *The Draught of six Cohorts opposed to Pompey's Horse.* O. *The River Enipeus.*

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At the ſame time turning to *Cæſar*, "General, ſays he, this Day you ſhall be "ſatisfied with my Behaviour, and whether I live or die, I will take care to "deſerve your Commendations." So ſaying, he marched up to the Enemy, and began the Attack at the head of a hundred and twenty Volunteers.

LXXVI. BETWEEN the two Armies there was an interval ſufficient for the Onſet: but *Pompey* had given his Troops orders to keep their Ground, that *Cæſar*'s Army might have all that way to come. This he is ſaid to have done by the Advice of *C. Triarius*, that the Enemy's Ranks might be broken, and themſelves put out of Breath, by having ſo far to run; of which Diſorder he hoped to make an Advantage. He was beſides of Opinion, that our Javelins would have leſs effect, by the Troops continuing in their Poſt, than if they ſprung forward at the very time they were lanched; and as the Soldiers would have twice as far to run as uſual, they muſt be weary and breathleſs by that time they came up with the firſt Line. But herein *Pompey* ſeems to have acted without ſufficient reaſon; becauſe there is a certain Alacrity and Ardor of Mind, naturally planted in every Man, which is inflamed by the deſire of fighting; and which an able General, far from endeavouring to repreſs, will by all the methods he can deviſe, foment and cheriſh. Nor was it a vain Inſtitution of our Anceſtors, that the Trumpets ſhould ſound on every ſide, and the whole Army raiſe a Shout, in order to animate the Courage of their own Men, and ſtrike terror into the Enemy. *Cæſar*'s Soldiers entirely defeated *Pompey*'s hopes by their good Diſcipline and Experience. For perceiving the Enemy did not ſtir, they halted of their own accord in the midſt of their Career; and having taken a moment's Breath, put themſelves a ſecond time in motion, marched up in good Order, flung their Javelins, and then betook themſelves to their Swords. Nor did *Pompey*'s Men act with leſs preſence of Mind: for they ſuſtained our Attack, kept their Ranks, bore the diſcharge of our Darts; and having lanched their own, immediately had recourſe to their Swords. At this inſtant *Pompey*'s Horſe, accompanied by the Archers and Slingers, attacked *Cæſar*'s; and having compelled them to give ground, began to extend themſelves to the left, in order to flank the Infantry. Whereupon *Cæſar* gave the appointed Signal to the ſix Cohorts, who fell on the Enemy's Horſe with ſuch fury, that they not only drove them from the Field of Battle, but even compelled them to ſeek refuge in the higheſt Mountains. The Archers and Slingers, deprived of their Protection, were ſoon after cut to pieces. Mean-while the ſix Cohorts, not content with this Succeſs, wheeled round upon the Enemy's left Wing, and began to charge it in the rear: whereupon *Cæſar*, perceiving the Victory ſo far advanced, to compleat it, brought up his third Line, which 'till then had not engaged. *Pompey*'s Infantry being thus doubly attacked, in front by freſh Troops, and in rear by the victorious Cohorts, could no longer reſiſt, but fled to their Camp. Nor was *Cæſar* miſtaken in his Conjecture, when in exhorting his Men, he declared that Victory would depend chiefly on the ſix Cohorts, which formed the Body of Reſerve, and were ſtationed to oppoſe the Enemy's Horſe: for by them were their Cavalry defeated, their Archers and Slingers cut to pieces, and their left Wing ſurrounded and forced to fly.

LXXVII. *POMPEY* ſeeing his Cavalry routed, and that part of the Army on which he chiefly depended put into diſorder, deſpaired of being able to reſtore the Battle, and quitted the Field. Repairing immediately to his Camp, he ſaid aloud to the Centurions who guarded the Prætorian Gate, ſo as all

all the Soldiers might hear him: " Take care of the Camp, and defend it " vigorouſly in caſe of an Attack. I go to viſit the other Gates, and give " orders for their defence." This ſaid, he retired to his Tent, deſpairing of Succeſs, yet waiting the Event. *Cæſar* having forced the *Pompeians* to ſeek refuge in their Camp, and not willing to allow them time to recover from their Conſternation, exhorted his Troops to make the beſt of their preſent Victory, and vigorouſly attack the Enemy's Intrenchments. Tho' the Battle had laſted 'till noon, the Weather being extremely hot; yet prepared to encounter all Difficulties, they chearfully complied with his Orders. The Camp was bravely defended for ſome time by the Cohorts left to guard it; and particularly by a great number of *Thracians*, and other Barbarians, who made a very ſtout Reſiſtance: for as to ſuch Troops as had there ſought refuge from the Field of Battle, they were in too great a Conſternation to think of any thing more than a ſafe Retreat. It was not however poſſible for the Troops poſted on the Rampart, long to ſtand the multitude of Darts continually poured upon them; which in the end obliged them to retire covered with Wounds, and under the conduct of their Tribunes and Centurions, ſeek ſhelter in the Mountains adjoining to the Camp.

LXXVIII. ON entring *Pompey*'s Camp, we found Tables ready covered, Side-boards loaded with Plate, and Tents adorned with Branches of Myrtle; that of *L. Lentulus*, with ſome others, was ſhaded with Ivy. Every thing gave Proofs of the higheſt Luxury, and an aſſured expectation of Victory; whence it was eaſy to ſee, that they little dreamt of the iſſue of that Day, ſince intent only on voluptuous Refinements, they pretended, with Troops immerſed in Luxury, to oppoſe *Cæſar*'s Army, accuſtomed to Fatigue, and inured to the want of Neceſſaries.

LXXIX. *POMPEY* finding our Men had forced his Intrenchments, mounted his Horſe, quitted his Armour for a Habit more ſuitable to his ill Fortune, and withdrawing by the *Decuman* Port, rode full ſpeed to *Lariſſa*. Nor did he ſtop there; but continuing his Flight Day and Night without intermiſſion, he arrived at the Sea-ſide with thirty Horſe, and went on board a little Bark; often complaining, " That he had been ſo far deceived in his Opinion " of his Followers, as to ſee thoſe very Men from whom he expected " Victory, the firſt to fly, and in a manner betray him into the hands of " his Enemies."

LXXX. *CÆSAR* having maſtered the Enemy's Camp, requeſted his Soldiers not to leave the Victory imperfect, by buſying themſelves about the Plunder. Finding them ready to obey, he began a Line of Circumvallation round the Mountain. The *Pompeians* quickly abandoned a Poſt, which, for want of Water, was not tenable, and endeavoured to reach the City of *Lariſſa:* whereupon *Cæſar*, dividing his Army, left one part in *Pompey*'s Camp, ſent back another to his own Camp, and having with four Legions taken a nearer Road than that by which the Enemy paſſed, he found means to intercept them, and after ſix miles march drew up in order of Battle. But the *Pompeians* once more found Protection from a Mountain, at the foot of which ran a Rivulet. Tho' *Cæſar*'s Troops were greatly fatigued by fighting the whole Day, before Night he had flung up ſome Works, ſufficient to prevent the Enemy from having any communication with the Rivulet. As by this ſtep they were cut off from all hopes of relief, or of eſcaping, they ſent Deputies

puties to treat about a Surrender. Affairs continued in this Situation all that night, of which ſome few Senators, who had accompanied them, took the advantage to make their eſcape. At break of Day they all, by *Cæſar*'s Order, came down into the Plain, and delivered up their Arms; humbly imploring his Goodneſs, and ſuing for Mercy. *Cæſar* ſpoke to them with great mildneſs, and to alleviate their Apprehenſions, cited various inſtances of his Clemency, which he had on ſo many Occaſions made evident. In fact, he gave them their Lives, and forbid his Soldiers to offer them any Violence, or to take any thing from them. He then ſent for the Legions which had paſſed the night in Camp, to relieve thoſe that had accompanied him in the Purſuit; and being determined to follow *Pompey*, began his march, and arrived the ſame Day at *Lariſſa*.

LXXXI. THIS Battle coſt *Cæſar* no more than two hundred Soldiers: but he loſt thirty Centurions, Men of ſingular Courage. Among theſe latter was *Craſtinus*, whoſe Gallantry and Intrepidity, in marching up to Battle, has been taken notice of. This brave Officer, fighting regardleſs of danger, received a Wound in the Mouth from a Sword. Nor was he deceived in promiſing himſelf *Cæſar*'s Approbation, who was thoroughly ſenſible of his Merit, and greatly applauded his Behaviour in this Action. On *Pompey*'s ſide there fell about fifteen thouſand: but upwards of four and twenty thouſand were taken Priſoners: for the Cohorts that guarded the Forts ſurrendered to *Sylla*; tho' many eſcaped into the adjacent Countries. One hundred and eighty Colours were taken, and nine Eagles. *L. Domitius* flying towards the Mountains, and growing faint thro' the Fatigue, was overtaken and killed by ſome Horſemen.

LXXXII. ABOUT this time *D. Lælius* arrived with his Fleet at *Brunduſium*, and poſſeſſed himſelf of the Iſland over-againſt the Harbour, as *Libo* had done before. *Vatinius*, who commanded in the Place, having equipped ſeveral Boats, endeavoured to entice ſome of *Lælius*'s Ships within the Haven, and took a five-benched Galley, with two ſmaller Veſſels, that had ventured too far into the Port: then diſpoſing his Cavalry along the Shore, he prevented the Enemy from getting freſh Water. But *Lælius* having choſen a more convenient Seaſon of the Year for ſailing, brought Water in Tranſports from *Corcyra* and *Dyrrhachium*; ſtill keeping to his purpoſe; from which neither the diſgrace of loſing his Ships, nor the want of Neceſſaries could divert him, 'till he received intelligence of the Battle of *Pharſalia*.

LXXXIII. MUCH about the ſame time *Caſſius* arrived in *Sicily*, with the *Syrian*, *Phœnician*, and *Cilician* Fleets. And as *Cæſar*'s Fleet was divided into two parts, in one of which *P. Sulpicius* the Prætor commanded at *Vibo* in the Straits; in the other *M. Pomponius* at *Meſſana*: *Caſſius* was arrived at *Meſſana* with his Fleet before *Pomponius* had notice of his coming. And finding him unprepared, without Guards, Order, or Diſcipline, he took the Opportunity of a favourable Wind, and ſent ſeveral Fire-Ships againſt him, which conſumed his whole Fleet, thirty-five in number, twenty of which were decked. The terror occaſioned by this Blow was ſo great, that tho' there was an entire Legion in Garriſon at *Meſſana*, they durſt ſcarce look the Enemy in the Face; and would doubtleſs have delivered up the Town, had not the news of *Cæſar*'s Victory reached them, by means of the Cavalry ſtationed along the Coaſt. *Caſſius* then ſailed for *Sulpicius*'s Fleet at *Vibo*; which finding at

Anchor, near the Shore, by reaſon the Conſternation was become general over the whole Iſland; he put the ſame Stratagem in practice as before. For taking the advantage of a favourable Wind, he made forty Fire-ſhips advance againſt them, and the Flame catching hold on both ſides, quickly reduced five Gallies to Aſhes. The Conflagration continuing to ſpread, rouſed the Indignation of ſome veteran Soldiers, who had been left to guard the Ships. Accordingly they went on board, weighed Anchor, and attacking the Enemy, took two Quinqueremes, in one of which was *Caſſius* himſelf; but he eſcaped in a Boat. Two three-benched Gallies were ſunk: and ſoon after he was informed of the Defeat at *Pharſalia*, by ſome of *Pompey*'s own Followers; for hitherto he had regarded it as a falſe Report, ſpread abroad by *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants and Friends. Upon this Intelligence he quitted *Sicily*, and retired with his Fleet.

LXXXIV. *CÆSAR* laying all other thoughts aſide; determined to purſue *Pompey*, whitherſoever he ſhould retire, to prevent his drawing together freſh Forces, and renewing the War. He marched every Day as far as the Body of Cavalry he had with him could hold out, and was followed by ſhorter marches by a ſingle Legion. *Pompey* had iſſued a Proclamation at *Amphipolis*, enjoining all the Youth of the Province, whether *Greeks* or *Romans*, to join him in Arms. But whether this was with intent to conceal his real deſign of retreating much farther, or to try to maintain his Ground in *Macedonia*, if no body purſued him, is hard to determine. Here he lay one Night at Anchor, ſending to what Friends he had in the Town, and raiſing all the Money he poſſibly could. But being informed of *Cæſar*'s approach, he departed with all expedition, and came in a few Days to *Mitylene*. Here he was detained two Days by the badneſs of the Weather; and having increaſed his Fleet with a few Gallies, ſailed to *Cilicia*, and thence to *Cyprus*. There he was informed, that the *Antiochians*, and *Roman* Citizens trading thither, had with joint conſent ſeized the Caſtle, and ſent Deputies to ſuch of his Followers as had taken refuge in the neighbouring States, not to come near *Antioch* at their Peril. The ſame had happened at *Rhodes* to *L. Lentulus* the Conſul of the foregoing Year, to *P. Lentulus* a conſular Senator, and to ſome other Perſons of diſtinction; who following *Pompey* in his flight, and arriving at that Iſland, were refuſed admittance into the Town and Harbour, and received an Order to withdraw immediately, which they were neceſſitated to comply with; for the fame of *Cæſar*'s approach had now reached the neighbouring States.

LXXXV. UPON this Intelligence *Pompey* laid aſide his deſign of going into *Syria*, ſeized all the Money he found in the publick Bank, borrowed as much more as he could of his Friends, ſent great Quantities of Braſs on board for military Uſes: and having raiſed two thouſand Soldiers, amongſt the publick Officers, Merchants, and his own Servants, ſailed for *Peluſium*. Here, by accident, was King *Ptolemy*, a Minor, warring with a great Army againſt his Siſter *Cleopatra*; whom, ſome Months before, by the Aſſiſtance of his Friends, he had expelled the Kingdom, and was then encamped not far diſtant from her. *Pompey* ſent to demand his Protection, and a ſafe retreat in *Alexandria*, in conſideration of the Friendſhip that had ſubſiſted between him and his Father. The Meſſengers, after diſcharging their Commiſſion, began to converſe freely with the King's Troops, exhorting them to aſſiſt *Pompey*, and not deſpiſe him in his adverſe Fortune. Among theſe Troops were many of *Pompey*'s old Soldiers, whom *Gabinius* having draughted out of the *Syrian* Army,

had

had carried to *Alexandria*, and, upon the concluſion of the War, left there with the young King's Father. The King's Miniſters, who had the care of the Government during his minority, being informed of this; either out of Fear, as they afterwards pretended, leſt *Pompey* ſhould debauch the Army, and thereby render himſelf maſter of *Alexandria* and *Egypt*; or deſpiſing his low Condition, (as Friends in bad Fortune, often turn Enemies,) ſpoke favourably to the Deputies in publick, and invited *Pompey* to Court: but privately diſpatched *Achillas*, Captain of the King's Guards, a Man of ſingular Boldneſs, and *L. Septimius*, a military Tribune, with Orders to murder him. They accoſted him with an Air of Frankneſs, eſpecially *Septimius*, who had ſerved under him as a Centurion in the War with the Pirates; and inviting him into the Boat, treacherouſly ſlew him. *L. Lentulus* was likewiſe ſeized by the King's Command, and put to death in Priſon.

LXXXVI. WHEN *Cæſar* arrived in *Aſia*, he found that *T. Ampius*, having formed the deſign of ſeizing the Treaſures of the *Epheſian Diana*, and ſummoned all the Senators in the Province to bear witneſs to the Sum taken, had quitted that Project upon *Cæſar*'s approach, and betaken himſelf to flight. Thus was the Temple of *Epheſus* a ſecond time ſaved from Plunder by *Cæſar*. It was remarked in the Temple of *Minerva* at *Elis*, that the very Day *Cæſar* gained the Battle of *Pharſalia*, the Image of Victory, which before ſtood fronting the Statue of the Goddeſs, turned towards the Portal of the Temple. The ſame Day, at *Antioch* in *Syria*, ſuch a noiſe of fighting and Trumpets was heard two ſeveral times, that the Inhabitants ran to Arms, and manned their Walls. The like happened at *Ptolemais*. At *Pergamus*, in the inner receſſes of the Temple, called by the *Greeks Adyta*, where none but Prieſts are allowed to enter, the ſound of Cymbals was heard. And in the Temple of Victory at *Trallis*, where a Statue was conſecrated to *Cæſar*, a Palm ſprouted between the joining of the Stones that arched the Roof.

LXXXVII. *CÆSAR*, after a ſhort ſtay in *Aſia*, hearing that *Pompey* had been ſeen at *Cyprus*, and thence conjecturing he was gone for *Egypt*, becauſe of the Intereſt he had in that Kingdom, and the Advantages it would afford him; left *Rhodes*, with a Convoy of ten *Rhodian* Gallies, and a few others from *Aſia*, having on board two Legions, one which he had ordered to follow him from *Theſſaly*, the other detached from *Fufius*'s Army in *Achaia*, and eight hundred Horſe. In theſe Legions were no more than three thouſand two hundred Men: the reſt, fatigued with the length of the march, or weakened with Wounds, had not been able to follow him. But *Cæſar* depending on the Reputation of his former Exploits, ſcrupled not to truſt the ſafety of his Perſon to a feeble Eſcort, believing no Place would dare to attempt any thing againſt him. At *Alexandria* he was informed of *Pompey*'s death: and upon landing, was accoſted in a clamorous manner by the Soldiers, whom *Ptolemy* had left to garriſon the City: and he obſerved that the Mob appeared diſſatisfied to ſee the Faſces carried before him, which they interpreted a degradation of the ſovereign Authority. Tho' this Tumult was appeaſed, yet each Day produced ſome freſh Diſturbance, and many of the *Roman* Soldiers were murdered in all parts of the City.

LXXXVIII. FOR theſe Reaſons he ſent into *Aſia* for ſome of the Legions which he had raiſed out of the remains of *Pompey*'s Army; being himſelf neceſſarily detained by the *Eteſian* Winds, which are directly contrary to any Paſſage

Paſſage by Sea from *Alexandria*. Mean-time conſidering the difference between *Ptolemy* and his Siſter, as ſubject to the Cogniſance of the *Roman* People, and of him as Conſul; and the rather, becauſe the Alliance with *Ptolemy* the Father had been contracted during his former Conſulſhip; he gave the King and *Cleopatra* to underſtand, that it was his Pleaſure they ſhould diſmiſs their Troops, and inſtead of having recourſe to Arms, come and plead their Cauſe before him.

LXXXIX. *POTHINUS* the Eunuch, Governor to the young King, had the chief management of Affairs during his minority. This Miniſter complained bitterly to his Friends, that the King ſhould be ſummoned to plead his Cauſe before *Cæſar*: afterwards finding among thoſe that ſided with the King, ſome who were diſpoſed to enter into his Views, he privately ſent for the Army from *Peluſium* to *Alexandria*, and conferred the chief command upon *Achillas*, the ſame we have ſpoken of before; inciting him by Letters and Promiſes, both in the King's Name and his own, to execute ſuch Orders as he ſhould receive from him. *Ptolemy* the Father, by his Will, had appointed the eldeſt of his two Sons, and his elder Daughter, joint Heirs of the Kingdom. For the more certain accompliſhment of this Deſign, he in the ſame Will implored the Protection of the *Roman* People; adjuring them by all the Gods, and the Treaties he had made at *Rome*, to ſee it put in execution. A Copy of this Will was ſent by Ambaſſadors to *Rome*, to be depoſited in the publick Treaſury; but the domeſtick Troubles preventing it, it was left in the hands of *Pompey*. The Original, ſigned and ſealed, was kept at *Alexandria*.

XC. WHILE this Affair was debated before *Cæſar*, who paſſionately deſired to terminate the Matter amicably, and to the ſatisfaction of both Parties; he was informed that the King's Army, with all the Cavalry, were arrived at *Alexandria*. *Cæſar*'s Forces were by no means ſufficient to give battle without the Town; and therefore the only Courſe left was, to ſecure the moſt convenient Poſts within the City, 'till he ſhould get acquainted with *Achillas*'s Deſigns. Mean-time he ordered all the Soldiers to their Arms, and admoniſhed the King, to ſend ſome Perſons of the greateſt Authority to *Achillas*, to forbid his approach. *Dioſcorides* and *Serapion*, who had both been Ambaſſadors at *Rome*, and in great credit with *Ptolemy* the Father, were deputed to this Office. But no ſooner did they come before *Achillas*, than without giving them a hearing, or enquiring after the Meſſage they brought, he ordered them to be ſeized and put to death. One was killed upon the ſpot; and the other having received a dangerous Wound, was carried off for dead by his Attendants. Upon hearing this, *Cæſar* took care to ſecure the King's Perſon, the Authority of whoſe Name would authorize his Proceedings, and occaſion *Achillas* and his Aſſociates, to be eſteemed ſeditious and rebellious.

XCI. *ACHILLAS*'s Army was far from being contemptible, whether we regard their Number, Courage, or Experience in War. It amounted to twenty thouſand effective Men, many of whom were originally *Romans*, brought into the Country by *Gabinius*, when he came to ſettle *Auletes* on the Throne; and who having afterwards married and ſettled in *Alexandria*, were devoted to the *Ptolemean* Intereſt. There were alſo ſome Brigades raiſed in *Syria* and *Cilicia*, together with a conſiderable number of renegade Slaves, who had

had deſerted their Maſters, and found Protection in *Egypt*, by entering into the Service. If any of theſe was ſeized by his Maſter, their Companions flocked to his reſcue, regarding his ſafety as a common Cauſe, becauſe they were all embarked in the like Guilt. Theſe would often take upon them to put to death the King's Miniſters, to plunder the rich, for the ſake of increaſing their Pay, to inveſt the royal Palace, to baniſh ſome, and ſend for others home, with other liberties of the like nature, which the *Alexandrian* Army claims by a kind of Preſcription. Beſides theſe, he had likewiſe two thouſand Horſe, who, during the late Troubles, and the Wars that enſued, had had Opportunities of inuring themſelves to Arms. Theſe had reſtored *Ptolemy* the Father to his Kingdom, killed *Bibulus*'s two Sons, warred againſt the *Egyptians* with ſucceſs, and acquired a thorough Experience in military Affairs.

XCII. *ACHILLAS* truſting to the Valour of his Troops, and deſpiſing the handful of Men that followed *Cæſar*, quickly made himſelf maſter of *Alexandria*, the Palace only excepted, where *Cæſar* thought proper to make his ſtand, and which he attacked briskly, tho' without effect. But it was on the ſide of the Harbour that the greateſt Efforts were made. On that, in effect, the Victory depended. Beſides two and twenty conſtant Guard-Ships, there were in the Port fifty Gallies, from three to five Banks of Oars, which the Year before had been ſent to *Pompey*'s Aſſiſtance, and were returned ſince the Battle of *Pharſalia*. Had *Achillas* been once maſter of theſe Veſſels, he might have cut *Cæſar* off from all communication with the Ocean, and conſequently from all hopes of receiving ſupplies of Victuals or Forces. Thus the *Egyptians* in hopes of a compleat Victory, and the *Romans* to avoid a certain Ruin, exerted themſelves with incredible Vigour. At length *Cæſar* carried his Point, and not only ſet fire to the Veſſels above-mentioned, but to all that were in the Arſenals; after which he paſſed ſome Troops into the Iſle of *Pharos*.

XCIII. THE *Pharos* is a Tower of prodigious height, and wonderful workmanſhip, built in an Iſland from whence it takes its Name. This Iſland lying over-againſt *Alexandria*, makes a Haven; and is joined to the Continent by a Cauſeway of nine hundred Paces, and by a Bridge. Here dwell ſeveral *Egyptians*, who have built a Town, and live by pillaging the Ships that are thrown upon their Coaſt, either by Miſtake or Tempeſt. As it is ſituate at the entrance of the Port, which is but narrow, it abſolutely commands it. *Cæſar* knowing the importance of this Poſt, whilſt the Enemy were engaged in the Aſſault, landed ſome Troops there, ſeized the Tower, and put a Garriſon into it; thereby ſecuring a ſafe Reception for the Supplies he had ſent for on all ſides. In the other Quarters of the Town, the Fight was maintained with equal Advantage, neither Party loſing Ground, becauſe of the narrowneſs of the Paſſes, which enabled them eaſily to ſupport themſelves. After a few Men killed on both ſides, *Cæſar* having ſecured the moſt neceſſary Places, fortified them in the night. In this Quarter was a ſmall part of the King's Palace, where *Cæſar* was lodged upon his firſt arrival; and adjoining thereto a Theatre, that ſerved inſtead of a Citadel, and had a communication with the Port and other Arſenals. Theſe Works he increaſed afterwards, that they might ſerve inſtead of a Rampart, to prevent his being obliged to fight againſt his will. Mean-time *Ptolemy*'s youngeſt Daughter, hoping the Throne would

be vacant, fled from the Palace to *Achillas*, and joined with him in the proſecution of the War. But they ſoon diſagreed about the Command, which increaſed the Largeſſes to the Soldiers, each Party endeavouring to gain them by large Preſents. During theſe Tranſactions, *Pothinus*, *Ptolemy*'s Governor, and Regent of the Kingdom, being diſcovered in a clandeſtine Correſpondence with *Achillas*, whom he encouraged to the vigorous proſecution of his Enterpriſe, *Cæſar* ordered him to be put to death. Such was the commencement of the *Alexandrian* War.

A. HIRTIUS

A. HIRTIUS PANSA's

COMMENTARIES

OF THE

ALEXANDRIAN WAR.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. Cæſar *prepares for War.* II. *As likewiſe the* Alexandrians. III. Arſinoe, Ptolemy's *Daughter, poſſeſſes herſelf of the ſupreme Authority.* IV. *Scheme of the* Alexandrians *to deprive the* Romans *of Water.* V. Cæſar's *Speech to his Soldiers. They fall to digging of Wells, and thereby find Water.* VI. Cæſar *having brought his Tranſports to* Alexandria, *has the advantage in ſeveral naval Encounters.* XIII. *And afterwards makes himſelf maſter of ſome Forts that commanded the Port.* XIV. *But attempting ſome others is repulſed, and narrowly eſcapes by ſwimming.* XV. *Which loſs ſerves only the more to animate his Soldiers.* XVI. Cæſar, *at the requeſt of the* Alexandrians, *ſends them their King* Ptolemy, *who immediately becomes his Enemy.* XVII. Cæſar's *Fleet has the diſadvantage in an Engagement.* XVIII. Mithridates, Cæſar's *Friend, having made himſelf maſter of* Peluſium, *advances towards* Alexandria *at the head of a great Body of Troops.* XIX. *The King's Forces, endeavouring to oppoſe him, are repulſed with loſs.* XX. Cæſar *marching to the aſſiſtance of* Mithridates, *and* Ptolemy *at the ſame time to reinforce his Troops, they come to a Battle, with all their Forces, in which the King is entirely defeated.* XXII. Cæſar *ſtorms the Enemy's Camp; and the King himſelf endeavouring to make his eſcape, is drowned.* XXIII. Cæſar *admitting the* Alexandrians *to a ſurrender, reſtores Tranquillity to* Egypt. XXIV. *And ſettles the Kingdom upon* Cleopatra *and her Brother.* XXV. *Mean-time* Domitius Calvinus, *one of* Cæſar's *Generals, loſes a Battle againſt* Pharnaces *in* Armenia *the leſſer.* XXXII. *At the ſame time* Gabinius *receives a conſiderable Check in* Illyricum, *which had been gallantly defended by* Q. Cornificius. XXXIV. *But this loſs is afterwards repaired by the Bravery of* Vatinius, *who recovers* Illyricum *to the Obedience of* Cæſar. XXXVIII. *About the ſame time Commotions ariſe in* Spain, *occaſioned by the Extortions of* Caſſius Longinus. XLII. Caſſius *is wounded by the Conſpirators.* XLIII. *After which he behaves ſtill more tyrannically.* XLIV. *Whence new Diſturbances ariſe.* L. *Which are, appeaſed at laſt, by the arrival of* Lepidus, *and the death of* Caſſius. LII. Cæſar *reſtores his Affairs in* Syria. LIII. *As likewiſe in* Cilicia *and* Cappadocia. LIV. *And in* Gallogræcia. LV. *He afterwards treats of Peace with* Pharnaces *in* Pontus. LVI. *And finding him not faithful to his Engagements, reſolves to make War upon him.* LIX. Pharnaces *raſhly hazarding a Battle, is totally routed, and his Army cut to pieces.* LXII. Pontus *being thus ſpeedily recovered, and Tranquillity reſtored to all the* Aſiatick *Provinces,* Cæſar *returns to* Italy.

ÆGYPTVS ANTIQVA

LIBYA

PONTVS

THRACIA PARS

BITHINIA

Paphlagonia

Byzantium

Sinope

Hellespontus

Rhyndacus

Granicus fl.

Sangarius fl.

Ancyra

Gallogracia

Ilium

Lemnus

Mysia

Alexandria

Pessinus

Pergamus

Aeolia

Magnesia

Phrygia

MARE

Hermus fl.

Sardis

Chios

Smyrna

Cayster fl.

Ephesus

Meander

Icaria

Ionia

Cibyra

Pisidia

Patmus

Miletus

Caria

Pamphylia

AEGAEVM

Halicarnassus

Lycia

Patara

Cos

Caudus

Rhodus

Carpathus

CRETA

MARE MEDITERRANEUM

Pharos

Alexandria

Paraetonium

MARMARICA

Cherronesus

Marea Lacus

Meridies

LIBYCI MONTES

Psamius mons Herodoto.

LIBYCA PARS.

TABENNAM hanc insulam posterioribus temporibus appellatam credo. Inde Tabennesiotas monachos vocant: primitivæ ecclesiæ scriptores: quorum olim hic ingens multitudo.

CATADVPI

Meridies

Locus ubi Arx Æthiopum præsidium Primis

Tacompsos altera Plin.

Tacompsos

Tacompsos vicus qui et Ibatice

Abaton petra

Phile

ELEPHANTINA Insula in qua Nilometrum et Cataractes tam

Nilus

Cataractes minor

Hierasycaminos

Elephantis

Contrasiene

Crophi et Mophi montes

Dodecaschoenos Ptolemæo locus et Herodoto apud quem eum designari puto, qui inter Cataracten minorem est et Philen insulam.

Syene

Ceraſtæ

Catadupi gens vel scopuli: quos Seneca Nilo venas appellari dicit ubi Cataractes minor Ptolemæi inter Crophi et Mophimontes nimirum.

THEBAIDIS REGIO

Pathiris vicus

Pampanis vicus

LATOPOLITES Nomus. Latopolis sive Latorum urb.

Apollinis magna et primas Thebaidis Apollonopolis superior

Aphroditos

Hermonthis

HERMONTHITES nom.

MEMNON Nomus Sacer mons

Memnonium

Phthonitis vicus

Contra Thumum

Thumus

OMBITES Nomus

Ombi Ambos Antonio

Toum

Contra Ombos

Contra Latum

Latus

Typhium

Chumis

Elithyas, quæ Leucothea Plinio

THEBARVM sive DIOSPOLITIS Nomus.

Thebæ et Diospolis Ingens civitas magna

Serapeum

Coptos

Latus

TENTYRITIS Nomus

Tentira

Typhonia hic describuntur a Strabone

Cenæ

COPTITES Nom. Coptos Indicarum Arabicorumque mercium emporium

Apollinis parva civitas.

Acanthon lucus Apollinis sacer

Abydus

Diospolis parva civitas

Chenobascion Canobasium

Ptolemaïs Hermii urbs Thebaïdis maxima

Lepidotum

THINITIS Nom.

This

Nea

Thoenis

Chemnis Panopolis Antæi

PANOPOLITES Nomus qui et CHEMNITES

Quae et AEGYPTVS SVPERIOR.

ARABICA PARS.

Arsinonis

Campasi

Phoenicon Niconon Hydreuma Pliny videtur

Ioris

Aphroditum

Didyme

Porphirite

Basanites lapis mons

Hydreuma Apollinis

Phalacrium

Niger lapis mons

ARABES GNEBADEI.

Cabalsum

ARABES ADEI.

ARABES AZAREI.

TISEBARICA REGIO.

Coenon Hydreuma Anton. Norum Plinio.

Hydreuma vetus Troglodyticum

Pentadactylus mons

Berenice

Stenæ Deiræ et Halonnesi insulæ

Lepte acra

Smaragdis mons ubi smaragdi gemmæ reperiuntur. ut refert Heliodorus.

Acabe mons

Nechesia

Leucos Portus i. Albus

Aiax mons

Philaterę Aennum Plinij

Topazius lapis

Tadnos fons

AETHIOPIAE SVB AEGYPTO PARS.

Bazium prom.

ARABICI SINVS

SVPH nominant: BRAC

Orien

N°66

Septentrio

EVXINVS

Sinope
Amisus
Amasia
Comana
Ancyra
Thermodon fl.
Nicopolis
Zela
Iris fl.
Halys fl.
ARMENIA MINOR
CAPPADOCIA
Tauri M.
Comana
Taurus M.
Tarsus
Issus
Antiochia
Comagene
Euphrates fl.
Palmyra
Arabia Deserta
CYPRVS
Ptolemais
Alexandria
Pelusium
Delta
AEGYPTVS
ARABIA PETRAEA
Mare Rubrum
ARMENIA MAIOR
MESOPOTAMIA
BELLORUM ALEXANDRINI ET PONTICI CONSPECTUS
Harris Sculp.

Pednopum
Aspis mons
Cally pr.
Aeneesippa
Phocusæ insulæ duæ
Climax
Paretonium
Pychis prom.
Cally prom.
Catabathmus parvus Aegypti terminus Straboni
AEGYPTIVM MARE, quod et RARTHENIVM, item PHARIVM.
Oglamus mons
LIBYAE NOMVS
Prigens Ptol
Cæxis portus
Leuce acte
Nermæa acra
Phœnicus portus
Prigeus pagus Strab
Pedonia
Derris extrema
Pedonius port
Pedonia ins.
Antiphravillæ Eutichi Antonino
Zephyrium
Zyges
Glaucon
Leucaspis
Glaucum prom.
Cobÿ
MAREOTIS Nom.
Caportes
Antiphili
Monocaminum
TAE
Goniatæ.
AE
Prosoditæ
Chano
Canopæina
Strabonis ridetur
Taposiris Pol.
Abuyre
NIAS
Plinthine
Kierax
Pallemarius vicus
Climax
Phamotis
Taposiris Strab
TAPOSIRIS
Necropolis
Antiphr.
Chersonesus prom.
Canephoris
Didymæ insulæ
GYPSI
Myris quod et Moeris stagnum
Therme mons
SCITHIACA Regio quæ SCETIS, vel SCITIS posteriorib dicta.
Bacchis
Lycus fl.
Dionysias
Moeridis regis sepulchrum
Maria et Maraotis Palus
NITRIOTES nom.
Sciathis
MOMEMPHITES nom.
Libya
Pharos
Alexandria
Taposiris parva
Canobus
Heraclium ostium, idem, cum Canobico, et Naucratico
Bolbitinum ostium, quod Bucolicum etiam videtur
Sebennyticum sive Subenniticum Ostium
Pineptimi ostium
Diolcos ostium
Pathmeticum et Phatnicum, item Phatniticum, ostium.
Tarichiæ
Mendesium ostium.
Taniticum ostium, quod Saiticum nonnullis.
Pelusiacum ostium.
Gerrhum quod et Aldipson
Casium
Sirbonidis erupio
Ostracine
Rhinocorura
Antheadon
Ascalon
Septentrio

Ticanona
Crocodilorum civitas
CROCODILOPOLITES Nomus
Ibium
HEPTANOMIS, Quæ postea
Crocodilorum Vrbs
LYCOPOLITES Nom.
LIBYCON Pliny
Aphroditopolis
Lycopolis
Hermupolis, vel Mercury magnia civitas
Oxyrinchus
Chusa
HERMVPOLITES Nomus.
Herculis magna civitas
APHRODITOPOLIS Nomus
Nea
Thoenis
Hysopis
Apollinis Amoris
Hepsile Isidopis Anton.
Phylace Hermu polistæ
Tilotes
Ceme
Busiris
Memphis regia.
Cantharum vrbs
Bramides
Co
Chemnis
Panopolis Pinax Antæus
Salomon Amon Sibilla Persæ Libri Nili
Pasalos
Antæopolis
ANTEIOPOLITES Nomus.
HYPSELIOTES Nomus
Antinoia
Acaris
Cynopolis
Hipponon
Atlas fl.
Muse
Thimonepsis
CYNOPOLITES Nomus
Troia
Alabastra
dicta ARS
HERACLEOPOLITES Nom. Nili civitas
Memphites
Nomus
Peme
Sinopium mons
Letus vel Letopolis
MEMPHITES Nom.
Fossa magnica
Labyrinthus
Acesine quæ et Crocodilopolis
Ptolemaidis fluvius
APSINOITES Nom
Ysui
Ceni
Sebennytes
SABENNYTIS Nomus
Pachnamunis
Xois
XOITES nom
Licopolis
Cynopolitis Asylum
Tara
CARASITVS nom
Aphroditopolis
Aphroditopol
PROSOPITES Nom
Sudoxi specula
PHTHEMBVTIS nom
Athribis
Cyna
Diolcos
Onuphis
Psenaco
SEBENITIS Nom.
Cmeopolis
OVPHTIS Nom.
THMVITES nom
Leontopolis
LEONTOPOLITIS Nom.
PHATNITES Nom
Mendes
Busiris Regio
TRIPOLITIS
MENDESIVS Nom.
BVSIRITICVS Nomus
Busiritis
TANITES Nomus
Pharbætis
Pane Physis
Tarichiæ
HELIOPOLITES Nomus.
Scenæ Veterano rum
PHARBÆTHITES Nom.
Tanis
BVBASTICVS Nomus
MYECPHORITES Nom.
NEVI Nom.
PHAGRIOPOLITES Nom
Vicus Iudeor et Castra Iudeor Thou
Thaubasium.
Lychnos
Ba
Pelusium
Arabiæ paludes Solino Ad Paludes Strboni
ARABIAE Nom.
Autæi Arabes
SETHARITES Nom.
Tarichiæ
Casium
Rentis schœnus
Sirbonis palus
CASIOTIS REGIO.
Casius mons
Jovis Casy templum
Facidia
Antheadon
Ascalon
Septentrio

SVPERIOR PARS
Alabastrinus mons
Troicus lapis mons unde pyramides essossæ
Amari lacus vel fontes
ARSINOITES Nomus.
Tyra
Gens
Cleopatris
Arsinoe quæ et Cleopatris
Clysma præsidium
Dauon portus
Hero
Phagroum
Ptole mænus
Au.
Thaubasium.
Trajanus Augustus
Fossa Trajana
Heliopolis
Scenæ Veterano rum
Hieratica quæ Erythra dicitur
Climax montis
Charandra sinus.
Heropolites Sinus qui Arabibus Aeant dicitur, Apocapa Stephano.
ARABIAE PETRÆAE PARS
ORIENS AVGVSTAMNICA
Sirbonis palus
Pompei sepulcrum
Basilium
Jovis Casy templum
Ostracine
Rhinocorura
Antheadon
Ascalon
Mille Passuum scala
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Stadiorum scala
Septentrio

NVS PARS Hebræi MARE
RACHIA etiam dicitur Stephano.
Oriens

OPHAGI
Eos mons
Aphrodites postea
Aphrodisias
Drepanum Acrium fortis Plinij
Crocæ insulæ hic positæ Agatharchidis
Lambe inf.

27 28 29 30 31

A. HIRTIUS PANSA's

COMMENTARIES

OF THE

ALEXANDRIAN WAR.

I. THE War thus commencing at *Alexandria*, *Cæſar* ſent to *Rhodes*, *Syria*, and *Cilicia*, for his Fleet; to *Crete*, for Archers; and to *Malchus*, King of the *Nabatheans*, for Cavalry. He likewiſe ordered military Engines to be provided, Corn to be brought, and Forces diſpatched to him with all diligence. Mean-while he was daily employed in augmenting his Works; and ſuch Parts of the Town as appeared leſs tenable, were ſtrengthned with Tortoiſes and Mantelets. Openings were made in the Walls, through which the battering Rams might play; and whatever Houſes were thrown down, or taken by Force, were brought within the Intrenchments. For *Alexandria* is in a manner ſecure from Fire, becauſe the Inhabitants uſe no Wood in their Buildings, the Houſes being all vaulted, and roofed with Tile or Pavement. *Cæſar*'s principal aim was, to incloſe with Works the ſmalleſt Part of the Town, ſeparated from the reſt by a Moraſs towards the South. For thus the Army would lie cloſer together, be ſubject to one Command, and could readily diſpatch Relief where it was moſt wanted. Above all, he by this means made ſure of Water and Forage; which was of ſo much the more conſequence, as he was but ill provided of the one, and wholly deſtitute of the other. The Moraſs, on the contrary, ſerved abundantly to ſupply him with both.

II. NOR were the *Alexandrians* remiſs on their ſide, or leſs active in the Conduct of their Affairs. They had ſent Deputies and Commiſſioners into all Parts, where the Power and Territories of *Egypt* extend, with Orders to levy Troops. They had carried vaſt Quantities of Darts and Engines into the Town, and drawn together an innumerable Multitude of Soldiers. Yet not contented with all theſe Preparations, they eſtabliſhed Work-ſhops in every Part of the City, for the making of Arms; and inliſted all the Slaves that were of Age, the richer Citizens paying and maintaining them. With theſe they guarded the remoter Parts of the Town; while the veteran Cohorts, exempt from all other Service, were quartered in the Squares and open Places; that on whatever ſide an Attack ſhould be made, they might be at hand to give

Relief, and march freſh and entire to the Charge. All the Avenues and Paſſes were ſhut up by a triple Wall, built of ſquare Stones, and carried to the height of forty Feet. The lower Parts of the Town were defended by very high Towers of ten Stories: beſides which, they had likewiſe contrived a kind of moving Towers, which conſiſting of the ſame Number of Stories, and being fitted with Ropes and Wheels, could, by means of Horſes, as the Streets of *Alexandria* were quite even and level, be conveyed wherever their Service was neceſſary. The City abounding in every thing, and being very rich, furniſhed ample Materials for theſe ſeveral Works; and as the People were extremely ingenious, and quick of Apprehenſion, they ſo well copied what they ſaw done by us, that our Men ſeemed rather to imitate them. They even invented many things themſelves, and at once infeſted our Works, and defended their own. Their Chiefs every where repreſented: "That the People of *Rome* were "endeavouring by degrees to ſteal into the poſſeſſion of *Egypt:* that a few "Years before *Gabinius* had come thither with an Army: that *Pompey* had "choſen it for the Place of his Retreat: that *Cæſar* was now among them "with a conſiderable Body of Troops, and notwithſtanding his Rival's death, "made no offers to return: that if they did not therefore find means to expel "him, they would ſoon from a Kingdom be reduced to a *Roman* Province: "that no time was to be loſt in this Attempt; becauſe the Seaſon of the Year "having put a ſtop to Navigation, he could receive no Supplies from be-"yond Sea."

III. MEAN-WHILE a Diviſion ariſing between *Achillas*, who commanded the veteran Army, and *Arſinoe*, the youngeſt Daughter of King *Ptolemy*, as has been demonſtrated above: while they mutually endeavoured to ſupplant one another, each ſtriving to ingroſs the ſupreme Authority; *Arſinoe*, by the Aſſiſtance of the Eunuch *Ganymed*, her Governor, at length prevailed, and cauſed *Achillas* to be ſlain. After his death, being poſſeſſed of the whole Power without a Rival, ſhe raiſed *Ganymed* to the Command of the Army; who, on his entrance into that high Office, augmented the Allowance of the Troops, and with equal diligence diſcharged all other Parts of his Duty.

IV. *ALEXANDRIA* is almoſt quite hollow underneath, occaſioned by the many Aqueducts to the *Nile*, that furniſh private Houſes with Water; where being received in Ciſterns, it ſettles by degrees, and becomes perfectly clear. This is preſerved for the uſe of the Maſter and his Family: for the Water of the *Nile* being extremely thick and muddy, is apt to breed many Diſtempers. The common People, however, are forced to be contented with it, becauſe there is not a ſingle Spring in the whole City. The River was in that Part of the Town where the *Alexandrians* were Maſters. Hence *Ganymed* conceived, that a way might be found to deprive the *Romans* of Water; becauſe being diſtributed into ſeveral Streets, for the more eaſy defence of the Works, they made uſe of that which was preſerved in the Ciſterns of private Houſes. With this view he began a great and difficult Work: for having ſtopt up all the Canals by which his own Ciſterns were ſupplied, he drew vaſt Quantities of Water out of the Sea, by the help of Wheels and other Engines, pouring it continually into the Canals of *Cæſar*'s Quarter. The Ciſterns in the neareſt Houſes ſoon began to taſte ſalter than ordinary, and occaſioned great wonder among the Men, who could not think from what Cauſe it proceeded. They were even ready to disbelieve their Senſes, when thoſe who were quartered a little lower in the Town aſſured them, that they found the Water the ſame

as

A. *The City of Alexandria.* B. *The Royal Palace.* C. *The Theatre joining ye Royal Palace.* D. *The Isle of Pha*
leaps from his own Galley & swims to a Ship at some Distance. G. *The Rhodian Gallies in Cæsar's rig*
K. *Twenty two Quadriremes forming the Front Line of the Alexandrian Fleet.* L. *The rest of the Alex*
Boats of the Alexandrians. N. *The Moraſs towards the South of Alexandria.* O. *Cæsar's Rampart extending*



f Pharos. E. The narrow Pass from the Town to the Island, eight hundred Paces long. F. Cæsar
's right Wing. H. The Gallies of Pontus in his left. I. The rest of the Fleet drawn up as a Reserve
Alexandrian Fleet disposed in a second Line by way of Reserve. M. The smaller Vessels & armed
nding to the Moraſs. P. The Side of the Port in Cæsar's Poſſeſsion. Q. The Side of ỹ Port in Poſſeſsion of ỹ

as before. This put them upon comparing the Ciſterns one with another, and by trial they eaſily perceived the difference. But in a little time the Water in the neareſt Houſes became quite unfit for uſe, and that lower down grew daily more tainted and brackiſh; upon which ſuch a Terror enſued among the Troops, that they fancied themſelves reduced to the laſt Extremity. Some complained of *Cæſar*'s delay, and that he did not order them immediately to repair to their Ships. Others dreaded a yet greater Misfortune, as it would be impoſſible to conceal their Deſign of retreating from the *Alexandrians*, who were ſo near them; and no leſs ſo to embark in the face of a vigorous and purſuing Enemy. There were beſides a great Number of the Townſmen in *Cæſar*'s Quarter, whom he had not thought proper to force from their Houſes, becauſe they openly pretended to be in his Intereſt, and to have quitted the Party of their Fellow-Citizens. But to offer here at a defence either of the Sincerity or Conduct of theſe *Alexandrians*, would be only Labour in vain; ſince all who know the Genius and Temper of the People muſt be ſatisfied, that they are the fitteſt Inſtruments in the World for Treaſon.

V. *CÆSAR* laboured to remove his Soldiers Fears, by encouraging and reaſoning the caſe with them. "They might eaſily, he told them, find Water, "by digging Wells, as all Sea-coaſts naturally abounded with freſh Springs: "that if *Egypt* was ſingular in this reſpect, and differed from every other "Soil; yet ſtill as the Sea was open, and the Enemy without a Fleet, there "was nothing to hinder their fetching it at pleaſure in their Ships, either "from *Parætonium* on the left, or *Pharos* on the right; which two Places "lying different ways, the Wind could never exclude them from both at the "ſame time: that a Retreat was on no account to be thought of, not only by "thoſe who had a concern for their Honour, but even by ſuch as regarded "nothing but Life: that it was with the utmoſt difficulty they could defend "themſelves behind their Works; but if they once quitted that Advantage, "neither in Number nor Situation would they be a match for the Enemy: "that to embark would require much time, and be attended with great dan-"ger, eſpecially where it muſt be managed by little Boats: that the *Alexan-*"*drians* on the contrary were nimble and active, and thoroughly acquainted "with the Streets and Buildings: that fluſhed with ſo manifeſt an Advantage, "they would not fail to run before, ſeize all the advantageous Poſts, poſſeſs "themſelves of the tops of the Houſes, and by annoying them in their Retreat, "effectually prevent their getting on board: that they muſt therefore think no "more of retiring, but place all their hopes of ſafety in Victory." Having by this Speech re-aſſured his Men, he ordered the Centurions to lay aſide all other Cares, and apply themſelves day and night to the digging of Wells. The Work once begun, they puſhed it on ſo vigorouſly, that the very firſt Night abundance of freſh Water was found. Thus with little Labour on our ſide, the mighty Projects and painful Attempts of the *Alexandrians* were entirely fruſtrated.

VI. DURING theſe Tranſactions, the thirty-ſeventh Legion, compoſed of *Pompey*'s Veterans that had ſurrendred to *Cæſar*, embarking by Order of *Domitius Calvinus*, with Arms, Darts, Proviſions, and military Engines, arrived upon the Coaſt of *Africa*, a little above *Alexandria*. An eaſterly Wind, which continued to blow for ſeveral Days together, hindered their being able to gain the Port; but all along that Coaſt, 'tis very ſafe riding at Anchor. Being detained, however, longer than they expected, and preſſed with want of Water, they

they gave notice of it to *Cæſar* by a diſpatch Sloop. *Cæſar*, that he might himſelf be able to determine what was beſt to be done, went on board one of the Ships in the Harbour, and ordered the whole Fleet to follow. He took none of the land Forces with him, becauſe he was unwilling to leave the Works unguarded during his abſence. Being arrived at that part of the Coaſt known by the name of *Cherroneſus*, he ſent ſome Mariners on ſhore to fetch Water. Part of theſe venturing too far into the Country for the ſake of Plunder, were intercepted by the Enemy's Horſe. From them the *Egyptians* learnt, that *Cæſar* himſelf was on board, without any Soldiers. Upon this Information, they thought Fortune had thrown a fair Occaſion in their way, of attempting ſomething with ſucceſs. They therefore manned all the Ships that were in condition to ſail, and met *Cæſar* on his return. He declined fighting that Day for two Reaſons; becauſe he had no Soldiers on board; and it was paſt four in the Afternoon. The Night, he was ſenſible, muſt be highly advantageous to his Enemies, who were perfectly well acquainted with the Coaſt: and he would himſelf be deprived of the benefit of encouraging his Men; which could not be done with any effect in the dark, where Courage and Cowardiſe muſt remain equally unknown. He therefore drew all his Ships towards the Shore, where he imagined the Enemy would not venture to follow him.

VII. THERE was one *Rhodian* Galley in *Cæſar*'s right Wing, conſiderably diſtant from the reſt. This being obſerved by the Enemy, they came forward with four decked Ships, and ſeveral open Barks, to attack her. *Cæſar* was obliged to advance to her Relief, that he might not ſuffer the diſgrace of ſeeing one of his Gallies ſunk before his Eyes; tho', had he left her to periſh, ſhe ſeemed to deſerve it for her raſhneſs. The Attack was ſuſtained with great Courage by the *Rhodians*; who, tho' at all times diſtinguiſhed by their Valour and Experience in Engagements at Sea, yet exerted themſelves in a particular manner on this Occaſion, that they might not draw upon themſelves the charge of having occaſioned a Misfortune to the Fleet. Accordingly they obtained a compleat Victory; took one four-benched Galley; ſunk another; diſabled a third, and ſlew all that were on board, beſides a great number belonging to the other Ships. Nay, had not Night interpoſed, *Cæſar* would have made himſelf maſter of their whole Fleet. During the Conſternation that followed upon this Defeat, *Cæſar* finding the contrary Winds to abate, took the Tranſports in tow, and advanced with the victorious Fleet to *Alexandria*.

VIII. THE *Alexandrians* diſheartened at this loſs, as finding themſelves now worſted, not by the ſuperior Valour of the Soldiers, but by the Skill and Ability of the Mariners, retired to the tops of their Houſes, and blocked up the entrance of their Streets, as fearing our Fleet might attack them even by land. But ſoon after, *Ganymed* aſſuring them in Council, that he would not only reſtore the Veſſels they had loſt, but even increaſe their number; they began to repair their old Ships with great Expectation and Confidence, and reſolved to apply more than ever to the putting their Fleet in a good condition. And altho' they had loſt above an hundred and ten Ships in the Port and Arſenal, yet did not all this diſcourage them; becauſe by making themſelves maſters at Sea, they ſaw they would have it in their power to hinder *Cæſar*'s receiving any Reinforcements or Supplies. Beſides, being naturally Mariners, born upon the Sea-Coaſt, and exerciſed from their Infancy in naval Affairs, they were deſirous

ſirous to return to that wherein their true and proper Strength lay, remembring the Advantages they had formerly gained, even with their little Ships. They therefore applied themſelves with all diligence to the equipping a Fleet.

IX. VESSELS were ſtationed at all the mouths of the *Nile*, for receiving and gathering in the Cuſtoms. Several old Ships were likewiſe lodged in the King's private Arſenals, where they had remained unrigged for many Years. Theſe laſt they refitted, and recalled the former to *Alexandria*. To ſupply themſelves with Oars, they uncovered the Porticos, Academies, and publick Buildings, and made uſe of the Planks they furniſhed. Their natural Ingenuity, and the abundance of all things to be met with in the City, ſupplied every Want. In fine, they had no long Navigation to provide for, and were only ſolicitous about preſent Exigences, foreſeeing they would have no occaſion to fight but in the Port. In a few Days therefore, contrary to all expectation, they had fitted out twenty-two Quadriremes, and five Quinqueremes. To theſe they added a great number of ſmall open Barks; and employing the Rowers in the Harbour, to practiſe and exerciſe themſelves, put a ſufficient number of Soldiers on board, and prepared every thing neceſſary for an Engagement. *Cæſar* had nine *Rhodian* Gallies, (for of the ten which were ſent, one was ſhipwrecked on the Coaſt of *Egypt*;) eight from *Pontus*, five from *Lycia*, and twelve out of *Aſia*. Of theſe ten were Quadriremes, and five Quinqueremes. The reſt were of an inferior bulk, and for the moſt part without Decks. Yet truſting to the Valour of his Soldiers, and knowing the ſtrength of the Enemy, he prepared for an Engagement.

X. WHEN both ſides were come to have ſufficient Confidence in their own ſtrength, *Cæſar* ſailed round *Pharos*, and formed in line of Battle over-againſt the Enemy. The *Rhodian* Gallies were in his right Wing, and thoſe of *Pontus* in his left. Between theſe he left a ſpace of four hundred Paces, to ſerve for the extending and working the Veſſels. This Diſpoſition being made, he drew up the reſt of the Fleet as a reſerve, giving them the neceſſary Orders, and diſtributing them in ſuch manner, that every Ship followed that to which ſhe was appointed to give ſuccour. The *Alexandrians* came forth with great Confidence, and drew up their Fleet; placing their twenty-two Quadriremes in front, and diſpoſing the reſt behind them in a ſecond Line, by way of reſerve. They had beſides a great number of Boats and ſmaller Veſſels, that carried Fire and combuſtible Weapons, with deſign to fright us by their Number, Cries, and flaming Darts. Between the two Fleets were certain Flats, ſeparated by very narrow Channels, and which are ſaid to be on the *African* Coaſt, as being in that diviſion of *Alexandria* which belongs to *Africa*. Both ſides waited which ſhould firſt paſs theſe Shallows, becauſe whoever entered the narrow Channels between them, in caſe of any Misfortune, would find it very difficult either to retreat, or work the Ships to advantage.

XI. *EUPHRANOR* commanded the *Rhodian* Fleet, who for Valour and greatneſs of Mind deſerved rather to be ranked among the *Romans* than the *Grecians*. The *Rhodians* had raiſed him to the Poſt of Admiral, on account of his known Courage and Experience. He perceiving *Cæſar*'s Deſign, addreſſed him to this effect: "You ſeem afraid of paſſing the Shallows firſt, "leſt you ſhould be thereby forced to come to an Engagement, before the reſt "of the Fleet can be brought up. Leave that Matter to us; we will ſuſtain "the Fight, and I hope too without diſappointing your Expectations, 'till the

" whole Fleet gets clear of the Shallows. It is both diſhonourable and " afflicting, that they ſhould ſo long continue in our ſight with an air of " Triumph." *Cæſar* encouraging him in his Deſign, and beſtowing many Praiſes upon him, gave the Signal for engaging. Four *Rhodian* Ships having paſſed the Shallows, the *Alexandrians* gathered round and attacked them. They maintained the Fight with great Bravery, diſengaging themſelves by their Art and Addreſs, and working their Ships with ſo much Skill, that notwithſtanding the inequality of Number, none of the Enemy were ſuffered to run along ſide, or break their Oars. Mean-time the reſt of the Fleet came up; when on account of the narrowneſs of the Place, Art becoming uſeleſs, the ſucceſs depended wholly upon Valour. The *Alexandrians* and *Romans* who were in the Town, laying aſide all thoughts of Attack and Defence, mounted the tops of the Houſes, and all the Eminences that would give a view of the Fight, addreſſing the Gods by Vows and Prayers for Victory.

XII. THE event of the Battle was by no means equal. A Defeat would have deprived us of all reſource either by Land or Sea; and even Victory itſelf would not much better our Condition. The *Alexandrians*, on the contrary, by a Victory, gained every thing; and if defeated, might yet again have recourſe to Fortune. It was likewiſe a matter of the higheſt Concern, to ſee the Safety of all depend upon the Bravery of a few, whoſe want of Courage would expoſe their whole Party to Deſtruction. This *Cæſar* had often repreſented to his Troops during the preceding Days, that they might be thereby induced to fight with the more Reſolution, when they knew the common Safety to depend upon their Bravery. Every Man ſaid the ſame to his Comrade, Companion, and Friend, requeſting him not to diſappoint the Expectation of thoſe who had choſen him preferably to others for the defence of the common Intereſt. Accordingly they fought with ſo much Reſolution, that neither the Art nor Addreſs of the *Egyptians*, a maritime and ſeafaring People, could ſtand them in any ſtead; nor the multitude of their Ships be of ſervice to them; nor the Valour of thoſe ſelected for this Engagement, ſtand in competition with the determined Courage of the *Romans*. In this Action a Quinquereme was taken, and a Bireme with all the Soldiers and Mariners on board, beſides three ſunk, without any loſs on our ſide. The reſt fled towards the Town, ſheltering themſelves under the Mole and Forts, whither we durſt not purſue them.

XIII. TO deprive the Enemy of this reſource for the future, *Cæſar* thought it by all means neceſſary, to render himſelf maſter of the Mole and Iſland: for having already in great meaſure compleated his Works within the Town, he was in hopes of being able to defend himſelf both in the Iſland and City. This Reſolution being taken, he put into Boats and ſmall Veſſels ten Cohorts, a ſelect Body of light-armed Infantry, and ſuch of the *Gallick* Cavalry as he thought moſt for his purpoſe, and ſent them againſt the Iſland; whilſt at the ſame time, to occaſion a Diverſion, he attacked it on the other with his Fleet, promiſing great Rewards to thoſe who ſhould firſt render themſelves maſters of it. At firſt, the Attack was briſk, and the Defence vigorous: for they both annoyed our Men from the tops of the Houſes, and gallantly maintained their Ground along the Shore; which being ſteep and craggy, our Men could find no way of approach; all the more acceſſible Avenues being skilfully defended by ſmall Boats, and five Gallies, properly ſtationed for that purpoſe. But when after examining the Approaches, and ſounding the Shallows

lows, a few of our Men got upon the Shore, and were followed by others, who puſhed the Iſlanders without intermiſſion; the *Pharians* at laſt betook themſelves to flight.. Upon this, abandoning the defence of the Port, they quitted their Ships, and retired into the Town, to provide for the ſecurity of their Houſes. But they could not long maintain their Ground there: tho', to compare ſmall things with great, their Buildings reſembled thoſe of *Alexandria*, and their Towers were high, and joined together ſo as to form a kind of Wall; and our Men had neither Ladders, Faſcines, nor any Weapons for Aſſault. But Fear often deprives Men of Counſel and Strength, as happened upon this Occaſion. Thoſe who had ventured to oppoſe us on even Ground, terrified by the loſs of a few Men, and the general Rout; durſt not face us from a height of thirty Foot; but throwing themſelves from the Mole into the Sea, endeavoured to gain the Town, tho' above eight hundred Paces diſtant. Many however were ſlain, and about ſix hundred taken.

XIV. *CÆSAR* giving up the Plunder to the Soldiers, ordered the Houſes to be demoliſhed; but fortified the Caſtle at the end of the Bridge next the Iſland, and placed a Garriſon in it. This the *Pharians* had abandoned: but the other, towards the Town, which was conſiderably ſtronger, was ſtill held by the *Alexandrians*. *Cæſar* attacked it next Day; becauſe by getting poſſeſſion of theſe two Forts, he would be entirely maſter of the Port, and prevent ſudden Excurſions and Piracies. Already he had, by means of his Arrows and Engines, forced the Garriſon to abandon the Place, and retire towards the Town. He had alſo landed three Cohorts, which was all the Place would contain; and diſpoſed the reſt of his Troops aboard to ſuſtain them. He then fortified the Bridge on the ſide of the Enemy, built an Arch acroſs the entrance of the Port, and filled it up in ſuch a manner with Stones, that not the ſmalleſt Boat could paſs. When the Work was almoſt finiſhed, the *Alexandrians* ſallied in Crowds from the Town, and drew up in an open Place, over-againſt the Intrenchment we had caſt up at the head of the Bridge. At the ſame time the Veſſels, which they had been wont to make paſs under the Bridge, to ſet fire to our Ships of Burden, were ranged along the Mole. Our Men fought from the Bridge and the Mole; the Enemy from the Area over-againſt the Bridge, and from their Ships by the ſide of the Mole. While *Cæſar*, attentive to what paſſed, was exhorting his Troops; a number of Rowers and Mariners quitting their Ships, threw themſelves upon the Mole; partly out of curioſity, partly to have a ſhare in the Action. At firſt, with Stones and Slings they forced the Enemy's Ships from the Mole; and ſeemed to do ſtill greater execution with their Darts. But when ſome time after, a few *Alexandrians* found means to land, and attack them in flank; as they had left their Ships without Order or Diſcipline, ſo they ſoon began to fly with precipitation. The *Alexandrians* encouraged by this Succeſs, landed in greater numbers, and vigorouſly puſhed our Men, who were by this time in great Confuſion. Thoſe that remained in the Gallies perceiving this, drew up the Ladders, and put off from the Shore, to prevent the Enemies boarding them. The three Cohorts, who were at the head of the Mole, to guard the Bridge, aſtoniſhed at this Diſorder, the Cries they heard behind them, and the general rout of their Party; unable beſides to bear up againſt the multitude of Darts which came pouring upon them, and fearing to be ſurrounded, and have their Retreat cut off, by the departure of the Ships; abandoned the defence of the Bridge, and ran with all the ſpeed they could towards the Gallies. Some getting on board the neareſt Veſſels, overloaded and ſunk them. Part

making

making head againſt the Enemy, and uncertain what Courſe to take, were cut to pieces by the *Alexandrians*. Others more fortunate, got to the Ships that rode at anchor; and a few, by the help of their Bucklers, ſwam to the neareſt Veſſels. *Cæſar* endeavouring to reanimate his Men, and lead them back to the Defence of the Works, was expoſed to the ſame danger with the reſt: when finding them univerſally to give ground, he retreated to his own Galley; whither ſuch a Multitude followed, and crouded after him, that it was impoſſible either to work or put her off. Foreſeeing what muſt happen, he flung himſelf into the Sea, and ſwam to a Ship that lay at ſome diſtance. Hence diſpatching Boats to ſuccour his Men, he by that means preſerved a ſmall Number. His own Ship, ſunk by the Multitude that crouded into her, periſhed with all that were on board. We loſt in this Action about four hundred Legionary Soldiers, and ſomewhat above that Number of Sailors and Rowers. The *Alexandrians* ſecured the Fort by ſtrong Works, and a great Number of Engines: and having cleared away the Stones, with which *Cæſar* had blocked up the Port, enjoyed henceforward a free and open Navigation.

XV. OUR Men, inſtead of being diſheartned at this loſs, ſeemed rather rouſed and animated by it. They were making continual Sallies upon the Enemy, to deſtroy or check the Progreſs of their Works; fell upon them as often as they had an Opportunity; and never failed to intercept them, when they ventured to advance beyond their Fortifications. In ſhort, the Legions were ſo bent upon fighting, that they even outſtripped the Orders and Exhortations of *Cæſar*. They were inconſolable for their late diſgrace, and impatient to come to Blows with the Enemy; inſomuch that he found it rather neceſſary to reſtrain and check their Ardor, than incite them to Action.

XVI. THE *Alexandrians* perceiving that Succeſs confirmed the *Romans*, and that adverſe Fortune only animated them the more; as they knew of no medium between theſe, on which to ground any farther hopes, reſolved, either by the Advice of the Friends of their King, who were in *Cæſar*'s Quarter; or of their own motion; or, perhaps, on an intimation from the King himſelf, ſuggeſted to him by ſecret Emiſſaries; to ſend Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* to demand their King. They repreſented: "That the People, weary of ſubjection to a "Woman, of living under a precarious Government, and ſubmitting to the "cruel Laws of the Tyrant *Ganymed*, inſtead of obeying their own lawful "King, deſired nothing ſo much as to have him amongſt them: that in granting "their Requeſt, he would pave the way to an Alliance, and extinguiſh all the "Fears and Objections that had hitherto obſtructed it." Though *Cæſar* knew the Nation to be falſe and perfidious, ſeldom ſpeaking as they really thought, he judged it beſt however to comply with their deſire. He even flattered himſelf, that his Condeſcenſion in ſending back their King at their Requeſt, would prevail upon them to be faithful: or, as was more agreeable to their Character, if they only wanted the King to head their Army; at leaſt it would be more for his Honour and Credit, to have to do with a Monarch, than with a Band of Slaves and Fugitives. Accordingly he ſent *Ptolemy* to them, exhorting him "to take the Government into his own hands, and conſult the Welfare of "ſo fair and illuſtrious a Kingdom, defaced by hideous Ruins and Conflagrations. That he would make his Subjects ſenſible of their Duty, preſerve "them from the Deſtruction that threatned them, and act with Fidelity towards himſelf and the *Romans*, who put ſo much Confidence in him, as to "ſend him amongſt armed Enemies." Then taking him by the Hand, he told

told him he was at liberty to depart. But the young Prince, thoroughly verſed in the Art of Diſſimulation, and no way degenerating from the Character of his Nation, intreated *Cæſar* with Tears not to ſend him back; for that his Company was to him preferable to a Kingdom. *Cæſar*, moved at his Concern, dried up his Tears; and telling him if theſe were his real Sentiments they would ſoon meet again, diſmiſſed him. The King, like a wild Beaſt, eſcaped out of Confinement, carried on the War with ſuch Acrimony againſt *Cæſar*, that the Tears he ſhed at parting, ſeemed to have been Tears of Joy. *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants, Friends, Centurions, and Soldiers, were not a little pleaſed at this; becauſe through his eaſineſs of Temper, he had ſuffered himſelf to be impoſed upon by a Child: as if in truth *Cæſar*'s Behaviour on this occaſion had been the effect of Eaſineſs of Temper, and not of the moſt conſummate Prudence.

XVII. WHEN the *Alexandrians* found that the Reſtitution of their King had neither rendered their own Party ſtronger, nor the *Romans* weaker; that the Troops deſpiſed the Youth and Weakneſs of their King; and that their Affairs were no way bettered by his Preſence; they were greatly diſcouraged: the rather, becauſe a Report ran, that a great Body of Troops was marching by Land from *Syria* and *Cilicia* to *Cæſar*'s Aſſiſtance, of which he had not as yet himſelf received Information. This however did not hinder their Deſign of intercepting the Convoys that came to him by Sea. To this end having equipped ſome Ships, they ordered them to cruiſe before the *Canopic* Branch of the *Nile*, by which they thought it moſt likely our Supplies would arrive. *Cæſar*, who was informed of it, ſent likewiſe his Fleet to Sea, under the Command of *Tiberius Nero*. The *Rhodian* Gallies made part of this Squadron, headed by *Euphranor* their Admiral, without whom he had little hopes of Succeſs from any maritime Expedition. But Fortune, which often reſerves the heavieſt Diſaſters for thoſe who have been loaded with her higheſt Favours, encountered *Euphranor* upon this occaſion, with an Aſpect very different from what ſhe had hitherto worn. For when our Ships were arrived at *Canopus*, and the Fleets drawn up on each ſide had begun the Engagement, *Euphranor* according to cuſtom having made the firſt Attack, and pierced and ſunk one of the Enemy's Ships; as he purſued the next a conſiderable way, without being ſufficiently ſuſtained by thoſe that followed him, he was ſurrounded by the *Alexandrians*. None of the Fleet advanced to his Relief, either out of fear for their own Safety, or becauſe they imagined he would eaſily be able to extricate himſelf by his Courage and good Fortune. Accordingly he alone behaved well in this Action, and being abandoned by all the reſt, periſhed with his victorious Galley.

XVIII. ABOUT the ſame time *Mithridates* of *Pergamus*, a Man of illuſtrious Deſcent, diſtinguiſhed for his Bravery and Knowledge in the Art of War, and who bore a very high Place in the Friendſhip and Confidence of *Cæſar*; having been ſent in the beginning of the *Alexandrian* War, to raiſe Succours in *Syria* and *Cilicia*; arrived by Land at the head of a great Body of Troops, which his Diligence, and the Affection of theſe two Provinces, had enabled him to draw together in a very ſhort time. He conducted them firſt to *Peluſium*, a City which joins *Syria* to *Egypt*. *Achillas*, who was perfectly well acquainted with its Importance, had ſeized and put a ſtrong Garriſon into it. For *Egypt* is conſidered as defended on all ſides by ſtrong Barriers; towards the Sea by the *Pharos*, and towards *Syria* by *Peluſium*, which are

accounted the two Keys of that Kingdom. He attacked it ſo briskly with a large Body of Troops, freſh Men continually ſucceeding in the place of thoſe that were fatigued; and urged the Aſſault with ſo much Firmneſs and Perſeverance, that he carried it the ſame Day, and placed a Garriſon in it. Thence he purſued his march to *Alexandria*, reducing all the Provinces thro' which he paſſed, and conciliating them to *Cæſar*, by that Authority which always accompanies Victory.

XIX. NOT far from *Alexandria* lies *Delta*, the moſt celebrated Province of *Egypt*, which borrows its Name from the *Greek* Letter ſo called. For the *Nile* dividing into two Channels, which gradually runs off as they approach the Sea, into which they at laſt diſcharge themſelves at a conſiderable diſtance from one another, leaves an intermediate ſpace in form of a triangle. The King underſtanding that *Mithridates* approached this Place, and knowing he muſt paſs the River, ſent a great Body of Troops againſt him, ſufficient, as he thought, if not to overwhelm and cruſh him, at leaſt to ſtop his march. For tho' he earneſtly deſired to ſee him defeated, yet he thought it a great Point gained, to hinder his junction with *Cæſar*. The Troops that firſt paſſed the River, and came up with *Mithridates*, attacked him immediately, that they might alone have the Honour of the Victory. *Mithridates* at firſt confined himſelf to the defence of his Camp, which he had with great Prudence fortified according to the Cuſtom of the *Romans:* but obſerving that they advanced inſolently and without Caution, he ſallied upon them from all parts, and put a great number of them to the Sword; inſomuch that but for their knowledge of the Places, and the Neighbourhood of the Veſſels in which they had paſſed the River, they muſt have been all deſtroyed. But recovering by degrees from their Terror, and joining the Troops that followed them, they again prepared to attack *Mithridates*.

XX. *MITHRIDATES* ſent to inform *Cæſar* of what had happened. The King was likewiſe informed on his ſide. Thus much about the ſame time, *Ptolemy* ſet out to cruſh *Mithridates*, and *Cæſar* to relieve him. The King made uſe of the more expeditious Conveyance of the *Nile*, where he had a large Fleet in readineſs. *Cæſar* declined the Navigation of the River, that he might not be obliged to fight the Enemy's Fleet: and coaſting along the *African* Shore, found means to join the victorious Troops of *Mithridates*, before *Ptolemy* could attack him.

XXI. THE King had encamped in a very advantageous Place, being an Eminence ſurrounded on all ſides by a Plain. Three of its ſides were ſecured by various defences. One adjoined to the *Nile*, the other was ſteep and inacceſſible, and the third was defended by a Moraſs. Between *Ptolemy*'s Camp and *Cæſar*'s Rout lay a narrow River with very high Banks, which diſcharged itſelf into the *Nile*. This River was about ſeven miles from the King's Camp; who underſtanding that *Cæſar* directed his march that way, ſent all his Cavalry, with a choice Body of light-armed Foot, to hinder *Cæſar* from paſſing, and maintain an unequal Fight from the Banks, where Courage had no Opportunity to exert itſelf, and Cowardiſe ran no hazard. Our Men, both Horſe and Foot, were extremely mortified, that the *Alexandrians* ſhould ſo long maintain their Ground againſt them. Wherefore the *German* Cavalry diſperſing in queſt of a Ford, ſome found means to ſwim the River where the Banks were loweſt; and the Legionaries at the ſame time cutting down ſeveral large



A. *Ptolemy's Camp.* B. *The Nile.* C. *The highest Part of the Camp.* D. *The Moraſs that a*[illegible]*nded*
his Camp by a double Line of Communication. F. *Cæsar's Camp.* G. *Ptolemy's Fleet* [illegible]*tioned*
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*a*ended the King's Camp behind. E. A Fort in a Village, which the King had joined to
*S*tioned along the Nile, whence a continual Discharge was kept on Cæsar's Troops.

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large Trees, that reached from one Bank to another, and throwing them into the Water, by their help, got to the other ſide. The Enemy unable to ſuſtain their firſt Charge, betook themſelves to flight; but in vain: for very few returned to the King, being almoſt all cut to pieces in the Purſuit.

XXII. *CÆSAR*, upon this Succeſs, judging that his ſudden approach muſt ſtrike a great Terror into the *Alexandrians*, advanced towards their Camp with his victorious Army. But finding it well intrenched, ſtrongly fortified by Nature, and the Ramparts crowded with armed Soldiers, he did not think proper to attack it at that time, as his Troops were very much fatigued, both by their march and the late Battle; and therefore encamped at a ſmall diſtance from the Enemy. Next Day he attacked a Fort, in a Village not far off, which the King had joined to his Camp by a Line of Communication, with a view of keeping poſſeſſion of the Village. He employed his whole Army in this Aſſault: not becauſe it would have been difficult to carry it with a few Forces; but with deſign of falling immediately upon the Enemy's Camp, during the Alarm the loſs of this Fort muſt give them. Accordingly the *Romans*, in continuing the purſuit of thoſe that fled from the Fort, arrived at laſt before the *Alexandrian* Camp, where a furious Battle enſued. There were two Approaches by which it might be attacked: one by the Plain, of which we have ſpoken before; the other by a narrow Paſs, between their Camp and the *Nile*. The firſt, which was much the eaſieſt, was defended by a numerous Body of their beſt Troops: and the acceſs on the ſide of the *Nile* gave the Enemy great Advantages in diſtreſſing and wounding our Men: for they were expoſed to a double ſhower of Darts: in front, from the Rampart; behind, from the River, where the Enemy had ſtationed a great number of Ships, furniſhed with Archers and Slingers, that kept a continual diſcharge. *Cæſar* obſerving that his Troops fought with the utmoſt Ardor, and yet made no great Progreſs, on account of the diſadvantage of the Ground; as he ſaw they had left the higheſt part of their Camp unguarded, becauſe being ſufficiently fortified by Nature, they had all crowded to the other Attacks, partly to have a ſhare in the Action, partly to be ſpectators of the iſſue: he ordered ſome Cohorts to wheel round the Camp, and gain that Aſcent; appointing *Carſulenus* to command them, a brave Officer, and well acquainted with the Service. When they had reached the Place, where they found but very few to defend it, our Men attacked them ſo briskly, that the *Alexandrians* terrified by the Cries they heard behind them, and ſeeing themſelves attacked both in front and rear, fled in the utmoſt Conſternation on all ſides. Our Men animated by the Confuſion of the Enemy, entered the Camp in ſeveral places at the ſame time; and running down from the higher Ground, put a great number of them to the ſword. The *Alexandrians* endeavouring to eſcape, threw themſelves in Crowds over the Rampart next the River. The foremoſt tumbling into the Ditch, where they were cruſhed to death, furniſhed an eaſy paſſage for thoſe that followed. The King made his eſcape the ſame way; but by the Crowd that followed him, the Ship to which he fled was overloaded and ſunk.

XXIII. AFTER this ſpeedy and ſucceſsful Action, *Cæſar*, in confidence of ſo great a Victory, marched the neareſt way by Land to *Alexandria* with his Cavalry, and entered triumphant into that part of the Town poſſeſſed by the Enemy. He was not miſtaken in thinking, that the *Alexandrians*, upon hearing of the iſſue of the Battle, would give over all thoughts of War. Accordingly,

cordingly, as ſoon as he was arrived, he reaped the juſt fruit of his Valour and Magnanimity. For the *Alexandrians* throwing down their Arms, abandoning their Works, and aſſuming the habit of Suppliants, came forth to ſurrender themſelves to *Cæſar*, preceded by all thoſe ſacred Symbols of Religion, wherewith they were wont to mollify their offended Kings. *Cæſar* accepting their Submiſſion, and encouraging them, advanced thro' the Enemy's Works into his own Quarter of the Town, where he was received with the univerſal Congratulations of his Party, who were no leſs overjoyed at his arrival and preſence, than at the happy iſſue of the War.

XXIV. *CÆSAR* having thus made himſelf maſter of *Alexandria* and *Egypt*, lodged the Government in the hands of thoſe to whom *Ptolemy* had bequeathed it by Will, appointing the People of *Rome* his Executors, and requeſting them to confirm his Choice. For the eldeſt of his two Sons being dead, he ſettled the Kingdom upon the youngeſt, in conjunction with his Siſter *Cleopatra*, who had always continued faithful to the *Romans*. The younger *Arſinoe*, in whoſe name *Ganymed*, as we have ſeen, reigned for ſome time, he thought proper to baniſh the Kingdom, that ſhe might not raiſe any new Diſturbance, before the King's Authority ſhould be firmly eſtabliſhed. Things thus ſettled, he carried the ſixth Legion with him into *Syria*, leaving the reſt to ſupport the Authority of the King and Queen; who neither ſtood well in the Affections of their Subjects, on account of their Attachment to *Cæſar*; nor could be ſuppoſed to have given any fixed Foundation to their Power, in an Adminiſtration of only a few Days continuance. It was alſo for the Honour and Intereſt of the Republick, that if they continued faithful, our Forces ſhould protect them; if otherwiſe, would be in a condition to reſtrain them. Having thus ſettled the Kingdom, he marched by Land into *Syria*.

XXV. WHILE theſe things paſſed in *Egypt*, King *Dejotarus* applied to *Domitius Calvinus*, to whom *Cæſar* had intruſted the Government of *Aſia* and the neighbouring Provinces, beſeeching him, "Not to ſuffer *Pharnaces* to ſeize "and lay waſte the leſſer *Armenia*, which was his Kingdom; or *Cappadocia*, "which belonged to *Ariobarzanes*; becauſe unleſs they were delivered from "theſe Inſults, it would be impoſſible for them to execute *Cæſar*'s Orders, or "raiſe the Money they ſtood engaged to pay." *Domitius*, who was not only ſenſible of the neceſſity of Money to defray the Expences of the War, but likewiſe thought it diſhonourable to the People of *Rome* and *Cæſar*, as well as infamous to himſelf, to ſuffer the Dominions of Allies and Friends to be uſurped by a foreign Prince; ſent Ambaſſadors to *Pharnaces* to acquaint him, "That he muſt withdraw immediately out of *Armenia* and *Cappadocia*, and "no longer inſult the Majeſty and Right of the *Roman* People, engaged in a "civil War." But believing that his Deputation would have greater Weight, if he was ready to ſecond it himſelf at the head of an Army; he repaired to the Legions which were then in *Aſia*, ordering two of them into *Egypt* at *Cæſar*'s deſire, and carrying the thirty-ſixth along with him. To this *Dejotarus* added two more, which he had trained up for ſeveral Years according to our Diſcipline; and an hundred Horſe. The like number of Horſe were furniſhed by *Ariobarzanes*. At the ſame time he ſent *P. Sextius* to *C. Plætorius* the Quæſtor, for the Legion which had been lately levied in *Pontus*; and *Quinctius Patiſius* into *Cilicia*, to draw thence a Body of auxiliary Troops. All theſe Forces had Orders to rendezvous, as ſoon as poſſible, at *Comana*.

XXVI.

XXVI. MEAN-WHILE his Ambaſſadors returned with *Pharnaces*'s Anſwer: " That he had quitted *Cappadocia*; but kept poſſeſſion of the leſſer " *Armenia*, as his own by right of Inheritance: however, was willing to ſub- " mit all to the deciſion of *Cæſar*, to whoſe Commands he would pay imme- " diate Obedience." *C. Domitius*, ſenſible that he had quitted *Cappadocia*, not voluntarily, but out of neceſſity; becauſe he could more eaſily defend *Armenia*, which lay contiguous to his own Kingdom, than *Cappadocia*, which was more remote; and becauſe believing at firſt that *Domitius* had brought all the three Legions along with him, upon hearing that two were gone to *Cæſar*, he ſeemed more determined to keep poſſeſſion: inſiſted " upon his quitting *Arme-* " *nia* likewiſe, the Reaſon in both Caſes being the ſame; nor was it juſt to " demand that the Matter ſhould be poſtponed 'till *Cæſar*'s return, unleſs " things were put in the condition in which they were at firſt." Having returned this Anſwer, he advanced towards *Armenia* with the Forces abovementioned, directing his march along the Hills. For from *Pontus*, by the way of *Comana*, runs a woody ridge of Hills, that extends as far as *Armenia* the leſs, dividing it from *Cappadocia*. The Advantages he had in view by ſuch a March were; that he would thereby effectually prevent all Surpriſes, and be plentifully furniſhed with Proviſions from *Cappadocia*.

XXVII. MEAN-TIME *Pharnaces* was perpetually ſending Ambaſſadors to *Domitius* with Preſents, and to treat of Peace. All theſe he firmly rejected, telling the Deputies: " That nothing was more ſacred with him, than " the Majeſty of the *Roman* People, and the Rights of their Allies." After a long march he reached *Nicopolis*, a City of *Armenia* the leſs, ſituated in a Plain, having Mountains however on its two ſides, at a conſiderable diſtance. Here he encamped about ſeven miles from the Town. Between his Camp and *Nicopolis* lay a difficult and narrow Paſs, where *Pharnaces* placed a choſen Body of Foot, and all his Horſe in Ambuſcade. He ordered a great number of Cattle to be diſperſed in this Paſs, and the Townſmen and Peaſants to ſhow themſelves; that if *Domitius* entered the Defile as a Friend, he might have no ſuſpicion of an Ambuſcade, when he ſaw the Men and Flocks diſperſed without Apprehenſion in the Fields; or if he ſhould come as an Enemy, that the Soldiers quitting their Ranks to pillage, might fall an eaſy Prey to his Troops.

XXVIII. WHILE this Deſign was going forward, he never ceaſed ſending Ambaſſadors to *Domitius*, with Propoſals of Peace and Amity, as fancying by this means the more eaſily to inſnare him. The expectation of Peace kept *Domitius* in his Camp, ſo that *Pharnaces* diſappointed of his Hopes, and fearing the Ambuſcade might be diſcovered, drew off his Troops. Next Day *Domitius* approached *Nicopolis*, and encamped near the Town. While our Men were working at the Trenches, *Pharnaces* drew up his Army in order of Battle, forming his Front into one Line, according to the Cuſtom of the Country, and ſecuring his Wings with a triple Body of Reſerves. *Domitius* ordering part of the Troops to continue under Arms before the Rampart, compleated the Fortifications of his Camp.

XXIX. NEXT Night *Pharnaces* having intercepted the Couriers, who brought *Domitius* an Account of the poſture of Affairs at *Alexandria*; underſtood that *Cæſar* was in great danger, and requeſted *Domitius* to ſend him Succours ſpeedily, and come himſelf to *Alexandria* by the way of *Syria*.

Pharnaces, upon this Intelligence, imagined that protracting the Time would be equivalent to a Victory; becauſe *Domitius*, he ſuppoſed, muſt very ſoon depart. He therefore dug two Ditches four Foot deep, at a moderate diſtance from each other, on that ſide where lay the eaſieſt acceſs to the Town, and our Forces might with moſt advantage attack him; reſolving not to advance beyond them. Between theſe he conſtantly drew up his Army, placing all his Cavalry upon the Wings without them, which greatly exceeded ours in number, and would otherwiſe have been uſeleſs.

XXX. *DOMITIUS*, more concerned at *Cæſar*'s Danger than his own, and believing he could not retire with ſafety, ſhould he now deſire the Conditions he had rejected, or march away without any apparent Cauſe; drew his Forces out of the Camp, and ranged them in order of Battle. He placed the thirty-ſixth Legion on the right, that of *Pontus* on the left, and thoſe of *Dejotarus* in the main Body; drawing them up with a very narrow front, and poſting the reſt of the Cohorts to ſuſtain the Wings. The Armies thus drawn up on each ſide, they prepared for Battle; and the Signal being given at the ſame time by both Parties, the Engagement began. The Conflict was ſharp and various: for the thirty-ſixth Legion falling upon the King's Cavalry, that was drawn up without the Ditch, charged them ſo ſucceſsfully, that they drove them to the very Walls of the Town, paſſed the Ditch, and attacked their Infantry behind. But on the other ſide, the Legion of *Pontus* having given way; the ſecond Line, which advanced to ſuſtain them, fetching a compaſs round the Ditch, in order to attack the Enemy in flank, was overwhelmed and born down by a ſhower of Darts, in endeavouring to paſs it. The Legions of *Dejotarus* ſcarce made any reſiſtance; ſo that the victorious right Wing and main Body of the King's Army fell upon the thirty-ſixth Legion, which yet made a brave ſtand; and tho' ſurrounded by the Forces of the Enemy, with wonderful preſence of mind caſt themſelves into an Orb, and retired to the foot of a Mountain, whither *Pharnaces* did not think fit to purſue them, becauſe of the diſadvantage of the Place. Thus the Legion of *Pontus* being almoſt wholly cut off, with great part of thoſe of *Dejotarus*, the thirty-ſixth Legion retreated to an Eminence, with the loſs of about two hundred and fifty Men. Several *Roman* Knights of illuſtrious rank fell in this Battle. *Domitius*, after this Defeat, rallied the remains of his broken Army, and retreated by ſafe Ways thro' *Cappadocia* into *Aſia*.

XXXI. *PHARNACES* elated with this Succeſs, and hoping that *Cæſar* would never be able to extricate himſelf at *Alexandria*, entered *Pontus* with all his Forces. There acting as Conqueror and King, and promiſing himſelf a happier Deſtiny than his Father, he ravaged their Towns, ſeized the Effects of the *Roman* Citizens and Natives, inflicted Puniſhments worſe than Death upon ſuch as were diſtinguiſhed by their Age or Beauty; and having made himſelf maſter of all *Pontus*, as there was no one to oppoſe his Progreſs, boaſted that he had recovered his Father's Kingdom.

XXXII. ABOUT the ſame time we received a conſiderable Check in *Illyricum*; which Province Q. *Cornificius*, *Cæſar*'s Quæſtor, had defended the preceding Months, not only without Inſult, but even with Honour, and a Conduct worthy of Praiſe. *Cæſar* had ſent him thither the Summer before with two Legions; and tho' it was of itſelf little able to ſubſiſt an Army, and at that time in particular almoſt totally ruined by the Neighbourhood of ſo many



A. *Nicopolis*. B. *The two Ditches between which Pharnaces drew up his Army*. C. *The Center of Pharnaces Army*. D. *The two Wings*. E. *A Triple Line of Reserves behind the Center*. F. *The same behind the two Wings*. G. *The Cavalry on the Wings without the Ditches*. H. *The thirty sixth Legion forming Domitius's right Wing*. I. *The Legion of Pontus on his Left*. K. *The Legions of Dejotarus in the main Body*. L. *Domitius's Camp*.

many Wars; yet by his Prudence, Vigilance, and uncommon Care, he defended and kept poſſeſſion of it. For he made himſelf maſter of ſeveral Forts built on Eminences, whoſe advantageous Situation tempted the Inhabitants to make Deſcents and Inroads upon the Country; and gave the Plunder of them to his Soldiers: which tho' but inconſiderable, yet as they were no ſtrangers to the Diſtreſs and ill Condition of the Province, did not ceaſe to be grateful; the rather, as it was the fruit of their own Valour. And when after the Battle of *Pharſalia*, *Octavius* had retreated to that Coaſt with a large Fleet; *Cornificius*, with ſome Veſſels of the *Judertini*, who had always continued faithful to the Commonwealth, made himſelf maſter of the greateſt part of his Ships, which joined to thoſe of the *Judertini*, rendered him capable of ſuſtaining even a naval Engagement. And while *Cæſar* victorious was purſuing *Pompey* to the remoteſt parts of the Earth; upon advice that the Enemy had for the moſt part retired into *Illyricum*, on account of its neighbourhood to *Macedonia*, and were there uniting into a Body, he wrote to *Gabinius*, "To repair directly "thither with the new-raiſed Legions, and join *Cornificius*, that in caſe of any "danger to the Province, they might be the better able to protect it: but if "leſs Forces ſufficed, to march into *Macedonia*, which he foreſaw would never "be free from Commotions, ſo long as *Pompey* lived.

XXXIII. *GABINIUS*, whether he imagined the Province better provided than it really was, or depended much upon the auſpicious Fortune of *Cæſar*, or confided in his own Valour and Abilities, having often terminated with ſucceſs difficult and dangerous Wars; marched into *Illyricum* in the middle of Winter, and the moſt difficult Seaſon of the Year: where not finding ſufficient Subſiſtence in the Province, which was partly ruined, partly ill-affected; and having no Supplies by Sea, becauſe the ſeaſon of the Year had put a ſtop to Navigation; he found himſelf compelled to carry on the War, not according to his own Inclination, but as Neceſſity allowed. As he was therefore obliged to lay ſiege to Forts and Caſtles in a very rude Seaſon, he received many Checks, and fell under ſuch Contempt with the Barbarians, that retiring to *Salona*, a maritime City, inhabited by a ſet of brave and faithful *Romans*, he was attacked upon his march; and after the loſs of two thouſand Soldiers, thirty-eight Centurions, and four Tribunes, got to *Salona* with the reſt; where his Wants continually increaſing, he died a few Months after. His misfortunes and ſudden death gave *Octavius* great hopes of maſtering the Province. But Fortune, whoſe Influence is ſo great in matters of War, joined to the Diligence of *Cornificius*, and the Valour of *Vatinius*, ſoon put an end to his Triumphs.

XXXIV. FOR *Vatinius*, who was then at *Brunduſium*, having intelligence of what paſſed in *Illyricum*, by Letters from *Cornificius*, who preſſed him to come to the aſſiſtance of the Province, and informed him, that *Octavius* had leagued with the Barbarians, and in ſeveral Places attacked our Garriſons, partly by Sea with his Fleet, partly by Land with the Troops of the Barbarians: *Vatinius*, I ſay, upon notice of theſe Things, tho' extremely weakned by Sickneſs, inſomuch that his ſtrength of Body no way anſwered his Reſolution and greatneſs of Mind; yet by his Valour ſurmounted all oppoſition, the force of his Diſtemper, the rigour of the Seaſon, and the difficulties of a ſudden Preparation. For having himſelf but a very few Gallies, he wrote to *Q. Kalenus* in *Achaia*, to furniſh him with a Squadron of Ships. But theſe not coming with that Diſpatch which the danger our Army was in required, becauſe

becauſe *Octavius* preſſed hard upon them; he faſtened Beaks to all the Barks and Veſſels that lay in the Port, whoſe number was conſiderable enough, tho' they were not ſufficiently large for an Engagement. Joining theſe to what Gallies he had, and putting the veteran Soldiers aboard, whereof he had a great number, who had been left ſick at *Brunduſium* when the Army went over to *Greece*; he ſailed for *Illyricum:* where having ſubjected ſeveral maritime States that had declared for *Octavius*; and neglecting ſuch as continued obſtinate in their revolt, becauſe he would ſuffer nothing to retard his deſign of meeting the Enemy; he came up with *Octavius* before *Epidaurus*; and obliging him to raiſe the Siege, which he was carrying on with great Vigour by Sea and Land, joined the Garriſon to his own Forces.

XXXV. *OCTAVIUS* underſtanding that *Vatinius*'s Fleet conſiſted moſtly of ſmall Barks, and confiding in the ſtrength of his own, ſtopped at the Iſle of *Tauris*. *Vatinius* followed him thither, not imagining he would halt at that Place, but becauſe he was determined to purſue him wherever he went. *Vatinius*, who had no ſuſpicion of an Enemy, and whoſe Ships were moreover diſperſed by a Tempeſt, perceived, as he approached the Iſle, a Veſſel filled with Soldiers, that advanced towards him with full Sails. Upon this he gave Orders for furling the Sails, lowering the Sail-Yards, and arming the Soldiers: and hoiſting a Flag as a Signal of Battle, intimated to the Ships that followed to do the ſame. Our Men prepared themſelves in the beſt manner their ſudden Surpriſe would allow, while *Octavius* advanced in good order from the Port. The two Fleets drew up. *Octavius* had the advantage as to Diſpoſition, and *Vatinius* in the Bravery of his Troops.

XXXVI. *VATINIUS* finding himſelf inferior to the Enemy, both in the number and largeneſs of his Ships, reſolved to commit the Affair to Fortune, and therefore in his own Quinquereme, attacked *Octavius* in his four-benched Galley. This he did with ſuch violence, and the ſhock was ſo great, that the Beak of *Octavius*'s Galley was broke. The Battle raged with great fury likewiſe in other Places, but chiefly round the two Admirals: for as the Ships on each ſide advanced to ſuſtain thoſe that fought, a cloſe and furious Conflict enſued in a very narrow Sea, where the nearer the Veſſels approached, the more had *Vatinius*'s Soldiers the advantage. For with admirable Courage they leaped into the Enemy's Ships, and forcing them by this means to an equal Combat, ſoon maſtered them by their ſuperior Valour. *Octavius*'s Galley was ſunk. Many others were taken, or ſuffered the ſame Fate. The Soldiers were partly ſlain in the Ships, partly thrown overboard into the Sea. *Octavius* got into a Boat, which ſinking under the multitude that crowded after him, he himſelf, tho' wounded, ſwam to his Brigantine: where being taken up, and Night having put an end to the Battle; as the Wind blew very ſtrong, he ſpread all his Sails and fled. A few of his Ships, that had the good Fortune to eſcape, followed him.

XXXVII. *VATINIUS*, ſeeing the Enemy entirely defeated, ſounded a Retreat, and entered victorious the Port whence *Octavius* had ſailed to fight him, without the loſs of a ſingle Veſſel. He took in this Battle one Quinquereme, two Triremes, eight two-benched Gallies, and a great number of Rowers. The next Day was employed in repairing his own Fleet, and the Ships he had taken from the Enemy; after which he ſailed for the Iſland of *Iſſa*, imagining *Octavius* would retire thither after his Defeat. In this Iſland was a flouriſhing

flouriſhing City well affected to *Octavius*, which however ſurrendered to *Vatinius* upon the firſt Summons. Here he underſtood that *Octavius*, attended by a few ſmall Barks, had ſailed with a fair Wind for *Greece*, whence he intended to paſs on to *Sicily*, and afterwards to *Africa*. *Vatinius* having in ſo ſhort a ſpace ſucceſsfully terminated the Affairs of *Illyricum*, reſtored the Province in a peaceable condition to *Cornificius*, and driven the Enemy's Fleet out of thoſe Seas, returned victorious to *Brunduſium*, with his Army and Fleet in good condition.

XXXVIII. WHILE *Cæſar* beſieged *Pompey* at *Dyrrhachium*, triumphed at *Pharſalia*, and carried on the War with ſo much danger at *Alexandria*, *Caſſius Longinus*, who had been left in *Spain* as Proprætor of the farther Province; either through his natural diſpoſition, or out of a hatred he had contracted to the Province, becauſe of a Wound he had treacherouſly received there when Quæſtor, drew upon himſelf the general diſlike of the People. He diſcerned this Temper among them, partly from a conſciouſneſs that he deſerved it, partly from the manifeſt Indications they gave of their Diſcontent. To ſecure himſelf againſt their Diſaffection, he endeavoured to gain the love of the Soldiers; and having for this purpoſe aſſembled them together, promiſed them an hundred Seſterces a Man. Soon after, having made himſelf maſter of *Medobrega*, a Town in *Luſitania*, and of Mount *Herminius*, whither the *Medobregians* had retired; and being upon that occaſion ſaluted Imperator by the Army, he gave them another hundred Seſterces each. Theſe, accompanied with other conſiderable Largeſſes in great number, ſeemed for the preſent to increaſe the good-will of the Army, but tended gradually and imperceptibly to the relaxation of military Diſcipline.

XXXIX. *CASSIUS* having ſent his Army into Winter-Quarters, fixed his reſidence at *Cordova* for the adminiſtration of Juſtice. Being greatly in debt, he reſolved to pay it by laying heavy Impoſitions upon the Province; and according to the cuſtom of Prodigals, made his Liberalities a Pretence to juſtify the moſt exorbitant Demands. He taxed the rich at diſcretion, and compelled them to pay without the leaſt regard to their Remonſtrances; frequently improving light and trifling Offences, as an handle for all manner of Extortions. All methods of gain were purſued, whether great and apparent, or mean and ſordid. None that had any thing to loſe could eſcape accuſation; inſomuch that the plunder of their private Fortunes was aggravated by the Dangers they were expoſed to from pretended Crimes.

XL. THUS *Longinus*, acting the ſame part when Proconſul, which he had done when Quæſtor, drew upon himſelf the like Conſpiracies againſt his Life. Even his own Dependents concurred in the general Hatred; who tho' the Miniſters of his Rapine, yet hated the Man by whoſe Authority they committed thoſe Crimes. The Odium ſtill increaſed upon his raiſing a fifth Legion, which added to the Expence and Burden of the Province. The Cavalry was augmented to three thouſand, with coſtly Ornaments and Equipage; nor had the People any reſpite from his Extortions.

XLI. MEAN-WHILE he received Orders from *Cæſar*, to tranſport his Army into *Africa*, and march thro' *Mauritania* towards *Numidia*, becauſe King *Juba* had ſent conſiderable Succours to *Pompey*, and was preparing to ſend more. Theſe Letters filled him with an inſolent Joy, by the Opportu-

nity they offered him of pillaging new Provinces, and a wealthy Kingdom. He therefore haſtened into *Luſitania*, to aſſemble his Legions, and draw together a Body of Auxiliaries; appointing certain Perſons to provide Corn, Ships, and Money, that nothing might retard him at his return; which was much ſooner than expected: for when Intereſt called, *Caſſius* wanted neither Induſtry nor Vigilance.

XLII. HAVING got his Army together, and encamped near *Cordova*, he made a Speech to the Soldiers, wherein he acquainted them with the Orders he had received from *Cæſar*, and promiſed them a hundred Seſterces each, when they ſhould arrive in *Mauritania*. The fifth Legion, he told them, was to remain in *Spain*. Having ended his Speech, he returned to *Cordova*. The ſame Day about noon, as he went to the Hall of Juſtice, one *Minutius Silo*, a Client of *L. Racilius*, preſented him with a Paper, in a Soldier's Habit, as if he had ſome requeſt to make. Then retiring behind *Racilius* (who walked beſide *Caſſius*,) as if waiting for an Anſwer, he inſenſibly drew near; and a favourable Opportunity offering, ſeized *Caſſius* with his left Hand, and wounded him twice with a Dagger in his right. The Noiſe this occaſioned was as a Signal to the Conſpirators, who all ruſhed upon him in a Body. *Munatius Plancus* killed the Lictor that was next *Longinus*, and wounded *Q. Caſſius* his Lieutenant. *T. Vaſius*, and *L. Mergilio*, ſeconded their Countryman *Plancus*; for they were all *Italians*. *L. Licinius Squillus* flew upon *Longinus* himſelf, and gave him ſeveral ſlight Wounds as he lay upon the Ground. By this time his Guards came up to his Aſſiſtance, (for he always had a Body of Veterans armed with Darts to attend him,) and ſurrounded the reſt of the Conſpirators who were advancing to compleat the Aſſaſſination. Of this number were *Calpurnius Salvianus*, and *Manilius Tuſculus*. *Caſſius* was carried home; and *Minutius Silo* ſtumbling upon a Stone as he endeavoured to make his eſcape, was taken and brought to him. *Racilius* retired to the neighbouring Houſe of a Friend, 'till he ſhould have certain Information of the Fate of *Caſſius*. *L. Laterenſis* not doubting but he was diſpatched, ran in a tranſport of Joy to the Camp, to congratulate the ſecond and the new-raiſed Legions upon it, who, he knew, bore a particular hatred to *Caſſius*; and who immediately upon this Intelligence, placed him on the Tribunal, and proclaimed him Prætor. For there was not a Native of the Province, nor a Soldier of the new-raiſed Legion, nor a Perſon who by long reſidence was naturalized to the Province, of which kind the ſecond Legion conſiſted, who did not join in the general hatred of *Caſſius*. Mean-time *Laterenſis* was informed that *Caſſius* was ſtill alive; at which being rather grieved than diſconcerted, he immediately ſo far recovered himſelf, as to go and wait upon him. By this time the thirtieth Legion having notice of what had paſſed, marched to *Cordova* to the aſſiſtance of their General. The twenty-firſt and fifth followed their example. As only two Legions remained in the Camp, the ſecond fearing they ſhould be left alone, and thereby have their Sentiments known, did the ſame. But the new-raiſed Legion continued firm, nor could be induced by any Motives of Fear, to ſtir from its Place. *Caſſius* ordered all the Accomplices of the Conſpiracy to be ſeized, and ſent back the fifth Legion to the Camp, retaining the other three. By the Confeſſion of *Minutius* he learnt, that *L. Racilius*, *L. Laterenſis*, and *Annius Scapula*, a Man of great Authority and Credit in the Province, and equally in his Confidence with *Laterenſis* and *Racilius*, were concerned in the Plot: Nor did he long defer his Revenge, but ordered them to be put to death. He delivered *Minutius* to be racked by his Freed-men; likewiſe

wiſe *Calphurnius Salvianus*; who turning Evidence, increaſed the Number of the Conſpirators; juſtly, as ſome think; but others pretend he was forced. *L. Mergilio* was likewiſe put to the torture. *Squillus* impeached many others, who were all condemned to die, except ſuch as redeemed their Lives by a Fine: for he pardoned *Calphurnius* for ten, and *Q. Sextius* for fifty thouſand Seſterces; who, though deeply guilty, yet having in this manner eſcaped death, ſhewed *Caſſius* to be no leſs covetous than cruel.

XLIII. SOME Days after, he received Letters from *Cæſar*, with an Account of *Pompey*'s Defeat and Flight: which News equally affected him with Joy and Sorrow. *Cæſar*'s Succeſs gave him pleaſure; but the concluſion of the War would put an end to his Rapines: inſomuch that he was uncertain which to wiſh for, Victory, or an unbounded Licentiouſneſs. When he was cured of his Wounds, he ſent for all who were indebted to him in any Sums, and inſiſted upon immediate payment. Such as were taxed too low, had Orders to furniſh larger Sums. Such *Roman* Citizens as had been levied in the ſeveral Colonies of the Province, and were alarmed at the thoughts of a foreign Expedition, obtained their Diſcharge for a certain Sum. This brought in a vaſt Revenue, but greatly increaſed the general Hatred. He afterwards reviewed the Army, ſent the Legions and Auxiliaries deſigned for *Africa* towards the Straits of *Hercules*, and went himſelf to *Seville*, to examine the condition of the Fleet. He ſtay'd there ſome time, in conſequence of an Edict he had publiſhed, ordering all who had not pay'd the Sums in which they were amerced, to repair to him thither; which created an univerſal Murmuring and Diſcontent.

XLIV. IN the mean-time *L. Titius*, a military Tribune of the new-raiſed Legion, ſent him notice of a Report, that the thirtieth Legion, one of thoſe he was carrying with him to *Africa*, had mutinied at *Ilurgis*, killed ſome of the Centurions that oppoſed them, and were gone over to the ſecond Legion, who marched another way towards the Straits. Upon this Intelligence, he ſet out by night with five Cohorts of the twenty-firſt Legion, and came up with them in the Morning. He ſtay'd there that Day, to conſult what was proper to be done, and then went to *Carmona*, where he found the thirtieth and twenty-firſt Legions, with four Cohorts of the fifth, and all the Cavalry aſſembled. Here he learnt, that the new-raiſed Legion had ſurpriſed four Cohorts near *Obucula*, and forced them along with them to the ſecond Legion; where all joining, they had choſen *T. Thorius* an *Italian* for their General. Having inſtantly called a Council, he ſent *Marcellus* to *Cordova*, to ſecure that Town, and *Q. Caſſius*, his Lieutenant, to *Seville*. A few Days after, news was brought that *Cordova* had revolted, and that *Marcellus*, either voluntarily, or through force, (for the Reports were various) had joined them; as likewiſe the two Cohorts of the fifth Legion that were in Garriſon there. *Caſſius* provoked at theſe Mutinies decamped, and the next day came to *Segovia*, upon the River *Xenil*. There ſummoning an Aſſembly, to ſound the diſpoſition of the Troops, he found; that it was not out of any Regard to him, but to *Cæſar*, though abſent, that they continued faithful, and were ready to undergo any Danger for the recovery of the Province.

XLV. MEAN-WHILE *Thorius* marched the veteran Legions to *Cordova*; and that the Revolt might not appear to ſpring from a ſeditious Inclination in him or the Soldiers; as likewiſe to oppoſe an equal Authority to that of *Q. Caſſius*

Q. Caſſius, who was drawing together a great Force in *Cæſar*'s Name; he publickly gave out, that his Deſign was to recover the Province for *Pompey*. Nay perhaps he was really influenced by a love for *Pompey*, whoſe Name was dear to thoſe Legions that had ſerved under *Varro*. Be this as it will, *Thorius* at leaſt made it his Pretence; and the Soldiers were ſo infatuated with the Thought, that they had *Pompey*'s Name inſcribed upon their Bucklers. The Citizens of *Cordova*, Men, Women, and Children, came out to meet the Legions; "begging they would not enter *Cordova* as Enemies, ſeeing they joined "with them in their Averſion to *Caſſius*, and only deſired they might not be "obliged to act againſt *Cæſar*.

XLVI. THE Soldiers moved by the Prayers and Tears of ſo great a Multitude, and ſeeing they ſtood in no need of *Pompey*'s Name and Memory to ſpirit up a Revolt againſt *Caſſius*, as he was equally odious to the Partizans of both Parties; neither being able to prevail with *Marcellus*, or the People of *Cordova*, to declare againſt *Cæſar*; they eraſed *Pompey*'s Name from their Bucklers, choſe *Marcellus* their Commander, joined the Citizens of *Cordova*, and encamped near the Town. Two Days after, *Caſſius* encamped on an Eminence on this ſide the *Bætis*, about four Miles from *Cordova*, and within view of the Town; whence he ſent Letters to King *Bogud* in *Mauritania*, and *M. Lepidus*, Proconſul of hither *Spain*, to come to his Aſſiſtance as ſoon as poſſible for *Cæſar*'s ſake. Mean-while he ravaged the Country, and ſet fire to the Buildings round *Cordova*.

XLVII. THE Legions under *Marcellus*, provoked at this Indignity, ran to him, and begged to be led againſt the Enemy, that they might have an Opportunity of fighting them, before they could have time to deſtroy with Fire and Sword, the rich and noble Poſſeſſions of the *Cordovians*. *Marcellus*, tho' averſe to a Battle, which, whoever was victorious, muſt turn to *Cæſar*'s detriment; yet unable to reſtrain the Legions, croſſed the *Bætis*, and drew up his Men. *Caſſius* did the ſame upon a riſing ground: but as he would not quit his advantageous Poſt, *Marcellus* perſuaded his Men to return to their Camp. He had already begun to retire, when *Caſſius*, knowing himſelf to be ſtronger in Cavalry, fell upon the Legionaries with his Horſe, and made a conſiderable Slaughter in their Rear, upon the Banks of the River. This Check making *Marcellus* ſenſible of the Miſtake he had committed in paſſing the River, he removed his Camp to the other ſide, where both Armies frequently drew up, but did not engage, on account of the inequality of the Ground.

XLVIII. *MARCELLUS* was ſtronger in Foot, for he commanded veteran Legions, of great experience in War. *Caſſius* depended more on the Fidelity than the Courage of his Troops. The two Camps being very near each other, *Marcellus* ſeized a ſpot of ground where he built a Fort, very convenient for depriving the Enemy of Water. *Longinus* apprehending he ſhould be beſieged in a Country where all were againſt him, quitted his Camp in the night, and by a quick march reached *Ulla*, a Town on which he thought he could rely. There he encamped ſo near the Walls, that both by the Situation of the Place, (for *Ulla* ſtands on an Eminence) and the Defences of the Town, he was on all ſides ſecure from an Attack. *Marcellus* followed him, and encamped as near the Town as poſſible. Having taken a view of the Place, he found himſelf reduced by neceſſity to do what was moſt agreeable to his own Inclination; and neither engage *Caſſius*, which the ardour of his Soldiers would have forced him

him to, had it been poſſible; nor ſuffer him by his Excurſions to infeſt the Territories of other States, as he had done thoſe of *Cordova*. He therefore raiſed Redoubts in proper places, and continued his Works quite round the Town, incloſing both *Ulla* and *Caſſius* within his Lines. But before they were finiſhed, *Caſſius* ſent out all his Cavalry; who he imagined might do him great ſervice, by cutting off *Marcellus*'s Proviſions and Forage; and could only be an uſeleſs Incumbrance upon him, by conſuming his Proviſions, if he was ſhut up in his Camp.

XLIX. A few Days after, King *Bogud* having received *Caſſius*'s Letters, came and joined him with all his Forces, conſiſting of one Legion, and ſeveral auxiliary Cohorts. For as commonly happens in civil Diſſenſions, ſome of the States of *Spain* at that time favoured *Caſſius*, but a yet greater Number, *Marcellus*. *Bogud* came up to the advanced Works of *Marcellus*, where many ſharp Skirmiſhes happened with various Succeſs: however, *Marcellus* ſtill kept poſſeſſion of his Works.

L. MEAN-WHILE *Lepidus*, from the hither Province, with thirty-five Legionary Cohorts, and a great Body of Horſe and Auxiliaries, came to *Ulla*, with deſign to adjuſt the differences between *Caſſius* and *Marcellus*. *Marcellus* ſubmitted without heſitation: but *Caſſius* kept within his Works, either becauſe he thought his Cauſe the juſteſt, or from an apprehenſion that his Adverſary's Submiſſion had prepoſſeſſed *Lepidus* in his favour. *Lepidus* encamped with *Marcellus* at *Ulla*, prevented a Battle, invited *Caſſius* into his Camp, and engaged his Honour to act without prejudice. *Caſſius* heſitated long, but at laſt deſired that the Circumvallation ſhould be levelled, and free Egreſs given him. The Truce was not only concluded, but the Works demoliſhed, and the Guards drawn off, when King *Bogud* attacked one of *Marcellus*'s Forts, that lay neareſt to his Camp, unknown to any (unleſs perhaps *Longinus*, who was not exempt from ſuſpicion on this occaſion) and ſlew a great Number of his Men. And had not *Lepidus* interpoſed, much miſchief would have been done.

LI. A free Paſſage being now made for *Caſſius*, *Marcellus* joined Camps with *Lepidus*; and both together marched for *Cordova*, while *Caſſius* retired to *Carmona*. At the ſame time *Trebonius*, the Proconſul, came to take poſſeſſion of the Province. *Caſſius* having notice of his Arrival, ſent his Legions and Cavalry into Winter-Quarters, and haſtened with all his Effects to *Melaca*, where he embarked immediately, though it was the Winter-Seaſon; that he might not, as he pretended, come into the power of *Marcellus*, *Lepidus* and *Trebonius*; as his Friends gave out, to avoid paſſing through a Province, great part of which had revolted from him; but as was more generally believed, to ſecure the Money he had amaſſed by his numberleſs Extortions. The Wind favouring him as far as could be expected at that Seaſon of the Year, he put into the *Iberus*, to avoid ſailing in the Night; and thence continuing his Voyage, which he thought he might do with ſafety, though the Wind blew conſiderably freſher; he was encountered by ſuch a Storm at the mouth of the River, that being neither able to return, becauſe of the Stream, nor ſtem the fury of the Waves, the Ship and all that were in her periſhed.

LII. *CÆSAR* arriving in *Syria* from *Egypt*, and underſtanding by thoſe who attended him there from *Rome*, and the Letters he received at the ſame

time; that the Government there was upon a very bad footing, and all the Affairs of the Commonwealth managed indiſcreetly; that the Conteſts of the Tribunes were producing perpetual Seditions, and the Remiſneſs of the Officers of the Legions deſtroying military Diſcipline; all which required his ſpeedy preſence to redreſs them: thought it yet firſt incumbent upon him, to ſettle the ſtate of the Provinces through which he paſſed; that freeing them from domeſtick Contentions, and the fear of a foreign Enemy, the Laws might have a free courſe. This he hoped ſoon to effect in *Syria*, *Cilicia*, and *Aſia*, becauſe theſe Provinces were not involved in War. In *Bithynia* and *Pontus* indeed he expected more trouble, becauſe he underſtood *Pharnaces* ſtill continued in *Pontus*, and was not likely to quit it eaſily, being fluſhed with the Victory he had obtained over *Domitius Calvinus*. He made a ſhort ſtay in moſt States of Note, diſtributing Rewards both publickly and privately to ſuch as deſerved them, determining old Controverſies, and receiving into his protection the Kings, Princes, and Potentates, as well of the Provinces, as of the neighbouring Countries. And having ſettled the neceſſary Regulations for the defence of the Country, he diſmiſſed them fully ſatisfied with himſelf and the Republick.

LIII. AFTER a ſtay of ſome Days in thoſe Parts, he named *Sextus Cæſar*, his Friend and Relation, to the Command of *Syria*, and the Legions appointed to guard it; and ſailed himſelf for *Cilicia*, with the Fleet he had brought from *Egypt*. He ſummoned the States to aſſemble at *Tarſus*, the ſtrongeſt and fineſt City of the Province; where having ſettled every thing that regarded either it or the neighbouring Countries, his warlike Ardour would not ſuffer him to tarry longer; but marching through *Cappadocia* with the utmoſt Expedition, where he ſtopped two Days at *Mazaca*, he arrived at *Comana*, renowned for the ancient and ſacred Temple of *Bellona*, where ſhe is worſhipped with ſo much veneration, that her Prieſt is accounted next in Power and Dignity to the King. He conferred this Dignity on *Lycomedes* of *Bithynia*, deſcended of the ancient Kings of *Cappadocia*, who demanded it in right of Inheritance; his Anceſtors having loſt it upon occaſion of the Scepter's being transferred to another Line. As for *Ariobarzanes*, and his Brother *Ariarates*, who had both deſerved well of the Commonwealth, he confirmed the firſt in his Kingdom, and put the other under his protection; after which, he purſued his march with the ſame diſpatch.

LIV. UPON his approaching *Pontus*, and the Frontiers of *Gallogræcia*; *Dejotarus*, Tetrarch of that Province, (whoſe Title however was diſputed by the neighbouring Tetrarchs) and King of the leſſer *Armenia*, laying aſide the Regal Ornaments, and aſſuming the Habit not only of a private Perſon, but even of a Criminal, came in a ſuppliant manner to *Cæſar*, "to beg Forgive-" neſs for obeying and aſſiſting *Pompey*, at a time when *Cæſar* could afford " him no Protection: urging, that it was his buſineſs to obey the Governors " who were preſent, without pretending to judge of the Diſputes of the People " of *Rome*." *Cæſar*, after putting him in mind "of the many Services he " had done him, and the Decrees he had procured in his Favour when Conſul; " that his Defection could claim no Excuſe from want of Information, becauſe " one of his Induſtry and Prudence could not but know who was Maſter of " *Italy* and *Rome*; where the Senate, the People, and the Majeſty of the " Republick reſided; who in fine was Conſul after *Marcellus* and *Lentulus*: " told him, that he would notwithſtanding forgive his preſent Fault, in con-

" ſideration

" ſideration of his paſt Services, the former Friendſhip that had ſubſiſted between " them, the reſpect due to his Age, and the ſolicitation of thoſe who inter- " ceded in his behalf: adding, that he would refer the Controverſy relating to " the Tetrarchate to another time." He reſtored him the royal Habit, and commanded him to join him with all his Cavalry, and the Legion he had trained up after the *Roman* manner.

LV. WHEN he was arrived in *Pontus*, and had drawn all his Forces together, which were not very conſiderable either for their Number or Diſcipline; (for except the ſixth Legion, compoſed of veteran Soldiers, which he had brought with him from *Alexandria*, and which by its many Labours and Dangers, the length of its Marches and Voyages, and the frequent Wars in which it had been engaged, was reduced to leſs than a thouſand Men; he had only the Legion of *Dejotarus*, and two more that had been in the late Battle between *Domitius* and *Pharnaces*:) Ambaſſadors arrived from *Pharnaces*, " To " intreat that *Cæſar* would not look upon him as an Enemy, he being ready " to ſubmit to all his Commands." Particularly they repreſented, " That " *Pharnaces* had granted no Aid to *Pompey*, as *Dejotarus* had done, whom he " had nevertheleſs pardoned." *Cæſar* replied, " That *Pharnaces* ſhould meet " with the utmoſt Juſtice, if he performed his Promiſes: but at the ſame time " admoniſhed the Ambaſſadors in gentle Terms, to forbear mentioning *Dejo-* " *tarus*, and not to over-rate the having refuſed Aid to *Pompey*. He told them, " he was always ready to forgive the Suppliant, but would never look upon " private Services to himſelf, as an Atonement for publick Injuries done the " Province: That *Pharnaces*'s refuſal of aiding *Pompey*, had turned chiefly to " his own Advantage, as he had thereby avoided all ſhare in the Diſaſter of " *Pharſalia:* That he was however willing to forgive the Injuries done to the " *Roman* Citizens in *Pontus*, becauſe it was now too late to think of redreſ- " ſing them; as he could neither reſtore Life to the dead, or Manhood to " thoſe he had deprived of it, by a Puniſhment more intolerable to the *Ro-* " *mans* than Death itſelf. But that he muſt quit *Pontus* immediately, ſend " back the Farmers of the Revenues, and reſtore to the *Romans* and their Al- " lies, what he unjuſtly detained from them. Theſe Things performed, he " might then ſend the Preſents which ſucceſsful Generals were wont to receive " from their Friends:" (for *Pharnaces* had ſent him a golden Crown.) With this Anſwer he diſmiſſed the Ambaſſadors.

LVI. *PHARNACES* promiſed every thing: but hoping that *Cæſar*, who was in haſte to be gone, would give eaſy credit to whatever he ſaid, that he might the ſooner ſet out upon more urgent Affairs; (for every body knew that his preſence was much wanted at *Rome*,) he performed but ſlowly, wanted to protract the Day of his departure, demanded other Conditions, and in fine endeavoured to elude his Engagements. *Cæſar* perceiving his Drift, did now out of Neceſſity, what he was uſually wont to do thro' Inclination, and reſolved to decide the Affair as ſoon as poſſible by a Battle.

LVII. *ZIELA* is a Town of *Pontus*, well fortified, tho' ſituated in a Plain. For a natural Eminence, as if raiſed by Art, ſuſtains the Walls on all ſides. All around are a great number of large Mountains, interſected by Valleys. The higheſt of theſe, famed by the Victory of *Mithridates*, the Defeat of *Triarius*, and the Deſtruction of our Army, is not above three miles from *Ziela*, and has a Ridge that almoſt extends to the Town. Here *Pharnaces* lodged

lodged himſelf with all his Forces, repairing the Fortifications of a Camp which had proved ſo fortunate to his Father.

LVIII. *CÆSAR* encamped about five miles from the Enemy; and obſerving that the Valleys which defended the King's Camp, would likewiſe defend his own at the ſame diſtance, if the Enemy, who were much nearer, did not ſeize them before him; he ordered a great quantity of Faſcines to be brought within the Intrenchments. This being quickly performed; next Night, at the fourth Watch, leaving all the Baggage in the Camp, he ſet out with the Legions; and arriving at Day-break unſuſpected by the Enemy, poſſeſſed himſelf of the ſame Poſt where *Mithridates* had defeated *Triarius*. Hither he commanded all the Faſcines to be brought, employing the Servants of the Army for that purpoſe, that the Soldiers might not be called off from the Works; becauſe the Valley, which divided the Eminence where he was intrenching himſelf, from the Enemy, was not above a mile over.

LIX. *PHARNACES* perceiving this next Morning, ranged all his Troops in order of Battle before his Camp. But the approach towards us was ſo dangerous, that *Cæſar* concluded it to be no more than a Review; or done with deſign to retard his Works, by keeping a great number of his Men under Arms; or perhaps for Oſtentation, to ſhew that he truſted no leſs to his Army, than the advantage of his Poſt. Therefore keeping only his firſt Line in order of Battle, he commanded the reſt of the Army to go on with the Works. But *Pharnaces*, either prompted by the Place itſelf, which had been ſo fortunate to his Father; or induced by favourable Omens, as we were afterwards told; or deſpiſing the ſmall number of our Men that were in Arms; for he took all that were employed in carrying Materials to the Works to be Soldiers; or confiding in his veteran Army, who valued themſelves upon having defeated the twenty-ſecond Legion; and at the ſame time contemning our Troops, whom he had worſted under *Domitius*: was determined upon a Battle, and to that end began to croſs the Valley. *Cæſar* at firſt laughed at his Oſtentation, in crowding his Army into ſo narrow a Place, where no Enemy in his right Senſes would have ventured; while in the mean time *Pharnaces* continued his march, and began to aſcend the ſteep Hill on which *Cæſar* was poſted.

LX. *CÆSAR* aſtoniſhed at his incredible Raſhneſs and Confidence, and finding himſelf ſuddenly and unexpectedly attacked, called off his Soldiers from the Works, ordered them to Arms, oppoſed the Legions to the Enemy, and ranged his Troops in order of Battle. The ſuddenneſs of the thing occaſioned ſome terror at firſt; and the Chariots armed with Scythes, falling in with our Ranks before they were compleated, diſordered them conſiderably: however, the multitude of Darts diſcharged againſt them, ſoon put a ſtop to their career. The Enemy's Army followed them cloſe, and began the Battle with a Shout. Our advantageous ſituation, but eſpecially the aſſiſtance of the Gods, who preſide over all the Events of War, and more particularly thoſe where human Conduct can be of no ſervice, favoured us greatly on this Occaſion.

LXI. AFTER a ſharp and obſtinate Conflict, Victory began to declare for us on the right Wing, where the ſixth Legion was poſted. The Enemy there was totally overthrown; but in the center and left the Battle was long and doubtful:

A. *Ziela*. B. *Pharnaces's Camp*. C. *Cæsar's Camp*. D. *Pharnaces's Chariots armed with Scythes*. E. *His*

N°. 70



hes. B. *His Army in four Lines.* F. *The sixth Legion posted in Cæsar's right Wing.* G. *The left Wing.* H. *The Center.*

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doubtful: however, with the aſſiſtance of the ſame Gods, we at laſt prevailed there alſo, and drove them with the utmoſt Precipitation down the Hill, which they had ſo eaſily aſcended before. Great numbers being ſlain, and many cruſhed by the flight of their own Troops, ſuch as had the good Fortune to eſcape were nevertheleſs obliged to throw away their Arms; ſo that having croſſed the Valley, and got upon the oppoſite Aſcent, they could yet, becauſe unarmed, derive no Benefit from the advantage of the Ground. Our Men fluſhed with Victory made no ſcruple to follow them, and even attack their Camp; which they ſoon forced, notwithſtanding the Reſiſtance made by the Cohorts left by *Pharnaces* to guard it. Almoſt the whole Army was cut to pieces or made Priſoners. *Pharnaces* himſelf eſcaped with a few Horſe; and had not our Soldiers been detained ſome time by the Aſſault of the Camp, he muſt certainly have fallen alive into *Cæſar*'s hands.

LXII. THO' *Cæſar* was accuſtomed to Victory, yet the preſent Succeſs gave him no ſmall Joy; becauſe he had ſo ſpeedily put an end to a very great War. The remembrance too of the Danger to which he had been expoſed, enhanced the Pleaſure, as he had obtained an eaſy Victory in a very difficult Conjuncture. Having thus recovered *Pontus*, and abandoned the Plunder of the Enemy's Camp to the Soldiers, he ſet out next Day with a Guard of light Horſe. The ſixth Legion had Orders to return to *Italy*, to receive the Honours and Rewards they had merited: the auxiliary Troops of *Dejotarus* were ſent home: and *Cælius Vincianus* was left with two Legions to protect the Kingdom of *Pontus*.

LXIII. THRO' *Gallogræcia* and *Bithynia* he went into *Aſia*, ſettling all the Controverſies of the Provinces as he paſſed, and eſtabliſhing the Limits and Juriſdictions of the ſeveral Kings, States, and Tetrarchs. *Mithridates* of *Pergamus*, who had ſo ſpeedily and ſucceſsfully ſerved him in *Egypt*, as we have related above, a Man of royal Deſcent and Education, (for *Mithridates* King of all *Aſia*, out of regard to his Birth, had carried him along with him when very young, and kept him in his Camp ſeveral Years,) was appointed King of *Boſphorus*, which had belonged to *Pharnaces*. And thus were the Provinces of the *Roman* People ſcreened from the Attempts of barbarous and hoſtile Kings, by the Interpoſition of a Prince ſteddily attached to the Intereſts of the Republick. To this was added the Tetrarchate of *Gallogræcia*, which belonged to him of right, tho' it had been poſſeſſed for ſome Years by *Dejotarus*. Thus *Cæſar*, ſtaying no where longer than the neceſſity of Affairs required, and having ſettled all things relating to the Provinces with the utmoſt ſucceſs and diſpatch, returned to *Italy* much ſooner than was expected.

A. HIRTIUS PANSA's

COMMENTARIES

OF THE

AFRICAN WAR.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. Cæſar *ſets out for* Africa. III. *And lands at* Adrumetum. IV. *He treats with* Conſidius *about the ſurrender of that Town: but in vain.* V. *Thence he removes his Camp to* Ruſpina. VI. *And again to* Leptis, *which he immediately takes poſſeſſion of.* VII. *Here he draws together his auxiliary Troops.* VIII. *And afterwards returns to* Ruſpina, *to provide himſelf with Corn.* IX. *Whence preparing to ſail in queſt of his Tranſports, they unexpectedly appear before the Port.* XI. *Skirmiſhes between* Cæſar *and* Labienus *near* Ruſpina. XVII. Petreius *and* Piſo *advance to ſupport* Labienus, *but they are nevertheleſs all repulſed.* XVIII. *The number of* Labienus's *Troops, and his Preſumption.* XIX. Scipio *joins* Labienus, Cæſar *fortifies his Camp.* XXI. *Young* Pompey, *by* Cato's *Advice, prepares for War, but without ſucceſs.* XXII. Cæſar *ſuffers greatly for want of Corn.* XXIII. *King* Juba *marching to the aſſiſtance of* Scipio, *is forced to return to defend his own Kingdom againſt* Bogud. XXIV. Cæſar *reſolving to fight the Enemy, draws Troops together from all parts.* XXV. *The manner of training* Scipio's *Elephants.* XXVI. *One of* Cæſar's *Ships taken by the Enemy.* XXVII. Labienus *attacks* Leptis *in vain.* XXVIII. Scipio *draws out his Troops.* Cæſar *keeps within his Camp.* XXIX. *A great number of* Numidians *and* Getulians *deſert to* Cæſar. XXX. *The Town of* Acilla *demands a Garriſon from* Cæſar, *and is immediately inveſted by the Enemy.* XXXI. Cæſar *receives a Supply of Troops and Corn by Sea.* XXXII. *A Body of* Getulians, *ſent out as Scouts by* Scipio, *deſert to* Cæſar. XXXIII. Cato *ſends Supplies to* Scipio. *The City of* Tiſdra *demands a Garriſon of* Cæſar. XXXIV. Cæſar *makes choice of a new Camp, and ſtrengthens it with Works; which the Enemy advancing to retard, are repulſed with great Slaughter.* XXXVIII. *Upon which* Cæſar *draws out his Army; but the Enemy keep within their Camp.* XL. *The Siege of* Acilla *raiſed.* XLI. *The ſurpriſing Fortitude of one of* Cæſar's *Centurions, taken Priſoner by* Scipio; *and the Cruelty of that General.* XLII. *The great Miſchief done by a ſudden ſtorm of Rain.* XLIII. *King* Juba *arrives in* Scipio's *Camp at the head of a great Body of Troops.* XLIV. Cæſar *having diſlodged* Labienus, *ſeizes the Hill on which he was poſted.* XLV. Cæſar's *Works for the ſecurity of his Camp.* XLVI. Juba *and* Labienus *attacking a Party of* Cæſar's *Men, as they returned from the Works, are repulſed with great Slaughter.* XLVII. *Two Legions arrive to* Cæſar's *Aid.* XLVIII. Cæſar's *ſteddineſs in maintaining military Diſcipline.* XLIX. *The* Getulians *revolting from* Juba, *oblige him to divide his Forces.* L. Cæſar *feigns a deſign upon* Uzita, *whence a great many Perſons of illuſtrious Rank join him.* LI. Juba's *Pride.* LII. *Both Armies drawn up.* LIII. *The order of Battle on each ſide.* LIV. *After a few Skirmiſhes between the Horſe, both retire to their Camps.* LV. *Some of* Cæſar's *Ships burnt by the Enemy, and others taken.* LVI. Cæſar *embarking in perſon, follows the Enemy, defeats them, and returns to his Camp.* LVII. Cæſar *in want of Corn.* LVIII. *Which compels him to leave his Camp.* Scipio *purſues him.* LIX. *He poſſeſſes himſelf of* Zeta, *a Town beyond the Enemy's Camp.* LX. *The Enemy attacking him as he returns laden with Plunder, are repulſed.* LXI. *Difficulty of fighting with the* Numidians: Cæſar's *Contrivance for that purpoſe.* LXII. *The Town of* Vacca, *demanding a Garriſon of* Cæſar, *is plundered by King* Juba. LXIII. *The Enemy declining a Battle,* Cæſar *decamps, and repulſes the Troops ſent to ſet upon him in his march.* LXIV. *But not caring to beſiege* Sarſura, *he returns to his old Camp.* LXV. *The* Thabenenſes *demand* Cæſar's *Protection.* LXVI. Cæſar *receives freſh Succours.* LXVII. *A Battle of the Cavalry, in which* Cæſar *has the advantage.* LXVIII. *The Enemy ſtill declining an Engagement,* Cæſar *beſieges* Thapſus. LXIX. Scipio *attempts to relieve it.* LXX. Cæſar *encouraging his Men, and finding them full of Alacrity, attacks the Enemy.* LXXII. *The ſurpriſing Bravery of a private Soldier.* LXXIII. Scipio's *Army defeated, and almoſt totally cut off.* LXXIV. Cæſar *marches for* Utica. LXXV. *Whither* Scipio's *Cavalry had retired.* LXXVI. Cato *kills himſelf.* Utica *ſurrenders.* LXXVII. Cæſar *in his march to* Utica *poſſeſſes himſelf of* Uſceta *and* Adrumetum. LXXVIII. *He pardons the* Uticans. LXXIX. Juba *flying to* Zama, *is refuſed admittance.* LXXX. Zama, *and ſeveral of the King's Generals ſurrender to* Cæſar. LXXXI. Conſidius *ſurrenders* Tiſdra, *and* Vergilius Thapſus. LXXXII. *The death of* Juba *and* Petreius. LXXXIII. *Alſo of* Fauſtus *and* Afranius. LXXXIV. *And of* Scipio. LXXXV. Cæſar *converts* Juba's *Kingdom into a Province.* LXXXVI. *And returns to* Rome.

A. HIRTIUS PANSA's

COMMENTARIES

OF THE

AFRICAN WAR.

I. CÆSAR ſetting out from *Rome*, advanced by moderate Journeys towards *Sicily*; and continuing his march without intermiſſion, arrived on the nineteenth of *December* at *Lilybæum*. Deſigning to embark immediately, though he had only one Legion of new Levies, and not quite ſix hundred Horſe, he ordered his Tent to be pitched ſo near the Sea-ſide, that the Waves flowed up to the very foot of it. This he did with a view to take away all hopes of Delay, and keep his Men in readineſs at a Day or an Hour's Warning. The Wind at that time proving contrary, he nevertheleſs ſuffered none of the Soldiers or Mariners to come on Shore, that he might loſe no Opportunity of ſailing; the rather, becauſe the Inhabitants of the Province were perpetually talking of the mighty Forces of the Enemy; a Cavalry not to be numbred; four Legions headed by *Juba*, together with a great Body of light-armed Troops; ten Legions under the Command of *Scipio*; an hundred and twenty Elephants, and Fleets in abundance. Yet all theſe Reports alarmed him not, nor ought abated his Reſolution and Confidence. Meantime the Number of Gallies and Tranſports increaſed daily; the new levied Legions flocked in to him from all Parts; among the reſt the fifth, a veteran Legion, and about two thouſand Horſe.

II. HAVING got together ſix Legions, and about two thouſand Horſe; he embarked the Legions as faſt as they arrived, in the Gallies; and the Cavalry in the Tranſports. Then ſending the greateſt part of the Fleet before, with Orders to ſail for the Iſland of *Aponiana*, not far from *Lilybæum*; he himſelf continued a little longer in *Sicily*, to expoſe to publick Sale ſome confiſcated Eſtates. Leaving all other Affairs to the care of *Allienus* the Prætor, who then commanded in the Iſland; and ſtrictly charging him to uſe the utmoſt Expedition in embarking the remainder of the Troops; he ſet ſail the twenty-ſeventh of *December*, and ſoon came up with the reſt of the Fleet. As the Wind was favourable, and afforded a quick Paſſage, he arrived the fourth Day within ſight of *Africa*, attended by a few Gallies: for the Tranſports, being moſtly diſperſed and ſcattered by the Winds, were driven different ways.

Paſſing *Clupea* and *Neapolis* with the Fleet, he continued for ſome time to coaſt along the Shore, leaving many Towns and Caſtles behind him.

III. WHEN he came before *Adrumetum*, where the Enemy had a Garriſon commanded by *C. Conſidius*; and where *Cn. Piſo* appeared upon the Shore towards *Clupea*, with the Cavalry of *Adrumetum*, and about two thouſand *Moors*; having ſtopt a while facing the Port, 'till the reſt of the Fleet ſhould come up, he landed his Men, tho' their number at that time did not exceed three thouſand Foot, and an hundred and fifty Horſe. There encamping before the Town, he continued quiet in his Intrenchments, without offering any act of Hoſtility, or ſuffering his Men to plunder the Country. Meantime the Inhabitants manned the Walls, and aſſembled in great numbers before the Gates, to defend the Town, whoſe Garriſon amounted to two Legions. *Cæſar* having taken a view of the Place, and thoroughly examined its ſituation on all ſides, returned to his Camp. Some blamed his Conduct on this Occaſion, and charged him with a conſiderable Overſight, in not appointing a place of rendezvous to the Pilots and Captains of the Fleet, or at leaſt not delivering them ſealed Inſtructions, according to his uſual Cuſtom, which being opened at a certain time, might have directed them where to aſſemble. But in this *Cæſar* acted not without deſign: for as he knew of no Port in *Africa* that was clear of the Enemy's Forces, and where the Fleet might rendezvous in ſecurity, he choſe to rely entirely upon Fortune, and land where Occaſion offered.

IV. IN the mean time *L. Plancus*, one of *Cæſar*'s Lieutenants, deſired leave to treat with *Conſidius*, and try, if poſſible, to bring him to reaſon. Leave being granted accordingly, he wrote him a Letter, and ſent it into the Town by a Meſſenger. When the Meſſenger arrived, and preſented the Letter; *Conſidius* demanding whence it came, and being told from *Cæſar* the *Roman* General, anſwered: that he knew no General of the *Roman* Forces but *Scipio*. Then commanding the Meſſenger to be immediately ſlain in his preſence, he delivered the Letter unopened to a truſty Partizan, with Orders to carry it directly to *Scipio*.

V. *CÆSAR* had now continued a Day and a Night before the Town, without receiving any Anſwer from *Conſidius*; the reſt of the Forces were not yet arrived; his Cavalry was very inconſiderable; the Troops he had with him were moſtly new Levies, and not ſufficiently numerous to inveſt the Place; neither did he think it adviſeable, upon his firſt landing, to expoſe the Army to Wounds and Fatigue; more eſpecially, as the Town was ſtrongly fortified, extremely difficult of acceſs, and the Garriſon full of ſpirits, in expectation of a great Body of Horſe, who were ſaid to be upon their march to join them. For all theſe Reaſons he determined not to attempt a Siege; leſt, while he purſued that Deſign, the Enemy's Cavalry ſhould come behind and ſurround him. But as he was drawing off his Men, the Garriſon made a ſudden Sally; and *Juba*'s Horſe, whom he had ſent to receive their Pay, happening juſt then to come up, they jointly took poſſeſſion of the Camp *Cæſar* had left, and began to harraſs his Rear. This being perceived, the Legionaries immediately halted; and the Cavalry, tho' few in number, boldly charged the vaſt multitude of the Enemy. On this Occaſion it was, that leſs than thirty *Gallick* Horſe, by an incredible and aſtoniſhing effort of Valour, repulſed two thouſand *Moors*, and drove them quite within the Town. Having thus compelled

pelled the Enemy to retire, and ſhelter themſelves behind their Walls, *Cæſar* reſumed his intended march: but obſerving that they often repeated their Sallies, renewing the Purſuit from time to time, and again flying when attacked by the Horſe; he poſted ſome veteran Cohorts, with part of the Cavalry in the rear, to cover his Retreat, and ſo proceeded ſlowly on his march. The farther he advanced from *Adrumetum*, the leſs eager were the *Numidians* to purſue. Mean time Deputies arrived from the ſeveral Towns and Caſtles on the Road, offering to furniſh him with Corn, and receive his Commands. Towards the Evening of that Day, which was the firſt of *January*, he reached *Ruſpina*, and there fixed his Camp.

VI. THENCE he removed, and came before *Leptis*, a free City, and governed by its own Laws. Here he was alſo met by Deputies from the Town, who came in the name of the Inhabitants, to make an offer of their Submiſſion and Services. Whereupon placing Centurions and a Guard before the Gates, to prevent the Soldiers from entring, or offering violence to any of the Inhabitants; he himſelf encamped towards the Shore, not far diſtant from the Town. Hither by accident arrived ſome of the Gallies and Tranſports, by whom he was informed, that the reſt of the Fleet, uncertain what courſe to purſue, had been ſeen ſteering for *Utica*. This obliged him to keep with the Army near the Sea, and avoid marching into the inland Provinces, that he might be at hand to join his Troops upon their arrival. He likewiſe ſent the Cavalry back to their Ships, probably to hinder the Country from being plundered, and ordered freſh Water to be carried to them on board. Meanwhile the Rowers, who were employed in this ſervice, were ſuddenly and unexpectedly attacked by the *Mooriſh* Horſe, who killed ſome, and wounded many with their Darts. For the manner of theſe Barbarians is, to lie in ambuſh with their Horſes among the Valleys, and ſuddenly lanch upon an Enemy; they ſeldom chooſing to engage hand to hand in a Plain.

VII. IN the mean time *Cæſar* diſpatched Letters and Meſſengers into *Sardinia*, and the neighbouring Provinces, with Orders, as ſoon as the Letters came to hand, to ſend Supplies of Men, Corn, and warlike Stores; and having unloaded part of the Fleet, detached it with *Rabirius Poſthumus* into *Sicily*, to bring over the ſecond Embarkation. At the ſame time he ordered out ten Gallies, to get intelligence of the Tranſports that had miſſed their way, and maintain the freedom of the Sea. *C. Salluſtius Criſpus*, the Prætor, was likewiſe ſent out at the head of a Squadron, to ſeize *Cercina*, then in the hands of the Enemy, becauſe he heard there was great ſtore of Corn in that Iſland: In giving theſe Orders and Inſtructions, he uſed all poſſible Endeavours to leave no room for Excuſe or Delay. Mean-while having informed himſelf, from the Deſerters and Natives, of the condition of *Scipio* and his Followers; and underſtanding that they were at the whole Charge of maintaining *Juba*'s Cavalry; he could not but pity the infatuation of Men, who thus rather choſe to be Tributaries to the King of *Numidia*, than ſecurely enjoy their Fortunes at home with their Fellow-Citizens.

VIII. THE third of *January* he decamped; and leaving ſix Cohorts at *Leptis*, under the command of *Saſerna*, returned with the reſt of the Forces to *Ruſpina*, whence he had come the Day before. Here he depoſited the Baggage of the Army; and marching out with a light Body of Troops to forage, ordered the Inhabitants to follow with their Horſes and Carriages. Having by this

this means got together a great quantity of Corn, he came back to *Ruſpina*. His deſign was, as far as I can judge, that by keeping poſſeſſion of the maritime Cities, and providing them with Garriſons, he might ſecure a Retreat for his Fleet.

IX. LEAVING therefore *P. Saſerna*, the Brother of him who commanded at *Leptis*, to take charge of the Town with one Legion, and ordering all the Wood that could be found to be carried into the Place; he ſet out from *Ruſpina* with ſeven Cohorts, part of the veteran Legions, who had behaved ſo well in the Fleet under *Sulpicius* and *Vatinius*; and marching directly for the Port, which lies at about two miles diſtance, embarked with them in the Evening, without imparting his Intentions to the Army, who were extremely inquiſitive concerning the General's Deſign. His departure occaſioned the utmoſt Sadneſs and Conſternation among the Troops: for being few in number, moſtly new Levies, and thoſe not all ſuffered to land; they ſaw themſelves expoſed upon a foreign Coaſt, to the mighty Forces of a crafty Nation, ſupported by an innumerable Cavalry. Nor had they any Reſource in their preſent Circumſtances, or expectation of ſafety in their own Conduct; but derived all their Hope from the Alacrity, Vigour, and wonderful Chearfulneſs, that appeared in the General's Countenance: for he was of an intrepid Spirit, and behaved with undaunted Reſolution and Confidence. On his Conduct therefore they entirely relied, and promiſed themſelves to a Man, that under ſo able and experienced a Leader, all Difficulties would vaniſh before them.

X. *CÆSAR* having continued the whole night on board, about Day-break prepared to ſet ſail; when all on a ſudden, the part of the Fleet that had given ſo much Concern, appeared unexpectedly in view. Wherefore ordering his Men to quit their Ships immediately, and receive the reſt of the Troops in Arms upon the Shore; he made the new Fleet enter the Port with the utmoſt Diligence; and landing all the Forces, Horſe and Foot, returned again to *Ruſpina*. Here he eſtabliſhed his Camp; and taking with him thirty Cohorts without Baggage, advanced into the Country to forage. Thus was *Cæſar*'s Purpoſe at length diſcovered: that he meant, unknown to the Enemy, to have ſailed to the aſſiſtance of the Tranſports, that had miſſed their way, leſt they ſhould unexpectedly fall in with the *African* Fleet. Nor would he even impart his Deſign to his own Soldiers left behind in Garriſon; from an Apprehenſion, that when they came to reflect upon their own weakneſs, and the ſtrength of the Enemy, they might too much give way to Fear.

XI. *CÆSAR* had not marched above three miles from his Camp, when he was informed by his Scouts, and ſome advanced Parties of Horſe, that the Enemy's Forces were in view. At the ſame time a great Cloud of Duſt began to appear. Upon this Intelligence, *Cæſar* ordered all his Horſe, of which he had at that time but a very ſmall number, to advance; as likewiſe his Archers, only a few of whom had followed him from the Camp; and the Legions to march after him in order of Battle: while he went forward at the head of a ſmall Party. Soon after, having diſcovered the Enemy at ſome diſtance, he commanded the Soldiers to repair to their Arms, and prepare for Battle. Their number in all did not exceed thirty Cohorts, with about four hundred Horſe, and the Archers.

XII.

A. *Cæsar's Army in one Line.* B. *The Archers in the Front.* C. *His Cavalry on the right Wi* D. *T*
G. *His Cavalry on the left.* H. *Cæsar's Troops formed into an Orb, with the Cavalry in the mi* dle. I.

N.º 71.



D. *The Cavalry on the left.* E. *Labienus's Order of Battle.* F. *His Cavalry on the right Wing.*
dle. I. *Cæsar's Archers.* K. *Cæsar's Legionary Soldiers.* L. *Labienus's Army inclosing Cæsar's Orb*

XII. MEAN-WHILE the Enemy, under the command of *Labienus*, and the two *Pacidii*, drew up with a very large Front, conſiſting moſtly of Horſe, whom they intermixed with light-armed *Numidians* and Archers; forming themſelves in ſuch cloſe order, that *Cæſar*'s Army at a diſtance miſtook them all for Infantry; and ſtrengthening their right and left with many Squadrons of Horſe. *Cæſar* drew up his Army in one Line, obliged to it by the ſmallneſs of his numbers; covering his front with the Archers, and placing his Cavalry in the two Wings, with particular Inſtructions not to ſuffer themſelves to be ſurrounded by the Enemy's numerous Horſe; for he imagined that he was to have to do only with Infantry.

XIII. AS both ſides ſtood in expectation of the Signal, and *Cæſar* choſe to continue without ſtirring from his Poſt, as being ſenſible, that with ſuch few Troops, againſt ſo great a Force, he muſt depend more on Conduct and Contrivance than Strength; on a ſudden the Enemy began to extend themſelves, ſpread out upon the Hills on every ſide, and prepare to ſurround our Horſe, who were hardly able to maintain their Ground againſt them. Meanwhile both the main Bodies advancing to engage, the Enemy's Cavalry, intermixed with ſome light-armed *Numidians*, ſuddenly ſprung forward, and attacked the Legions with a ſhower of Darts. Our Men preparing to return the Charge, their Horſe retreated a little, while the Foot continued to maintain their Ground, 'till the others having rallied, came on again with freſh Vigour to ſuſtain them.

XIV. *CÆSAR* perceiving that his Ranks were in danger of being broken by this new way of fighting, (for our Foot, in purſuing the Enemy's Horſe as they retreated, being forced to advance a conſiderable way beyond their Colours, were flanked by the light-armed *Numidians*; while at the ſame time they could do but little execution againſt the Cavalry, by reaſon of the quickneſs wherewith they retired,) gave expreſs Orders, that no Soldier ſhould advance above four Foot beyond the Enſigns. Mean-while *Labienus*'s Cavalry confiding in their numbers, endeavoured to ſurround thoſe of *Cæſar*; who being few in number, and overpowered by the multitude of the Enemy, were forced to give ground a little, their Horſes being almoſt all wounded. The Enemy encouraged by this, preſſed on more and more; ſo that in an inſtant the Legions being ſurrounded on all ſides, were obliged to caſt themſelves into an Orb, and fight as if incloſed with Barriers.

XV. *LABIENUS* with his Head uncovered, advanced on horſeback to the front of the Battle to encourage his Men. Sometimes addreſſing *Cæſar*'s Legions: "Soho you raw Soldiers there, ſays he, why ſo fierce? Has he in-
"fatuated you too with his Words? Truly he has brought you into a fine
"Condition: I pity you ſincerely." Upon this one of the Soldiers: "I am
"none of your raw Warriors, but a Veteran of the tenth Legion. Where's
"your Standard? replied *Labienus*. I'll ſoon make you ſenſible who I am,
"anſwered the Soldier." Then pulling off his Helmet to diſcover himſelf, he threw a Javelin with all his ſtrength at *Labienus*, which wounding his Horſe ſeverely in the Breaſt: "Know, *Labienus*, ſays he, that this Dart was thrown
"by a Soldier of the tenth Legion." However, the whole Army was not a little daunted, eſpecially the new Levies; and began to caſt their Eyes upon *Cæſar*, minding nothing for the preſent but to defend themſelves from the Enemy's Darts.

XVI. *CÆSAR* mean-while perceiving the Enemy's Deſign, endeavoured to extend his order of Battle as much as poſſible, directing the Cohorts to face about alternately to the right and left. By this means he broke the Enemy's Circle with his right and left Wings; and attacking one part of them thus ſeparated from the other, with his Horſe and Foot, at laſt put them to flight. He purſued them but a little way, fearing an Ambuſcade, and returned again to his own Men. The ſame was done by the other Diviſion of *Cæſar*'s Horſe and Foot; ſo that the Enemy being driven back on all ſides, he retreated towards his Camp in order of Battle.

XVII. MEAN-TIME *M. Petreius*, and *Cn. Piſo*, with eleven hundred ſelect *Numidian* Horſe, and a conſiderable Body of Foot, arrived to the aſſiſtance of the Enemy: who recovering from their Terror upon this Reinforcement, and again reſuming Courage, fell upon the rear of the Legions as they retreated, and endeavoured to hinder them from reaching their Camp. *Cæſar* perceiving this, ordered his Men to wheel about and renew the Battle. As the Enemy ſtill purſued their former Plan, and avoided a cloſe Engagement; *Cæſar* conſidering that the Horſes had not yet recovered the fatigue of their late Voyage; that they were beſides weakened with Thirſt, Wearineſs, and Wounds, and of courſe unfit for a vigorous and long Purſuit, which even the time of the Day would not allow, ordered both Horſe and Foot to fall at once briskly upon the Enemy, and not ſlacken the Purſuit 'till they had driven them quite beyond the fartheſt Hills, and taken poſſeſſion of them themſelves. Accordingly upon a Signal given, the Enemy fighting in a faint and careleſs manner, he ſuddenly charged them with his Horſe and Foot; who in a moment driving them from the Field, and over the adjoining Hill, kept poſſeſſion of that Poſt for ſome time, and then retired ſlowly in order of Battle to their Camp. The Enemy, who in this laſt Attack had been very rudely handled, thought proper likewiſe to do the ſame.

XVIII. THE Action being over, a great number of Deſerters of all kinds flocked to *Cæſar*'s Camp, beſides multitudes of Horſe and Foot that were made Priſoners. By them we learnt, that it was the deſign of the Enemy to have aſtoniſhed our raw Troops with their new and uncommon manner of fighting, and after ſurrounding them with their Cavalry, to have cut them to pieces, as they had done *Curio*; and that they had marched againſt us expreſly with that Intention. *Labienus* had even ſaid in the Council of War, that he would lead ſuch a numerous Body of Troops againſt us, as ſhould fatigue us with the very Slaughter, and defeat us even in the boſom of Victory; for he relied more on the Number than the Valour of his Troops. He had heard of the Mutiny of the veteran Legions at *Rome*, and their refuſal to go into *Africa*; and was likewiſe well aſſured of the Fidelity of his Troops, who had ſerved three Years under him in *Africa*. He had a great number of *Numidian* Cavalry and light-armed Troops, beſides the *Gallick* and *German* Horſe, whom he had drawn together out of the remains of *Pompey*'s Army, and carried over with him from *Brunduſium*; he had likewiſe the Freed-men raiſed in the Country, and trained to fight on horſeback; and the multitude of *Juba*'s Forces, his hundred and twenty Elephants, his innumerable Cavalry and Legionaries, amounting to above twelve thouſand. Emboldened by the hope ſuch mighty Forces raiſed in him; on the fourth of *January*, ſix Days after *Cæſar*'s arrival, he came againſt him with ſixteen hundred *Gallick* and *German* Horſe, nine hundred under *Petreius*, eight thouſand *Numidians*, four times that number of light



A. *Cæsar's Army facing both Ways to withstand the Enemy*



...emy in Front and Rear. C. *Labienus's Troops put to Flight.*

light-armed Foot, with a multitude of Archers and Slingers. The Battle laſted from eleven 'till Sun-ſet, during which *Petreius* receiving a dangerous Wound, was obliged to quit the Field.

XIX. MEAN-TIME *Cæſar* fortified his Camp with much greater care, reinforced the Guards, and threw up two Intrenchments; one from *Ruſpina*, quite to the Sea; the other from his Camp to the Sea likewiſe; to ſecure the Communication, and receive Supplies without danger. He landed a great number of Darts and military Engines, armed part of the Mariners, *Gauls*, *Rhodians*, and others, that after the example of the Enemy, he might have a number of light-armed Troops to intermix with his Cavalry. He likewiſe ſtrengthened his Army with a great number of *Syrian* and *Iturean* Archers, whom he drew from the Fleet into his Camp: for he underſtood, that within three Days *Scipio* was expected with all his Forces, conſiſting of eight Legions, and four thouſand Horſe. At the ſame time he eſtabliſhed Work-ſhops, made a great number of Darts and Arrows, provided himſelf with leaden Bullets and Paliſades, wrote to *Sicily* for Hurdles and Wood to make Rams, becauſe he had none in *Africa*, and likewiſe gave Orders for ſending Corn; for the Harveſt in that Country was like to be inconſiderable, the Enemy having taken all the Labourers into their Service the Year before, and ſtored up the Grain in a few fortified Towns, after demoliſhing the reſt, forcing the Inhabitants into their garriſoned Places, and laying waſte the whole Country.

XX. IN this Neceſſity, by ſoothing the People, he obtained a ſmall Supply, and husbanded it with care. Mean-time he was very exact in viſiting the Works, and relieving the Guards. *Labienus* ſent his ſick and wounded, of which the number was very conſiderable, in Waggons to *Adrumetum*. Meanwhile *Cæſar*'s Tranſports, unacquainted with the Coaſt, or where their General had landed, wandered up and down in great uncertainty; and being attacked one after another by the Enemy's Coaſters, were for the moſt part either taken or burnt. *Cæſar* being informed of this, ſtationed his Fleet along the Coaſt and Iſlands, for the ſecurity of his Convoys.

XXI. MEAN-WHILE *M. Cato*, who commanded in *Utica*, never ceaſed urging and exhorting young *Pompey*, in Words to this effect: "Your "Father, when he was at your age, and obſerved the Commonwealth op- "preſſed by wicked and daring Men, and the honeſt Party either ſlain, or "driven by Baniſhment from their Country and Relations; incited by the "greatneſs of his Mind, and the love of Glory; tho' then very young, and "only a private Man, had yet the Courage to rally the remains of his Fa- "ther's Army, and deliver *Rome* from the Yoke of Slavery and Tyranny "under which it groaned. He alſo recovered *Sicily*, *Africa*, *Numidia*, *Mau- "ritania*, with amazing Diſpatch; and by that means gained an illuſtrious "and extenſive Reputation among all Nations, and triumphed at three and "twenty while but a *Roman* Knight. Nor did he enter upon the admini- "ſtration of publick Affairs, diſtinguiſhed by the ſhining Exploits of his Fa- "ther, or the Fame and Reputation of his Anceſtors, or the Honours and "Dignities of the State. You, on the contrary, poſſeſſed of theſe Honours, "and the Reputation acquired by your Father; ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed by "your own Induſtry and greatneſs of Mind; will you not beſtir yourſelf, "join your Father's Friends, and vindicate your own Liberty, that of the "Commonwealth, and of every good and honeſt Man." The Youth, rouſed by

by the Remonſtrances of that grave and worthy Senator, got together about thirty ſail of all ſorts, of which ſome few were Ships of War, and ſailing from *Utica* to *Mauritania*, invaded the Kingdom of *Bogud*. And leaving his Baggage behind him, with an Army of two thouſand Men, partly Freemen, partly Slaves, ſome armed, ſome not, approached the Town of *Aſcurum*, in which the King had a Garriſon. The Inhabitants ſuffered him to advance to the very Walls and Gates; when ſallying out all on a ſudden, they drove him quite back to his Ships. This ill Succeſs determined him to leave that Coaſt, nor did he afterwards land in any Place, but ſteered directly for the *Balearean* Iſles.

XXII. MEAN-TIME *Scipio*, leaving a ſtrong Garriſon at *Utica*, began his march with the Forces we have deſcribed above, and encamped firſt at *Adrumetum*; when after a ſtay of a few Days, ſetting out in the night, he joined *Petreius* and *Labienus*, lodging all the Forces in one Camp, about three miles diſtant from *Cæſar*'s. Their Cavalry were making continual Excurſions to our very Works, intercepted thoſe who ventured too far in queſt of Wood or Water, and obliged us to keep within our Intrenchments. This ſoon occaſioned a great ſcarcity of Proviſions among *Cæſar*'s Men, becauſe no Supplies had yet arrived from *Sicily* or *Sardinia*. The Seaſon too was dangerous for Navigation, and he did not poſſeſs above ſix miles every way in *Africa*, which alſo greatly ſtraitned him for want of Forage. The veteran Soldiers and Cavalry, who had been engaged in many Wars both by Sea and Land, and often ſtruggled with Wants and Misfortunes of this kind, gathering Sea-weed, and waſhing it in freſh Water, by that means ſubſiſted their Horſes and Cattle.

XXIII. WHILE things were in this ſituation, King *Juba* being informed of *Cæſar*'s Difficulties, and the few Troops he had with him, reſolved not to allow him time to remedy his Wants, or increaſe his Army. Accordingly he left his Kingdom at the head of a great Body of Horſe and Foot, and marched to join his Allies. Mean-time *P. Sitius*, and King *Bogud*, having intelligence of *Juba*'s march; joined their Forces, entered *Numidia*, and laying ſiege to *Cirta*, the moſt opulent City in the Country, carried it in a few Days, with two others belonging to the *Getulians*. They had offered the Inhabitants leave to depart in ſafety, if they would peaceably deliver up the Towns: but theſe Conditions being rejected, they were taken by ſtorm, and the Citizens all put to the Sword. They then fell to ravaging the Country, and laying all the Cities under Contribution: of which *Juba* having intelligence; tho' he was upon the point of joining *Scipio* and the other Chiefs, he determined to return to the relief of his own Kingdom, rather than run the hazard of being driven from it while he was aſſiſting others, and perhaps after all miſcarry too in his Deſigns againſt *Cæſar*. He therefore retired with his Troops, leaving only thirty Elephants behind him, and marched to the relief of his own Cities and Territories.

XXIV. MEAN-WHILE *Cæſar*, knowing that the Province ſtill doubted of his arrival, and imagined that not himſelf in perſon, but ſome of his Lieutenants had come over with the Forces lately ſent; diſpatched Letters to all the ſeveral States, to inform them of his preſence. Upon this many Perſons of rank fled to his Camp, complaining of the Barbarity and Cruelty of the Enemy. Hitherto he had continued quiet in his Poſt; but touched with their Fears, and a ſenſe of their Sufferings, he reſolved to take the Field

as

as ſoon as the Weather would permit, and he could draw his Troops together. He immediately diſpatched Letters into *Sicily*, to *Allienus* and *Rabirius Poſtumus* the Prætors, that without Delay or Excuſe, either of the Winter or the Winds, they muſt ſend over the reſt of the Troops, to ſave *Africa* from utter Ruin; becauſe without ſome ſpeedy Remedy, not a ſingle Houſe would be left ſtanding, nor any thing eſcape the Fury and Ravages of the Enemy. But ſuch was his impatience, and ſo long did the time appear, that from the Day the Letters were ſent, he complained without ceaſing of the Delay of the Fleet, and had his Eyes Night and Day turned towards the Sea. Nor ought we to wonder at his Behaviour on this occaſion: for he ſaw the Villages burnt, the Country laid waſte, the Cattle deſtroyed, the Towns plundered, the principal Citizens either ſlain or put in Chains, and their Children dragged into Servitude under the Name of Hoſtages; nor could he, amidſt all this Scene of Miſery, afford any Relief to thoſe who implored his Protection, becauſe of the ſmall Number of his Forces. He kept the Soldiers however at work upon the Intrenchments, built Forts and Redoubts, and carried on his Lines quite to the Sea.

XXV. MEAN-WHILE *Scipio* made uſe of the following Contrivance for training and diſciplining his Elephants. He drew up two Parties in order of Battle; one of Slingers, who were to act as Enemies, and diſcharge ſmall Stones againſt the Elephants; and fronting them, the Elephants themſelves, in one Line, with his whole Army behind them in Battle-Array; that when the Enemy, by their Diſcharge of Stones, had frightned the Elephants, and forced them to turn upon their own Men, they might again be made to face the Enemy, by the Vollies of Stones from the Army behind them. The Work however went on but ſlowly, becauſe theſe Animals, after many Years teaching, are often no leſs prejudicial to thoſe who bring them into the Field, than to the Enemy againſt whom they were intended.

XXVI. WHILST the two Generals were thus employed near *Ruſpina*, *C. Virgilius Prætorius*, who commanded in *Thapſus*, a maritime City, obſerving ſome of *Cæſar*'s Tranſports that had miſſed their way, uncertain where he had landed or held his Camp; and thinking that a fair Opportunity offered of deſtroying them, manned a Galley that was in the Port with Soldiers and Archers, and joining with it a few armed Barks, began to purſue *Cæſar*'s Ships. Though he was repulſed on ſeveral Occaſions he ſtill purſued his Deſign, and at laſt fell in with one, on board of which were two young *Spaniards*, of the name of *Titus*, who were Tribunes of the fifth Legion, and whoſe Father had been made a Senator by *Cæſar*. There was with them a Centurion of the ſame Legion, *T. Salienus* by name, who had inveſted the Houſe of *M. Meſſala*, *Cæſar*'s Lieutenant, at *Meſſana*, and expreſſed himſelf in very ſeditious Language, nay even ſeized the Money and Ornaments deſtined for *Cæſar*'s Triumph, and for that reaſon dreaded his Reſentment. He, conſcious of his Demerits, perſuaded the young Men to ſurrender themſelves to *Virgilius*, by whom they were ſent under a ſtrong Guard to *Scipio*, and three Days after put to death. It is ſaid that the elder *Titus* begged of the Centurions who were charged with the Execution, that he might be firſt put to death; which being eaſily granted, they both ſuffered according to their Sentence.

XXVII. THE Cavalry that mounted Guard in the two Camps were continually skirmiſhing with one another. Sometimes too the *German* and *Gallick*

Cavalry of *Labienus* entered into Diſcourſe with thoſe of *Cæſar*. Mean-time *Labienus*, with a Party of Horſe, endeavoured to ſurpriſe the Town of *Leptis*, which *Saſerna* guarded with three Cohorts; but was eaſily repulſed, becauſe the Town was ſtrongly fortified, and well provided with warlike Engines. But as ſeveral times he renewed the Attempt; one Day, as a ſtrong Squadron of the Enemy had poſted themſelves before the Gate, their Officer being ſlain by an Arrow diſcharged from a Scorpion, the reſt were terrified and took to flight; by which means the Town was delivered from any further Attempts.

XXVIII. AT the ſame time *Scipio* daily drew up his Troops in order of Battle, about three hundred Paces from his Camp; and after continuing in Arms the greateſt part of the Day, retreated again to his Camp in the Evening. This he did ſeveral times, no one mean-while offering to ſtir out of *Cæſar*'s Camp, or approach his Forces; which Forbearance and Tranquillity gave him ſuch a Contempt of *Cæſar* and his Army, that drawing out all his Forces, and his thirty Elephants with Towers on their Backs, and extending his Horſe and Foot as wide as poſſible, he approached quite up to *Cæſar*'s Intrenchments. Upon this *Cæſar* quietly, and without Noiſe or Confuſion, recalled to his Camp all that were gone out either in queſt of Forage, Wood, or to work upon the Fortifications: he likewiſe ordered the Cavalry that were upon Guard, not to quit their Poſt till the Enemy were within reach of Dart; and if they then perſiſted to advance, to retire in good Order within the Intrenchments. The reſt of the Cavalry were enjoined to hold themſelves in readineſs upon the firſt notice. Theſe Orders were not given by himſelf in perſon, or after viewing the Diſpoſition of the Enemy from the Rampart: but ſitting in his Tent, and informing himſelf of their Motions by his Scouts, ſuch was his conſummate Knowledge in the Art of War, that he gave all the neceſſary Directions by his Officers. He very well knew, that, whatever Confidence the Enemy might have in their Numbers, they would yet never dare to attack the Camp of a General, who had ſo often repulſed, terrified, and put them to flight; who had frequently pardoned and granted them their Lives; and whoſe very Name had Weight and Authority enough to intimidate their Army. He was beſides well intrenched with a high Rampart and deep Ditch, the Approaches to which were rendered ſo difficult, by the ſharp Spikes which he had diſpoſed in a very artful manner, that they were even ſufficient of themſelves to keep off the Enemy. He was likewiſe well provided with military Engines, and all ſorts of Weapons neceſſary for a vigorous Defence, which compenſated in ſome meaſure for the fewneſs of his Troops, and the inexperience of his new Levies. His forbearance therefore did not proceed from Fear, or any diſtruſt of the Valour of his Troops; but becauſe he was unwilling to purchaſe a bloody Victory over the ſhattered Remains of his diſperſed Enemies, after ſuch a ſeries of great Actions, Conqueſts, and Triumphs; and therefore reſolved to bear their Inſults and Bravadoes, till the Arrival of his veteran Legions by the ſecond Embarkation.

XXIX. *SCIPIO*, after a ſhort ſtay before the Intrenchments, as if in contempt of *Cæſar*, withdrew ſlowly to his Camp; and having called the Soldiers together, enlarged upon the Terror and Deſpair of the Enemy: when encouraging his Men, he aſſured them of a compleat Victory in a ſhort time. *Cæſar* made his Soldiers again return to the Works, and under pretence of fortifying his Camp, inured the new Levies to Labour and Fatigue. Mean-time the *Numidians* and *Getulians* deſerted daily from *Scipio*'s Camp. Part returned home; part

part came over to *Cæſar*, becauſe they underſtood he was related to *C. Marius*, from whom their Anceſtors had received conſiderable Favours. Of theſe he ſelected ſome of diſtinguiſhed Rank, and ſent them home with Letters to their Countrymen, exhorting them to levy Troops for their own defence, and not liſten to the Suggeſtions of his Enemies.

XXX. WHILE theſe things paſs near *Ruſpina*, Deputies from *Acilla*, and all the neighbouring Towns, arrive in *Cæſar*'s Camp, with offers of Submiſſion, and to ſupply him with Corn and other Neceſſaries, if he would ſend Garriſons to protect them from the Enemy. *Cæſar* readily complied with their Demands, and having aſſigned a Garriſon, ſent *C. Meſſius*, who had been Ædile, to command in *Acilla*. Upon Intelligence of this, *Conſidius Longus*, who was at *Adrumetum* with two Legions and ſeven hundred Horſe, leaving a Garriſon in that City, poſted to *Acilla* at the head of eight Cohorts: but *Meſſius* having accompliſhed his march with great expedition, arrived firſt at the Place. When *Conſidius* therefore approached, and found *Cæſar*'s Garriſon in poſſeſſion of the Town, not daring to make any Attempt, he returned again to *Adrumetum*. But ſome Days after, *Labienus* having ſent him a Reinforcement of Horſe, he found himſelf in a condition to renew the Siege.

XXXI. MUCH about the ſame time *C. Salluſtius Criſpus*, who, as we have ſeen, had been ſent a few Days before to *Cercina* with a Fleet, arrived in that Iſland. Upon which *C. Decimus* the Quæſtor, who with a ſtrong Party of his own Domeſticks, had charge of the Magazines erected there, went on board a ſmall Veſſel and fled. *Salluſtius* mean-while was well received by the *Cercinates*, and finding great ſtore of Corn in the Iſland, loaded all the Ships then in the Port, whoſe number was very conſiderable, and diſpatched them to *Cæſar*'s Camp. At the ſame time *Alienus* the Proconſul, put on board the Tranſports at *Lilybæum*, the thirteenth and fourteenth Legions, with eight hundred *Gallick* Horſe, and a thouſand Archers and Slingers, and ſent them over into *Africa*. This Fleet meeting with a favourable Wind, arrived in four Days at *Ruſpina*, where *Cæſar* had his Camp. Thus he experienced a double Pleaſure on this Occaſion, receiving at one and the ſame time, both a ſupply of Proviſions, and a reinforcement of Troops; which animated the Soldiers, and delivered them from the apprehenſions of Want. Having landed the Legions and Cavalry, he allowed them ſome time to recover from the Fatigue and Sickneſs of their Voyage, and then diſtributed them into the Forts, and along the Works.

XXXII. *SCIPIO* and the other Generals were greatly ſurpriſed at *Cæſar*'s Conduct, and could not conceive how one, who had always been forward and active in War, ſhould all of a ſudden change his Meaſures, which they therefore ſuſpected muſt proceed from ſome very powerful Reaſons. Uneaſy and diſturbed to ſee him ſo patient, they made choice of two *Getulians*, on whoſe Fidelity they thought they could rely; and promiſing them great Rewards, ſent them under the name of Deſerters, to get intelligence of *Cæſar*'s Deſigns. When they were brought before him, they begged they might have leave to ſpeak without offence; which being granted; "It is now a long time, great Gene-
"ral, ſaid they, ſince many of us *Getulians*, Clients of *C. Marius*, and al-
"moſt all *Roman* Citizens of the fourth and ſixth Legions, have wiſhed for
"an Opportunity to come over to you; but have hitherto been prevented by
"the Guards of *Numidian* Horſe. Now we gladly embrace the Occaſion,
being

" being ſent by *Scipio* under the name of Deſerters, to diſcover what Ditches " and Traps you have prepared for his Elephants, how you intend to oppoſe " theſe Animals, and what Diſpoſitions you are making for Battle." *Cæſar* commended them, rewarded them liberally, and ſent them to the other Deſerters. We had ſoon a Proof of the truth of what they had advanced; for next Day a great many Soldiers of thoſe Legions mentioned by the *Getulians*, deſerted to *Cæſar*'s Camp.

XXXIII. WHILST Affairs were in this poſture at *Ruſpina*, *M. Cato*, who commanded in *Utica*, was daily enliſting Freed-men, *Africans*, Slaves, and all that were of age to bear Arms, and ſending them without intermiſſion to *Scipio*'s Camp. Mean-while Deputies from the Town of *Tiſdra* came to *Cæſar*, to inform him, that ſome *Italian* Merchants had brought three hundred thouſand Buſhels of Corn into that City; and to demand a Garriſon, as well for their own Defence, as to ſecure the Corn. *Cæſar* thanked the Deputies, promiſed to ſend the Garriſon they deſired; and having encouraged them, ſent them back to their Fellow-Citizens. Mean-time *P. Sitius* entered *Numidia* with his Troops, and made himſelf maſter of a Caſtle ſituated on a Mountain, where *Juba* had laid up a great quantity of Proviſions, and other things neceſſary for carrying on the War.

XXXIV. *CÆSAR* having increaſed his Forces with two veteran Legions, and all the Cavalry and light-armed Troops that had arrived in the ſecond Embarkation, detached ſix Tranſports to *Lilybæum*, to bring over the reſt of the Army. On the twenty-ſeventh of *January*, ordering the Scouts and Lictors to attend him at ſix in the Evening, he drew out all the Legions at midnight, and directed his march towards *Ruſpina*, where he had a Garriſon, and which had firſt declared in his favour, no one knowing or having the leaſt ſuſpicion of his Deſign. Thence he continued his rout by the left of the Camp along the Sea, and paſſed a little declivity, which opened into a fine Plain, extending fifteen miles, and bordered by a chain of Mountains of moderate height, that formed a kind of Theatre. In this Ridge were ſome Hills that roſe higher than the reſt, where Forts and Watch-Towers had formerly been erected, and at the fartheſt of which *Scipio*'s Out-guards were poſted.

XXXV. *CÆSAR* having gained the Ridge, began to raiſe Redoubts upon the ſeveral Eminences, which he executed in leſs than half an Hour. When he was near the laſt, which bordered on the Enemy's Camp, and where, as we have ſaid, *Scipio* had his Out-guard of *Numidians*; he ſtopped a moment: and having taken a view of the Ground, and poſted his Cavalry in the moſt commodious ſituation, he ordered the Legions to throw up an Intrenchment along the middle of the Ridge, from the Place at which he was arrived, to that whence he ſet out. This being obſerved by *Scipio* and *Labienus*, they drew all their Cavalry out of the Camp, formed them in order of Battle; and advancing about a thouſand Paces, poſted their Infantry by way of a ſecond Line, ſomewhat leſs than half a mile from their Camp.

XXXVI. *CÆSAR* unmoved by the appearance of the Enemy's Forces, encouraged his Men to go on with the Work. But when he perceived that they were within fifteen hundred Paces of the Intrenchment, and that their deſign was to interrupt and diſturb the Soldiers, and oblige him to draw them off from the Works; he ordered a Squadron of *Spaniſh* Cavalry, ſuſtained by ſome

A. *Ruspina, a Town poſſeſs'd by Cæsar.* B. *The Port of Ruspina.* C. *The Intrenchment thrown up by Cæsar fro*
F. *The Camp of Scipio and Labienus.* G. *Cæsar's Army marching to take Poſſeſsion of the Mountains.* H. *The Fo*
Ridge from the Place at which Cæsar was arrived, to that whence he set out. K. *Cæsar's Cavalry poſted to*
Outguard of Numidians. M. *Scipio's Legions drawn up in Order of Battle, with Design to stop the Progreſs*
the Hill near Cæsar's Intrenchment. O. *The Villa which hinder'd Labienus from seeing that he was surrounded*



sar from Ruspina to the Sea. D. Cæsar's Camp. E. The Intrenchment reaching from the Camp to ye Town
. The Forts and Watch Towers upon the Hills. I. The Intrenchment thrown up along the middle of the
ted to cover the Troops that were at Work upon the Intrenchment. L. The Hill where Scipio had his
rogress of Cæsar's Works. N. Labienus advancing to succour the Numidians who had been driven from
unded by Cæsar's Horse. P. Cæsar's Legions in Order of Battle. Q. Cæsar's Horse sent to intercept Labienus's Re-
turn.

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ſome light-armed Infantry, to attack the *Numidian* Guard upon the neareſt Eminence, and drive them from that Poſt. They eaſily poſſeſſed themſelves of the Place, the *Numidians* being partly killed, and partly made Priſoners. This being perceived by *Labienus*, that he might the more effectually ſuccour the Fugitives, he wheeled off almoſt the whole right Wing of the Horſe. *Cæſar* waited 'till he was at a conſiderable diſtance from his own Men, and then detached his left Wing to intercept his return.

XXXVII. IN the Plain where this happened was a large Villa with four Turrets, which prevented *Labienus* from ſeeing that he was ſurrounded. He had therefore no apprehenſion of the approach of *Cæſar*'s Horſe, 'till he found himſelf charged in the rear; which ſtruck ſuch a ſudden terror into the *Numidian* Cavalry, that they immediately betook themſelves to flight. The *Gauls* and *Germans* who ſtood their Ground, being ſurrounded on all ſides, were entirely cut off. This being perceived by *Scipio*'s Legions, who were drawn up in order of Battle before the Camp, they fled in the utmoſt Terror and Confuſion. *Scipio* and his Forces being driven from the Plain and the Hills, *Cæſar* ſounded a Retreat, and ordered all the Cavalry to retire behind the Works. When the Field was cleared, he could not forbear admiring the huge Bodies of the *Gauls* and *Germans*, who partly induced by the Authority of *Labienus*, had followed him out of *Gaul*; partly had been drawn over by Promiſes and Rewards. Some being made Priſoners in the Battle with *Curio*, and having their Lives granted them, continued faithful out of Gratitude. Their Bodies of ſurpriſing ſhape and largeneſs, lay ſcattered all over the Plain.

XXXVIII. NEXT Day *Cæſar* drew all his Forces together, and formed them in order of Battle upon the Plain. *Scipio* diſcouraged by ſo unexpected a Check, and the numbers of his wounded and ſlain, kept within his Lines. *Cæſar* with his Army in Battalia, marched along the roots of the Hills, and gradually approached his Trenches. The Legions were by this time got within a mile of *Uzita*, a Town poſſeſſed by *Scipio*, whence he had his Water, and other Conveniences for his Army. Reſolving therefore to preſerve it at all hazards, he brought forth his whole Army, and drew them up in four Lines, forming the firſt of Cavalry, ſupported by Elephants with Caſtles on their Backs. *Cæſar* believing that *Scipio* approached with deſign to give Battle, continued where he was poſted not far from the Town. *Scipio* mean-while having the Town in the center of his front, extended his two Wings where were his Elephants, in full view of our Army.

XXXIX. WHEN *Cæſar* had waited 'till Sun-ſet, without finding that *Scipio* ſtirred from his Poſt; who ſeemed rather diſpoſed to defend himſelf by his advantageous Situation, than hazard a Battle in the open Field; he did not think proper to advance farther that Day, becauſe the Enemy had a ſtrong Garriſon of *Numidians* in the Town, which beſides covered the center of their front; and he foreſaw great Difficulty in forming at the ſame time an Attack upon the Town, and oppoſing their right and left with the diſadvantage of the Ground: eſpecially as the Soldiers had continued under Arms, and faſted ſince Morning. Having therefore led back his Troops to their Camp, he reſolved next Day to extend his Lines nearer the Town.

XL. MEAN-TIME *Conſidius*, who beſieged eight mercenary Cohorts of *Numidians* and *Getulians* in *Acilla*, where *C. Meſſius* commanded; after

continuing long before the Place, and ſeeing all his Works burnt and deſtroyed by the Enemy: upon the Report of the late Battle of the Cavalry; ſet fire to his Corn, deſtroyed his Wine, Oil, and other Stores; and abandoning the Siege of *Acilla*, divided his Forces with *Scipio*, and retired thro' the Kingdom of *Juba* to *Adrumetum*.

XLI. MEAN-WHILE one of the Tranſports belonging to the ſecond Embarkation, in which were *Q. Cominius* and *L. Ticida* a *Roman* Knight, being ſeparated from the reſt of the Fleet in a Storm, and driven to *Thapſus*, was taken by *Virgilius*, and all the Perſons on board ſent to *Scipio*. A three-benched Galley likewiſe, belonging to the ſame Fleet, being forced by the Winds to *Ægimurum*, was intercepted by the Squadron under *Varus* and *M. Octavius*. In this Veſſel were ſome veteran Soldiers, with a Centurion, and a few new Levies; whom *Varus* treated reſpectfully, and ſent under a Guard to *Scipio*. When they came into his preſence, and appeared before his Tribunal: "I am ſatisfied, ſaid he, it is not by your own Inclination, but at the Inſtigation of your wicked General, that you impiouſly wage War on your Fellow-Citizens, and on the honeſteſt part of the Republick. If therefore, now that Fortune has put you in our power, you will take this Opportunity to unite with the good Citizens, in the defence of the Common-weal; I not only promiſe you your Life, but you may expect to be rewarded. Let me know what you think of the Propoſal." *Scipio* having ended his Speech, and expecting a thankful return to ſo gracious an Offer, permitted them to reply: when the Centurion, who on this Occaſion was Spokeſman, thus addreſſed him: "*Scipio*, ſays he, (for I cannot give you the Appellation of General) I return you my hearty Thanks for the good Treatment you are willing to ſhow to Priſoners of War; and perhaps I might accept of your Kindneſs, were it not to be purchaſed at the expence of an horrible Crime. What! ſhall I carry Arms and fight againſt *Cæſar* my General, under whom I have ſerved as Centurion; and againſt his victorious Army, to whoſe Renown I have ſo many Years endeavoured to contribute by my Valour? 'Tis what I will never do; and even adviſe you not to puſh the War any farther. You know not what Troops you have to deal with, nor the difference 'twixt them and yours; of which, if you pleaſe, I will give you an indiſputable Inſtance. Do you pick out the beſt Cohort you have in your Army; and give me only ten of my Comrades, who are now your Priſoners, to engage them. You ſhall ſee, by the Succeſs, what you are to expect from your Soldiers." When the Centurion had made this Reply, *Scipio* incenſed at his Boldneſs, and reſenting the Affront, made a Sign to ſome of his Officers to kill him on the Spot, which was immediately put in execution. At the ſame time ordering the other veteran Soldiers to be ſeparated from the new Levies: "Carry away, ſaid he, theſe Villains, pampered with the Blood of their Fellow-Citizens." Accordingly they were conducted without the Rampart, and cruelly maſſacred. The new-raiſed Soldiers were diſtributed among his Legions; and *Cominius* and *Ticida* forbid to appear in his preſence. *Cæſar* concerned for this Misfortune, broke with Ignominy the Officers, whoſe Inſtructions being to ſecure the Coaſt, and advance to a certain diſtance into the main Sea, to protect and facilitate the approach of the Tranſports, had been negligent on that important Station.

XLII. ABOUT this time a moſt incredible Accident befel *Cæſar*'s Army. For the Pleiades being ſet; about nine at Night a terrible Storm aroſe, attended with

with Hail of an uncommon ſize. But what contributed to render this Misfortune the greater was, that *Cæſar* had not, like other Generals, put his Troops into Winter-quarters; but was every three or four Days changing his Camp, to gain ground on the Enemy: which keeping the Soldiers continually employed, they were utterly unprovided of any Conveniences to protect them from the Inclemency of the Weather. Beſides, neither Officer nor Soldier had been permitted to take their Equipages or Utenſils with them, nor ſo much as a Veſſel, or a ſingle Slave, when they parted from *Sicily*: and ſo far had they been from acquiring or providing themſelves with any thing in *Africa*, that by reaſon of the great ſcarcity of Proviſions, they had even conſumed all their former Stores. Impoveriſhed by theſe Accidents, very few of them had Tents: the reſt had made themſelves a kind of Covering, either by ſpreading their Cloaths, or with Mats and Ruſhes. But theſe being ſoon penetrated by the Storm and Hail, the Soldiers had no Reſource left, but wandered up and down the Camp, covering their Heads with their Bucklers, to ſhelter them from the Weather. In a ſhort time the whole Camp was under Water, the Fires extinguiſhed, and all their Proviſions waſhed away or ſpoil'd. The ſame Night, the Shafts of the Javelins belonging to the fifth Legion of their own accord took fire.

XLIII. IN the mean-time King *Juba*, having received Advice of the Horſe-engagement with *Scipio*, and being earneſtly ſolicited by Letters from that General, to come to his Aſſiſtance; left *Sabura* at home with part of the Army to carry on the War againſt *Sittius*: and imagining his Name and Preſence ſufficient to free *Scipio*'s Troops from the dread they had of *Cæſar*, began his march with three Legions, eight hundred Horſe, a Body of *Numidian* Cavalry, great Numbers of light-armed Infantry, and thirty Elephants. When he arrived, he lodged himſelf with all his Forces in a ſeparate Camp, at no great diſtance from that of *Scipio*. *Cæſar*'s Army had for ſome time paſt been poſſeſſed with no ſmall Terror of *Juba*'s Forces; and the report of his Approach had increaſed the Inquietude, and produced a general Suſpence and Expectation among the Troops. But his Arrival, and the appearance of his Camp, ſoon diſpelled all theſe Apprehenſions; and they as much deſpiſed the King of *Mauritania*, now he was preſent, as they had feared him, when at a diſtance. It was eaſy to be ſeen, however, that the Reinforcement brought by the King, greatly raiſed the Courage and Confidence of *Scipio*. For next Day, drawing out all his own and the Royal Forces, with ſixty Elephants; he ranged them in order of Battle with great Oſtentation, advanced a little beyond his Intrenchments, and after a ſhort ſtay retreated to his Camp.

XLIV. *CÆSAR* knowing that *Scipio* had received all the Supplies he expected, and judging he would no longer decline coming to an Engagement; began to advance along the Ridge with his Forces, extend his Lines, ſecure them with Redoubts, and poſſeſs himſelf of the Eminences between him and *Scipio*. The Enemy confiding in their Numbers, ſeized a neighbouring Hill, and thereby prevented the Progreſs of our Works. *Labienus* had formed the deſign of ſecuring this Poſt, and as it lay neareſt his Quarters, ſoon got thither. *Cæſar* had the ſame Project in view: but before he could reach the Place, was neceſſitated to paſs a broad and deep Valley, of rugged Deſcent, broken with Caves, and beyond which was a thick Grove of Olives. *Labienus* perceiving that *Cæſar* muſt march this way, and having a perfect Knowledge of the Country, placed himſelf in ambuſh with the light-armed Foot, and part of the Cavalry.

At

At the ſame time he diſpoſed ſome Horſe behind the Hills, that when he ſhould fall unexpectedly upon *Cæſar*'s Foot, they might ſuddenly advance from behind the Mountain. Thus the Enemy attacked in Front and Rear, ſurrounded with danger on all ſides, and unable either to retreat or advance, would, he imagined, fall an eaſy Prey to his victorious Troops. *Cæſar*, who had no ſuſpicion of the Ambuſcade, ſent his Cavalry before: and arriving at the Place; *Labienus*'s Men, either forgetting or neglecting the Orders of their General, or fearing to be trampled to death in the Ditch by our Cavalry, began to iſſue in ſmall Parties from the Rock, and aſcend the Hill. *Cæſar*'s Horſe purſuing them, ſlew ſome, and took others Priſoners: then making towards the Hill, drove thence *Labienus*'s Detachment, and immediately took poſſeſſion. *Labienus*, followed by a ſmall Party of Horſe, eſcaped with great difficulty.

XLV. THE Cavalry having thus cleared the Mountain, *Cæſar* reſolved to intrench himſelf there, and diſtributed the Work to the Legions. He then ordered two Lines of Communication to be drawn from the greater Camp, croſs the Plain on the ſide of *Uzita*, which ſtood between him and the Enemy, and was garriſon'd by a Detachment of *Scipio*'s Army. Theſe Lines were ſo contrived, as to meet at the right and left Angles of the Town. His Deſign in this Work was, that when he approached the Town with his Troops, and began to attack it, theſe Lines might ſecure his Flanks, and hinder the Enemy's Horſe from ſurrounding him, and compelling him to abandon the Siege. It likewiſe gave his Men more frequent Opportunities of converſing with the Enemy, and facilitated the means of Deſertion to ſuch as favoured his Cauſe; many of whom had already come over, though not without great danger to themſelves. He wanted alſo, by drawing nearer the Enemy, to ſee how they ſtood inclined to a Battle. Add to all theſe Reaſons, that the Place itſelf being very low, he might there ſink ſome Wells, whereas before, he had a long and troubleſom Way to ſend for Water. While the Legions were employed in theſe Works, part of the Army ſtood ready drawn up before the Trenches, and had frequent Skirmiſhes with the *Numidian* Horſe and light-armed Foot.

XLVI. IN the Evening, when *Cæſar* was drawing off his Legions from the Works; *Juba*, *Scipio*, and *Labienus*, at the head of all their Horſe and light-armed Foot, fell furiouſly upon his Cavalry: who overwhelmed by the ſudden and general Attack of ſo great a Multitude, were forced to give ground a little. But the Event was very different from what the Enemy expected: for *Cæſar* leading back his Legions to the aſſiſtance of his Cavalry, they immediately rallied, turned upon the *Numidians*, and charging them vigorouſly whilſt they were diſperſed and diſordered with the Purſuit, drove them with great Slaughter to the King's Camp. And had not Night intervened, and the Duſt raiſed by the Wind obſtructed the Proſpect; *Juba* and *Labienus* would both have fallen into *Cæſar*'s hands, and their whole Cavalry and light-armed Infantry been cut off. Mean-while *Scipio*'s Men, of the fourth and ſixth Legions, left him in crowds, ſome deſerting to *Cæſar*'s Camp, others flying to ſuch Places as were moſt convenient for them. *Curio*'s Horſe likewiſe, diſtruſting *Scipio* and his Troops, followed the ſame Counſel.

XLVII. WHILE theſe things paſſed near *Uzita*, the ninth and tenth Legions ſailing in Tranſports from *Sicily*; when they came before *Ruſpina*, obſerving *Cæſar*'s Ships that lay at Anchor about *Thapſus*, and fearing it might be the Enemy's Fleet ſtationed there to intercept them, they imprudently ſtood out

out to Sea; and after being long toſſed by the Winds, Proviſions and Water failing them, at laſt arrived at *Cæſar*'s Camp.

XLVIII. SOON after they were landed, *Cæſar* calling to mind their licentious Behaviour in *Italy*, and the Rapines of ſome of their Officers, ſeized the pretence furniſhed by *C. Avienus*, a military Tribune of the tenth Legion, who, when he ſet out from *Sicily*, filled a Ship entirely with his own Equipage and Attendants, without taking on board one ſingle Soldier. Wherefore ſummoning all the military Tribunes and Centurions to appear before his Tribunal next Day, he addreſſed them in theſe Terms. "I could have wiſhed that thoſe, "whoſe Inſolence and former licentious Character have given me cauſe of "Complaint, had been capable of amendment, and of making a good uſe of "my Mildneſs, Patience, and Moderation. But ſince they know not how to "confine themſelves within bounds, I intend to make an Example of them, "according to the Law of Arms, in order that others may be taught a better "Conduct. You *C. Avienus*, when you was in *Italy*, inſtigated the Soldiers "of the *Roman* People to revolt from the Republick; you have been guilty "of Rapines and Plunders in the municipal Towns; and you have never been "of any real ſervice, either to the Commonwealth, or to your General: laſtly, "in lieu of Soldiers, you have crowded the Tranſports with your Slaves and "Equipage; ſo that, through your Fault, the Republick fails in Soldiers, who "at this time are not only uſeful, but neceſſary. For all theſe Cauſes, I "break you with Ignominy, and order you to leave *Africa* this very Day. "In like manner I break you, *A. Fonteius*, becauſe you have behaved your-"ſelf as a ſeditious Officer, and as a bad Citizen. You, *T. Salienus*, "*M. Tiro*, *C. Cluſinas*, have attained the Rank of Centurions, through my In-"dulgence, and not through your own Merit; and ſince you have been in-"veſted with that Rank, have neither ſhewn Bravery in War, nor good "Conduct in Peace. Inſtead of endeavouring to act according to the Rules "of Modeſty and Decency, your whole ſtudy has been to ſtir up the Soldiers "againſt your General. I therefore think you unworthy of continuing Cen-"turions in my Army: I break you, and order you to quit *Africa* as ſoon as "poſſible." Having concluded this Speech, he delivered them over to ſome Centurions, with Orders to confine them ſeparately on board a Ship, allowing each of them a ſingle Slave to wait on them.

XLIX. MEAN-TIME the *Getulian* Deſerters, whom *Cæſar* had ſent home with Letters and Inſtructions, as we have related above, arrived among their Countrymen: who partly ſwayed by their Authority, partly by the Name and Reputation of *Cæſar*, revolted from *Juba*; and ſpeedily and unanimouſly taking up Arms, ſcrupled not to act in oppoſition to their King. *Juba* having thus three Wars to ſuſtain, was compelled to detach ſix Cohorts from the Army deſtined to act againſt *Cæſar*, and ſend them to defend the Frontiers of his Kingdom againſt the *Getulians*.

L. *CÆSAR* having finiſhed his Lines of Communication, and puſhed them ſo near the Town, as to be juſt without reach of Dart, intrenched himſelf there. He cauſed warlike Engines in great numbers to be placed in the Front of his Works, wherewith he played perpetually againſt the Town; and to increaſe the Enemy's Apprehenſions, drew five Legions out of his other Camp. This Opportunity gave ſeveral Perſons of Rank in both Armies, a deſire to ſee and converſe with their Friends, which *Cæſar* foreſaw would turn

to his advantage. For the chief Officers of the *Getulian* Horſe, with other illuſtrious Men of that Nation, whoſe Fathers had ſerved under *C. Marius*, and from his Bounty obtained conſiderable Eſtates in their Country, but after *Scylla*'s Victory had been made Tributaries to King *Hiempſal*; taking the opportunity of the Night, when the Fires were lighted, with their Horſes and Servants, to the Number of about a thouſand, came over to *Cæſar*'s Camp near *Uzita*.

LI. AS this Accident could not but diſturb *Scipio* and his Followers; they perceived, much about the ſame time, *M. Aquinius* in diſcourſe with *C. Saſerna*. *Scipio* ſent him word, that he did not do well to correſpond with the Enemy. *Aquinius* paid no attention to this Reprimand, but purſued his Diſcourſe. Soon after, one of *Juba*'s Guards came to him and told him, in the hearing of *Saſerna*, The King forbids you to continue this Converſation. He no ſooner received this Order, than immediately he retired, for fear of offending the King. One cannot wonder enough at this ſtep in a *Roman* Citizen, who had already attained to conſiderable Honours in the Commonwealth; that though neither baniſhed his Country, nor ſtripped of his Poſſeſſions, he ſhould pay a more ready obedience to the Orders of a foreign Prince, than thoſe of *Scipio*; and chooſe rather to behold the Deſtruction of his Party, than return into the boſom of his Country. Nor was *Juba*'s arrogance confined to *M. Aquinius*, a new Man, and an inconſiderable Senator; but reached even *Scipio* himſelf, a Man of illuſtrious Birth, diſtinguiſhed Honours, and high Dignity in the State. For as *Scipio*, before the King's arrival, always wore a purple Coat of Mail; *Juba* is reported to have told him, that he ought not to wear the ſame Habit as he did. Accordingly *Scipio* changed his purple Robe for a white one, ſubmitting to the Caprice of a haughty barbarian Monarch.

LII. NEXT Day they drew out all their Forces from both Camps; and forming them on an Eminence not far from *Cæſar*'s Camp, continued thus in order of Battle. *Cæſar* likewiſe drew out his Men, and diſpoſed them in Battle-array before his Lines; not doubting but the Enemy, who exceeded him in number of Troops, and had been ſo conſiderably reinforced by the arrival of King *Juba*, would advance to attack him. Wherefore having rode through the Ranks, encouraged his Men, and given them the Signal of Battle, he ſtay'd expecting the Enemy's Charge. For he did not think it adviſeable to remove far from his Lines; becauſe the Enemy having a ſtrong Garriſon in *Uzita*, which was oppoſite to his right Wing, he could not advance beyond that Place, without expoſing his Flank to a Sally from the Town. Beſides, the acceſs to *Scipio*'s Army was rough and difficult, and would have diſordered his Troops before they gave the Onſet.

LIII. AND here it may not be improper to deſcribe the Order of Battle of both Armies. *Scipio*'s Troops were drawn up in this manner. He poſted his own Legions, and thoſe of *Juba*, in the Front: behind them the *Numidians*, as a Body of Reſerve; but in ſo very thin Ranks, and ſo far extended in length, that to ſee them at a diſtance, you would have taken the main Battle for a ſimple Line of Legionaries, which was doubled only upon the Wings. The Elephants were placed at equal diſtances on the right and left, and ſuſtained by the light-armed Troops, and auxiliary *Numidians*. All the bridled Cavalry were on the right; for the left was covered by the Town of *Uzita*, nor had the Cavalry room to extend themſelves on that ſide. Accordingly

A. *Scipio's Front, in which were his own and Juba's Legions.* B. *The Numidians as a Line of R*
Troops and auxiliary Numidians posted to sustain the Elephants in the right Wing. F. *The sam*
Uzita. H. *The Numidian Cavalry at some Distance, to wheel round upon Cæsar's Left during t*
L. M. N. O. *The thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty eighth and twenty sixth in the main Body.* P. Q.
Levies. S. *His third Line posted to the Left.* T. *Cæsar's Horse and light armed Foot in the le*
upon a Hill. Z. *Cæsar's Lines of Communication, reaching from the greater Camp to the To*

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serve. C. *The Elephants in the right Wing.* D. *The Elephants in the Left.* E. *The light-armed*
in the Left. G. *All the bridled Cavalry on the right; the left being covered by the Town of*
Battle. I. *The light armed foot.* K. *The ninth and seventh Legions in Cæsar's left Wing,*
the thirtieth and twenty ninth in the Right. R. *Cæsar's second Line consisting partly of new*
Wing. V. *The fifth Legion posted to sustain the Horse.* X. *The Town of Uzita.* Y. *Cæsar's Camp*
A A. *Cæsars second Camp under the Walls of the Town.*

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ingly he ſtationed the *Numidian* Horſe, with an incredible multitude of light-armed Foot, about a thouſand Paces from his right, towards the foot of a Mountain, conſiderably removed from his own and the Enemy's Troops. His deſign in this was, that during the progreſs of the Battle, the Cavalry having room to extend themſelves, might wheel round upon *Cæſar*'s left, and diſorder it with their Darts. Such was *Scipio*'s Diſpoſition. *Cæſar*'s Order of Battle, to deſcribe it from left to right, was as follows: The ninth and ſeventh Legions formed the left Wing; the thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ſixth, the main Body; and the thirtieth and twenty-ninth, the right. His ſecond Line on the right, conſiſted partly of the Cohorts of thoſe Legions we have already mentioned, partly of new Levies. His third Line was poſted to the left, extending as far as the middle Legion of the main Body, and ſo diſpoſed, that the left Wing formed a triple order of Battle. The reaſon of this Diſpoſition was; becauſe his right Wing being defended by the Works, it behoved him to make his left the ſtronger, that they might be a match for the numerous Cavalry of the Enemy; for which reaſon he had placed all his Horſe there, intermixed with light-armed Foot; and as he could not rely much upon them, had detached the fifth Legion to ſuſtain them. The Archers were diſperſed up and down the Field, but principally in the two Wings.

LIV. THE two Armies thus facing one another in order of Battle, with a ſpace of no more than three hundred Paces between, continued ſo poſted from Morning 'till Night without fighting, of which perhaps there never was an Inſtance before. But when *Cæſar* began to retreat within his Lines, ſuddenly all the *Numidian* and *Getulian* Horſe without Bridles, who were poſted behind the Enemy's Army, made a Motion to the right, and began to approach *Cæſar*'s Camp on the Mountain; while the regular Cavalry under *Labienus*, continued in their Poſt, to keep our Legions in check. Upon this part of *Cæſar*'s Cavalry, with the light-armed Foot, advancing haſtily, and without Orders againſt the *Getulians*, and venturing to paſs the Moraſs, found themſelves unable to deal with the ſuperior multitude of the Enemy; and being abandoned by the light-armed Troops, were forced to retreat in great Diſorder, after the loſs of one Trooper, twenty-ſix light-armed Foot, and many of their Horſes wounded. *Scipio* overjoyed at this Succeſs, returned towards Night to his Camp. But as Fortune's Favours are ſeldom permanent to thoſe engaged in the Trade of War; the Day after, a Party of Horſe ſent by *Cæſar* to *Leptis* in queſt of Proviſions, falling in unexpectedly with ſome *Numidian* and *Getulian* Stragglers, killed or made Priſoners about a hundred of them. *Cæſar*, mean-while, omitted not every Day to draw out his Men, and labour at the Works; carrying a Ditch and Rampart quite croſs the Plain, to prevent the Incurſions of the Enemy. Nor was *Scipio* leſs active in forwarding his Works, and ſecuring his Communication with the Mountain. Thus both Generals were buſied about their Intrenchments, yet ſeldom a Day paſſed, without ſome Skirmiſh between the Cavalry.

LV. IN the mean time *Varus*, upon notice that the ſeventh and eighth Legions had ſailed from *Sicily*, ſpeedily equipped the Fleet he had brought to winter at *Utica*; and manning it with *Getulian* Rowers and Mariners, went out a cruiſing; and came before *Adrumetum* with fifty-five Ships. *Cæſar*, who knew nothing of his arrival, ſent *L. Ciſpius*, with a Squadron of twenty-ſeven Sail, to cruiſe about *Thapſus*, for the ſecurity of his Convoys; and likewiſe diſpatched *Q. Aquila* to *Adrumetum*, with thirteen Gallies, upon the ſame Errand.

rand. *Ciſpius* ſoon reached the Station appointed him: but *Aquila* being attacked by a Storm, could not double the Cape, which obliged him to put into a Creek at ſome diſtance, that afforded convenient ſhelter. The reſt of the Fleet anchored before *Leptis*, where the Mariners went on Shore, ſome to refreſh themſelves, others to buy Proviſions in the Towns, and left their Ships quite defenceleſs. *Varus* having notice of this from the Deſerters, and reſolving to take advantage of the Enemy's Negligence, left *Adrumetum* about nine at night, and arriving early next Morning with his whole Fleet before *Leptis*, burnt all the Tranſports that were out at Sea, and took without oppoſition two five-benched Gallies, in which were none to defend them.

LVI. *CÆSAR* had an Account brought him of this unlucky Accident, as he was inſpecting the Works of his Camp. Whereupon he immediately took Horſe, went full ſpeed to *Leptis*, which was but two Leagues diſtant, and going on board a Brigantine, ordered all the Ships in the Port to follow him, and in this manner put to Sea. He ſoon came up with *Aquila*, whom he found diſmayed and terrified at the number of Ships he had to oppoſe; and continuing his Courſe, began to purſue the Enemy's Fleet. Mean-time *Varus* aſtoniſhed at *Cæſar*'s Boldneſs and Diſpatch, tacked about with his whole Fleet, and made the beſt of his way for *Adrumetum*. But *Cæſar* after four miles ſail came up with him, recovered one of his Gallies, with the Crew, and an hundred and thirty Men left to guard her; and took a three-bench'd Galley belonging to the Enemy, with all the Soldiers and Mariners on board. The reſt of the Fleet doubled the Cape, and made the Port of *Adrumetum*. *Cæſar* could not double the Cape with the ſame Wind, but keeping the Sea all night, appeared early next Morning before *Adrumetum*. He ſet fire to all the Tranſports without the Haven, took what Gallies he found there, or forced them into the Harbour; and having waited ſome time to offer the Enemy Battle, returned again to his Camp. On board the Ship he had taken was *P. Veſtrius* a *Roman* Knight, and *P. Ligarius Afranianus*, the ſame who had proſecuted the War againſt him in *Spain*, and who, inſtead of acknowledging the Conqueror's Generoſity, in granting him his Liberty, had joined *Pompey* in *Greece*; and after the Battle of *Pharſalia*, had gone into *Africa* to *Varus*, there to continue in the ſervice of the ſame Cauſe. *Cæſar*, to puniſh his Perfidy and breach of Oath, gave immediate Orders for his Execution. But he pardoned *P. Veſtrius*, becauſe his Brother had paid his Ranſom at *Rome*, and he made it appear, that being taken in *Naſidius*'s Fleet, and condemn'd to die, *Varus* had ſaved his Life, ſince which no Opportunity had offered of making his eſcape.

LVII. 'TIS uſual for the People of *Africa*, to depoſit their Corn privately in Vaults under Ground, to ſecure it in time of War, and guard it from the ſudden Incurſions of an Enemy. *Cæſar* having intelligence of this from a Spy, drew out two Legions with a Party of Cavalry at midnight, and ſent them about ten miles off, whence they returned loaden with Corn to the Camp. *Labienus* being informed of it, marched about ſeven miles through the Mountains *Cæſar* had paſſed the Day before, and there encamped with two Legions; where expecting that *Cæſar* would often come the ſame way in queſt of Corn, he daily lay in Ambuſh with a great Body of Horſe and light-armed Foot. *Cæſar* having notice of this from the Deſerters, ſuffered ſome Days to paſs, 'till the Enemy by repeating the Practice often, had abated a little of their Circumſpection. Then iſſuing unexpectedly one Morning by the *Decuman* Port, with eight veteran Legions, and a Party of Horſe, he ordered the Ca-

valry

valry to march before; who coming ſuddenly upon the Enemy's light-armed Foot that lay in ambuſh among the Valleys, ſlew about five hundred, and put the reſt to flight. Mean-time *Labienus* advanced with all his Cavalry to ſupport the Runaways, and was on the point of overpowering our ſmall Party with his Numbers, when ſuddenly *Cæſar* appeared with the Legions in order of Battle. This ſight check'd the Ardor of *Labienus*, who thought proper to ſound a Retreat. The Day after, *Juba* ordered all the *Numidians* who had deſerted their Poſt and fled to the Camp, to be crucified.

LVIII. MEAN-WHILE *Cæſar* being ſtraitened for want of Corn, recalled all his Forces to the Camp: and having left Garriſons at *Leptis*, *Ruſpina*, and *Acilla*; ordered *Ciſpius* and *Aquila* to cruiſe with their Fleets, the one before *Adrumetum*, the other before *Thapſus*; and ſet fire to his Camp at *Uzita:* he ſet out in order of Battle at three in the Morning, diſpoſed his Baggage in the left, and came to *Agar*, a Town that had been often vigorouſly attacked by the *Getulians*, and as valiantly defended by the Inhabitants. There encamping in the Plain before the Town, he went with part of his Army round the Country in queſt of Proviſions; and having found ſtore of Barley, Oil, Wine, and Figs, with a ſmall quantity of Wheat; after allowing the Troops ſome time to refreſh themſelves, he returned to his Camp. *Scipio*, mean-while, hearing of *Cæſar*'s departure, followed him along the Hills with all his Forces, and poſted himſelf about ſix miles off in three different Camps.

LIX. THE Town of *Zeta* lying on *Scipio*'s ſide of the Country, was not above ten miles from his Camp; but might be about eighteen from that of *Cæſar*. *Scipio* had ſent two Legions thither to forage: which *Cæſar* having intelligence of from a Deſerter, removed his Camp from the Plain to a Hill, for the greater Security; and leaving ſome Troops to guard it, marched at three in the Morning with the reſt of his Forces, paſſed the Enemy's Camp, and poſſeſſed himſelf of the Town. *Scipio*'s Legions were gone farther into the Country to forage; againſt whom ſetting out immediately, he found the whole Army come up to their Aſſiſtance, which obliged him to give over the Purſuit. He took on this Occaſion *C. Mutius Reginus*, a *Roman* Knight, *Scipio*'s intimate Friend, and Governor of the Town; alſo *P. Atrius*, a *Roman* Knight likewiſe, of the Province of *Utica*; with twenty-two Camels belonging to King *Juba*. Then leaving a Garriſon in the Place, under the command of *Oppius* his Lieutenant, he ſet out upon his return to his own Camp.

LX. AS he drew near *Scipio*'s Camp, by which he was neceſſitated to paſs; *Labienus* and *Afranius*, who lay in ambuſcade among the neareſt Hills, with all their Cavalry and light-armed Infantry, ſtarted up and attacked his Rear. *Cæſar* detaching his Cavalry to receive their Charge, ordered the Legions to throw all their Baggage into a heap, and face about upon the Enemy. No ſooner was this Order executed, than upon the firſt Charge of the Legions, the Enemy's Horſe and light-armed Foot began to give way, and were with incredible eaſe driven from the higher Ground. But when *Cæſar*, imagining them ſufficiently deterred from any further Attempts, began to purſue his march, they again iſſued from the Hills; and the *Numidians*, with the light-armed Infantry, who are wonderfully nimble, and accuſtom themſelves to fight intermixed with the Horſe, with whom they keep an equal pace either in advancing or retiring, fell a ſecond time upon our Foot. As they repeated this often, preſ-

ſing upon our Rear when we marched, and retiring when we endeavoured to engage, always keeping at a certain diſtance, and with ſingular Care avoiding a cloſe Fight, as holding it enough to wound us with their Darts; *Cæſar* plainly ſaw that their whole aim was, to oblige him to encamp in that Place, where no Water was to be had; that his Soldiers, who had taſted nothing from three in the Morning 'till four in the Afternoon, might periſh with Hunger, and the Cattle with Thirſt. Sun-ſet now approached; when *Cæſar*, finding he had not gained an hundred Paces compleat in four Hours, and that by keeping his Cavalry in the rear, he loſt many Horſe, ordered the Legions to fall behind, and cloſe the march. Proceeding thus with a ſlow and gentle Pace, he found the Legions fitter to ſuſtain the Enemy's Charge. Mean-time the *Numidian* Horſe, wheeling round the Hills to the right and left, threatned to incloſe *Cæſar*'s Forces with their numbers, while part continued to harraſs his Rear: and if but three or four veteran Soldiers faced about, and darted their Javelins at the Enemy, no leſs than two thouſand of them would take to flight; but ſuddenly rallying, returned to the Fight, and charged the Legionaries with their Darts. Thus *Cæſar*, one while marching forward, one while halting, and going on but ſlowly, reached his Camp ſafe about ſeven that Evening, having only ten Men wounded. *Labienus* too retreated to his Camp, after having thoroughly fatigued his Troops with the Purſuit; in which, beſides a great number wounded, his loſs amounted to about three hundred Men. And *Scipio* withdrew his Legions and Elephants, whom for the greater Terror, he had ranged before his Camp within view of *Cæſar*'s Army.

LXI. *CÆSAR* having ſuch an Enemy to deal with, was neceſſitated to inſtruct his Soldiers, not like a General of a veteran Army, which had been victorious in ſo many Battles; but like a Fencing-maſter training up his Gladiators: with what Foot they muſt advance or retire; when they were to oppoſe and make good their Ground, when to counterfeit an Attack; at what place, and in what manner to lanch their Javelins. For the Enemy's light-armed Troops gave wonderful Trouble and Diſquiet to our Army; becauſe they not only deterred the Cavalry from the Encounter, by killing their Horſes with their Javelins, but likewiſe wearied out the legionary Soldiers by their ſwiftneſs: for as often as theſe heavy-armed Troops advanced to attack them, they evaded the Danger by a quick Retreat. This gave *Cæſar* no ſmall Trouble: becauſe as often as he engaged with his Cavalry, without being ſuſtained by the Infantry, he found himſelf by no means a match for the Enemy's Horſe, ſupported by their light-armed Foot: and as he had no experience of the ſtrength of their Legions, he foreſaw ſtill greater Difficulties when theſe ſhould be united, as the ſhock muſt then be wonderful. The number too and ſize of the Elephants, greatly increaſed the Terror of the Soldiers; for which however he found a Remedy, in cauſing ſome of thoſe Animals to be brought over from *Italy*, that his Men might be accuſtomed to the ſight of them, know their Strength and Courage, and in what part of the Body they were moſt eaſily to be wounded. For as the Elephants are covered with Trappings and Ornaments, it was neceſſary to inform them what parts of the Body remained naked, that they might direct their Darts thither. It was likewiſe needful to familiarize his Horſes to the cry, ſmell, and figure of theſe Animals; in all which he ſucceeded to a Wonder: for the Soldiers quickly came to touch them with their Hands, and to be ſenſible of their Tardineſs; and the Cavalry attacked them with blunted Darts, and by degrees brought their Horſes to endure their preſence. For theſe Reaſons already mentioned, *Cæſar* was not without his Anxieties, and proceeded

ceeded with more Slowneſs and Circumſpection than uſual, abating conſiderably of his wonted Expedition and Celerity. Nor ought we to wonder: for in *Gaul* his Troops had been accuſtomed to fight in a champian Country, againſt an open undeſigning Enemy, who deſpiſed Artifice, and valued themſelves only on their Bravery. But now he was to habituate his Soldiers to the Arts and Contrivances of a crafty Enemy, and teach them what to purſue, and what to avoid. The ſooner therefore to inſtruct them in theſe Matters, he took care not to confine his Legions to one Place, but under pretence of foraging, engaged them in frequent Marches, and Counter-Marches; knowing well that the Enemy would take care not to loſe ſight of him. Three Days after, he drew up his Forces with great Art, and marching paſt *Scipio*'s Camp, waited for him in an open Plain; but ſeeing that he ſtill declined a Battle, he retreated to his Camp in the Evening.

LXII. MEAN-TIME Ambaſſadors arrived from the Town of *Vacca*, bordering upon *Zeta*, of which we have obſerved *Cæſar* had poſſeſſed himſelf. They requeſted and intreated that he would ſend them a Garriſon, promiſing to furniſh many of the Neceſſaries of War. At the ſame time, by an uncommon piece of good Fortune for *Cæſar*, a Deſerter informed him, that *Juba* had by a quick march reached the Town, maſſacred the Inhabitants, and abandoned the Place itſelf to the plunder of his Soldiers. Thus was *Cæſar*'s Garriſon prevented from ſetting out, and by that means ſaved from Deſtruction.

LXIII. *CÆSAR* having reviewed his Army the eighteenth of *February*, advanced next Day with all his Forces five Miles beyond his Camp, and remained a conſiderable time in order of Battle two miles from *Scipio*'s. When he had waited ſufficiently long to invite the Enemy to an Engagement, finding them ſtill decline it, he led back his Troops. Next Day he decamped, and directed his march towards *Sarſura*, where *Scipio* had a Garriſon of *Numidians*, and a Magazine of Corn. *Labienus* being informed of this Motion, fell upon his Rear with the Cavalry and light-armed Troops; and having made himſelf maſter of part of the Baggage, was encouraged to attack the Legions themſelves, believing they would fall an eaſy Prey, under the Load and Incumbrance of a March. But *Cæſar*, from a foreſight of what might happen, had ordered three hundred Men out of each Legion, to hold themſelves in readineſs for Action. Theſe being ſent againſt *Labienus*, he was ſo terrified at their approach, that he ſhamefully took to flight, great numbers of his Men being killed or wounded. The Legionaries returned to their Standards, and purſued their march. *Labienus* ſtill followed us at a diſtance along the ſummit of the Mountains, and kept hovering on our right.

LXIV. *CÆSAR* arriving before *Sarſura*, took it in preſence of the Enemy, who durſt not advance to its relief; and put to the Sword the Garriſon which had been left there by *Scipio* under the command of *P. Cornelius*, who after a vigorous Defence was ſurrounded and ſlain. Having given all the Corn in the Place to the Army, he marched next Day to *Tiſdra*, where *Conſidius* was with a ſtrong Garriſon, and his Cohort of Gladiators. *Cæſar* having taken a view of the Town, and being deterred from beſieging it for want of Corn, ſet out immediately, and after a march of four miles, encamped near a River. Here he ſtayed about four Days, and then returned to his former Camp at *Agar*. *Scipio* did the ſame, and retreated to his old Quarters.

LXV.

LXV. MEAN-TIME the *Thabenenſes*, a Nation ſituated in the extreme Confines of *Juba*'s Kingdom, along the Sea-coaſt, and who had been accuſtomed to live in ſubjection to that Monarch; having maſſacred the Garriſon left there by the King, ſent Deputies to *Cæſar* to inform him of what they had done, and to beg he would take under his Protection a City which deſerved ſo well of the *Roman* People. *Cæſar* approving their Conduct, ſent *M. Criſpus* the Tribune, with a Cohort, a party of Archers, and a great Number of warlike Engines, to charge himſelf with the defence of *Thabena*.

LXVI. AT the ſame time the Legionary Soldiers, who either on account of Sickneſs, or for other Reaſons, had not been able to come over into *Africa* with the reſt, to the number of four thouſand Foot, four hundred Horſe, and a thouſand Archers and Slingers, now arrived all together. With theſe, and his former Troops, he advanced into a Plain eight Miles diſtant from his own Camp, and four from that of *Scipio*, where he waited the Enemy in order of Battle.

LXVII. THE Town of *Tegea* was below *Scipio*'s Camp, where he had a Garriſon of four hundred Horſe. Theſe he drew up on the right and left of the Town; and bringing forth his Legions, formed them in order of Battle upon a Hill ſomewhat lower than his Camp, and which was about a thouſand Paces diſtant from it. After he had continued a conſiderable time in this Poſture, without offering to make any Attempt; *Cæſar* ſent ſome Squadrons of Horſe, ſupported by his light-armed Infantry, Archers, and Slingers, to charge the Enemy's Cavalry, who were poſted before the Town. Our Men advancing upon the Spur, *Pacidius* began to extend his Front, that he might at once ſurround and give us a warm Reception. Upon this *Cæſar* detached three hundred Legionaries to our aſſiſtance, while at the ſame time *Labienus* was continually ſending freſh Reinforcements, to replace thoſe that were wounded or fatigued. Our Cavalry, who were only four hundred in number, not being able to ſuſtain the Charge of four thouſand, and being beſides greatly incommoded by the light-armed *Numidians*, began at laſt to give ground: which *Cæſar* obſerving, detached the other Wing to their aſſiſtance; who joining thoſe that were like to be overpowered, they fell in a Body upon the Enemy, put them to flight, ſlew or wounded great Numbers, purſued them three Miles quite to the Mountains, and then returned to their own Men. *Cæſar* continued in order of Battle till four in the Afternoon, and then retreated to his Camp without the loſs of a Man. In this Action *Pacidius* received a dangerous Wound in the Head, and had many of his beſt Officers either killed or wounded.

LXVIII. WHEN he found that the Enemy were by no means to be prevailed with to fight him upon equal terms, and that he could not encamp nearer them for want of Water, in conſideration of which alone, and not from any confidence in their Numbers, the *Africans* had dared to deſpiſe him; he decamped the fourteenth of *April* at midnight, marched ſixteen Miles beyond *Agar* to *Thapſus*, where *Vergilius* commanded with a ſtrong Garriſon, and there fixed his Camp. The very firſt Day he began the Circumvallation, and raiſed Redoubts in proper Places, as well for his own ſecurity, as to prevent any Succours from entering the Town. This Step reduced *Scipio* to the neceſſity of fighting, to avoid the diſgrace of abandoning *Vergilius* and the *Thapſitani*, who had all along remained firm to his Party: and therefore following

Cæſar



A. *The City of Thapsus in Africa.* B. *Cœsar's Camp.* C. *The Circumvallation in f*
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in Cæsar's right Wing. H. *The eighth and ninth in his left.* I. *The five Legions in hu*
L. *The Archers and Slingers in the two Wings.* M. *The Cavalry intermixe*

N.o 75.

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

A. *The City of Thapsus in Africa.* B. *Cæsar's Camp.* C. *The Circumvallation in form of* ha
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L. *The Archers and Slingers in the two Wings.* M. *The Cavalry intermixed with* ight

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

half Moon, wherewith Cæsar inclosed the Town. D. *Scipio's Cavalry in his right and left as near the Shore as possible, to alarm the Enemy behind.* G. *The tenth & second Legions* K. *The five Cohorts placed in either Wing to sustain the Shock of the Elephants.* *ght armed Foot.* N. *Scipio's Camp.*

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Cæſar without delay, he poſted himſelf in two Camps, eight Miles from *Thapſus*.

LXIX. BETWEEN a Moraſs and the Sea was a narrow Paſs of about fifteen hundred Paces, by which *Scipio* hoped to throw Succours into the Place. But *Cæſar* from a foreſight of what might happen, had the Day before raiſed a very ſtrong Fort at the entrance of it, where he left a triple Garriſon; and encamping with the reſt of his Troops in form of a half Moon, carried his Works round the Town. *Scipio*, diſappointed of his Deſign, paſſed the Day and Night following a little above the Moraſs; but early next Morning advanced within a ſmall diſtance of our Fort, where he began to intrench himſelf about fifteen hundred Paces from the Sea. *Cæſar* being informed of this, drew off his Men from the Works; and leaving *Aſprenas* the Proconſul with two Legions to guard the Camp and Baggage, marched all the reſt of his Forces with the utmoſt expedition to the Place where the Enemy were poſted. He left part of the Fleet before *Thapſus*, and ordered the reſt to make as near the Shore as poſſible towards the Enemy's Rear, obſerving the Signal he ſhould give them, upon which they were to raiſe a ſudden ſhout, that the Enemy alarmed and diſturbed by the Noiſe behind them, might be forced to face about.

LXX. WHEN *Cæſar* came to the Place, he found *Scipio*'s Army in order of Battle before the Intrenchments, the Elephants poſted in the two Wings, and part of the Soldiers employed in fortifying the Camp. Upon ſight of this diſpoſition, he drew up his Army in three Lines, placed the ſecond and tenth Legions in the right Wing, the eighth and ninth in the left, five Legions in the Center, covered his Flanks with five Cohorts poſted over-againſt the Elephants, diſpoſed the Archers and Slingers in the two Wings, and intermingled the light-armed Troops with his Cavalry. He himſelf on foot went from Rank to Rank, to rouſe the Courage of the Veterans, putting them in mind of their former Bravery, and animating them by his ſoothing Addreſs. He exhorted the new Levies to emulate the Bravery of the Veterans, and endeavour by a Victory to attain the ſame degree of Glory and Renown.

LXXI. AS he ran from Rank to Rank, he obſerved the Enemy very uneaſy, hurrying from Place to Place, one while retiring behind the Rampart, another coming out again in great Tumult and Confuſion. As the ſame was obſerved by many others in the Army, his Lieutenants and Volunteers begged him to give the Sign of Battle, as the immortal Gods promiſed him a certain Victory. While he heſitated with himſelf, and ſtrove to repreſs their Eagerneſs and Deſires, as being unwilling to yield to the Importunity of Men, whoſe Duty it was to wait his Orders; on a ſudden a Trumpet in the right Wing, without his leave, and compelled by the Soldiers, ſounded a Charge. Upon this all the Cohorts ran to Battle, in ſpite of the Endeavours of the Centurions, who ſtrove to reſtrain them by force, but to no purpoſe. *Cæſar* perceiving that the Ardor of his Soldiers would admit of no Reſtraint, giving Good-fortune for the Word, ſpurred on his Horſe, and charged the Enemy's Front. On the right Wing the Archers and Slingers poured their Javelins without intermiſſion upon the Elephants, and by the Noiſe of their Slings and Stones, ſo terrified theſe unruly Animals, that turning upon their own Men, they trod them down in heaps, and ruſhed through the Gates of the Camp, that were but half finiſhed. At the ſame time the *Mauritanian* Horſe, who were in the ſame Wing with

the Elephants, ſeeing themſelves deprived of their aſſiſtance, betook themſelves to flight. Whereupon the Legions wheeling round the Elephants, ſoon maſtered the Enemy's Intrenchments. Some few that made reſiſtance were ſlain: the reſt fled with all expedition to the Camp they had quitted the Day before.

LXXII. AND here we muſt not omit taking notice of the Bravery of a veteran Soldier of the fifth Legion. For when an Elephant which had been wounded in the left Wing, and rouſed to Fury by the Pain, ran againſt an unarmed Sutler, threw him under his Feet, and leaning on him with his whole weight, brandiſhing his Trunk, and raiſing hideous Cries, cruſhed him to death; the Soldier could not refrain from attacking the Animal. The Elephant ſeeing him advance with his Javelin in his Hand, quitted the dead Body of the Sutler, and ſeizing him with his Trunk, wheeled him round in the Air. But the Soldier amidſt all the danger, loſing nothing of his Courage, ceaſed not with his Sword to ſtrike at the Elephant's Trunk, who at laſt overcome with the Pain, quitted his Prey, and fled to the reſt with hideous Cries.

LXXIII. MEAN-WHILE the Garriſon of *Thapſus*, either deſigning to aſſiſt their Friends, or abandon the Town, ſallied by the Gate next the Sea, and wading navel-deep in the Water, endeavoured to reach the Land. But the Servants and Followers of the Camp, attacking them with Darts and Stones, obliged them to return again to the Town. *Scipio*'s Camp meanwhile being forced, and his Men flying on all ſides, the Legions inſtantly began the purſuit, that they might have no time to rally. When they arrived at their former Camp, by means of which they hoped to defend themſelves, they began to think of chooſing a Commander, to whoſe Authority and Orders they might ſubmit: but finding none on whom they could rely, they threw down their Arms, and fled to *Juba*'s Quarter. This being likewiſe poſſeſſed by our Men, they retired to a Hill; where deſpairing of ſafety, they endeavoured to ſoften their Enemies, ſaluting them by the name of Brethren. But this ſtood them in little ſtead: for the Veterans tranſported with Rage and Anger, were not only deaf to the Cries of their Enemies, but even killed or wounded ſeveral Citizens of Diſtinction in their own Army, whom they upbraided as Authors of the War. Of this number was *Tullius Rufus* the Quæſtor, whom a Soldier knowingly ran through with a Javelin; and *Pompeius Rufus*, who was wounded with a Sword in the Arm, and would doubtleſs have been ſlain, had he not ſpeedily fled to *Cæſar* for protection. This made ſeveral *Roman* Knights and Senators retire from the Battle, leſt the Soldiers, who after ſo ſignal a Victory aſſumed an unbounded Licence, ſhould be induced by the hopes of Impunity to wreck their Fury on them likewiſe. In ſhort all *Scipio*'s Soldiers, though they implored the protection of *Cæſar*, were yet in the very ſight of that General, and amidſt his Intreaties to his Men to ſpare them, univerſally, and without exception, put to the Sword.

LXXIV. *CÆSAR* having made himſelf maſter of the Enemies three Camps, killed ten thouſand of them, and put the reſt to flight, retreated to his own Quarters with the loſs of no more than fifty Men, and a few wounded. In his way he appeared before *Thapſus*, and ranged all the Elephants he had taken in the Battle, amounting to ſixty-four, with their Ornaments, Trappings, and Caſtles, in full view of the Place. He was in hopes by this evidence of his Succeſs, to induce *Vergilius* to a ſurrender. He even called and invited him



BATTLE WITH TH

C. Kuÿberts. fec: Aquaforti.

THE ELEPHANTS.

(X)

him to ſubmit, reminding him of his Clemency and Mildneſs; but no Anſwer being given, he retired from before the Town. Next Day, after returning thanks to the Gods, he aſſembled his Army before *Thapſus*, praiſed his Soldiers in preſence of the Inhabitants, rewarded the victorious, and from his Tribunal extended his Bounty to every one, according to their Merit and Services. Setting out thence immediately, he left the Proconſul *C. Rebellius* with three Legions to continue the Siege, and ſent *Cn. Domitius* with two, to inveſt *Tiſdra*, where *Conſidius* commanded. Then ordering *M. Meſſala* to go before with the Cavalry, he began his march to *Utica*.

LXXV. *SCIPIO*'s Cavalry, who had eſcaped out of the Battle, taking the Road of *Utica*, arrived at *Parada*: but being refuſed admittance by the Inhabitants, who had heard of *Cæſar*'s Victory, they forced the Gates, lighted a great Fire in the middle of the Forum, and threw all the Inhabitants into it, without diſtinction of Age or Sex, with their Effects: avenging in this manner by an unheard of Cruelty, the Affront they had received. Thence they marched directly to *Utica*. *M. Cato*, ſome time before, diſtruſting the Inhabitants of that City, becauſe of the Privileges granted them by the *Julian* Law, had diſarmed and expelled the Populace, obliging them to dwell without the warlike Gate, in a ſmall Camp environed with a ſlight Intrenchment, round which he had planted Guards, while at the ſame time he held the Senators under Confinement. The Cavalry attacked their Camp, as knowing them to be Well-wiſhers to *Cæſar*, and to avenge, by their Deſtruction, the ſhame of their own Defeat. But the People animated by *Cæſar*'s Victory, repulſed them with Stones and Clubs. They therefore threw themſelves into the Town, killed many of the Inhabitants, and pillaged their Houſes. *Cato* unable to prevail with them to abſtain from Rapine and Slaughter, and undertake the defence of the Town, as he was not ignorant of what they aimed at, gave each a hundred Seſterces to make them quiet. *Sylla Fauſtus* did the ſame out of his own Money; and marching with them from *Utica*, advanced into the Kingdom of *Juba*.

LXXVI. A great many others that had eſcaped out of the Battle, fled to *Utica*. Theſe *Cato* aſſembled, with three hundred more who had furniſhed *Scipio* with Money for carrying on the War, and exhorted them to ſet their Slaves free, and in conjunction with them defend the Town. But finding that tho' part aſſembled, the reſt were terrified and determined to fly, he gave over the Attempt, and furniſhed them with Ships to facilitate their eſcape. He himſelf having ſettled all his Affairs with the utmoſt Care, and commended his Children to *L. Cæſar* his Quæſtor; without the leaſt Indication which might give cauſe of Suſpicion, or any change in his Countenance and Behaviour, privately carried a Sword into his Chamber when he went to ſleep, and ſtabbed himſelf with it. But the Wound not proving mortal, and the noiſe of his Fall creating a Suſpicion; a Phyſician with ſome Friends broke into his Chamber, and endeavoured to bind up the Wound: which he no ſooner was ſenſible of, than tearing it open again with his own Hands, he expired with undaunted reſolution and preſence of mind. The *Uticans*, tho' they hated his Party, yet in conſideration of his ſingular Integrity, his Behaviour ſo different from that of the other Chiefs, and the wonderful Fortifications he had erected to defend their Town, interred him honourably. *L. Cæſar*, that he might procure ſome Advantages by his death, aſſembled the People, and after haranguing them, exhorted them to open their Gates, and throw themſelves upon *Cæſar*'s Clemency,

Clemency, from which they had the greateſt reaſon to hope the beſt. This Advice being followed, he came forth to meet *Cæſar*. *Meſſala* having reached *Utica* according to his Orders, placed Guards at all the Gates.

LXXVII. MEAN-WHILE *Cæſar* leaving *Thapſus*, came to *Uſceta*, where *Scipio* had laid up great ſtore of Corn, Arms, Darts, and other warlike Proviſions, under a ſmall Guard. He ſoon made himſelf maſter of the Place, and marched directly to *Adrumetum*, which he entered without oppoſition. He took an account of the Arms, Proviſions, and Money in the Town; pardoned *Q. Ligarius* and *C. Conſidius*; and leaving *Livineius Regulus* there with one Legion, ſet out the ſame Day for *Utica*. *L. Cæſar* meeting him by the way, threw himſelf at his Feet, and only begged for his Life. *Cæſar*, according to his wonted Clemency, eaſily pardoned him; as he did likewiſe *Cæcina*, *C. Ateius*, *P. Atrius*, *L. Colla* Father and Son, *M. Eppius*, *M. Aquinius*, *Cato*'s Son, and the Children of *Damiſippus*. He arrived at *Utica* in the Evening by torch-light, and continued all that Night without the Town.

LXXVIII. NEXT Morning early he entered the Place, ſummoned an Aſſembly of the People, and thanked them for the Affection they had ſhewn to his Cauſe. At the ſame time he cenſured ſeverely, and enlarged upon the Crime of the *Roman* Citizens and Merchants, and the reſt of the three hundred, who had furniſhed *Scipio* and *Varus* with Money; but concluded with telling them that they might ſhow themſelves without fear, as he was determined to grant them their Lives, and content himſelf with expoſing their Effects to ſale; yet ſo, that he would give them notice when their Goods were to be ſold, and the liberty of redeeming them upon payment of a certain Fine. The Merchants half dead with Fear, and conſcious that they merited Death, hearing upon what Terms Life was offered them, greedily accepted the Condition, and intreated *Cæſar* that he would impoſe a certain Sum in groſs upon all the three hundred. Accordingly he amerced them in two hundred thouſand Seſterces, to be paid to the Republick at ſix equal Payments, within the ſpace of three Years. They all accepted the Condition, and conſidering that Day as a ſecond Nativity, joyfully returned thanks to *Cæſar*.

LXXIX. MEAN-WHILE King *Juba*, who had eſcaped from the Battle with *Petreius*, hiding himſelf all day in the Villages, and travelling only by night, arrived at laſt in *Numidia*. When he came to *Zama*, his ordinary place of reſidence, where were his Wives and Children, with all his Treaſures, and whatever he held moſt valuable, and which he had ſtrongly fortified at the beginning of the War; the Inhabitants having heard of *Cæſar*'s Victory, refuſed him entrance, becauſe upon declaring War againſt the *Romans*, he had raiſed a mighty Pile of Wood in the middle of the Forum, deſigning, if unſucceſsful, to maſſacre all the Citizens, fling their Bodies and Effects upon the Pile, then ſetting fire to the Maſs, and throwing himſelf upon it, deſtroy all without exception, Wives, Children, Citizens, and Treaſures, in one general Conflagration. After continuing a conſiderable time before the Gates, finding that neither Threats nor Intreaties would avail, he at laſt deſired them to deliver him his Wives and Children, that he might carry them along with him. But receiving no Anſwer, and ſeeing them determined to grant him nothing, he quitted the Place, and retired to one of his Country-Seats with *Petreius* and a few Horſe.

LXXX. MEAN-TIME the *Zamians* ſent Ambaſſadors to *Cæſar* at *Utica*, to inform him of what they had done, and to requeſt his Aſſiſtance againſt *Juba*, who was drawing his Forces together to attack them. They aſſured him of their Submiſſion, and Reſolution to defend the Town for him. *Cæſar* commended the Ambaſſadors, and ſent them back to acquaint their Fellow-Citizens, that he was coming himſelf to their Relief. Accordingly ſetting out the next Day from *Utica* with his Cavalry, he directed his march towards *Numidia*. Many of the King's Generals met him on the way, and ſued for Pardon: to all whom having given a favourable Hearing, they attended him to *Zama*. The Report of his Clemency and Mildneſs ſpreading into all Parts, the whole *Numidian* Cavalry flocked to him to *Zama*, and were there delivered from their Fears.

LXXXI. DURING theſe Tranſactions, *Conſidius* who commanded at *Tiſdra*, with his own Retinue, a Garriſon of *Getulians*, and a Company of Gladiators; hearing of the defeat of his Party, and terrified at the arrival of *Domitius* and the Legions, abandoned the Town; and privately withdrawing with a few of the Barbarians, and all his Money, took his way towards *Numidia*. The *Getulians*, to render themſelves maſters of his Treaſure, murdered him by the way, and fled every Man where he could. Mean-time *C. Vergilius*, ſeeing himſelf ſhut up by Sea and Land, without power of making a Defence; his Followers all ſlain or put to flight; *M. Cato* dead by his own hands at *Utica*; *Juba* deſpiſed and deſerted by his own Subjects; *Sabura* and his Forces defeated by *Sitius*; *Cæſar* received without Oppoſition at *Utica*; and that of ſo vaſt an Army, nothing remained capable of ſcreening him or his Children; thought it his moſt prudent Courſe, to ſurrender himſelf and the City to the Proconſul *Caninius*, by whom he was beſieged.

LXXXII. AT the ſame time King *Juba*, ſeeing himſelf excluded from all the Cities of his Kingdom, and that there remained no hopes of Safety; having ſupped with *Petreius*, propoſed an Engagement Sword in hand, that they might die honourably. *Juba*, as being the ſtronger, eaſily got the better of his Adverſary, and laid him dead at his Feet: but endeavouring afterwards to run himſelf through the Body, and wanting Strength to accompliſh it, he was obliged to have recourſe to one of his Slaves, and by his Intreaties prevailed upon him to perform that mournful Office.

LXXXIII. IN the mean time *P. Sitius*, having defeated the Army of *Sabura*, *Juba*'s Lieutenant, and ſlain the General; and marching with a few Troops thro' *Mauritania* to join *Cæſar*, chanced to fall in with *Fauſtus* and *Afranius*, who were at the head of the Party that had plundered *Utica*, amounting in all to about fifteen hundred Men, and deſigning to make the beſt of their way to *Spain*. Having expeditiouſly placed himſelf in ambuſcade during the night, and attacking them by day-break, he either killed or made them all Priſoners, excepting a few that eſcaped from the Van. *Afranius* and *Fauſtus* were taken among the reſt, with their Wives and Children: but ſome few Days after, a Mutiny ariſing among the Soldiers, *Fauſtus* and *Afranius* were ſlain. *Cæſar* pardoned *Pompeia*, the Wife of *Fauſtus*, with her Children, and permitted her the free enjoyment of all her Effects.

LXXXIV. MEAN-WHILE *Scipio*, with *Damaſippus* and *Torquatus*, and *Plætorius Ruſtianus*, having embarked on board ſome Gallies, with a deſign to

make for the Coaſt of *Spain*; and being long and ſeverely toſſed by contrary Winds, were at laſt obliged to put into the Port of *Hippo*, where the Fleet commanded by *P. Sitius* chanced at that time to be. *Scipio*'s Veſſels, which were but ſmall, and few in number, were eaſily ſurrounded and ſunk by the larger and more numerous Ships of *Sitius*; on which Occaſion *Scipio*, and all thoſe whom we have mentioned above, as having embarked with him, periſhed.

LXXXV. MEAN-WHILE *Cæſar* having expoſed the King's Effects to publick ſale at *Zama*, and confiſcated the Eſtates of thoſe, who though *Roman* Citizens, had born Arms againſt the Republick: after conferring Rewards upon ſuch of the *Zamians* as had been concerned in the deſign of excluding the King, he aboliſhed all the royal Tributes, converted the Kingdom into a Province; and appointing *Criſpus Salluſtius* to take charge of it with the Title of Proconſul, returned again to *Utica*. There he ſold the Eſtates of the Officers that had ſerved under *Juba* and *Petreius*, fined the People of *Thapſus* twenty thouſand Seſterces, and the Company of *Roman* Merchants there thirty thouſand; fined likewiſe the Inhabitants of *Adrumetum* in thirty thouſand, and their Company in fifty thouſand, but preſerved the Cities and their Territories from Inſult and Plunder. Thoſe of *Leptis*, whom *Juba* had pillaged ſome time before, and who upon Complaint made to the Senate by their Deputies, had obtained Arbitrators and Reſtitution, were enjoined to pay yearly three hundred thouſand Pounds of Oil; becauſe from the beginning of the War, in conſequence of a diſſenſion among their Chiefs, they had made an Alliance with the King of *Numidia*, and ſupplied him with Arms, Soldiers, and Money. The People of *Tiſdra*, becauſe of their extreme Poverty, were only condemned to pay annually a certain quantity of Corn.

LXXXVI. THESE Things ſettled, he embarked at *Utica* on the thirteenth of *June*, and three Days after arrived at *Carales* in *Sardinia*. Here he condemned the *Sulcitani* in a Fine of one hundred thouſand Seſterces, for receiving and aiding *Naſidius*'s Fleet; and inſtead of a tenth, which was their former Aſſeſsment, ordered them now to pay an eighth to the publick Treaſury. He likewiſe confiſcated the Eſtates of ſome who had been more active than the reſt, and weighing from *Carales* on the twenty-ninth of *June*, coaſted along the Shore, and after a Voyage of twenty-eight Days, during which he was ſeveral times obliged to put into Port by contrary Winds, arrived ſafe at *Rome*.

A. HIRTIUS

A. HIRTIUS PANSA's

COMMENTARIES

OF THE

SPANISH WAR.

THE ARGUMENT.

I. *The Commencement of the* Spaniſh *War.* II. Cæſar *marches to attack* Cordova. III. *At the ſame time throws Succours into* Ulia, *beſieged by* Pompey. IV. *The Attempt upon* Cordova *obliges* Pompey *to raiſe the Siege of* Ulia. V. Pompey *advancing to the Relief of* Cordova, Cæſar *attacks* Ategua, *whither he is followed by* Pompey. VII. *Both intrench themſelves in mountainous Places, of difficult Acceſs.* IX. Pompey *attacking a Fort belonging to* Cæſar, *is repulſed.* X. Cæſar *continues the Siege of* Ategua. XI. *Repulſes a Sally from the Town.* XIII. *Various Skirmiſhes between the two Armies.* XV. *Cruelty of the Townſmen.* XVI. Cæſar *repulſes them in a ſecond Sally.* XVII. Tullius *treats with* Cæſar *about a Surrender.* XVIII. *Continuation of the Siege.* XIX. *The Town ſurrenders.* XX. Pompey *removes his Camp towards* Ucubis. XXII. *Behaviour of the* Burſavolenſes. XXIII. Cæſar *and* Pompey *both encamp near* Ucubis, *where ſome Skirmiſhes happen.* XXV. *Single Combat of* Turpio *and* Niger. XXVI. *Great Numbers of the Enemy deſert to* Cæſar. *Some of* Pompey's *Letters intercepted.* XXVII. *Both Parties encamp in the Plain of* Munda. XXVIII. *A great Battle enſues.* XXXI. *In which* Pompey *is totally defeated.* XXXII. Cæſar *beſieges the Runaways in* Munda. XXXIII. *Attacks and makes himſelf maſter of* Cordova. XXXV. *Likewiſe of* Hiſpalis; *whence he is expelled, and again recovers it. The* Mundenſes, *under pretence of a Surrender, preparing to attack our Men, are themſelves put to the Sword.* XXXVII. Carteia *ſurrenders to* Cæſar. Pompey *makes his Eſcape.* XXXIX. Pompey *is ſlain.* XL. *Some of* Cæſar's *Ships burnt.* XLI. Cæſar's *Troops take poſſeſſion of* Munda, *and afterwards inveſt* Urſao. XLII. Cæſar's *Speech to the People of* Hiſpalis.

HISPANIA VETERIS DESCRIPTIO.

OCEANUS ATLANTICUS, QUOD HESPERIUM, VESPERTINUM, OCCÌDUUM, ET EXTERNUM.

CANTABRICUS OCEANUS

Leucæ Hispanicæ. 10 20 30 40 50

Milliaria Germanica. 10 20 30 40

Frons Hispaniæ Occidentalis, Plin. et Mele

Frons Hispaniæ Septentrionalis

Scythicum prom. Mela, Lapatia Ptolomæi puto, quod Trileucum

Trifurcis sepulc.

Flavium

Flavio-briga olim

Arg

Amnis et Corticata insula, hic a Plinio describitur

Magnus portus

Vaca Portus

Saleni

Cassiterides insulæ, hic Ptolemæo.

Olina

Zelæ.

Astures transmontani.

Pesici

Cantabri

Lucus Asturum

Artabrum et Celticum prom. Plinio Nerium Ptolemæo, Spodes Britannus Oræ

Florium Brigantium

Clandomerium

Celtici

Britonium

Ladicus mons

Vindius mons

Pintia

Lacce

Laberri

Coniaci

Burum

Astures Augustani.

Interamnium Flav.

Turmodigi.

Brigæcium

Murbogi.

Borgidum

Lucenses.

Julio-briga, et Lancum fons

Locus Turris Sextianæ

Ang.

Talamina

Tritium

Irtha Flavia

Tamarici.

Seuri

Cæporiacum

Præsamarci.

Flavia Lambris et Lambriaca

Cileni.

Dactonium

Cicæ et Deorum insula

Callaici.

Bedunia

Amphilochi.

Tyde

Bracari.

Valentia

Caladunum

Gronij et Gravij.

Caradus

Ararum

Arae Sestianae

Nemetati.

Origeni.

Duris flu. qui et Dorius

Lamaca

Fer. Narbasorum

Vettones.

Mirobriga

Liancia oppidana

Ilurbida

Langobrica

Araducta

Aritium

Lusitani.

Veruvium

Capara

Lancienses

Ocellenses.

Ocellum

Manliana

Mantuanus saltus

Vaccæi, et Baccæ

Solimancum

Elaboris

Tagus

Vacca

Vaccæi

Tallabrica

Velladis

Caurita

Laconi murgum

Placentia

Deobriga

Carpetani.

Altamira

Belitani.

Turmulum

Norba Cæsarea

Olba et Olibia

Chretina

Conimbrica

Tacubus

Lusitani.

Concordia, et Boccoris

Castra Cælisis

Augustobriga

Arabriga

Celtici

Burdea

Colarni.

Louciana

Eburobritium

Londrobis Erythræa

Lana mons

Tagrus mons

Colarnum

Caurium

Castra Cæcilia et Metallina

Turduli.

Oretani.

Gerræa

Phorcis

Setia

Sisapon

Merobriga

Lancobriga

Bratelum

Talecus

Ebura

Obolcola, et Obulco Pontificense

Marianimontes

Emiliana

Tagus

Barbaria prom.

Capiana

Ardobriga

Castrum Romanum antiquum

Curfu

Celtici

Contributa

Pax Augusta Strab. Pax Plinij

Bæturia.

Arva

Mellaria Plin.

Artinis

Vepia

Vetones

Turduli Veteres.

Acandis

Arunda Ptol.

Arnci Ptol.

Regiana

Mirobriga

Spoletinum

Corticata

Vania

Italia

Virum

Ceriana

Pax Julia Ptol. et Ant.

ITALI

CASIA.

Ostidamnij, et Cynesij.

Ossanoba, à Plinio Lusitaniæ cognominata

Balsa

CUNEUS Ager

Sacrum prom. Ptol.

Sacer mons Columnæ Calbium Straboni et

Caput Eroæ Estiatæ

Gades insula et urbs

GADITANUM MARE.

Junonis prom.

Tartessus

Exitani.

IBERICUM M

Fretum Herculeum, Gaditanum, et Columnarum

Idem, Limen

Interni maris, et Oceani ostium.

EMPORICUS sinus qui et SAGUTI

Mauri populi.

HISPANIA TRANSFRETANA SIVE TINGITANA, QUÆ ET MAURITANIA

AFRICAE P

Nº 77

GALLIAE CONFINIA

GALLICUS Sinus, Strab.

GALLICUS Sinus Minor

Massilia

Pyrenæi montes

Narbona

Salsulæ fons

Salsulæ

Rubina

Illiberi

Aphrodisium prom.

Thicis Au Ilyberris forte Strabonis

Palæopolis

Tauro Scalæ Annibalis

Tauromenium prom.

Pyrene Illiberi forte

Blanda

Tholobis Au.

Sardinia

Balearis Au.

Betulle Au.

Subur

Tarraco

Tarraconensis Au.

Ilercaonia

Ebusus insula

Ophiusa insula

Ferraria prom. quod et Artemisium, sive Diana ...

Plumbaria

Illicitanus Sinus

Longuntica

Virphasii tumulus

Lucentia

Alonæ

Illice

Orcelis

Iaccetani

Dertosa

Ibera

Theoa

Elerca

Cannas mons

Tiarinlia

Sedetani

Lobetani

Leonicenses

Damania

Illum

Carteia

Ballantia fl.

Oliba fl.

Colubraria

Menaria

Sanisera

Balma

Iamno

Polentia

Cinium

Cunici

Capraria

Ebusus

Ebusitanæ Insulæ

Sucronensis Sinus

Edulius mons

Vessitania

Dera regio

Cerretani Iuliani et Augustani

Bergistani

Sueßitani

Endigetes

Cempsi

Orgella

Ilalia Libyca

Deciana

Cimiana

Longinus campus

Betteres

Castellani

Laletani

Laietani

Ausetani

Ilergetes

Surdaones

Gallica Flavia

Carthago restituta Pœnor.

Tolobis

Colsetani

Eoencula campus

Subur

Iesus

Traiana Capita

Cinna

Oleas

Tarraco

Ilercaonia

Bergusia

Cempsi

Iulium Cor. Pœnorum

Pompeii

Iberis Au.

Subur

Betulle Au.

Rubricatus Au.

Tarraconensis Au.

Pelendones

Vascones

Vasconum saltus

Pompeiopolis

Andelos

Lacca

Bituris

Sassa

Allabona

Gallicum

Caesar munitus

Saltibis

Ilumbri Livii forte

Segisa

Bellisa

Bellisinum

Vasama

Voluce

Tueris

Areyacæ

Lutia

Bilbilis

Saccontia

Nertobriga

Sermone

Bisargis

Carietes

Arcobriga

Ilarcuris

Ecbolsus

Segontia quæ Segobia Ptol.

Agiria

Thermidæ

Varada

Cæsata

Albonica

Aquæ Bilbitanorum

Caraceca, Aricaca Antiq.

Complutum

Ergavica

Manlua

Valpongæ

Lobetani

Attacum

Caudebona

Tiarda

Damania

Illum

Leonicenses

Carteia

Lacca

Ossicerda

Saenobriga

Bursada

Ilipa fl.

Olcades

Barnacis

Alaba

Meteroesa

Alces

Ilsonium

Salduba

Consabu-rense.

Dittani qui et Titthi.

Celtiberi.

Lamini.

Torboletæ

Belli

Contestani.

Salica

Castrum album

Asso

Bergula

Arcilacis

Illunum

Saltus

Iugienis

Bastitani.

Carca

Murgis

Plin.

Iaspis

Thiar.

Mentesa

Castulo

Bantiana

Bætulle

Bigitia

Laurì

Segisa

Virgilia

Ilurci et Ilorci

Gyri Ioeni.

Spar

Cronii vel Saturni tumulus

Tader fl.

Accì

Calicula

Accitum

Lacippo

Illiberis

Iturgis

Lacibis

Solambina

Vlyssea

Abdera

Sebinum

Barea

Pyrrus Marmæ

Errorum insula

Mercurii prom.

Aegimoriara

Clupea

Neapolis

Tiagul

Aphrodisium

Adrumetum

Ithon

Ruspina

Leptis parua

Thapsus

Achulla

Tercina insula

Taphura

Meninx Ins

Syrtis Minor

Tasapa

Gitti

Sabrata

Occa

Abrotonum

Leptis mag

Tritonitis lacus

Tripolitana regio

Gaulos

Melite

Cossyra Lopaduſa

Paconia

Agates Ins

Aponiana forsan

Acgusa

Pelorum pr

Messana

Ætna

Lilybæum

Agrigentum

Syracusa

Gela

Pachynum pr

SICILIA

Iunonis

Rhoda, Rhodope, et Rhodopolis.

Emporiæ.

Castelon.

Gerunda.

Aquæ vocatis Aquæ calidæ. Ptol.

Basi.

BALEARICUM Mare

BALEARIDES, quæ et GYMNESIÆ et CHOERADES. Insulæ duæ, quæ MAIOR et MINOR

ET

ET

MARE

MARE

AFRICANUM Mare

VIRGITANUS Sinus

ILLICITANUS Sinus

Mauretaniæ Tingitanæ pars. Ptol.

Mauretaniæ Tingitanæ pars. Ptol.

Caspe

Carietes

Vardulli

Autrigones

Berones

Pelendones

Areyacæ

Caristi Tuboricum

Vascones

Vandelia

Oretani

Deitania

Carpetani

Oretani

Characitani.

Olcades

Celtiberi.

Dittani qui et Titthi.

Lamini.

Contestani.

Bastitani.

Deitania

Gyri Ioeni.

Accitani

Mentesani

Bastuli

Turdetani

Turdetania

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A. HIRTIUS PANSA's

COMMENTARIES

OF THE

SPANISH WAR.

. *PHARNACES* being vanquiſhed, and *Africa* reduced, thoſe who eſcaped fled into *Spain* to young *Cn. Pompey*; who having got poſſeſſion of the farther Province, whilſt *Cæſar* was employed in diſtributing Rewards in *Italy*, endeavoured to ſtrengthen himſelf by engaging the ſeveral States to join him: and partly by intreaty, partly by force, ſoon drew together a conſiderable Army, with which he began to lay waſte the Country. n this ſituation of Things, ſome States voluntarily ſent him Supplies, others hut the Gates of their Towns againſt him: of which, if any chanced to fall nto his hands by Aſſault; how well ſoever a Citizen might have deſerved of is Father, yet if he was known to be rich, ſome ground of Complaint was ever wanting, under pretence of which to deſtroy him, that his Eſtate might all a Prey to the Soldiers. Thus the Enemy, encouraged by the Spoils of the anquiſhed, increaſed daily in Number and Strength: inſomuch that the States n *Cæſar*'s Intereſt were continually ſending Meſſengers into *Italy*, to preſs his mmediate march to their relief.

II. *CÆSAR* now a third time Dictator, and nominated alſo a fourth time o the ſame Dignity, haſtening with all diligence into *Spain*, to put an end to he War, was met upon the Way by the Ambaſſadors of *Cordova*, who had leſerted from the Camp of *Cn. Pompey*. They informed him that it would e an eaſy matter to make himſelf maſter of the Town by night, becauſe the Enemy as yet knew nothing of his arrival in the Province, the Scouts ſent out y *Cn. Pompey* to inform him of *Cæſar*'s approach, having been all made Priſoners. They alledged beſides many other very probable Reaſons; all which ſo far wrought upon him, that he ſent immediate advice of his arrival to *Q. Pedius*, and *Q. Fabius Maximus* his Lieutenants, to whom he had left the command of the Troops in the Province; ordering them to ſend him all the Cavalry they had been able to raiſe. He came up with them much ſooner than they expected, and was joined by the Cavalry according to his deſire.

III. *SEXTUS POMPEY*, the Brother of *Cneus*, commanded at this time in *Cordova*, which was accounted the Capital of the Province. Young *Cneus Pompey* himſelf was employed in the Siege of *Ulia*, which had now laſted ſome Months. The Beſieged having notice of *Cæſar*'s arrival, ſent Deputies to him, who paſſed unobſerved thro' *Pompey*'s Camp, and requeſted with great earneſtneſs, that he would come ſpeedily to their Relief. *Cæſar*, who was no ſtranger to the Merit of that People, and their conſtant Attachment to the *Romans*, detached about nine at night eleven Cohorts, with a like number of Horſe, under the command of *L. Julius Paciecus*, a good Officer, well known in the Province, and who was beſides perfectly acquainted with the Country. When he arrived at *Pompey*'s Quarters, a dreadful Tempeſt ariſing, attended with a violent Wind; ſo great a darkneſs enſued, that it was difficult to diſtinguiſh even the Perſon next you. This Accident proved of great advantage to *Paciecus*: for being arrived at *Pompey*'s Camp, he ordered the Cavalry to advance two by two, and march directly thro' the Enemy's Quarters to the Town. Some of their Guards calling to know who paſſed; one of our Troopers bid them be ſilent, for they were juſt then endeavouring by ſtealth to approach the Wall, in order to get poſſeſſion of the Town; and partly by this Anſwer, partly by favour of the Tempeſt, which hindered the Sentinels from examining things diligently, they were ſuffered to paſs without diſturbance. When they reached the Gates, upon a Signal given they were admitted; and both Horſe and Foot raiſing a mighty Shout, after leaving ſome Troops to guard the Town, ſallied in a Body upon the Enemy's Camp; who having no apprehenſion of ſuch an Attack, were almoſt all like to have been made Priſoners.

IV. *ULIA* being relieved, *Cæſar*, to draw *Pompey* from the Siege, marched towards *Cordova*; ſending the Cavalry before, with a ſelect Body of heavy-armed Foot; who as ſoon as they came within ſight of the Place, got up behind the Troopers, without being perceived by thoſe of *Cordova*. Upon their approach to the Walls, the Enemy ſallied in great numbers, to attack our Cavalry; when the Infantry leaping down, fell upon them with ſuch fury, that out of an almoſt infinite multitude of Men, very few returned to the Town. This ſo alarmed *Sextus Pompey*, that he immediately ſent Letters to his Brother, requeſting him to come ſpeedily to his relief, leſt *Cæſar* ſhould make himſelf maſter of *Cordova* before his arrival. Thus *Cn. Pompey*, moved by his Brother's Letters, quitted the Siege of *Ulia*, which was upon the point of ſurrendering, and began his march towards *Cordova*.

V. *CÆSAR* arriving at the River *Betis*, which he found too deep to be forded, ſunk ſeveral Baskets of Stones in it; and raiſing a Bridge upon them, ſupported by double Beams, carried over his Forces in three Bodies. *Pompey* arriving ſoon after with his Troops, encamped directly over-againſt him. *Cæſar*, to cut off his Proviſions and Communication with the Town, run a Line from his Camp to the Bridge. *Pompey* did the ſame; inſomuch that a Struggle aroſe between the two Generals, which ſhould firſt get poſſeſſion of the Bridge; and this daily brought on ſmall Skirmiſhes, in which ſometimes the one, ſometimes the other Party had the better. At laſt the Diſpute becoming more general, they came to a cloſe Fight, tho' upon very diſadvantageous Ground: for both ſides ſtriving earneſtly to obtain the Bridge, they found themſelves as they approached ſtraitened for want of room, and extending themſelves towards the River ſide, many fell headlong from the Banks.

Thus

Thus the loſs was pretty equal; for on either ſide lay heaps of ſlain: and *Cæſar*, for many Days, uſed all poſſible endeavours to bring the Enemy to an Engagement on equal terms, that he might bring the War to a concluſion as ſoon as poſſible.

VI. BUT finding that they carefully avoided a Battle, with a view to which chiefly he had quitted the rout of *Ulia*; he cauſed great Fires to be lighted in the night, repaſſed the River with all his Forces, and marched towards *Ategua*, one of their ſtrongeſt Garriſons. *Pompey* having notice of this from the Deſerters, retreated the ſame Day to *Cordova*, by a very narrow and difficult Road, with a great number of Carriages and Machines of War. *Cæſar* began his Attack upon *Ategua*, and carried Lines quite round the Town; of which *Pompey* having intelligence, ſet out upon his march the ſame Day. But *Cæſar* had taken care beforehand to ſecure all the advantageous Poſts, and poſſeſs himſelf of the Forts; partly to ſhelter his Cavalry, partly to poſt Guards of Infantry for the defence of his Camp. The Morning of *Pompey*'s arrival was ſo foggy, that he found means, with ſome Cohorts and Troops of Cavalry, to hem in a Party of *Cæſar*'s Horſe, and fell upon them in ſuch manner, that very few eſcaped ſlaughter.

VII. THE following Night *Pompey* ſet fire to his Camp, paſſed the River *Salſus*, and marching thro' the Valleys, encamped on a riſing Ground, between the two Towns of *Ategua* and *Ucubis*. *Cæſar* mean-while continued his Approaches, caſt up a Mount, and brought forward his Machines. The Country all around is mountainous, and ſeems formed for War. The River *Salſus* runs thro' the Plains, and divides them from the Mountains, which all lie upon the ſide of *Ategua*, at about two miles diſtance from the River. *Pompey*'s Camp was upon theſe Mountains, within view of both the Towns, but nearer to *Ategua*; to which he could however ſend no relief, tho' his Army conſiſted of thirteen Legions. Of theſe he chiefly relied on four: two *Spaniſh* ones, which had deſerted from *Trebonius*; one formed out of the *Roman* Colonies in thoſe parts; and a fourth which he had brought with him from *Africa*. The reſt were for the moſt part made up of Fugitives and Deſerters. As to light-armed Foot and Cavalry, we far exceeded him both in the number and goodneſs of the Troops.

VIII. BUT what proved principally ſerviceable to *Pompey*'s deſign of drawing out the War into length, was the nature of the Country, full of Mountains, and extremely well adapted to Encampments. For almoſt the whole Province of farther *Spain*, tho' of an extremely fertile Soil, and abounding in Springs, is nevertheleſs very difficult of acceſs. Here too, on account of the frequent Incurſions of the Natives, all the Places remote from great Towns, are fortified with Towers and Caſtles, covered, as in *Africa*, not with Tiles, but with Earth. On theſe they place Centinels, whoſe high ſituation commands an extenſive view of the Country on all ſides. Nay the greateſt part of the Towns of this Province are built on Mountains, and Places exceedingly ſtrong by Nature, the approaches to which are extremely difficult. Thus Sieges are rare and hazardous in *Spain*, it not being eaſy to reduce their Towns by force; as happened in the preſent War. For *Pompey* having eſtabliſhed his Camp between *Ategua* and *Ucubis*, as related above, and within view of both Towns, *Cæſar* found means to poſſeſs himſelf of an Eminence very conveniently ſituated, and only about four miles from his own Camp, on which he built a Fortreſs.

IX.

IX. *POMPEY*, who from the nature of the Ground was covered by the ſame Eminence, and beſides at a ſufficient diſtance from *Cæſar*'s Quarters, ſoon became ſenſible of the importance of this Poſt: and as *Cæſar* was ſeparated from it by the River *Salſus*, he imagined that the difficulty of ſending relief would prevent his attempting any thing of that kind in its defence. Relying on this perſuaſion, he ſet out about midnight, and attacked the Fort, which had been very troubleſom to the Beſieged. The Enemy, upon their approach, ſetting up a Shout, diſcharged their Javelins in great numbers, and wounded multitudes of our Men: but thoſe in the Fort making a vigorous Reſiſtance, and diſpatching Meſſengers to the greater Camp to inform *Cæſar* of what had happened, he haſtened to their relief with three Legions. His approach ſtruck the Enemy with terror: many were ſlain, and a yet greater number made Priſoners; nay multitudes in their flight threw away their Arms; inſomuch that above fourſcore Shields were found which they had left behind them.

X. THE Day after *Arguetius* arrived from *Italy* with the Cavalry, and five Standards taken from the *Saguntines*; but was forced to quit his Poſt by *Aſprenas*, who likewiſe brought a Reinforcement from *Italy* to *Cæſar*. The ſame Night *Pompey* ſet fire to his Camp, and drew towards *Cordova*. A King named *Indus*, who was bringing ſome Troops to *Cæſar* with a Party of Cavalry, following the purſuit of the Enemy too briskly, was made Priſoner and ſlain by the *Spaniſh* Legionaries. Next Day our Cavalry purſued thoſe who were employed in carrying Proviſions from the Town to *Pompey*'s Camp, almoſt to the very Walls of *Cordova*, and took fifty Priſoners, beſides Horſes. The ſame Day *Q. Marcius*, a military Tribune in *Pompey*'s Army, deſerted to us. At midnight the Beſieged fell furiouſly upon our Works, and by all the Methods they could deviſe, threw Fire and combuſtible Matter into the Trenches. When the Attack was ended, *C. Fundanius* a *Roman* Knight quitted the Enemy, and came over to us.

XI. NEXT Day two *Spaniſh* Legionaries, who pretended they were Slaves, were made Priſoners by a Party of our Horſe: but being brought to the Camp, they were known by the Soldiers who had formerly ſerved under *Fabius* and *Pedius*, and deſerted from *Trebonius*, who would grant no Quarter, but maſſacred them immediately. At the ſame time ſome Couriers ſent from *Cordova* to *Pompey*, entering our Camp by miſtake, were ſeized, had their Hands cut off, and then were diſmiſſed. About nine at night the Beſieged, according to cuſtom, ſpent a conſiderable time in caſting Fire and Darts upon our Soldiers, and wounded a great number of Men. At day-break they ſallied upon the ſixth Legion, who were buſy at the Works, and began a ſharp Conteſt, in which however our Men got the better, tho' the beſieged had the advantage of the higher Ground: and fifty of their Horſe, who had begun the Attack, being vigorouſly oppoſed on our ſide, notwithſtanding all the Inconveniences we fought under, were at length obliged to retire into the Town with many Wounds.

XII. NEXT Day *Pompey* began a Line from the Camp to the River *Salſus*; and a ſmall Party of our Horſe, being attacked by a much greater Body of the Enemy, were driven from their Poſt, with the loſs of three of their number. The ſame Day *A. Valgius*, the Son of a Senator, whoſe Brother was in *Pompey*'s Camp, mounted his Horſe and went over to the Enemy, leaving all

all his Baggage behind him. A Spy belonging to *Pompey*'s ſecond Legion was taken and ſlain. At the ſame time a Bullet was ſhot into the Town with this Inſcription: That Notice ſhould be given by the Signal of a Buckler, when *Cæſar* advanced to ſtorm the Town. This encouraging ſome to hope that they might ſcale the Walls and poſſeſs themſelves of the Town without danger, they fell the next Day to ſapping them, and threw down a conſiderable Part of the outward Wall. They then endeavoured to mount the Breach, but were made Priſoners, and afterwards employed by the Garriſon to make an Offer of ſurrendering the Town to *Cæſar*, upon condition he would ſuffer them to march out with their Baggage. The Anſwer was, That it had been always his Cuſtom to give, not accept of Conditions; which being reported to the Garriſon, they ſet up a Shout, and began to pour their Darts upon our Men from the whole Circuit of the Wall; which gave reaſon to believe that the Garriſon intended that Day to make a vigorous Sally. Wherefore ſurrounding the Town with our Troops, the Conflict was for ſome time maintained with great Violence, and one of our Batteries threw down a Tower belonging to the Enemy, in which were five of their Men, and a Boy, whoſe Office it was to obſerve the Battery.

XIII. AFTER this *Pompey* erected a Fort on the other ſide of the *Salſus*, in which he met with no interruption from our Men, and gloried not a little in the imagination of having poſſeſſed himſelf of a Poſt ſo near us. Alſo the following Day, extending himſelf in like manner ſtill farther, he came up with our out-guard of Cavalry; and charging them briskly, obliged ſeveral Squadrons, and the light-armed Foot to give ground; many of whom, by reaſon of the ſmallneſs of their Numbers, incapable of any vigorous Oppoſition, were trod down by the Enemy's Horſe. This paſſed within view of both Camps, and not a little animated the *Pompeians*, to ſee our Men puſhed ſo far: but being afterwards reinforced by a Party from our Camp, they faced about with deſign to renew the Fight.

XIV. IN all Battles of the Horſe this is found to hold, that when the Troopers diſmount with deſign to charge the Infantry, the Match evermore proves unequal, as happened on the preſent occaſion. For a ſelect Body of the Enemy's light-armed Foot, coming unexpectedly upon our Horſe, they alighted to ſuſtain the Charge. Thus in a very little time, from a Horſe it became a Foot-skirmiſh, and again from a Foot changed to a Horſe encounter, in which our Men were driven back to their very Lines: but being there reinforced, about a hundred and twenty-three of the Enemy were ſlain, ſeveral forced to throw down their Arms, many wounded, and the reſt purſued quite to their Camp. On our ſide a hundred and eleven Men were ſlain, beſides twelve Foot-ſoldiers and five Troopers wounded.

XV. TOWARDS the Evening of the ſame Day, the Fight, as uſual, was renewed before the Walls; and the Enemy having thrown many Darts, and a great Quantity of Fire from the Battlements, proceeded afterwards to an Action of unexampled Cruelty and Barbarity: for in the very ſight of our Troops they fell to murdering the Citizens, and tumbling them headlong from the Walls; an inſtance of Inhumanity, of which no Parallel is to be found in the Hiſtory of the moſt ſavage Nations.

XVI. WHEN Night came on, *Pompey* ſent a Meſſenger unknown to us, to exhort the Garriſon to make a vigorous Sally about midnight, and ſet fire to our Towers and Mount. Accordingly having poured upon us a great Quantity of Darts and Fire, and deſtroyed a conſiderable part of the Rampart, they opened the Gate which lay over-againſt and within view of *Pompey*'s Camp, and ſallied out with all their Forces, carrying with them Faſcines to fill up the Ditch; Hooks and Fire to deſtroy and reduce to Aſhes the Barracks, which the Soldiers had built moſtly of Reeds to defend them from the Winter; and ſome Silver and rich Apparel to ſcatter among the Tents, that while our Men ſhould be employed in ſecuring the Plunder, they might fight their way through and eſcape to *Pompey*; who in expectation that they would be able to effect their Deſign, had croſſed the *Salſus* with his Army, where he continued all Night in order of Battle, to favour their Retreat. But though our Men had no Apprehenſion of this Deſign, their Valour enabled them to fruſtrate the Attempt, and repulſe the Enemy with many Wounds. They even made themſelves maſters of the Spoil, their Arms, and ſome Priſoners, who were put to death next Day. At the ſame time a Deſerter from the Town informed us, that *Junius*, who was employed in the Mine when the Citizens were maſſacred, exclaimed againſt it as a cruel and barbarous Action, which ill ſuited the kind Treatment they had received, and was a direct Violation of the Laws of Hoſpitality. He added many things beſides, which made ſuch an Impreſſion upon the Garriſon, that they deſiſted from the maſſacre.

XVII. THE next Day *Tullius*, a Lieutenant-General, accompanied by *C. Antonius* of *Luſitania*, came to *Cæſar*, and addreſſed him to this effect. "Would to Heaven I had rather been one of your Soldiers, than a Follower "of *C. Pompey*, and given thoſe Proofs of Valour and Conſtancy in obtaining "Victories for you, rather than in ſuffering for him. The only Advantage "we reap from following his Banners are doleful Applauſes, being reduced to "the condition of indigent Citizens, and by the melancholy Fate of our "Country ranked among its Enemies; who having never ſhared with *Pompey* "in his good Fortune, find ourſelves yet involved in his Diſgrace; and after "ſuſtaining the Attack of ſo many armed Legions, employing ourſelves Day "and Night in Works of Defence, expoſed to the Darts and Swords of our "Fellow-Citizens; vanquiſhed, deſerted by *Pompey*, and compelled to give "way to the ſuperior Valour of your Troops, find ourſelves at laſt obliged to "have recourſe to your Clemency, and implore that you will not ſhow your-"ſelves leſs placable to Fellow-Citizens, than you have ſo often been to fo-"reign Nations." "I am ready, returned *Cæſar*, to ſhow the ſame Favour to "Citizens, which vanquiſhed Nations have always received at my hands."

XVIII. THE Ambaſſadors being diſmiſſed, when they arrived at the Gate of the Town, *Tiberius Tullius* obſerving that *C. Antony* did not follow him, returned to the Gate and laid hold of him, upon which drawing a Poniard from his Breaſt, he wounded him in the Hand, and in this condition they both fled to *Cæſar*. At the ſame time the Standard-bearer of the firſt Legion came over to our Camp, and reported that the Day when the Skirmiſh happened between the Horſe, no leſs than thirty-five of his Company fell; but it was not allowed to mention it in *Pompey*'s Camp, or ſo much as own the loſs of one Man. A Slave, whoſe Maſter was in *Cæſar*'s Camp, and who had left his Wife and Son in the City, cut his Maſter's Throat, and deceiving the Guards,

Guards, eſcaped privately to *Pompey*'s Camp; whence by means of a Bullet, on which he inſcribed his Intelligence, he gave us notice of the Preparations made for the defence of the Place. When we had read the Inſcription, thoſe who were employed to throw the Bullet returning to the City, two *Luſitanian* Brothers deſerted, and informed us, that *Pompey* in a Speech made to his Soldiers had ſaid; that as he found it impoſſible to relieve the Town, he was reſolved to withdraw privately in the night, and retire towards the Sea: to which one made anſwer, that it were better to hazard a Battle, than take Refuge in flight; for which he was immediately killed. At the ſame time ſome of his Couriers were intercepted, who were endeavouring to get into the Town. *Cæſar* ſent the Letters to the Inhabitants, and one of the Meſſengers begging his Life, he granted it with promiſe of further Reward, if he would ſet fire to the Enemy's wooden Turret. The Enterpriſe was not without difficulty: he undertook it however, but was ſlain in the Attempt. The ſame Night a Deſerter informed us that *Pompey* and *Labienus* were greatly offended at the maſſacre of the Citizens.

XIX. ABOUT nine at Night, one of our wooden Towers, which had been ſeverely battered by the Enemy's Engines, gave way as far as the third Story. At the ſame time a ſharp Action happened near the Walls, and the Beſieged, aſſiſted by a favourable Wind, burnt the remaining part of that Tower and another. Next Morning a Matron threw herſelf from the Wall, and came over to our Camp, reporting, that the reſt of her Family had intended the ſame, but were apprehended and put to death; likewiſe a Letter was thrown over, in which was written; "*L. Minutius* to *Cæſar*: *Pompey* has abandoned "me; if you will grant me my Life, I promiſe to ſerve you with the ſame "Fidelity and Attachment I have hitherto manifeſted towards him." At the ſame time the Deputies who had been ſent before to *Cæſar* by the Garriſon, now waited on him a ſecond time, offering to deliver up the Town next Day, upon a bare grant of their Lives: to which he reply'd, That he was *Cæſar*, and would perform his Word. Thus having made himſelf maſter of the Place the nineteenth of *February*, he was ſaluted Emperor by the Army.

XX. *POMPEY* being informed by ſome Deſerters that the Town had ſurrendered, removed his Camp towards *Ucubis*, where he began to build Redoubts, and ſecure himſelf with Lines. *Cæſar* alſo decamped and drew near him. At the ſame time a *Spaniſh* Legionary Soldier deſerting to our Camp, informed us; that *Pompey* had aſſembled the People of *Ucubis*, and given it them in charge to enquire diligently who favoured his Party, who that of the Enemy. Some time after, the Slave, who, as we have related above, had murdered his Maſter, was taken in a Mine and burnt alive. About the ſame time eight *Spaniſh* Centurions came over to *Cæſar*: and in a Skirmiſh between our Cavalry and that of the Enemy, we were repulſed, and ſome of our light-armed Foot wounded. The ſame Night we took four of the Enemies Spies. One, as being a Legionary Soldier, was beheaded, but the other three, who were Slaves, were crucified.

XXI. THE Day following ſome of the Enemies Cavalry and light-armed Infantry deſerted to us; and about eleven of their Horſe, falling upon a Party of our Men that were ſent to fetch Water, killed ſome, and took others Priſoners; amongſt which laſt were eight Troopers. Next Day *Pompey* beheaded ſeventy-

ſeventy-four Perſons as favourers of *Cæſar*'s Cauſe, ordering the reſt who lay under the ſame Suſpicion to be carried back to the Town, of whom an hundred and twenty eſcaped to *Cæſar*.

XXII. SOME time after, the Deputies of *Burſavola*, whom *Cæſar* had taken Priſoners in *Ategua*, and ſent along with his own Ambaſſadors to their City, to inform them of the maſſacre of the *Ateguans*, and what they had to apprehend from *Pompey*, who ſuffered his Soldiers to murder their Hoſts, and commit all manner of Crimes with Impunity, arriving in the Town; none of our Deputies, except ſuch as were Natives of the Place, durſt enter the City, though they were all *Roman* Knights and Senators. But after many Meſſages backward and forward, when the Deputies were upon their Return, the Garriſon purſued and put them all to the Sword, except two who eſcaped to *Cæſar*, and informed him of what had happened. Some time after, the *Burſavolenſes* ſending Spies to *Ategua*, to know the Truth of what had happened, and finding the Report of our Deputies confirmed, were for ſtoning to death him who had been the Cauſe of the Murder of the Deputies, and were with difficulty reſtrained from laying violent hands upon him, which in the end proved the occaſion of their own Deſtruction. For having obtained leave of the Inhabitants to go in perſon to *Cæſar* and juſtify himſelf, he privately drew together ſome Troops, and when he thought himſelf ſtrong enough, returned in the night, and was treacherouſly admitted into the Town; where he made a dreadful maſſacre of the Inhabitants, ſlew all the Leaders of the oppoſite Party, and reduced the Place under his Obedience. Soon after, ſome Slaves who had deſerted informed us, that he had ſold all the Goods of the Citizens, and that *Pompey* ſuffered none of his Soldiers to quit the Camp but unarmed, becauſe ſince the taking of *Ategua*, many deſpairing of ſucceſs fled into *Bethuria*, having given over all Expectation of Victory; and that if any deſerted from our Camp, they were put among the light-armed Infantry, whoſe Pay was only ſixteen Aſſes a Day.

XXIII. THE Day following *Cæſar* removed his Camp nearer to *Pompey*'s, and began to draw a Line to the River *Salſus*. Here while our Men were employed in the Work, ſome of the Enemy fell upon us from the higher Ground, and as we were in no condition to make Reſiſtance, wounded great Numbers, obliging us, contrary to cuſtom, to retreat. This being perceived; two Centurions of the fifth Legion paſſed the River, and reſtored the Battle; when urging the Enemy with aſtoniſhing Bravery, one of them fell, overwhelmed by the multitude of Darts diſcharged from above. The other continued the Combat for ſome time; but ſeeing himſelf in danger of being ſurrounded, as he was endeavouring to make good his Retreat, he ſtumbled and fell. His Death being known, the Enemy flocked together in ſtill greater Numbers, upon which our Cavalry paſſed the River, and drove them quite back to their Intrenchments; but purſuing them with too much heat, were ſurrounded by their Cavalry and light-armed Foot; where but for the moſt aſtoniſhing Efforts of Bravery, they muſt all unavoidably have been made Priſoners: for they were ſo hemmed in by the Enemies Lines, that they wanted room to defend themſelves. Many were wounded on our ſide in theſe two Encounters, and among the reſt *Clodius Aquitius*; but as the Fight was carried on moſtly at a diſtance, only the two Centurions of whom mention has been already made, and whom the deſire of Glory rendered regardleſs of their own Safety, were killed.

XXIV.

XXIV. NEXT Day both Parties withdrawing from *Soricaria*, we continued our Works. But *Pompey* obſerving that our Fort had cut off his Communication with *Aſpavia*, which is about five Miles diſtant from *Ucubis*, judged it neceſſary to come to a Battle. Yet he did not offer it upon equal terms, but choſe to draw up his Men upon a Hill, that he might have the advantage of the higher Ground. Mean-while both ſides endeavouring to poſſeſs themſelves of an Eminence that lay extremely convenient, we at laſt got the better of the *Pompeians*, and drove them from the Plain. The Slaughter was very great, and would have been ſtill greater, had they not been protected by the Mountain rather than their Valour. Night came on very opportunely to favour their Eſcape; without which our Men, though few in Number, would have entirely cut off their Retreat. *Pompey* loſt on this occaſion three hundred and twenty-four light-armed Foot, and about a hundred and thirty-eight Legionary Soldiers, beſides thoſe whoſe Armour and Spoils we carried off. Thus the death of the two Centurions, which happened the Day before, was fully revenged.

XXV. THE Day after, *Pompey*'s Horſe advanced according to their uſual cuſtom to our Lines; for only the Cavalry durſt venture to draw up on equal Ground. They therefore began to skirmiſh with our Men who were at work, the Legionaries calling out to us at the ſame time to chooſe our Field of Battle, with deſign to make us believe that they deſired nothing ſo much as to come to Blows. Upon this Invitation our Men quitted the Eminence where they were encamped, and advanced a great way into the Plain, deſiring no advantage of Ground. But none of the Enemy had the boldneſs to preſent themſelves, *Antiſtius Turpio* excepted; who preſuming on his Strength, and fancying no one on our ſide a match for him, offered us defiance. Upon this enſued a Combat not unlike that recorded of *Memnon* and *Achilles*. For *Q. Pompeius Niger*, a *Roman* Knight born in *Italy*, quitting his Rank, advanced to the Encounter. The fierce Air of *Antiſtius* having engaged the Attention of all, the two Armies drew up to be Spectators of the iſſue of this Challenge, and expreſſed no leſs Impatience than if the whole fortune of the War had depended upon it; and the Wiſhes on both ſides for Succeſs, were equal to the Anxiety and Concern each felt for his own Combatant. They advanced into the Plain with great Courage, having each a reſplendent Buckler of curious Workmanſhip. And doubtleſs the Combat would have been ſoon decided, had not ſome light-armed Foot, drawn up near the Lines, to ſerve as a Guard to the Camp, becauſe of the approach of the Enemy's Horſe. *** Our Horſe in retreating to their Camp, being warmly purſued by the Enemy, ſuddenly faced about with great Cries; which ſo terrified the *Pompeians*, that they immediately betook themſelves to flight, and retreated to their Camp with the loſs of many of their Men.

XXVI. *CÆSAR*, to reward the Valour of the *Caſſian* Troop, preſented them with thirteen thouſand *Seſterces*, diſtributed ten thouſand more among the light-armed Foot, and gave *Caſſius* himſelf two golden Chains. The ſame Day, *A. Bebius*, *C. Flavius*, and *A. Trebellius*, *Roman* Knights of *Aſti*, with their Horſes richly capariſoned and adorned with Silver, came over to *Cæſar*, and informed him; that all the reſt of the *Roman* Knights in *Pompey*'s Camp, had like them conſpired to come and join him, but that a Diſcovery being made of their Deſign by a Slave, they had been all ſeized, themſelves excepted, who during the Confuſion found means to eſcape. The ſame Day Letters were

intercepted, ſent by *Pompey* to *Urſao*, importing: "That hitherto he had all "the Succeſs againſt the Enemy he could deſire, and would have ended the "War much ſooner than was expected, could he have brought them to fight "him upon equal terms: that he did not think it adviſeable to venture new-"levied Troops on a Plain: that the Enemy defending themſelves with their "Lines, ſeemed inclinable to draw out the War to length, inveſting City after "City, and thence ſupplying themſelves with Proviſions: that he would "therefore endeavour to protect the Towns of his Party, and bring the War "to as ſpeedy an iſſue as poſſible: that he would ſend them a Reinforcement "of ſome Cohorts, and made no doubt of forcing *Cæſar* in a ſhort time to "an Engagement, by cutting off his Proviſions."

XXVII. SOME time after, as our Men were careleſly diſperſed about the Works, a few Horſe were killed, who had gone to a Foreſt of Olives to fetch Wood. Several Slaves deſerted at this time, and informed us, that ever ſince the Action at *Soritia* on the ſeventh of *March*, the Enemy had been under continual alarms, and appointed *Attius Varus* to guard the Lines. The ſame Day *Pompey* decamped, and poſted himſelf in an Olive-Wood over-againſt *Hiſpalis*. *Cæſar*, before he removed, waited till midnight, when the Moon began to appear. At his departure he ordered Fire to be ſet to the Fort of *Ucubis*, which the Enemy had abandoned, and that the whole Army ſhould rendezvous in the greater Camp. He afterwards laid ſiege to *Ventiſponte*, which ſurrendered; and marching thence to *Carruca*, encamped over-againſt *Pompey*, who had burnt the City, becauſe the Garriſon refuſed to open the Gates to him. A Soldier who had murdered his Brother in the Camp, being intercepted by our Men, was ſcourged and put to death. *Cæſar* ſtill purſuing his march, arrived in the Plains of *Munda*, and pitched his Camp oppoſite to that of *Pompey*.

XXVIII. NEXT Day, as *Cæſar* was preparing to ſet out with the Army, notice was ſent him by his Spies, that *Pompey* had been in order of Battle ever ſince midnight. Upon this Intelligence he ordered the Standard to be erected. *Pompey* had taken this Reſolution in conſequence of his Letter to the Inhabitants of *Urſao*, who were his firm Adherents, in which he told them that *Cæſar* refuſed to come down into the Plain, becauſe his Army conſiſted moſtly of new-levied Troops. This had greatly confirmed the City in its Allegiance, which therefore ſerving as a ſure Reſource behind him, he thought he might hazard a Battle without danger; and the rather, as he was very advantageouſly encamped: for as we obſerved before, this Country is full of Hills, which run in a continued Chain, without any conſiderable breaks or hollows.

XXIX. BUT we muſt by no means omit an Accident which fell out about this time. The two Camps were divided from one another by a Plain about five Miles in extent, inſomuch that *Pompey* by his Situation enjoyed a double defence. On one ſide, the Town, ſeated on an eminence. On the other, the nature of the Ground where the Camp ſtood: for acroſs this Valley ran a Rivulet, which rendered the Approach of the Mountain extremely difficult, becauſe it formed a deep Moraſs on the right. *Cæſar* made no doubt but the Enemy would deſcend into the Plain and come to a Battle, and his whole Army were of the ſame mind; the rather, becauſe the Plain would give their Cavalry full room to act, and the Day was ſo ſerene and clear, that the Gods ſeemed to have ſent it on purpoſe to bring on an Engagement. Our Men

Men rejoiced at the favourable Opportunity: ſome however were not altogether exempt from fear, when they conſidered that their all was at Stake, and the uncertainty of what might be their Fate an Hour after. He advanced however to the Field of Battle, fully perſuaded that the Enemy would do the ſame; but they durſt not venture above a Mile from the Town, being determined to ſhelter themſelves under its Walls. Our Men ſtill continued before them in order of Battle; but although the equality of the Ground ſometimes tempted them to come and diſpute the Victory, they nevertheleſs ſtill kept their Poſt on the Mountain, in the neighbourhood of the Town. We doubled our ſpeed to reach the Rivulet, without their ſtirring from the Place where they ſtood.

XXX. THEIR Army conſiſted of thirteen Legions: the Cavalry was drawn up upon the Wings, with ſix thouſand light-armed Infantry, and about the ſame Number of Auxiliaries. We had only eighty heavy-armed Cohorts, and eight thouſand Horſe. When we came to the extremity of the Plain, as the Ground was very diſadvantageous, it would have been dangerous for us to advance farther, becauſe the Enemy were ready to charge us from the Eminences: and therefore, that we might not raſhly intangle ourſelves, *Cæſar* had taken care to mark beforehand how far we might advance with ſafety. The Army when commanded to halt, murmured greatly, as if they had been kept back from a certain Victory. The delay however ſerved to enliven the Enemy, who fancy'd that our Troops were afraid of coming to Blows. They therefore had the boldneſs to advance a little way, yet without quitting the advantage of their Poſt, the approach to which was extremely dangerous. The tenth Legion, as uſual, was on the right; the third and fifth on the left, with the auxiliary Troops and Cavalry. At length the Battle began with a Shout.

XXXI. BUT though our Men were ſuperior to the Enemy in Courage, they nevertheleſs defended themſelves ſo well by the advantage of the higher Ground, the Shouts were ſo loud, and the diſcharge of Darts on both ſides ſo great, that we almoſt began to deſpair of Victory. For the firſt Onſet and Clamour, with which an Enemy is moſt apt to be diſmayed, were pretty equal in the preſent Encounter. All fought with equal Valour, the Place was covered with Arrows and Darts, and great Numbers of the Enemy fell. We have already obſerved that the tenth Legion was on the right, which though not conſiderable for the Number of Men, was nevertheleſs formidable on account of its Courage; and ſo preſſed the Enemy on that ſide, that they were obliged to draw a Legion from the right Wing to reinforce the left, and prevent its being taken in flank. Upon this motion, our Cavalry on the left fell upon *Pompey*'s right Wing, weakened by the departure of the Legion: but they defended themſelves with ſo much Bravery and Reſolution, as to ſtand in need of no new Troops to ſupport them. Mean-while the Claſhing of Armour, mingled with the Shouts of the Combatants, and the Groans of the dying and wounded, terrified the new-raiſed Soldiers: for, as *Ennius* ſays, they fought Hand to Hand, Foot to Foot, and Shield to Shield. But though the Enemy fought with the utmoſt Vigour, they were obliged to give ground, and retire towards the Town. The Battle was fought on the Feaſt of *Bacchus*, and the *Pompeians* were entirely routed and put to flight; inſomuch that not a Man could have eſcaped, had they not ſheltered themſelves in the Place whence they advanced to the Charge. The Enemy loſt on this occaſion upwards of thirty thouſand Men,

Men, and among the reſt *Labienus* and *Attius Varus*, whoſe funeral Obſequies were performed upon the Field of Battle. They had likewiſe three thouſand *Roman* Knights killed, partly of *Italy*, partly of the Province. About a thouſand were ſlain on our ſide, partly Foot, partly Horſe; and five hundred wounded. We gained thirteen Eagles and Standards, and made ſeventeen Officers Priſoners. Such was the iſſue of this Action.

XXXII. THE remains of *Pompey*'s Army retreating to *Munda*, with deſign to defend themſelves in that Town, it became neceſſary to inveſt it. The dead Bodies of the Enemy, heaped together, ſerved inſtead of a Rampart, and their Javelins and Darts were fixed up by way of Paliſades. Upon theſe we hung their Bucklers to ſupply the place of a Breaſt-work, and fixing the Heads of the deceaſed upon Swords and Lances, planted them all around the Works, to ſtrike the greater Terror into the Beſieged, and keep awake in them a ſenſe of our Bravery. Amidſt theſe mournful Objects did they find themſelves ſhut in, when our Men began the Attack, which was managed chiefly by the *Gauls*. Young *Valerius*, who had eſcaped to *Cordova* with ſome Horſe, informed *Sextus Pompey* of what had happened; who upon receipt of the mournful News, diſtributing what Money he had about him to the Troopers, left the Town about nine at Night, under pretence of going to find out *Cæſar*, to treat of an Accommodation. On the other ſide, *Cn. Pompey*, attended by a few Horſe and Foot, took the Road of *Carteia*, where his Fleet lay, and which was about an hundred and ſeventy Miles diſtant from *Cordova*. When he was arrived within eight Miles of the Place, he ſent *P. Calvitius* his Camp-Marſhal before, to fetch a Litter to carry him to the Town, becauſe he found himſelf out of order. The Litter came, and when he entered the Town, thoſe of his Party waited on him privately, to receive his Orders about the management of the War. As they aſſembled round the Place in great Crowds, *Pompey* quitting his Litter, put himſelf under their protection.

XXXIII. *CÆSAR*, after the Battle, ſeeing the Circumvallation of *Munda* compleated, marched to *Cordova*. Thoſe of the Enemy who had eſcaped the Slaughter poſſeſſing themſelves of a Bridge, upon the approach of our Men, called out to them with an Air of Deriſion, What? we are no more than a handful of Men eſcaped from the Battle, and ſhall we be allowed no Place of Retreat? Immediately they prepared to defend the Bridge. *Cæſar* paſſed the River and encamped on the other ſide. *Scapula*, who had ſtirred up the Freedmen to a Revolt, eſcaping after the Battle to *Cordova*; when he found himſelf beſieged, aſſembled all his Followers, ordered a funeral Pile to be erected, and a magnificent Supper ſerved up; when putting on his richeſt Dreſs, he diſtributed his Plate and ready Money among his Domeſticks, ſupped chearfully, anointed himſelf once and again, and laſt of all, ordered one of his Freedmen to diſpatch him, and another to ſet Fire to the Pile.

XXXIV. *CÆSAR* had no ſooner encamped before the Place, than a diviſion aroſe among the Inhabitants, between thoſe who favoured *Cæſar*, and thoſe who were in the Intereſt of *Pompey*, attended with ſo rude a Clamour, that it reached our Camp. During the Conteſt, ſome Legions, compoſed partly of Fugitives, partly of Slaves manumitted by *Pompey*, came and ſurrendered themſelves to *Cæſar*. But the thirteenth Legion prepared to defend the Place, and with that view poſſeſt themſelves of the Walls and ſome Towers, in ſpite of all the oppoſition they met with; which obliged the other Party to ſend

Deputies

Deputies to *Cæſar* for aid. Upon this thoſe who had eſcaped out of the Battle ſet fire to the Place, and our Men entering at the ſame time, ſlew about twenty two thouſand of them, beſides thoſe who were ſlain without the Walls; and thus became maſters of the Town. Whilſt *Cæſar* was employed in this Siege, thoſe who were blocked up at *Munda* made a ſally, but were driven back into the Town with conſiderable loſs.

XXXV. THENCE *Cæſar* marched to *Hiſpalis*, which ſent Deputies to ſue for Pardon, and obtained it. Tho' the Citizens aſſured him that they were able to defend the Town with their own Forces, he nevertheleſs thought proper to ſend *Caninius* his Lieutenant thither with ſome Troops, and encamped himſelf before the Place. There was in the Town a ſtrong Party of *Pompeians*, who diſpleaſed to ſee *Cæſar*'s Troops received within the Walls, deputed ſecretly one *Philo*, a zealous Partizan of *Pompey*, and well known in *Luſitania*, to beg aſſiſtance of *Cecilius Niger* ſirnamed *the barbarous*, who lay encamped near *Lenius*, with a ſtrong Army of *Luſitanians*. Theſe approaching the Town towards night, got over the Walls, ſurpriſed the Centinels and Garriſon, ſhut the Gates, and began to defend the Place.

XXXVI. DURING theſe Tranſactions, Deputies arrived from *Carteia*, with accounts of their having ſecured *Pompey*; hoping by this Service to atone for their former Fault of ſhutting their Gates againſt *Cæſar*. Mean-time the *Luſitanians* in *Hiſpalis*, ſtill continued pillaging the Town, which tho' known to *Cæſar*, did not yet determine him to preſs it too hard, leſt they ſhould in deſpair ſet fire to the Town, and deſtroy the Walls. It was reſolved in Council to ſuffer the *Luſitanians* to eſcape in the night by a ſally, yet ſo that the thing might not appear deſigned. In this ſally, they ſet fire to the ſhips that were in the River *Bætis*, and while our Men were employed in extinguiſhing the Flames, endeavoured to get off; but being overtaken by the Cavalry, were moſtly cut to pieces. Thence he marched to *Aſta*, which ſubmitted. *Munda* having been now a long while beſieged, many of thoſe who had eſcaped out of the Battle, deſpairing of ſafety, ſurrendered to us; and being formed into a Legion, conſpired among themſelves, that upon a Signal given, the Garriſon ſhould ſally out in the night, while they at the ſame time ſhould begin a maſſacre in the Camp. But the Plot being diſcovered, they were next Night, at the changing of the third Watch, all put to death without the Rampart.

XXXVII. THE *Carteians*, while *Cæſar* was employed in reducing the other Towns upon his rout, fell into a Diſſenſion about young *Pompey*. There were two Parties in the Town, one that had ſent the Deputies to *Cæſar*, and another in the *Pompeian* Intereſt. Theſe laſt prevailing, ſeized the Gates, and made a dreadful ſlaughter of their Adverſaries. *Pompey* himſelf was wounded in the Fray, but eſcaping to his Ships, fled with about thirty Gallies. *Didius*, who was at *Cadiz* with *Cæſar*'s Fleet, hearing of what had happened, immediately ſailed in purſuit of them; ſtationing at the ſame time ſome Cavalry and Infantry along the Coaſt, to prevent his getting off by Land. *Pompey* had departed with ſo much precipitation from *Carteia*, that he took no time to furniſh himſelf with Water, which obliging him to ſtop by the way, *Didius* came up with him after four Days ſailing, took ſome of his Ships, and burnt the reſt.

XXXVIII. *POMPEY*, with a few Followers, eſcaped to a Place ſtrongly fortified by Nature; of which the Troops ſent in purſuit of him having certain intelligence by their Scouts, followed day and night. He was wounded in the Shoulder and left Leg, and had beſides ſtrained his Ancle, all which greatly retarded his Flight, and obliged him to make uſe of a Litter. A *Luſitanian* having diſcovered the place of his retreat, he was quickly ſurrounded by our Cavalry and Cohorts. Seeing himſelf betrayed, he took refuge in a Poſt naturally ſtrong, and which could eaſily be defended by a few Men, becauſe the approach to it was extremely difficult. We attempted to ſtorm it, but were repulſed, and vigorouſly purſued by the Enemy; and meeting with no better ſucceſs after ſeveral trials, we at length reſolved to lay ſiege to the Place, it ſeeming too hazardous to force it. Accordingly a Terraſs was raiſed, and Lines drawn round the Place; which the Enemy perceiving, thought proper to betake themſelves to flight.

XXXIX. *POMPEY*, as we have obſerved above, being lame and wounded, was in no condition to make a ſpeedy Retreat; and the rather, becauſe the Place was ſuch, that he could uſe neither Horſe nor Litter. He ſaw his People driven from the Fort, maſſacred on all ſides, and himſelf left without reſource. In this Extremity he fled to a Cave, where he could not eaſily be diſcovered, unleſs he was betrayed by the Priſoners. Here he was ſlain, and his Head brought to *Cæſar* the twelfth of *April*, juſt as he was ſetting out for *Hiſpalis*, and afterwards expoſed to the view of the People.

XL. AFTER the death of young *Pompey*, *Didius*, proud of his Succeſs, hauled ſome of his Veſſels aſhore to be refitted, and retired himſelf to a neighbouring Fort. The *Luſitanians* who had eſcaped from the Battle of *Munda*, rallying in great Bodies, found themſelves ſtrong enough to make head againſt him. Tho' the preſervation of the Fleet was what principally engaged his Attention, he was yet neceſſitated to make frequent Sallies, to check the Inſolence of the Enemy. Theſe daily Skirmiſhes gave them an opportunity of projecting an Ambuſcade; for which purpoſe they divided their Troops into three Bodies. *Didius* ſallied according to cuſtom; when upon a Signal given, one of the Parties advanced to ſet fire to the Fleet; and another counterfeiting a retreat, drew him inſenſibly into the Ambuſcade, where he was ſurrounded and ſlain with moſt of his Followers fighting valiantly. Some eſcaped in Boats which they found upon the Coaſt; others made for the Gallies by ſwimming; and weighing Anchor, ſtood out to ſea. A great many ſaved themſelves in this manner, but the *Luſitanians* got all the Baggage. *Cæſar* mean-while returned from *Cales* to *Hiſpalis*.

XLI. *FABIUS MAXIMUS*, whom he had left to continue the Siege of *Munda*, carried on the Approaches with great ſucceſs; inſomuch that the Enemy ſeeing themſelves ſhut up on all ſides, reſolved to attempt a Sally: but were repulſed with great loſs. Our Men ſeized this Opportunity to get poſſeſſion of the Town, and made all the reſt Priſoners. Thence they drew towards *Urſao*, a Town exceedingly ſtrong both by Nature and Art, and capable of reſiſting an Enemy. For there is not ſo much as a Rivulet within eight miles of the Place, nor any Spring, but that which ſupplies the Town. Add to all this, that the Wood neceſſary for building Towers and other Machines, was to be fetched from a diſtance of ſix miles; becauſe young *Pompey*, to render the Siege more difficult, had cut down all the Wood round the Place;

Place; which obliged our Men to bring all the Materials for carrying on the Siege from *Munda*.

XLII. DURING theſe Tranſactions at *Munda* and *Urſao*, *Cæſar*, who was returned from *Cales* to *Hiſpalis*, aſſembled the Citizens, and made the following Speech: "That when he was advanced to the Quæſtorſhip, he had "choſen their Province preferably to all others, and during his continuance in "that Office, done them every ſervice in his power: That during his Prætor-"ſhip, he had obtained for them of the Senate the abolition of the Taxes "impoſed by *Metellus*, declared himſelf their Patron, procured their Deputies "a hearing at *Rome*, and made himſelf many Enemies, by undertaking the "defence both of their private and publick Rights. In fine, that when he was "Conſul, he had, tho' abſent, rendered the Province all the Services in his "power: That inſtead of making a ſuitable return for ſo many Favours, they "had always diſcovered the utmoſt Ingratitude, both towards him and the "People of *Rome*, as well in this laſt War as the preceding. You, ſays he, tho' "no ſtrangers to the Law of Nations, and the Rights of *Roman* Citizens, have "yet like Barbarians often violated the ſacred Perſons of *Roman* Magiſtrates. "You attempted in open Day, in the publick Square, to aſſaſſinate *Caſſius*. "You have been always ſuch Enemies to Peace, that the Senate could never "ſuffer the Province to be without Legions. You take Favours for Offences, "and Inſults for Benefits, are inſolent and reſtleſs in Peace, and cowardly and "effeminate in War. Young *Pompey*, tho' only a private Citizen, nay a Fu-"gitive, was yet received among you, and ſuffered to aſſume the Enſigns of "Magiſtracy. After putting many Citizens to death, you ſtill furniſhed him "with Forces, and even urged him to lay waſte the Country and Province. "Againſt whom do you hope to be victorious? Can you be ignorant, that "upon the ſuppoſition of my Overthrow, the People of *Rome* have ſtill ten "Legions, capable not only of making head againſt you, but of bringing the "whole Earth under ſubjection." * * * * *

AN

G.R. III

Andreas Mantinea, Pinxit.

The Procession begins with the Players

Representations of Battles fo

N°. 78.

C: Huijberts. Sculp.

...ers upon Musical Instruments; followed by
...les fought, and Cities taken.



Andreas Mantinea. pinxit.

The Machines of War; the Enemies Spoils in form of
Gaul, Egypt, Pontus, Africa, Spain; and of the King

C. Huÿberts. sculp.

2.

re of Trophies; the Names of the conquered Nations,
Kings subdued, Pharnaces, Juba, Ptolemy, Vercingetorix.

Andreas Mantinea Pinxit.

The Arms taken from the Enemy, consisting of H
Bows, Quivers: also Plate and Booty of the

N.º 80.

C. Huÿberts. Sculpt:

elmets, Shields, Bucklers, Coats of Mail,
onquered Nations and Kings.

Andreas Mantinea. pinxit.

Vessels of Gold and Silver; Diadems and Cron

and Generals; Victims and

C. Kuÿberts. sculp

Crowns of the conquered Princes
and Sacrifices.

Andreas Mantinea Pinxit.

Cæsar, on the Day of his Triumph over the Gauls, a

Lights, carried in Branches on

C: Kuÿberts Sculp:

…ls, advances to the Capitol amidst an Infinity of
…on the Backs of Elephants. —

Page 336.

Andreas Mantinea. Pinxit. C. Huÿberts. Sculpsit.

Gold, Silver, and Copper, either in Ingots, or coined; Paintings, Colours, Standards, Jewels, Purple Robes, and other rich Spoils.

Andreas Mantinea. Pinxit.

The more illustrious Captives, walking in C
Officers of State, Generals of Armies, Prin

C. Huijberts. Sculp:

in Chains before the Victors Chariot; Great Princes, Kings with their Wives & Children.

The Moors and Alexandrians sing the Triumpha
Images of the conquered Cities, crowned with Lon

C. Hulsbert. Sculp:

umphal Song to the sound of Musical Instruments,
h Towers, are carried aloft, to grace the Pomp.



Andreas Mantinea Pinxit.

Cæsar in his Triumphal Chariot drawn by four Horses and robed r
Behind him Victory incircling his Head with a Crown of Laure

N° 86.

C. Kuÿpers Sculp.

bed with the august and magnificent Habit of Triumph:
Laurel; and in his Hand a Branch of the same Tree.

AN INDEX OF

Ancient and modern GEOGRAPHY to CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES.

N. B. The Words in Roman Letters denote the ancient Names, and thoſe in Italick the Modern.

A

ACarnania, a Region of Epirus, *Carnia.*

Achaia, ſometimes taken for all Greece; but moſt commonly for a Part of it only, in Peloponneſus, *Romania alta.*

Acilla, or Acholla, a City of Africa, unknown.

Actium, a Promontary of Epirus, now called the *Cape of Tigalo*, famous for a naval Victory gained near it, by Auguſtus, over M. Anthony.

Addua, the *Adda*, a River that ariſes in the Alps, and parting the Dutchy of Milan, from the State of Venice, falls into the Po, above Cremona.

Adduaſdubis, a River of Burgundy, the *Doux.*

Adriatick Sea, the *Gulf of Venice*, at the Bottom of which that City is ſituate.

Adrumetum, a Town in Africa, *Mahometta.*

Ædui, the *Autunois*, a People of Gaul, near *Autun*, in the Country now called Lower Burgundy.

Ægean Sea, the *Archipelago*, a Part of the Mediterranean, which lies between Greece, Aſia Minor, and the Iſle of Crete.

Ægimurus, an Iſland in the African Sea, *Galetta.*

Æginium, a Town of Theſſaly.

Ægyptus, *Egypt*, one of the moſt ancient, fertile, and celebrated Kingdoms in Africa.

Æmilia Via, a Roman Road in Italy, from Rimini to Aquileia, and from Piſa to Dertona.

Ætolia, a Country of Greece, *Deſpotato.*

Africa, one of the four great Continents into which the Earth is divided.

Agar, a Town in Africa, unknown.

Agendicum, a City of the Senones, *Sens.*

Alba, a Town of Latium in Italy, *Albano.*

Albici, a People of Gaul unknown, ſome make them the ſame with the *Vivarois.*

Albis, the *Elbe*, a large and noble River in Germany, which has its ſource in the Giants Mountains in Sileſia, on the Confines of Bohemia, and paſſing through Bohemia, upper and lower Saxony, falls into the North Sea at Ritzbuttel, about ſixty Miles below Hamburg.

Alemanni, a People of ancient Germany, who inhabited between the Maine, the Rhine, and the Danube, and from whom the French ſtill give this Name to all the Germans.

Alemannia, the Country inhabited by the Alemanni.

Aleſia, or Alexia, a Town of the Mandubians, *Aliſe.*

Alexandria, a city of Egypt, *Scanderia.* It was built by Alexander the Great, 330 Years before Chriſt.

Aliſo, by ſome ſuppoſed to be the Town now called *Iſelburg*; or, according to Junius, *Weſel*, in the Dutchy of Cleves; but more probably *Elſen.*

Allobroges, an ancient People of Gallia Tranſalpina, who inhabited that Country which is now called *Dauphiny*, *Savoy*, and *Piedmont.*

Alps, a Ridge of high Mountains, which ſeparate France and Germany from Italy. That part of them which ſeparate Dauphiny from Piedmont, had the Name of the Cottian Alps.

Alſatia, a Province of Germany, in the upper Circle of the Rhine, *Alſace.*

Amagetobria, a City of Gaul, unknown.

Amantia, a Town in Macedonia, *Porto Raguſeo.*

Amanus, a Mountain of Syria, *Scanderona.*

Amani Pylæ, or Amanicæ Portæ, *Straits of Scanderona.*

Ambarri, a People of Gaul, uncertain.

Ambialites, a People of Gaul, of *Lamballe in Bretagne.* Others take the Word to be only a different Name for the Ambiani.

Ambiani, or Ambianenſes, the People of *Amiens.*

Ambianum, a City of Belgium, *Amiens.*

Ambibari, a People of Gaul, thoſe of *Ambie* in Normandy.

Ambivareti, a People of Gaul, the *Vivarais.*

Ambivariti, an ancient People of *Brabant*, between the Rhine and the Maeſe.

Ambracia, a City of Epirus, *Arta.*

Ambrones, an ancient People, who lived in that Country, which is now called the *Canton* of *Bern*, in Swiſſerland.

INDEX of the Names of Places.

Amphilochia, a Region of Epirus, *Anfilocha.*

Amphipolis, a City of Macedonia, *Criſtopoli*, or *Emboli.*

Anartes, a People of Germany, *Walachians*, *Servians*, or *Balgarians.*

Anas, a River of Spain, the *Guadiana*, or *Rio Roydera.*

Ancalites, a People of Britain, of the Hundred of *Henley*, in Oxfordſhire.

Anchialos, a City of Thrace, near the Euxine Sea, now called *Kenkis.*

Ancona, a City of Italy, *Ancona.*

Andes, *Angers*, in France, the Capital of the Dutchy of Anjou.

Andes, a People of Gaul, the ancient Inhabitants of the Dutchy of Anjou.

Andomadunum Lingonum, a large and ancient City of Champaign, at the Source of the River Marne, *Langres.*

Angrivarii, an ancient People of lower Germany, who dwelt between the Ems and the Weſer, below the Lippe.

Anſibarii, or Anſivarii, an ancient People of lower Germany, of and about the Town of *Anſeſtaet*, or *Amſlin.*

Antioch, *Antachia*, an ancient and famous City, once the Capital of Syria, or rather of the Eaſt: It is ſituate on two Rivers, the Orontes and the Phaſpar, not far from the Mediterranean.

Apamea, *Apami*, a City of Bithynia, built by Nicomedes, the Son of Pruſias.

Apennine Alps, part of the Alps ſo called, which run from the other Alps through the Middle of Italy.

Apollonia, a City of Macedonia, *Piergo.*

Aponiana, an Iſland near the Promontory of Lilybæum in Sicily.

Appia Via, the Appian Highway, which led from Rome into Campania, and from the Sea to Brunduſium.

Apſus, a River of Macedonia, the *Aſpro.*

Apulia, a Region of Italy. *La Puglia.*

Aquilaria, a Town of Africa near Clupea.

Aquileia, formerly a famous and conſiderable City of Italy, not far from the Adriatick, now little more than a Heap of Ruins, *Aquilegia.*

Aquitain, the third Part of ancient Gaul, now containing *Guienne*, *Gaſcony*, &c.

Aquitani, the People inhabiting Aquitain.

Arar, or Araris, a River of Gaul, the *Saone.*

Arduenna ſilva, the Foreſt of *Ardenne* in France, reaching from the Rhine, to the City of Tournay, in the Low Countries.

Arelate, or Arelatum, a City of Gaul, *Arles.*

Argentuaria, the Caſtle of *Horburg*, near the City of Colmar, in upper Alſace.

Argentoratum, *Strasburg*, a City of Germany, anciently the Capital of the Tribocci, on the Rhine, now the chief City of Alſace, belonging to the French.

Argos, a noted City of Peloponneſus, of which Juno was tutelar Goddeſs, *Argo.*

Ariminum, a City of Italy, *Rimini.*

Armenia, a Country of Aſia, divided into the greater and leſſer, and now called *Turcomania.*

Armorici, the ancient People of Armorica, a part of Gallia Celtica, now *Bretagne.*

Arretium, a City of Hetruria in Italy, *Arezo.*

Arteſia, a Province of the Spaniſh Netherlands, *Artois.*

Arverni, an ancient People of France, on the Loire, whoſe chief City was Arvernum, now *Clermont*, the Capital of *Auvergne.*

Aſciburgum, a City of ancient Germany, between Vetera and Gelduba. The preſent City of Aſchaffenburg, in Franconia, is ſo called; but, by the Situation, does not ſeem to be this.

Aſculum, a Town of Italy, *Aſcoli.*

Aſcurum, a maritime City of Mauritania, unknown.

Aſparagium, a Town in Macedonia, unknown.

Aſpavia, a Town in Hiſpania Bætica, *Eſpejo.*

Aſſona, a River of Champagne, in France, which runs into the Oiſe, near Compeigne, now called the *Aiſne.*

Aſta, a Town in Hiſpania Bætica, *Maſſa de Aſta.*

Aſta, *Aſti*, the Capital of the Country of the ſame Name, on the River Tanaro, in Piedmont.

Aſtigi, or Aſtingi, a People of Andaluſia in Spain.

Athens, one of the moſt ancient and noble Cities of Greece, the Capital of Attica.

Athos, a Mountain in Macedonia, in the Province of Jamboli, which runs into the Ægean Sea, like a Peninſula, and is ninety Miles in Compaſs.

Ategua, a Town in Hiſpania Bætica, *Tebala Veja.*

Atrebates, an ancient People of Gaul, who lived in that Part of the Netherlands, which is now called *Artois.*

Attica, a Country of Greece, between Achaia and Macedonia, famous on account of its Capital, Athens.

Attuarii, a People of ancient Germany, who inhabited between the Maeſe and the Rhine, whoſe Country is now a Part of the Dutchy of *Gueldres.*

Atuatica, the Capital of the Eburones, now *Tongres* in Brabant.

Atuatici, the Inhabitants of thoſe Parts, the Remains of the Cimbri.

Avaricum, a City of Aquitain, the Capital of the Biturigians, *Bourges.*

Auguſta Nemetum, *Spire*, an ancient City of Germany, in the now upper Circle of the Rhine, and on that River.

Auguſta Rauracorum, *Augſt*, now a Village only; but a famous Paſs in Swiſſerland, on the Rhine, two German Miles from Baſil.

Auguſta Trevirorum, *Triers*, a very ancient City of lower Germany, on the Moſel, ſaid to have been built by Trebetas, the Brother of Ninus, 1496 Years before Chriſt; made a Roman Colony in the time of Auguſtus, and afterwards the moſt famous City of Gallia Belgica. It was for ſome time the Seat of the Weſtern Empire, now only the Seat of the Eccleſiaſtical Elector of that Name.

Auguſta, Vangionum, *Worms*, a City of Germany, within the Bounds of the Palatinate, free and Imperial, on the Weſtern Bank of the Rhine.

Auguſta Vindelicorum, *Augsburg*, a famous City of Germany, and a Place of great Trade, a free Imperial City, the Capital of Suabia, on the Lech, not far from the Danube; famous for the Auguſtan Confeſſion.

Auguſtodunum, *Autun*, a very ancient City of Burgundy, on the River Arroux.

Aulerci Eburovices, a People of Gaul, the Country of *Evreux*, in Normandy.

Aulerci Brannovices, a People of Gaul, *Morienne.*

Aulerci Cenomanni, a People of Gaul, the Country of *Maine.*

Aulerci Diablintes, a People of Gaul, *le Perche.*

Auſci, a People of Gaul, thoſe of *Auchs* or *Aux*, in Gaſcony.

Auſetani, a People of Spain, under the Pyrenæan Mountains.

Auximum, a Town in Italy, *Oſimo*, or *Oſmo.*

Axona, a River of Belgic Gaul, the *Aiſne.*

B

Baccnis, a Foreſt of ancient Germany, which parted the Suevi from the Cheruſci, by ſome ſuppoſed to be the

the Foreſts of *Thuringia*, by others the *Black Foreſt*.

Bætica, in the ancient Geography, about a third Part of Spain, containing *Andaluſia*, and a Part of *Granada*.

Bætis, a River of Spain, now called the *Guadalquivir*.

Bagandæ, an ancient People of Gaul, who twice revolted from the Romans, and were both times defeated.

Bagrada, a River of Africa, near Utica, the *Megrada*.

Baleares Inſulæ, ſeveral Iſlands in the Mediterranean Sea, formerly ſo called, of which *Majorca* and *Minorca* are the chief.

Baſilea, Baſil, a City of ancient Germany, now the principal City of all Swiſſerland, on the Rhine.

Batavi, the ancient Inhabitants of the Iſland of Batavia.

Batavia, or Batavorum Inſula, *Holland*, a Part of which ſtill retains the Name of *Betuwe*.

Belgæ, the Inhabitants of Gallia Belgica. The original Belgæ were ſuppoſed to be of German Extraction; but paſſing the Rhine, ſettled themſelves in Gaul.

Belgia, Belgium, or Gallia Belgica, the *Low Countries*, or *Netherlands*.

Bellocaſſi, or Velocaſſes, a People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country of *Bayeus* in Normandy.

Bellovaci, an ancient renowned People among the Belgæ, inhabiting the Country now called *Beauvais*, in France.

Bergea, a City of Macedonia, now called *Veria*.

Beſſi, a People of Thrace, *Beſſarabia*.

Bethuria, a Region of Hiſpania Luſitanica, *Eſtremadura*.

Betones, or Berones, a People of Hiſpania Tarraconenſis, *Birones*.

Bibracte, a Town of Burgundy, now called *Autun*, the Capital of the *Ædui*.

Bibrax, a Town of Rheims, *Braine*, or *Breſne*.

Bibroci, a People of Britain, according to Cambden, *the Hundred of Bray*, in Berkſhire.

Bigerriones, a People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country now called *Bigorre*, in Gaſcony.

Bithynia, a Country of Aſia Minor, adjoining to Troas, over-againſt Thrace, *Becſangial*.

Bituriges, a People of Guienne, in France, of the Country of *Berry*.

Bœotia, a Country in Greece; parted from Attica, by Mount Citheron. It had formerly ſeveral other Names, and was famous for its Capital Thebes; but is now called *Stramulipa*.

Boii, an ancient People of Germany, who paſſing the Rhine, ſettled in Gaul, the *Bourbonnois*.

Borani, an ancient People of Germany, ſuppoſed by ſome to be the ſame as the Burii.

Boſphorani, a People bordering upon the Euxine Sea, *the Tartars*.

Boſphorus, two Straits of the Sea, ſo called; one *Boſphorus Thracius*, now *the Straits of Conſtantinople*; the other Boſphorus Cimmerius, now *the Straits of Caffa*.

Brannovices, the People of *Morienne*, in France.

Bratuſpantium, a City of Gaul, belonging to the Bellovaci, *Beauvais*.

Britannia, *Britain*, an Iſland containing *England*, *Scotland*, and *Wales*.

Brueteri, an ancient People of the Netherlands, in Eaſt-Frieſland, afterwards called *Broeckmoreland*.

Brunduſium, a City of Italy, *Brindiſi*.

Brutii, a People of Italy, *the Calabrians*.

Bucinobantes, an ancient People of Germany, who lived oppoſite to *Mentz*.

Bulgaria, a Part of the Lower Mæſia, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube.

Bullis, a Town in Macedonia, unknown.

Burii, an ancient People of Germany, who inhabited the Iſland of *Bornholm*.

Burſavolenſes, a People of Hiſpania Bætica, thought to be the ſame with the Urſaonenſes,.

Buthrotum, a City of Epirus, *Butrinto*, or *Botronto*.

Byzantium, an ancient City of Thrace, called at ſeveral times Ligos, Nova Roma, and now *Conſtantinople*.

Byzazyna, a City and Province of Africa, within the Kingdom of Tunis.

C

Cabillonum, a City of ancient Gaul, *Chalons ſur Saone*.

Cadetes, a People of Gaul, unknown.

Cadurci, a People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country of *Quercy*.

Cæcinus, a River of Locris, in ancient Greece.

Cæreſi, a People of Belgic Gaul, inhabiting the Country round Namur.

Cæſarea, the chief City of Cappadocia.

Cæſia Silva, the *Cæſian* Foreſt, ſuppoſed to be a Part of the Hercynian Foreſt, about the Dutchy of Cleves and Weſtphalia.

Calagurritani, a People of Hiſpania Tarraconenſis, inhabiting the Province of *Calahorra*.

Caletes, an ancient People of Belgic Gaul, inhabiting the Country called *Le Pais de Caulx*, in Normandy, betwixt the Seine and the Sea.

Caletum, the Town of *Calais*, in Picardy, over-againſt Dover.

Calydon, a City of Ætolia, *Ayton*.

Camerinum, a City of Umbria, in Italy, *Camerino*.

Campania, the pleaſanteſt Part of Italy, in the Kingdom of Naples, now called *Terra di Lavoro*.

Campi Canini, a Place in the Milaneze, in Italy, not far from Belizona.

Campi Catalaunici, ſuppoſed to be the large Plain, which begins about two Miles from Chalons ſur Marne.

Candavia, a Country of Macedonia, *Canovia*.

Caninefates, an ancient People of the lower Part of Germany, near Batavia, about where Gorckum, on the Maeſe, in South Holland, now is.

Cannæ, a poor Village in Apulia, famous only for a great Overthrow of the Romans there by Hannibal.

Canopus, *Bochir*, a famous City of Egypt, whence the Canopic Branch of the Nile derived its Name.

Cantabri, an ancient warlike People of Spain, properly of the Provinces of *Guipuſcoa* and *Biſcay*.

Cantium, a Part of England, *the County of Kent*.

Canuſium, a City of Apulia in Italy, *Canoſa*.

Capitol, one of the ſeven Hills in ancient Rome, on which the Romans had a famous Fortreſs, founded by Tarquinius Priſcus, and perfected by Tarquinius Superbus.

Cappadocia, a large Country in Aſia Minor, upon the Euxine Sea.

Caprea, Capreæ, an Iſland on the Coaſt of Campania.

Capua, Capoa, a City in the Kingdom of Naples, in the Province di Lavoro.

Carales, a City of Sardinia, *Cagliari*.

Caralitani, the People of *Cagliari*, in Sardinia.

Carbillo, a City of Spain, near Corduba.

Carcaſo, a City of Gaul, *Carcaſſone*.

Carmona, a Town of Hiſpania Bætica, *Carmone*.

Carni, an ancient People, who inhabited a Part of Noricum, whoſe Country is yet called *Carniola*.

Carnutes,

Carnutes, an ancient People of France, inhabiting the Territory, yet called *Chartrain.*

Carpi, an ancient People near the Danube.

Carrucca, a Town in Spain, uncertain.

Carteia, a Town in Spain, *Algeziva*, or *Tariffa.*

Carthago, once the moſt famous City of Africa, the Rival of Rome, built by Queen Dido, about ſeventy Years after Rome, according to ſome; but Juſtin will have it built before Rome; Appian before the Deſtruction of Troy; and Voſſius before Tyre itſelf.

Carthago nova; *Carthagena*, a City of Murcia, in Spain, built by Aſdrubal, General of the Carthaginians.

Caſilinum, a Town in Italy, *Caſtelluzzo.*

Caſpian Sea, a vaſt Lake between Perſia, Great Tartary, Muſcovy and Georgia, ſaid to be ſix hundred Miles long, and near as broad.

Caſſandrea, a City of Macedonia, *Caſſandria.*

Caſſi, a People of ancient Britain, *the Hundred of Caiſhow*, in *Hertfordſhire.*

Caſtellum Menapiorum, *Keſſel*, a Town in Brabant, on the River Neerſe, not far from the Maeſe.

Caſtra Poſthumiana, a Town in Hiſpania Bætica, *Caſtro el Rio.*

Caſtra Vetera, an ancient City in Lower Germany, in the Dutchy of Cleves; ſome ſay where *Santon*, others where *Byrthen* now is.

Caſtulonenſis Saltus, a City of Hiſpania Tarraconenſis, *Caſtona la Vieja.*

Catti, an ancient People of Germany, who inhabited Part of the Country now called *Heſſe*, and *Thuringia*; from the Mountains of Hartz, to the Weſer and the Rhine.

Catuaci, corrupted probably from Atuatici. Some make them the ſame with the People of *Douay*, in France.

Caturiges, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country of *Embrun*, or *Ambrun*, alias *Charges.*

Cebenna Mons, the Mountains of the *Cevennes*, in Gaul, ſeparating the Helvians from Auvergne.

Celeja, a City of Noricum Mediterraneum, now *Cilley.*

Celetæ, a People of Thrace, about the Mountains of Rhodope and Hæmus.

Celtæ, an ancient People of Gaul, in that Part called Gallia Comata, between the Garumna and Sequana, from whom that Country was likewiſe called Gallia Celtica.

Celtiberi, an ancient People of Spain, deſcended from the Celtæ, who ſettled about the Rivers Iberus, or *Ebro*, from whom the Country was called Celtiberia, now *Arragon.*

Cenimagni, or Iceni, an ancient People of Britain, inhabiting the Counties of *Suffolk*, *Norfolk*, *Cambridgeſhire*, and *Huntingtonſhire.*

Cenis Mons, that Part of the Alps which ſeparates Savoy from Piedmont.

Cenni, an ancient People of Celtic Extraction.

Cenomani, a People of Gallia Celtica, in the Country now called *Le Manſeau*, next adjoining to that of the Inſubres.

Centrones, an ancient People of Flanders, about the City of *Courtray*, dependent on the Nervians.

Centrones, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country of Tarantaiſe.

Cerauni Montes, Mountains of Epirus, *Monti di Chimera.*

Cercina, an Iſland on the Coaſt of Africa, *Chercara*, *Cercare.*

Cherroneſus, a Peninſula of Africa, near Alexandria.

Cherſoneſus Cimbrica, a Peninſula on the Baltick, now *Jutland*, Part of *Holſtein*, *Ditmarſh*, and *Sleſwic.*

Cheruſci, a great and warlike People of ancient Germany, between the Elbe and the Weſer, about the Country, now called *Mansfield*, Part of the Dutchy of *Brunſwick*, and the Dioceſes of *Hildeſheim*, and *Halberſtadt.*

Chiavenna, the Capital of a Country of that Name, on the River Meira, with a ſtrong Caſtle, in Switzerland.

Chryſopolis, a City of Bithynia, now called *Scutari*, oppoſite to Conſtantinople.

Cimbri, *the Jutlanders*, a very ancient northern People, who inhabited Cherſoneſus Cimbrica.

Cimmerii, an ancient People near the Euxine Sea, whence the Boſphorus Cimmerius, *Tartars.*

Cinga, a River of Spain, *Cinca*, or *Senga.*

Cingulum, a Town of Picenum in Italy, *Cingoli.*

Cirta, a Town in Africa, *Conſtantina*, or *Conſantina*, al. *Tadel.*

Clupea, a maritime City of Africa, *Quipia.*

Cocaſates, a People of Gaul, according to ſome the *Bazadois.*

Coimbra, an ancient City of Portugal, once deſtroyed, but now rebuilt, on the River *Mendego.*

Colchis, a Country in Aſia, near Pontus, including the preſent *Mingrelia*, and *Georgia.*

Comana Pontica, a City of Aſia Minor, *Com*, or *Tabachzan.*

Comana of Cappadocia, *Arminacha.*

Compſa, a City of Italy, *Conza*, or *Conſa.*

Concordia, an ancient City of the Province of *Triuli*, in Italy, now in Ruins.

Condruſi, or Condruſones, an ancient People of Belgium, dependent on the Treviri, whoſe Country is yet called *Condrotz*, between Liege and Namur.

Confluens Moſi & Rheni, *Coblentz.*

Corcyra, an Iſland of Epirus, *Corfu.*

Corduba, a City of Hiſpania Bætica, *Cordova.*

Corfinium, a Town belonging to the Peligni in Italy, *St. Pelino*, al. *Penting.*

Corinth, a famous and rich City of Achaia in Italy, in the Middle of the Iſthmus, going into Peloponneſus.

Corneliana Caſtra, a City of Africa, between Carthage and Utica.

Corſica, a conſiderable Iſland in the Mediterranean Sea, near Sardinia, which ſtill retains its Name, and at preſent belongs to the Genoeſe.

Coſanum, a City of Calabria in Italy, *Caſſano.*

Cremona, an ancient City of Gallia Ciſalpina, which retains its Name to this Day, and is the Metropolis of the *Cremoneſe* in Italy.

Crete, one of the nobleſt Iſlands in the Mediterranean Sea, now called *Candia.*

Cteſiphon, a Town of Aſſyria, over-againſt Seleucia.

Curioſolitæ, a People of Gaul, inhabiting *Cornoualle* in Bretagne.

Cyclades, Iſlands in the Ægean Sea, *L'Iſole dell' Archipelago.*

Cyprus, an Iſland in the Mediterranean Sea, between Syria and Cilicia, *Cipro.*

Cyrene, an ancient and once a fine City of Africa, ſituate over-againſt Matapan, the moſt ſouthern Cape of Morea, Cairoan.

Cyzicus, *Chizico*, formerly one of the largeſt Cities of Aſia Minor, in an Iſland of the ſame Name, on the White Sea.

D

Dacia, an ancient Country of Scythia, beyond the Danube, containing Part of *Hungary*, *Tranſylvania*, *Walachia* and *Moldavia.*

Dalmatia, a Part of Illyricum, now called *Sclavonia*, lying between Croatia, Boſnia, Servia, and the Adriatick Gulf.

INDEX of the Names of Places.

Danube, the largeſt River in Europe, which has its riſe in Swabia, and after flowing through that Country, Bavaria, Auſtria, Hungary, Servia, Bulgaria, Moldavia, Beſſarabia, and part of Tartary, taking in its Courſe a great Number of noted Rivers, ſome ſay ſixty, falls into the Black or Euxine Sea, in two Arms.

Dardania, the ancient Name of a Country in upper Mœſia, which became afterwards a part of Dacia; *Raſcia*, and part of *Servia*.

Decetia, a Town in Gaul, *Deciſe* on the Loire.

Delphi, a City of Achaia, *Delpho*, al. *Salona*.

Delta, a very conſiderable Province of Egypt, at the Mouth of the Nile, *Errif*.

Diablintes, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country called *Le Perche*; al. *Diableres* in Bretagne; al. *Lintes* of Brabant; al. *Lendoul*, over-againſt Britain.

Dubis, a River of Burgundy, *Le Doux*.

Duratium, commonly ſuppoſed to be a City of Gaul, in the Province of Poitou; but in fact Cæſar uſes Duratius for the Name of a Nobleman of conſiderable Rank.

Durocortorum, a City of Gaul, *Rheims*.

Dyrrhachium, a City of Macedonia, *Durazzo*, *Drazzi*.

E

Eburones, an ancient People of Germany, inhabiting Part of the Country now the Biſhoprick of *Liege*, and the County of *Namur*.

Eburovices, a People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country of *Evreux*, in Normandy.

Egypt, one of the moſt ancient, fertile, and celebrated Kingdoms in Africa.

Elaver, a River of Gaul, *the Allier*.

Elcuthori, a People of Celtic Gaul, *la Rouergue*.

Elis, a City of Peloponneſus, *Belvidere*.

Eluſates, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country of *Euſe*, in Gaſcony.

Epheſus, an ancient and celebrated City of Aſia. Minor, *Efeſo*.

Epidaurus, a maritime City of Dalmatia, *Raguſa*.

Epirus, a Country in Greece, between Macedonia, Achaia, and the Ionian Sea, by ſome now called *Albania inferior*.

Eſſui, a People of Gaul, thoſe of *Seez*, but the Word ſeems rather a corruption from *Æduî*.

Euſubii, corrupted from *Unelli*, or *Lexovii*, probably the People of *Liſieux*, in Normandy.

F

Fanum, a City of Umbria in Italy, *Fano*.

Feſole, an ancient City of Italy, in the Dutchy of Florence, anciently one of the twelve conſiderable Cities of Hetruria.

Finni, an ancient People of Pruſſia.

Flavum, anciently reckoned the eaſtern Mouth of the Rhine, now called the *Ulie*, and is a Paſſage out of the Zuyder Sea into the North Sea.

Forum Flaminii, a City of Umbria, three Miles from Fulginium, yet called *Forflamine*.

Forum Julium, *Frejus*, an ancient Town on the Coaſt of Provence, in France.

Foſſa Mariana, a Canal made by C. Marius, near Marſeilles, for the Conveyance of ſhips from the Sea, into the Rhone.

Foſſæ Marianæ, a City of Gallia Narbonenſis, now called *Aigues Mortes*.

Frentani, an ancient People of Italy, *Abruzzo*, *Capitanata*.

Friſii, the ancient inhabitants of *Frieſland*.

G

Gabali, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country of *Givaudan*.

Gades, *Cadiz*, an ancient and conſiderable City of Spain.

Gaditani, the People of Gades, or *Cadiz*, in Spain.

Galatia, a Country of Aſia Minor, lying between Cappadocia, Pontus, and Paphlagonia; now called *Chiangare*.

Galli, the People of ancient Gaul, now the *French*.

Gallia, the ancient and renowned Country of Gaul, now *France*. It was divided by the Romans into,

Gallia Ciſalpina, Tonſa, or Togata, now *Lombardy*, between the Alps and the River Rubicon: And

Gallia Tranſalpina, or Comata, comprehending *France*, *Holland*, *the Netherlands*; and farther ſubdivided into,

Gallia Belgica, now a part of *Lower Germany*, and the *Netherlands*, with *Picardy*; divided by Auguſtus, into Belgica, and Germania; and the latter into prima and ſecunda.

Gallia Celtica, now *France* properly ſo called; divided, by Auguſtus, into Lugdunenſis, and Rothomagenſis.

Gallia Aquitanica, now *Gaſcony*; divided, by Auguſtus, into prima, ſecunda and tertia: And

Gallia Norbonenſis, or Braccata, now *Languedoc*, *Dauphiny*, and *Provence*.

Gallicia, a Province of Spain, of a large Extent, once a Kingdom, and comprehending *old Caſtile*, but now a Part of the Kingdom of *Leon*.

Gallogræcia, a Country of Aſia Minor, the ſame as *Galatia*.

Garites, a People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country now called *Gavre*, or *Gavardan*.

Garoceli, or Graioceli, an ancient People of Gaul, about *Mount Cenis*, or *Mount Genevre*; others place them in the *Val de Morienne*.

Garumna, the *Garonne*, one of the largeſt Rivers of France, which ariſing in the Pyrenees, flows through Guienne, forms the vaſt Bay of Garronne, and falls, by two Mouths, into the Britiſh Seas.

Garumni, an ancient People of Gaul, in the Neighbourhood of the *Garonne*.

Gebenna Mons, the Mountains of the *Cevennes*, which ſeparated the Helvians from the Arverni.

Geldura, a Fortreſs of the Ubii, on the Rhine, not improbably the preſent Village of *Gelb*, on that River, eleven German Miles from Neus.

Genabum, *Orleans*, an ancient Town in Gaul, famous for the Maſſacre of the Roman Citizens committed there by the Carnutes.

Geneva, a City of Savoy, now a free Republick, upon the Borders of Helvetia, at the going out of the Rhone from the Lake Lemanus, anciently a City of the Allobroges.

Genuſus, a River of Macedonia, uncertain.

Gepidæ, or Gepidi, an ancient northern People, ſuppoſed to have dwelt about the Mouth of the Viſtula.

Gergovia, the Name of two Cities in ancient Gaul, the one belonging to the Boii, the other to the Arverni. Their ſituation is not certainly known.

Germania, *Germany*, one of the largeſt Countries of Europe, and the Mother of thoſe Nations which, in the Fall of the Roman Empire, conquered all the reſt.

Geſatæ, a kind of Militia among the ancient Germans.

Getæ, an ancient People of Scythia, who inhabited betwixt Mœsia and Dacia, on each Side of the Danube. Some think their Country the same with the present *Wallachia*, or *Moldavia*.

Getulia, a Province of the Kingdom of Morocco, in Barbary.

Gomphi, a Town in Thessaly, *Gonsi*.

Gorduni, a People of Belgium, the ancient Inhatants of *Ghent*; according to others, of *Courtray*.

Gotini, an ancient People of Germany, who were driven out of their Country by Maroboduus.

Græcia, *Greece*, a large Part of Europe, called by the Turks, *Romelia*, containing many Countries, Provinces, and Islands, once the Nursery of Arts, Learning, and Sciences.

Graioceli, the ancient Inhabitants of *Mount Cenis*, see Garoceli.

Grudii, the ancient Inhabitants about *Louvain*, or, according to some, about *Bruges*.

Gugerni, a People of ancient Germany, who dwelt on the right Banks of the Rhine, between the Ubii and the Batavi.

Guttones, or Gythones, an ancient People of Germany inhabiting about the Vistula.

H

Hæmus, a Mountain dividing Mœsia and Thrace, *Argentaro*.

Haliacmon, a River of Macedonia, uncertain.

Harudes, or Harudi, a People of Gallia Celtica, supposed to have been originally Germans; and by some to have inhabited about *Constance*.

Hellespont, *Straits of Gallipoli*, the famous straits by Constantinople, dividing Europe from Asia, between Propontis, and the Ægean Sea.

Helvetia, *Switzerland*, now divided into thirteen Cantons.

Helvetii, *the Switzers*, ancient Inhabitants of the Country of *Switzerland*.

Helvii, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country now possessed by the *Vivarois*.

Heraclea, a City of Thrace, on the Euxine Sea, *Pantiro*.

Heraclea Sentica, a Town in Macedonia, *Chesia*.

Hercynia Silva, *the Hercynian Forest*, the largest Forest of ancient Germany, being reckoned by Cæsar to have been sixty Days Journey in length, and nine in breadth. Many Parts of it have been since cut down, and many are yet remaining; of which, among others, is that called the *Black Forest*.

Hermanduri, an ancient People of Germany, particularly in the Country now called *Misnia*, in upper Saxony; though they possessed a much larger Tract of Land, according to some all *Bohemia*.

Herminius Mons, a Mountain of *Lusitania*, *Monte Armino*; according to others, *Monte della Strella*.

Heruli, an ancient northern People, who came first out of Scandavia, but afterwards inhabited the Country now called *Mecklenburg* in lower Saxony, towards the Baltick.

Hibernia, *Ireland*, a considerable Island to the West of Great Britain.

Hippo, *Bona*, a City of the Province of Constantine, in the Kingdom of Tunis, in Africa, upon the Mediterranean.

Hispalis, a City of Hispania Bætica, Seville.

Hispania, *Spain*, one of the most considerable Kingdoms in Europe, divided by the Ancients into Tarraconensis, Bætica, and Lusitania.

Hyrcania, a Country of Asia, bordering on the Caspian Sea, *Tabaristan*, *Gorgian*.

I

Jacetani, or Lacetani, a People of Spain, near the Pyrenæan Mountains.

Jadertini, a People so called, from their capital Jadera, a City of Illyricum, *Zara*.

Jazygæ, or Jazyges, a People of Sarmatia Europea, inhabiting about the Countries now called *Livonia* and *Prussia*.

Iberus, a River of Hispania Tarraconensis, *the Ebro*.

Iccius, or Itius Portus, a Sea-Port-Town of ancient Gaul; *Boulogne*, or, according to others, *Calais*.

Igilium, an Island in the Tuscan Sea, *il Giglio*, *L'Isle du Lys*.

Iguvium, a City of Umbria in Italy, *Gubio*.

Ilerda, a City of Catalonia, in Spain, now called *Lerida*, on the *Segre*.

Illurgavonenses, a People of Hispania Tarraconensis, near the Iberus.

Illyricum, formerly the Country between Pannonia to the North, and the Adriatic Sea to the South, divided into Liburnia and Dalmatia. It is now chiefly comprehended under *Dalmatia* and *Sclavonia*, and bordered by Pannonia, Istria, Macedonia, and the Adriatic Gulf; almost wholly under the respective Dominions of the Venetians and the Turks.

Ilurgis, a Town of Hispania Bætica, *Illera*.

Insubria, a Country of Gallia Cisalpina, now the Dutchies of *Milan*, *Mantua*, *Brescia*.

Ionia, a Country of Asia Minor, anciently inhabited by a Colony from Greece, *Sarchan*.

Issa, an Island of the Adriatic Sea, *Lissa*.

Ister, that Part of the Danube, which passed by Illyricum.

Istria, a Country now in Italy, under the Venetians, bordering on Illyricum, so called from the River Ister.

Istropolis, a City of lower Mœsia, near the South Entrance of the Danube, *Prostraviza*.

Isara, the *Isere*, a River of France, which arises in Savoy, and falls into the Rhone above Valence.

Isauria, a Province anciently of Asia Minor, now a Part of *Caramania*, and subject to the Turks.

Italia, *Italy*, one of the most famous Countries in Europe, once the Seat of the Roman Empire, now under several Princes, and free Commonwealths.

Italica, a City of Hispania Bætica, *Sevila la Veja*; according to others, *Alcala del Rio*.

Ituræa, a Country of Palestine, *Bacar*.

Jura, a Mountain in Gallia Belgica, which separated the Sequani, from the Helvetians, most of which is now called *Mount St. Claude*.

Juvavia, formerly the Capital of Noricum Mediterraneum, now *Saltzburg*.

L

Lacetani, a People of Spain, near the Pyrenæan Hills.

Lacus Benacus, *Lago di Guardo*, a Lake now belonging to the Venetians, between Verona, Brescia, and Trent.

Larinates, the People of Larinum, a City of Italy, *Larino*.

Lariſſa, the principal City of Thessaly, a Province of Macedonia, on the River Peneo.

Latini, the Inhabitants of Latium, an ancient Part of Italy, whence the Latin Tongue is so called.

Latobriges, a People of Gallia Belgica, between the Allobroges and Helvetii, in the Country now called *Lausane*.

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Lazi, an ancient People of Sarmatia Europea, according to ſome on the Banks of the Palus Mæotis; but, according to others, towards the Caſpiæ Portæ, near the Iberi.

Lemanus Lacus, the Lake upon which Geneva ſtands, made by the River Rhone, between *Switzerland* to the North, and Savoy to the South, commonly called the *Lake of Geneva.*

Lemnos, an Iſland in the Ægean Sea, now called *Stalimane.*

Lemovices, an ancient People of Gaul, *le Limoſin.*

Lemovices Armorici, the People of *St. Paul de Leon.*

Lenium, a Town in Luſitania, unknown.

Lepontii, a People of the Alps, near the Valley of *Leventina.*

Leptis, a Town in Africa, *Lebeda*, or *Lepeda.*

Levaci, a People of Brabant, not far from Louvain, whoſe chief Town is now called *Leew.*

Leuci, a People of Gallia Belgica, where now Lorrain is, well skilled in darting. Their chief City is now called *Toul.*

Lexovii, an ancient People of Gaul, *Liſieux* in Normandy.

Liburni, an ancient People of Illyricum, inhabiting Part of the preſent *Croatia.*

Ligeris, the *Loire*, one of the greateſt and moſt celebrated Rivers of France, ſaid to take one hundred and twelve Rivers in its Courſe; it riſes in Velay, and falls into the Bay of Aquitain, below Nantz.

Liguria, a Part of ancient Italy, extending from the Appennines to the Tuſcan Sea, containing *Ferrara*, and the Territories of *Genoa.*

Lilybeum, the moſt weſtern Promontory of the Iſland of Sicily, where ſtood a City of the ſame Name, now *Capo Boco.*

Limo, or Limomum, a City of ancient Gaul, *Poitiers.*

Lingones, a People of Gallia Belgica, inhabiting in and about *Langres*, in Champaign.

Liſſus, an ancient City of Macedonia, *Aleſſio.*

Lucani, an ancient People of Italy, inhabiting the Country now called *Baſilicate.*

Luceria, an ancient City of Italy, *Lucera.*

Luſitania, *Portugal*, a Kingdom on the Weſt of Spain, formerly a Part of it.

Lutetia, *Paris*, an ancient and famous City, the Capital of all France, on the River *Seine.*

Lydia, an inland Country of Aſia Minor, formerly governed by the famous Crœſus, who was the laſt King of it, *Caraſia.*

Lygii, an ancient People of upper Germany, who inhabited the Country now called *Sileſia*, and on the Borders of *Poland.*

M

Macedonia, a large Country, of great Antiquity and Fame, in Greece, containing ſeveral Provinces, now under the Turks.

Mæotis Palus, a vaſt Lake in the North Part of Scythia, now called *Marbianco*, or *Mare della Tana.* It is about ſix hundred Miles in Compaſs, and the River Tanais diſembogues itſelf into it.

Magetobria, or Amagetobria, a City of Gaul, uncertain.

Malaca, a City of Hiſpania Bætica, *Malaga.*

Mandubii, an ancient People of Gaul, *l'Auxois*, in Burgundy.

Marcomanni, a Nation of the Suevi, whom Cluverius places between the Rhine, the Danube, and the Neckar; who ſettled, however, under Maroboduus, in *Bohemia* and *Moravia.*

Marrucini, an ancient People of Italy, inhabiting the Country now called *Abruzzo.*

Marſi, an ancient People of Italy, inhabiting the Country now called *Ducato de Marſi.*

Maſſilia, *Marſeilles*, a large and flouriſhing City of Provence, in France, on the Mediterranean; ſaid to be very ancient, and, according to ſome, built by the Phœnicians; but, as Juſtin will have it, by the Phocians, in the time of Tarquinius, King of Rome.

Matiſco, an ancient City of Gaul, *Maſcon.*

Matrona, a River in Gaul, the *Marne.*

Mauritania, *Barbary*, an ancient large Region of Africa, divided into Cæſarienſis, Tingitatana, and Sitofenſis.

Mazaca, a City of Cappadocia, *Tiſaria.*

Mediomatrices, a People of Lorrain, on the Moſel, about the City of *Metz.*

Mediterranean Sea, the firſt diſcovered Sea in the World, ſtill very famous, and much frequented, which breaks in, from the Atlantic Ocean, between Spain and Africa, by the Straits of Gibraltar, or Hercules' Pillars, the ne plus ultra of the Ancients.

Medobrega, a City of Luſitania, *Armenna.*

Meldæ, according to ſome the People of *Meaux*; but more probably corrupted from *Belgæ.*

Melodunum, an ancient City of Gaul, upon the Seine, above Paris, *Melun.*

Menapii, an ancient People of Gallia Belgica, who inhabited on both Sides of the Rhine. Some take them for the Inhabitants of *Cleves*; and others of *Antwerp*, *Ghent*, &c.

Meſopotamia, a large Country in the Middle of Aſia, between the Tigris and the Euphrates, *Diarbeck.*

Meſſana, an ancient and celebrated City of Sicily, ſtill known by the Name of *Meſſina.*

Metaurus, a River of Umbria, now called *Metoro*, in the Dutchy of Urbino.

Metioſedum, an ancient City of Gaul, on the Seine, below Paris, *Corbeil.*

Metropolis, a City of Theſſaly, between Pharſalus and Gomphi.

Mitylene, a City of Lesbos, *Metelin.*

Mœſia, a Country of Europe, and a Province of the ancient Illyricum, bordering on Pannonia, divided into the Upper, containing *Boſnia* and *Servia*, and the Lower, called *Bulgaria.*

Mona, in Cæſar, the Iſle of *Man*; in Ptolemy, *Angleſey.*

Morini, an ancient People of the Low Countries, who probably inhabited on the preſent Coaſt of *Bologne*, on the Confines of *Picardy* and *Artois*, becauſe Cæſar obſerves, that from their Country was the neareſt Paſſage to Britain.

Moſa, the *Maeſe*, or *Meuſe*, a large River of Gallia Belgica, which falls into the German Ocean below the Briel.

Moſella, the *Moſelle*, a River which, running through Lorrain, paſſes by Triers, and falls into the Rhine at Coblentz, famous for the Vines growing in the Neighbourhood of it.

Munda, an ancient City of Spain, *Munda*; al. *Ronda la Veja.*

Murſa, a Town and Caſtle, in Sclavonia, at the Conflux of the Draw and Danube, now called *Eſſeek*, famous for a Bridge three Miles over.

Myſia, a Country of Aſia Minor, not far from the Helleſpont, divided into Major and Minor.

N

Nabathæi, an ancient People of Arabia, uncertain.

Nannetes,

Nannetes, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting about *Nantes*.

Nantuates, an ancient People of the North Part of Savoy, whoſe Country is now called *Le Chablais*.

Narbo, *Narbonne*, an ancient Roman City, in Languedoc, in France, ſaid to be built an hundred and thirty-eight Years before the Birth of Chriſt.

Nariſci, the ancient People of the Country now called *Nortgow*, in Germany, the Capital of which is the famous City of Nuremburg.

Naupactus, an ancient and conſiderable City of Ætolia, now called *Lepanto*.

Neapolis, a City of Italy, which ſtill retains the Name of *Naples*.

Neapolis, a City of Africa, between Clupea and Adrumetum, now called *Napoli*.

Nemetes, a People of ancient Germany, about the City of Spire, on the Rhine.

Nemetocenna, a Town of Belgium, not certainly known; according to ſome, *Arras*.

Neocæſarea, the Capital of Pontus, on the River Lycus, now called *Tocat*.

Nervii, an ancient People of *Gallia Belgica*, thought to have dwelt in the now Dioceſe of *Cambray*.

Neſſus, or Neſtus, a River in Thrace, *Neſto*.

Nicæa, a City of Bithynia, now called *Iſnick*, famous for the firſt general Council, Anno 324, againſt Arianiſm.

Nicomedia, a City of Bithynia, where Conſtantine the Great died, *Comidia*.

Nicopolis, a City of Armenia the leſs, *Gianich*; likewiſe of Bulgaria, at the Confluence of the Iſacar, and the Danube, commonly called *Nigeboli*.

Nilus, the *Nile*, a River of Egypt, famous for its annual Overflow.

Nitiobriges, an ancient People of Gaul, *l'Agenois*.

Noreia, a City on the Borders of Illyricum, about nine German Miles from Aquileia.

Noricæ Alpes, that Part of the Alps, which were in, or bordering upon Noricum.

Noricum, anciently a large Country, now containing ſeveral, as a great Part of *Auſtria*, *Stiria*, *Corinthia*, Part of *Tyrol*, *Bavaria*, *&c.* and divided into Noricum Mediterraneum, and Ripenſe.

Noviodunum Belgarum, an ancient City of Belgic Gaul, now called *Noyon*.

Noviodunum Biturigum, *Neuvy*, or *Neufvy*.

Noviodunum Æduorum, *Nevers*.

Noviodunum Sueſſionum, *Soiſſons*, al. *Noion*.

Noviomagum, *Spire*, an ancient City of Germany, in the now upper Circle of the Rhine, and on that River.

Numantia, a celebrated City of ancient Spain, famous for a gallant Reſiſtance againſt the Romans, in a Siege of fourteen Years; *Almaſan*.

Numidia, an ancient and celebrated Kingdom of Africa, bordering on Mauritania; *Algiers*, *Tunis*, *Tripoli*, *&c.*

Numicus, the *Numico*, a River of ancient Latium in Italy.

Nymphæum, a Promontory of Macedonia, in the Confines of Sclavonia.

O

Obucula, a Town in Hiſpania Bætica, uncertain.

Ocelum, a Town ſituated among the Alps in Gaul, *Exilles*.

Octodurus, a Town belonging to the Veragrians, *Martinao*.

Octogeſa, a City of Hiſpania Tarraconenſis, *Mequinenza*.

Orchomenus, a Town in Bœotia, *Orcomeno*.

Oricum, a Town in Epirus, *Orco*, or *Orcha*.

Oſcenſes, the People of Oſca, a Town in Hiſpania Tarraconenſis, now *Hueſcar*.

Oſiſmii, an ancient People of Gaul, uncertain.

P

Padus, the *Po*, the largeſt River in Italy, which ariſes in Piedmont, and dividing Lombardy into two Parts, falls into the Adriatick Sea, by many Mouths.

Pæmani, an ancient People of Gallia Belgica; according to ſome, thoſe of *Luxemburg*; according to others, the People of *Pemont*, near the Black Foreſt.

Palæſte, a Town in Epirus, near Oricum.

Pannonia, a very large Country, in the ancient Diviſion of Europe, divided into the Upper and Lower, and comprehended betwixt Illyricum, the Danube, and the Mountains Cethi.

Parada, a Town in Africa, not far from Utica.

Parætonium, a maritime City of Africa, *Alberton*.

Pariſii, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country now called the *Iſle of France*.

Parthia, a Country in Aſia, lying between Media, Caramania, and the Hircanian Sea.

Parthini, a People of Macedonia.

Peligni, a People of Italy in Apruzzo.

Peloponneſus, the *Morea*, a famous, large and fruitful Peninſula of Greece, now belonging to the Venetians.

Peluſium, an ancient and celebrated City of Egypt, *Belbais*.

Pergamus, an ancient and famous City of Myſia, *Pergamo*.

Perinthus, a City of Thrace, about a Day's Journey Weſt of Conſtantinople, now in a decaying Condition, and called *Heraclea*.

Perſia, one of the largeſt, moſt ancient, and celebrated Kingdoms of Aſia. It anciently contained many Countries, and now many Provinces.

Petra, an ancient City of Macedonia, uncertain.

Petrogorii, a Country in Gaul, *Perigord*.

Peucini, the Inhabitants of the Iſland of Peuce, in one of the Mouths of the Danube.

Pharſalia, a Part of Theſſaly, famous for the Battle between Cæſar and Pompey, which decided the Fate of the Roman Commonwealth.

Pharus, an Iſle facing the Port of Alexandria in ancient Egypt; *Farion*.

Phaſis, a large River in Colchis, now called *Faſſo*, which flows into the Euxine Sea.

Philippi, a City of Macedonia, on the Confines of Thrace, *Filippo*.

Philippopolis, a City of Thrace, near the River Hebrus, *Filippopoli*.

Phrygia, two Countries in Aſia Minor, one called Major, the other Minor.

Picenum, an ancient Diſtrict of Italy, lying eaſtward of Umbria; *the March of Ancona*, according to others *Piſcara*.

Picti, *Picts*, an ancient barbarous northern People, who by Intermarriages became, in courſe of Time, one Nation with the Scots; but are originally ſuppoſed to have come out of Denmark or Scythia, to the Iſles of Orkney, and from thence into Scotland.

Pictones, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country of *Poitou*.

Piruſtæ, an ancient People of Illyricum, *Albaneſi*.

Piſaurum, a City of Umbria in Italy, *Piſaro*.

Placentia, an ancient City of Gallia Ciſalpina, near the Po, now the Metropolis of the Dutchy of *Piacenza*, which Name it alſo bears.

Pleumoſii, an ancient People of Gallia Belgica, ſubject to the Nervians, and inhabiting near *Tournay*.

Polentia,

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Polentia, an ancient City near the Alps, though the learned diſagree as to the particular Situation of it.

Pontus, an ancient Kingdom of Aſia Minor, between Bithynia and Paphlagonia upon the Euxine Sea.

Pontus Euxinus, the *Euxine*, or *Black Sea*, from the Ægean, along the Helleſpont, to the Mæotick Lake, between Europe and Aſia.

Poſthumiana Caſtra, an ancient Town in Hiſpania Bætica, now called *Caſtro el Rio*.

Præciani, an ancient People of Gaul, *Precins*.

Provincia Romana, or Romanorum, one of the ſouthern Provinces of France, the firſt the Romans conquered and brought into the Form of a Province, whence it obtained its Name; which it ſtill in ſome Degree retains, being called at this Day *Provence*.

Pruſa or Pruſas, *Burſa*, a City of Bithynia, at the Foot of Olympus, built by Hannibal.

Ptolemais, an ancient City of Africa, *St. Jean d'Acre*.

Pyrenæi Montes, the *Pyrenees*, or *Pyrenean Mountains*, one of the largeſt Chains of Mountains in Europe, which divide Spain from France, running from Eaſt to Weſt eighty-five Leagues in length.

R

Ravenna, a very ancient City of Italy, near the Coaſt of the Adriatick Gulf, which ſtill retains its ancient Name. In the Decline of the Roman Empire, it was ſometime the Seat of the Emperors of the Weſt; as it was likewiſe of the Wiſi-Gothick Kingdom.

Rauraci, a People of ancient Germany, near the Helvetii, who inhabited near where *Baſil* in Switzerland now is.

Rhedones, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting about *Rennes* in Bretagne.

Rhætia, the Country of the *Griſons*, on the Alps, near the Hercynian Foreſt.

Rhemi, the People of *Rheims*, a very ancient, fine, and populous City of France, in the Province of Champaign, on the River Veſle.

Rhenus, the *Rhine*, a great and famous River in Germany, which formerly divided it from Gaul. It ſprings out of Rhætian Alps, in the weſtern Borders of Switzerland, and the northern of the Griſons, from two ſprings which unite near Coire, and falls into the Maeſe and the German Ocean, by two Mouths, whence Virgil calls it Rhenus bicornis.

Rhodanus, the *Rhone*, one of the moſt celebrated Rivers of France, which ariſes from a double Spring in Mont de la Fourche, a Part of the Alps, on the Borders of Switzerland, near the Springs of the Rhine, and after a vaſt Circuit through France, falls into the Mediterranean, by five Mouths.

Rhodope, a famous Mountain of Thrace, now called *Valiza*.

Rhodus, *Rhodes*, a celebrated Iſland in the Mediterranean, upon the Coaſt of Aſia Minor, over-againſt Caria.

Rhyndagus, a River of Myſia in Aſia, which falls into the Propontis.

Roma, *Rome*, once the Seat of the Roman Empire, and the Capital of the then known World, now the immediate Capital of Camagna di Roma only, on the River Tyber, and the Papal Seat; generally ſuppoſed to have been built by Romulus, in the firſt Years of the ſeventh Olympiad.

Roxolani, a People of Scythia Europæa, bordering upon the Alani: Their Country, anciently called Roxolania, is now *Red Ruſſia*, belonging to the Crown of Poland.

Ruſpina, an ancient Maritime City of Africa, *Souſe*.

Rutheni, an ancient People of Gaul, *la Rouergue*.

S

Sabis, the *Sambre*, a River of the Low Countries, which ariſes in Picardy, and falls into the Maeſe at Namur.

Saguntini, the People of Saguntum, a noble City of ancient Spain, the Memory of which is recorded with Honour, for the Fidelity ſhewn to its Allies the Romans, *Morvedre*.

Salaſſii, an ancient People of Piedmont, whoſe chief Town was where now *Aoſta* is ſituate.

Salluvii, *Sallyes*, a People of Gallia Narbonenſis, about where *Aix* now is.

Salona, an ancient City of Dalmatia, and a Roman Colony; the Place where Diocleſian was born, and whither he retreated, after he had reſigned the Imperial Dignity.

Salſum, a River of Hiſpania Bætica, *Rio Salado*, or *Guadajos*.

Samarobriva, *Amiens*, an ancient City of Gallia Belgica, enlarged and beautified by the Emperor Antoninus Pius, now the chief City of Picardy, on the River Somme.

Santones, the ancient Inhabitants of *Guienne* or *Xantoigne*.

Sardinia, a great Iſland in the Mediterranean, which in the Time of the Romans had forty-two Cities, now belonging to the Duke of Savoy, with the Title of King.

Sarmatia, a very large northern Country, divided into Sarmatia Aſiatica, containing *Tartary*, *Petigora*, *Circaſſia*, and the Country of the *Morduitæ*: And Sarmatia Europæa, containing *Ruſſia*, Part of *Poland*, *Pruſſia* and *Lithuania*.

Sarſura, a Town in Africa, unknown.

Savus, the *Save*, a large River, which ariſes in upper Carniola, and falls into the Danube at Belgrade.

Scaldis, the *Scheld*, a noted River in the Low Countries, which arriſes in Picardy, and waſhing ſeveral of the principal Cities of Flanders and Brabant, in its Courſe, falls into the German Ocean by two Mouths, one retaining its own Name, and the other called the *Honte*.

Scandavia, anciently a vaſt nothern Peninſula, containing what is yet called *Schonen*, anciently Scania, belonging to *Denmark*; and Part of *Sweden*, *Norway* and *Lapland*.

Scythia, a large Country, properly Crim-Tartary; but in Hiſtory and Geography, greatly extended, and particularly divided into Scythia Aſiatica, on either Side of Mount Imaus: And Scythia Europæa, about the Euxine Sea, and the Mæotick Lake.

Seduni, an ancient People of Switzerland, *Sion*.

Seduſii, an ancient People of Germany, on the Borders of Swabia.

Segni, an ancient German Nation, Neighbours of the Condruſi, *Zulpich*.

Segontiaci, a People of ancient Britain, inhabiting about *Holſhot*, in Hampſhire.

Segovia, a City of Hiſpania Bætica, *Segovia la menos*.

Seguſiani, a People of Gallia Celtica, about where now *Lionois Foreſt* is ſituate.

Senones, an ancient Nation of the Celtæ, inhabiting about the *Senonois*, in Gaul.

Sequana, the *Seine*, one of the principal Rivers of France, ariſing in the Dutchy of Burgundy, not far from a Town of the ſame Name, and running through Paris, and by Roan, forms at Candebec a great Arm of the Sea.

Sequani, an ancient People of Gallia Belgica, inhabiting the Country now called the *Franche Comté*, or the *Upper Burgundy*.

Seſuvii, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting about *Seez*.

Sibutzates, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country of *Buck*.

Sicilia, *Sicily*, a large Iſland in the Tyrrhene Sea, at the ſouth-weſt Point of Italy, formerly called the Store-houſe of the Roman Empire, and the firſt Province the Romans poſſeſſed out of Italy.

Sicoris, a River in Catalonia, the *Segre*.

Sigambri, or Sicambri, an ancient People of Lower Germany, between the Maeſe and the Rhine, where now *Guelderland* is; though by ſome placed on the Banks of the Maine.

Silicenſis, a River of Hiſpania Bætica, *Rio de las Algamidas*. Others think it a Corruption from *Singuli*.

Sinueſſa, a City of Campania, not far from the Save, an ancient Roman Colony, now in a ruinous Condition; *Rocca di Mondragone*.

Soricaria, a City of ancient Spain, unknown.

Soritia, an ancient Town in Spain, unknown.

Sotiates, or Sontiates, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the Country about *Aire*.

Sparta, a City of Peloponneſus, now called *Muſithra*, ſaid to be ſo ancient as the Days of the Patriarch Jacob.

Spoletum, *Spoleto*, a City of great Antiquity, of Umbria, in Italy, the Capital of a Dutchy of the ſame Name, on the River Teſino, where are yet ſome ſtately Ruins of ancient Roman and Gothick Edifices.

Sueſſiones, an ancient People of Gaul, *le Soiſſonnois*.

Suevi, an ancient, great, and warlike People of Germany, who poſſeſſed the greateſt Part of it, from the Rhine to the Elbe, but afterwards removed from the northern Parts, and ſettled about the Danube, and ſome marched into Spain, where they eſtabliſhed a Kingdom.

Sulcitani, an ancient People of Sardinia, unknown.

Sulmo, an ancient City of Italy, *Sulmona*.

Sunici, an ancient People of the Dutchy of *Limburg*, where there is yet a Place called *Sunich*, a Name probably borrowed from them.

Syracuſæ, *Saraguſa*, once one of the nobleſt Cities of Sicily, ſaid to be built by Archias, a Corinthian, above ſeven hundred Years before Chriſt. The Romans beſieged and took it during the ſecond Punic War, on which Occaſion the great Archimedes was killed. It has been ſo often entirely deſtroyed, that it has no Remains to ſhew of its Antiquity.

Syria, a large Country of Aſia, containing ſeveral Provinces, now called *Souriſtan*.

Syrtes, *the Deſarts of Barbary*; alſo two dangerous ſandy Gulphs, in the Mediterranean, upon the Coaſt of Barbary, in Africa, called the one Syrtis magna, now the *Gulph of Sidra*, the other Syrtis parva, now the *Gulph of Capes*.

T

Tameſis, the *Thames*, a celebrated and well known River of Great Britain.

Tanais, the *Don*, a very large River in Scythia, dividing Aſia from Europe. It riſes in the Province of Reſan, in Muſcovy, and flowing through the Crim-Tartary, runs into the Mæotick Lake, near a City of the ſame Name, now in Ruins, and in the Hands of the Turks.

Tarbelli, a People of ancient Gaul, near the Pyrenees, inhabiting about *Ays* and *Bayonne*, in the Country of *Labourd*.

Tarracina, an ancient City of Italy, which ſtill retains the ſame Name.

Tarraco, *Tarragona*, a City of Spain, which, in ancient time, gave Name to that Part of it called Hiſpania Tarraconenſis; by ſome ſaid to be built by the Scipios, though others ſay before the Roman Conqueſt, and that they only enlarged it. It ſtands on the Mouth of the River Tulcis, now *el Fracoli*, with a ſmall Haven on the Mediterranean.

Tarſus, *Tarſo*, the Metropolis of Cilicia, famous for being the Birth-Place of St. Paul.

Taruſates, an ancient People of Gaul, uncertain; according to ſome, *le Teurſan*.

Tauris, an Iſland in the Adriatick Sea, unknown.

Taurois, the Name of a Caſtle near Marſeilles.

Taurus Mons, the greateſt Mountain in all Aſia, extending from the Indian to the Ægean Sea, called by different Names in different Countries, viz. Imaus, Caucaſus, Caſpius, Ceraunius, and in Scripture, Ararat. Herbert ſays it is fifty Engliſh Miles over, and fifteen hundred long.

Tectoſages, ſee Volcæ.

Tegea, a City of Africa, unknown.

Tenchtheri, a People of ancient Germany, bordering on the Rhine, near *Overyſſel*.

Tergeſtini, an ancient People inhabiting about *Trieſte*, in the Confines of Iſtria and the Carni.

Terni, an ancient Roman Colony, on the River Nare, twelve Miles from Spoletum.

Teutones, or *Teutoni*, an ancient People bordering on the Cimbri, the common ancient Name for all the Germans, whence they yet call themſelves *Teutſche*, and their Country *Teutſchland*.

Thabena, a City of Africa, unknown.

Thapſus, a Maritime City of Africa, uncertain.

Thebæ, a City of Bœotia, in Greece, ſaid to have been built by Cadmus, deſtroyed by Alexander the Great, but rebuilt, and now known by the Name of *Stives*.

Thermopyle, a famous Paſs on the great Mountain Oeta, leading into Phocis, in Achaia, now called *Bocca di Lupo*.

Theſſaly, a Country of Greece, formerly a great Part of Macedonia, now called *Janna*.

Theſſalonica, the chief City of Macedonia, now called *Salonichi*.

Thracia, a large Country of Europe, eaſtward from Macedonia, commonly called *Romania*, bounded by the Euxine and Ægean Seas.

Thurii, or Turii, an ancient People of Italy, *Torre Brodogneto*.

Tigurinus Pagus, a Nation of the Helvetians, the ancient Inhabitants of the Canton of *Zurich*, in Switzerland.

Tiſdra, or Tiſdrus, an ancient City of Africa, *Cairoan*.

Toloſa, *Thouloufe*, a City of Aquitain, of great Antiquity, the Capital of Languedoc, on the Garonne.

Toxandri, an ancient People of the Low Countries, about *Breda*, and *Gertruydenburgh*; but according to ſome of the Dioceſe of *Liege*.

Tralles, an ancient City of Lydia in Aſia Minor, *Chora*.

Treviri, the People of *Treves*, or *Triers*, a very ancient City of Lower Germany, on the Moſelle, ſaid to have been built by Trebetas, the Brother of Ninus. It was made a Roman Colony in the time of Auguſtus, and became afterwards the moſt famous City of Gallia Belgica. It was for ſome time the Seat of the weſtern Empire, but it is now only the Seat of the Eccleſiaſtical Elector named from it.

Tribocci, or Triboces, a People of ancient Germany, inhabiting the Country of *Alſace*.

Trinobantes,

INDEX of the Names of Places.

Trinobantes, a People of ancient Britain, Inhabitants of the Counties of *Middleſex*, and *Hertfordſhire*.

Troja, *Troy*, a City of Phrygia, in Aſia Minor, near Mount *Ida*, deſtroyed by the Greeks after a ten Years Siege.

Tubantes, an ancient People of Germany, about *Weſtphalia*.

Tugium, a City and Canton of Helvetia, or Switzerland, now called *Zug*.

Tulingi, an ancient People of Germany, who inhabited about where now *Stulingen* in Switzerland is.

Tungri, an ancient People inhabiting about where Tongres, in Liege, now is.

Turones, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting about *Tours*.

Tuſcia, *Tuſcany*, a very large and conſiderable Region of Italy, anciently called Tyrrhenia, and Etruria.

Tyber, one of the moſt noted, though not largeſt Rivers of Italy, which ariſes in one of the Appennines, and, among other Places, paſſing through Rome, falls into the Tyrrhenian Sea at *Oſtia*.

Tygris, a rapid River of Aſia, which, in its courſe, unites with the Euphrates.

Tyrus, *Tyre*, an ancient City of Phœnicia, upon the Mediterranean, famous for its Traffick and Riches.

V

Vacca, a Town in Africa, unknown.

Vahalis, *the Waal*, the middle Branch of the Rhine, which, paſſing by Nimeguen, falls into the Maeſe, above Gorcum.

Valencia, a City of Spain, which gives Name to a whole Kingdom, about a Mile from the Mediterranean, ſuppoſed to be built by Junius Brutus.

Valentia, *Valence*, a City of Gallia Narbonenſis, now in the Dauphiny, on the Rivers Rhone and Iſere.

Vangiones, an ancient People of Germany, about the City of *Worms*.

Varus, the *Var*, a River in Gaul, that flows into the Ligurian Sea.

Ubii, an ancient People of Lower Germany, who inhabited about where *Cologn*, and the Dutchy of *Juliers* now are.

Ucubis, a Town in Hiſpania Bætica, *Lucubi*.

Velauni, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting about *Velai*.

Vellaunodunum, a Town in Gaul, about which Geographers are much divided; ſome making it *Auxerre*, others *Chaſteau Landon*, others *Villeneuve* in Lorrain, others, *Veron*.

Velocaſſes, an ancient People of Normandy, about *Rouan*.

Veneti, this Name was anciently given as well to the *Venetians*, as to the People of *Vannes*, in Bretagne, in Gaul, for which laſt it ſtands in Cæſar.

Venetiæ, *Venice*, a noble City of Italy built upon ſixty Iſlands, joined together by five hundred Bridges, at the Top of the Adriatick Gulph, the Capital of a powerful Commonwealth.

Ventiſponte, a Town in Spain, unknown.

Veragri, a People of Gallia Lugdunenſis, whoſe chief Town was Aguanum, now *St. Maurice*.

Verbigenus, or Urbigenus Pagus, a Nation or Canton of the Helvetians, inhabiting the Country in the Neighbourhood of *Orbe*.

Vercelli Campi, the *Plains of Vercellæ*, famous for a Victory the Romans obtained there over the Cimbri. The City of that Name is in Piedmont, on the River Seſia, on the Borders of the Dutchy of Milan.

Veromandui, a People of Gallia Belgica, whoſe Country, now a Part of Picardy, is ſtill called *Vermandois*.

Verona, a City of Lombardy, the Capital of a Province of the ſame Name, on the River Adige, ſaid to be built by the Gauls two hundred and eighty two Years before Chriſt. It has yet ſeveral Remains of Antiquity.

Veſontio, *Beſançon*, the Capital of the Sequani, now the chief City of Burgundy.

Vettones, a People of Spain, inhabiting the Province of *Eſtramadura*.

Vibo, a Town in Italy, not far from the Sicilian Straits, *Bibona*.

Vienna, a City of Narboneſe Gaul, *Vienne in Dauphiny*.

Vindelici, an ancient People of Germany, Inhabitants of the Country of Vindelicia, otherwiſe called Rætia ſecunda.

Viſtula, *the Weichſel*, a famous River of Poland, which ariſes in the Carpathian Mountains, in Upper Sileſia, and falls into the Baltick, not far from Dantzick, by three Mouths.

Viſurgis, *the Weſer*, a River of Lower Germany, which ariſes in Franconia, and, among other Places of Note, paſſing by Bremen, falls into the German Ocean, not far from the Mouth of the Elbe, between that and the Ems.

Ulla, or Ulia, a Town in Hiſpania Bætica, in regard to whoſe Situation Geographers are not agreed; ſome making it *Monte major*, others, *Vaena*, others, *Vilia*.

Umbria, a large Country of Italy, on both Sides of the Appennines.

Unelli, an ancient People of Gaul, uncertain.

Vocates, a People of Gaul, on the Confines of the Lapurdenſes.

Vocontii, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting about *Die*, in Dauphiny, and *Vaiſon* in the County of Veniſſe.

Vogeſus Mons, the Mountain of *Vauge* in Lorrain, or, according to others, *de Faucilles*.

Volcæ Arecomici, and Tectoſages, an ancient People of Gaul, inhabiting the *Upper* and *Lower Languedoc*.

Urſao, a Town of Hiſpania Bætica, *Oſſuna*.

Uſæta, a Town of Africa, whoſe Situation is not certainly known.

Uſipetes, an ancient People of Germany, who frequently changed their Habitation.

Utica, a City of Africa, famous for the Death of Cato; *Biſerte*.

Uxellodunum, a Town in Gaul, whoſe Situation is not known; according to ſome *Uſſoldun*.

Uzita, a Town unknown.

X

Xantones, the ſame with the Santones, or People of *Xantonge*.

Z

Zama, a Town in Africa, famous for the Defeat of Hannibal there by Scipio, now called *Zamora*.

Zetta, a maritime City of Africa, now *Zerbi*.

Ziela, or Zela, a City of Pontus, *Arzila*.

Zingitana, a Part of ancient Africa, now included in the Kingdom of *Algiers*.

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Albici, a Kind of Mountaineers taken into the Service of the Marſeillians, *C.* i. 32.

Alces, a Species of Animals reſembling in ſome reſpects a Goat, to be found in the Hercynian Foreſt, *G.* vi. 25.

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